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ABSTRACT 
This research aims to analyze the Greater China television industry in the context of 
the debate on globalization. It presents an overview of the transnational corporate 
practices and the resulting transformation of the Greater China's television industry. 
The objective of this dissertation is threefold. It analyzes the development of the 
television industry in Greater China, examines the corporate practices of cross-horder 
management, and discusses the formation of the Greater China television space. 
A milestone in Greater China's globalization was Mainland China and Taiwan's 
accession to WTO, which imposed an obligation on the Chinese authorities towards 
their media policies. However, the beginning of television transnationalization can be 
traced back to the appearance of Star TV in 1990. Since then. the pan-Chinese market 
has emerged as a significant power in the world system. Unsurprisingly, global media 
conglomerates are keen to set foot in a market with huge potential. At the same time, 
local companies in quest of new markets have also launched numerous regional 
television channels that reached beyond the boundaries of their home territory. 
The Greater China television space is multi-layered, composed of global, regional 
and national/local players. Six first-tier global media conglomerates are present in the 
region. This research found that most global companies, such as Viacom, Time 
Warner, Sony and NBC Universal, were inclined to adopt transnational strategies in 
their approach to the region. News Corporation and Disney, however, usually 
employed multinational and global strategies. By contrast, the second-tiered players -
for instance TVB and Phoenix TV - were more ethnocentric in their approach to 
international expansion. 
This study found that the globalization of television in Greater China is driven by 
multi-layered transnational television companies, their cross-border TV networks, 
transnational managerial practices and their glocalization strategy. The Greater China 
regional media space is increasingly transnational and deterritorialized in character. In 
addition, factors such as linguistic and cultural proximity are powerful forces in 
determining the formation of the geo-cultural market. Mandarin. Fellg Simi and 
GlIlIIlX; have transformed Greater China into a distinctive pan-regional media space 
both in daily life and business culture. In this transnational space, Hong Kong remains 
the regional hub. But while economic competition is intense, this study highlights the 
fact that national states do playa crucial role in shaping this pan-regional market. In 
the near future. such political harriers will remain a detenllining factor in the 
development of the Greater China television space. 
VIII 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
AEC 
ABC 
ABN 
AOL 
AP 
APEC 
ASANFrA 
ASEAN 
ATV 
BBC 
BRFr 
BWS 
CBN 
CCTV 
CEPA 
CETV 
CNN 
CNNI 
CRFr 
CSM 
CTN 
CTS 
CTV 
DMCS 
DTH 
DTT 
EBN 
EMC 
EMG 
ESS 
ETTV 
EU 
FDI 
FrNS 
FrS 
FTV 
Asian Entertainment Channel 
American -Born Chinese 
Asian Business News 
America Online Inc. 
Associated Press 
Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation 
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations Free Trade Area 
Association of South-East Nations 
Asia Television 
British Broadcasting Corporation 
Beijing Radio, Film and Television Group 
Bretton Woods monetary system 
China Business Network 
China Central Television Station 
Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement 
China Entertainment Television 
Cable News Network 
Cable News Network International 
China Radio, Film and TV Group 
CVSC-Sofres Media 
Chinese Television Network 
China Television System 
China Television Company 
Department of Culture, Media and Sport (UK) 
Direct-to-Home satellite service 
Digital-Terrestrial-Television 
European Business News 
East Movie Channel 
Eastern Multimedia Group 
ESPN Star Sports 
Eastern Television 
European Union 
Foreign direct investment 
Fixed telecommunication network services 
Fox Television Station 
Formosa Television 
IX 
GATS 
GATT 
GCEA 
GIO 
GNP 
GSB 
HBO 
HKCTV 
Hong Kong SAR 
ICTs 
IMF 
Intelsat 
ITU 
JET TV 
MBNS 
MERCOSUR 
MGM 
MSO 
NAFTA 
NAM 
NCC 
NETV 
NWICO 
OTV 
PCC 
PCCW 
PLA 
PMC 
PRC 
PTA 
PTS 
RHTV 
ROC 
RTV 
SARFT 
SCA 
SEC 
SMEs 
The General Agreement on Trade in Services 
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
Greater China Economic Area 
The Government Information Office (Taiwan) 
Gross national product 
Galaxy Satellite Broadcasting 
Home Box Office 
Hong Kong Cable Television 
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the PRC 
Information and Communication Technologies 
International Monetary Fund 
International Telecommunications Satellite Organization 
International Telecommunication Union 
Japan Entertainment Television 
MEASAT Broadcast Network Systems 
Southern Common Market 
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 
Multiple System Operations 
North American Free Trade Agreement 
Non-Aligned Movement 
National Communications Commission (Taiwan) 
National Experimental Education Television 
New World Information and Communication Order 
Oriental TV 
Phoenix Chinese Channel 
Pacific Century CyberWork Limited 
People's Liberation Army 
Phoenix Movies Channel 
People's Republic of China 
Preferential Trade Agreement 
.... 
Public Television Service 
Radio Television Hong Kong 
Republic of China 
Rediffusion Television 
The Sate Administration of Radio, Film and Television 
Sony Corporation of America 
Satellite Entertainment Communication 
Small-to-Medium Enterprises 
x 
SMG 
STY 
SiTV 
SMEs 
SPE 
SPTI 
Star TV 
TCC 
TNMCs 
TRIPs 
TTV 
TVB 
TVBA 
TVBI 
TVBS 
TVBS-E 
TVBS-G 
TVBS-N 
TVBSP 
TWC 
UNESCO 
UPN 
WTO 
Shanghai Media Group 
Shanghai TV 
Shanghai Interactive Television 
Small-to-Medium enterprises 
Sony Pictures Entertainment 
Sony Pictures Television International 
Satellite Television Asian Region 
The Chinese Channel 
Transnational Media Corporations 
The Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
Taiwan Television 
Television Broadcasts 
TVB Australia 
Television Broadcasts International 
Television Broadcasts SuperchanneI 
TVB Satellite-Europe 
TVBS Golden Channel 
TVBS News 
TVB Satellite Platform 
Time Warner Cable Inc. 
United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization 
United Paramount Network 
World Trade Organization 
XI 
Chapter 1 Theories of globalization and the cultural indu.,tries 
Chapter 1 Theories of globalization and the cultural industries 
In the early 1990s, it was commonly accepted by media scholars that there were four 
dominating trends in international communication: deregulation. globalization. 
synergy and convergence. I In the following years, with the emergence of truly global 
media corporations, media globalization became an accepted fact by scholars and 
observers alike. However, how exactly is globalization having an impact on the media 
industry? No matter what the answer is, globalization has only made the international 
media landscape more complex and multidimensional than in the past. In addition. 
media globalization has to be comprehended in the context of global transformations 
in the economy, society and politics. ｾ＠ Any change in the cultural sphere must be 
connected to transformations in adjacent fields. In this research, I analyze how 
Greater China is gradually entering the global media scene. 
The region of Great China consists of Mainland China, Hong Kong and Taiwan. 
Apart from Hong Kong and Taiwan, Mainland China has been undergoing a 
transformation in its economic system by passing from communism to state 
capitalism and adopting the self-styled 'planning market economy'. The beginning of 
Mainland China market's opening-up can be traced back to 1978, coinciding with the 
rise of neo-liberalism in the Western world. It was not until the 1990s that its 
economy started growing steadily. The expansion of the economy is retlected in the 
dramatic progress of ownership of television sets in the country, passing from 26.66 
million in 1980 to ＲｾＵＮＹＹ＠ million in 2005 .. ｾ＠ The number of television households has 
increased from 303.25 million in 1999 to 355.86 million in 200S.-l The growth of 
I Dyson. K. & Humphreys. P. 1990. "Introduction: Politics. markets and n)Jlllnunication policies:' in 
The Political ecol/omy of CO"",,"l/iCCltiOl/s: IIlIallaTiol/,,1 "lid Ellropeall dimells;olls . K. ｄｾ＠ \on & P. 
Humphreys. eds .. Routledge. London. pp. 1-3. 
ｾ＠ Hdd. D.. McGrew. A.. Goldhlall. D.. & Perraton. 1. 1999. Glohal TnIll".!cmnaT;(lf1\' PoliTin. 
l'cOIlOmics ami ell/lllre. Polity Press. Camhridge. 
I Data is hased on EUTlll1lonitor International from Council of Europe. Sl'l' Tahk 2.7. 
4 2(Xl6. ''Chinesl' cahle tell" ision profile", ScrC('1/ DigcsT no. Octoher. p. 32tl. 
Chapter I Theories of globalization and the cultural industries 
satellite TV households has also been significant, increasing from 269.1-l thousand in 
1991 to 13.41 milli<?n in 2005.5 Because the size of its domestic market and pace of 
development, Mainland China's economic development had an immediate impact on 
the world media market. 
If Mainland China's 'planning market economy' can be regarded as the informal 
economic transformation of the region, Mainland China's and Taiwan's entry into the 
WTO in 200l would be the 'official' manifestation of Great China's connection to the 
global market. Economic co-operation between Greater China and the rest of the 
world will inevitably expand. It implies that the world's most populous market might 
become more accessible to foreign companies, luring them into a challenging place. 
Apart from the APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation),6 WTO memhership 
symbolizes the global recognition of the area's recent economic achievement. 
Although the issue of media and cultural trade was not directly included in the 
memhership agreements, Western media companies grasped the imminence of the 
media revolution and began to rise to the challenge presented by the market of Greater 
China. 
The television industry, being at the vanguard of audiovisual media, is by no 
means ahsent from the current media upsurge in Greater China. Within the region, due 
to the limited scope of their domestic markets, the majority of Taiwan and Hong 
Kong's television corporations consider Mainland China as paramount to their 
international expansion. Likewise, Mainland China has become a target for glohal 
corporations. In hoth cases, their progress has not heen as smooth as these companies' 
executives expected. Television has been considered for a long time by the Chinese 
authorities as heing part of the ideological state apparatus. Thus for political and 
ｾ＠ Data hascd on Euromonitor International from Council of Europe. sec Tahlc 2.11. 
6 APEC is the only l'Xisting institution which is taken as an instrument for regional cll-operatilln hut i, 
i ncffc" .. t i \"c. 
Chapter I Theories of globalization and the cultural industries 
historical reasons, Taiwan's television companies have long been barred from entry 
into Mainland China. It is only recently (2001) that Hong Kong's Phoenix TV 
successfully penetrated 'fortress China'. 7 At a global level, all global media 
corporations were barred from entering Mainland China until News Corporation 
pierced the carapace of the 'dormant dragon' .8 
The interaction between Mainland China and foreign media suggests that China 
will no longer remain silent and seal itself from the rest of the world. Even Mainland 
China, which has stayed secluded over the past years, cannot escape from the impact 
of media globalization and liberalization, particularly when quite a few media 
corporations have been queuing up for entry. In addition, due to the exponential 
growth of the legal (and illegal) cable and satellite infrastructure. the technological 
revolution makes it difficult for the Chinese government to tackle a series of issues. 
These include the shortage of sophisticated media knowledge and the popularity of 
television spillover from neighbouring Hong Kong and Taiwan. As a result, Mainland 
China was forced to take on more realistic strategies to cope with external 'threats'. In 
2002, both Time Warner and News Corporations successfully penetrated into the Pearl 
Delta area (China mainland), signalling the likelihood of a more liberal policy 
towards foreign television broadcasters and heralding a new epoch of competition 
among corporate players in the Chinese market. Thus, the key issue is as follows: 
what shape will the coming competition and resulting television landscape take? The 
very limited success of global media corporations in Mainland China did not stop the 
calls for increased openness from foreign television companies. On the contrary. it 
triggered a new rivalry for entry to the Chinese market and therefore increased the 
7 Chan. 1. M. 2005. '1'rans-border broadcasters and TV ｲｾｧｩｯｮ｡ｬｩＯＮ｡ｴｩｯｮ＠ in Greater China: ｐｮｸＺｾｳｳ｣ＢＬ＠
and strategies." in Trtlll.'IIICltiOlwl tele\'iJioll worldu'idt': Towards 1I lieu' media order. J. K. Chalahy. ｾ､＠ .. 
I.B.Tauris. London. p. I K.2. 
II Chang, Y.-L. .2003. "Globalization of television: Programming strategies of global ｴ､ｾ｜＠ isinn 
broadcasters in Asia", Asiall jou",al of Commullicatioll. \01. J 3. no. J. pr· 5-7 . 
. ｾ＠
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tension between Mainland China and foreign players to an unprecedented stage. 
Beside political and economic factors, culture will play a determining role 10 
deciding the success of foreign television companies in Mainland China, particularly 
since it is a conservative marketplace. Even in the region as a whole, the local cultural 
sensitivity, mixed with political and economic singularities, further complicates the 
interplay between globalization, regionalization and local interests. Thus the strategies 
adopted by the prospective television players are diverse and continuously changing 
the television landscape in the region. This research aims to analyze the changing 
nature of the television industry in the context of globalization in the Greater China 
region. Considering that the process of development is profoundly affected by the 
cultural, political, social, and economic environment, only an in-depth contextual 
analysis can disentangle the complex interplay between the local, regional and global 
layers in the current re-mapping of the Chinese television industry. 
1.1 Media development and international communication theories 
Theories of media and communication often reflect specific historical circumstances. 
This is particularly true in the field of international communication because it always 
has had a close connection to politics and international relations. The following 
historical overview shows that this link has existed since the origins of international 
communication. 
The emergence of international communication was associated with the swift 
social changes provoked by the industrial revolution in Europe, signaling the central 
role of communication in the development of capitalism and empire.9 Followed by 
the second industrial revolution in the second half of the 19th century, the application 
9 Thussu. D. K. ｾｏｏＲＮ＠ IllIemllt;ol/lIl comm"l/;cat;ol/: Omt;",,;(y lImi cha"ge. 2 l·dn. Arnold. London. p. 
ＵｾＮ＠
Chapter I Theories of globalization and the cultural industries 
of telegraph technology further pushed the transmission of infonnation forward. 
spurring the epoch of media internationalization and facilitating the emergence of the 
first international media corporations and media markets. \0 In 1837. Samuel Morse 
developed the electric telegraph in the United States, enabling the instant transmission 
of infonnation through long distances. I I In addition, the first international regulatory 
institution, ITU, was founded in 1865 with 22 members, in order to control the 
growing worldwide flow of infonnation. 12 In parallel with the expansion of the 
telegraph, companies with international expertise also swiftly expanded their 
operation in different territories. The film trade, then burgeoning and dominated by 
French companies, was shortly surpassed by the American Hollywood film ｩｮ､ｵｳｴｲｹＮｬＮｾ＠
During the 20th century, the rapid growth of the film and television industry raised 
a number of questions about the nature of international communication. An increasing 
number of scholars began to look at these issues, coming up with different - and 
sometimes divergent - answers and theoretical frameworks. Annahelle Sreberny 
(2000) distinguishes between four theoretical models: communications and 
development, cultural imperialism, cultural pluralism and the global/local model. 14 
Daya Thussu draws a distinction among an even greater number of theoretical 
frameworks, including structural imperialism, hegemony, critical theory, cultural 
studies perspective, information society, globalization and critical political economy. 15 
Broadly speaking, these models cover three historical paradigms that have dominated 
10 Chalaby. J. K. 2005. "From internationalization to transnationalization", Global Media al/(I 
Commullicatioll. vol. I. no. I, p. 28. 
II Headrick. D. 1991. The indsible weapon: Telecommunicatioll and illtemational politin Oxford 
University Press. New York. 
ｉｾ＠ Mandan. A. 1994. Mappillg world commullicatioll: \Var, progress. culture. Uniwr"ity of 
Minnesota Press, Minneapleapolis. p. 9. 
I.l Chalaby. J. K. 2005. "From internationalization to transnationalization", Global Mt'dia Cllld 
Commullicat;oll. vol. I. no. I. p. 2M. 
ｉｾ＠ Srcbcrny. A. 2(X)(). ''The global and the local in international communications." in Ma.\\ I1/('dia tllld 
socie" .. 3 edn. 1. Curran & M. Gure"itch. cds., Arnold. London. pp. 93-120. 
ｉｾ＠ ｔｨｾｳｳｵＮ＠ D. K. 2002. I",emat;onal co""",mication: C01llin";I), lIllll ＨＧｨ｡ｮｧｾＮ＠ 2 cdn. Arnold. London. 
5 
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the discipline in tum: modernization theory, the dependency theory and the 
globalization theory. 
The modernization theory emerged in the 1950s and 1 960s, seeking to understand 
how to use the media (mostly the press and radio) in order to promote economic 
development. The paradigm is defined by two key books of the period. Daniel 
Lerner's The Passing of Traditional Society: Modenlizing the Middle East (1958) and 
Wilbur Schramm's Mass Media and National Development' (1964). They argued that 
the media could be used as agents of social change to spur modernity and 
Western-style capitalism in developing countries. 16 This paradigm fell in disfavour in 
the 1970s when scholars, notably from Latin America, argued that these views not 
only justified but promoted Western cultural and economic imperialism. They pointed 
out that this use of the media in the developing world would merely reinforce the 
'core-peripheral' structure of the world economic system and the dependent nature of 
the relationship between the West and the global South. The communications and 
development model, suffused with functionalism,17 lost its power in the international 
communication discourse. 
Following the modernization perspective, the interpretation of international 
communication was left to the dependency theory. which dominated the discipline 
from the 1960s to the 1980s. This critical paradigm was based on the Marxist cultural 
imperialism theory and more specifically on Immanuel Wallerstein's world-system 
theory (see Boyd-Barrett, 1977, 1980 and 1982; Tomlinson, 1991; Tunstall. ＱＹＷＷｾ＠
Wallerstein, 1979). As Wallerstein explains, global economic expansion spread from a 
relatively small group of core-zone nation-states (i.e. countries in NAFTA. the EU, 
II> Lerner. D. 1958. Tire pll.uillR of traditiollal society: Modemi:.illg the Middle Emt Free Press. New 
York: Schramm. W. 1964. Mass media alld Ilatiollal derelopml'lll: Th(' role 4 ill/onnaliall ill Ihe 
t/t'rt'/opillg cOIlI/lries Stanford University Press. Stanford. CA .. 
17 Boyd-Barrell. 0. 1982. "Cultural dependency and the mass media:' in Culture. socit'l\' "lid Ille 
media. M. Gurevitch et aJ.. cds .. Methuen Mar. London. pp. ＱＷｾＭＱＱＮＩＵＮ＠
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ASEAN, or MERCOSUR) to semi-peripheral and peripheral zones. This system is 
ruled by market forces and is dominated by the nations in the core zone, which are the 
system's only winners. IS 
The paradigm's central concern IS the fairness of modem international 
communication. It is argued that developing countries are at the 'wrong' end of the 
'one-way flow of communication': they receive a lot of cultural products from the 
West while the West takes very little material from the global South. This imbalanced 
flow of communication reinforces inequalities among nations and equate to a type of 
neo-colonialism. 19 
In order to resist this set of neo-colonial relationship, many developing countries 
have demanded the formation of the New World Information and Communication 
Order (known as NWICO). Their initiative was first developed in the diplomatic 
framework set by the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). The idea for the NWICO 
reached the United Nations arena. In 1978, both the UNESCO and the United Nations 
General Assembly adopted an official resolution on the New World Information and 
Communication order. A year before, the UN had also set up an International 
Commission for the Study of Communication Problems. which resulted in the famous 
MacBride Report - Many Voice. One World. This report strives to find concrete 
solutions to the imbalanced flow of information and entertainment worldwide. Among 
82 recommendations, the authors ｷｲｩｴ･ＺｾＨＩ＠
We recommend the establishment of national cultural policies, which should 
foster cultural identity and creativity, and involve the media in these tasks. 
Such policies should also contain guide-lines for safeguarding national 
III McPhail. T. L. 2 (X>6. Glohal comnllmicatioll: Tht'ories. stakeholders. alld trellds. 2 edn. Blackwell 
Puhlishing. Oxford. pp. 2-'·30. 
IQ Masll1oudi. M. 1979. "The new world intllrm31ion order", JOIln/al ojCommllllicat;oll. \01. 29. no. 2. 
pr. 172·1 ｾＵ＠ . 
• 11 ｍｾｋｂｲｩ､｣Ｎ＠ S. ｊＹｾｏＮ＠ Mewy ,·oias. one world: Commullication alld society today ami tomorroll 
UNESCO. ｐ｡ｲｩｾＮ＠ p. 259. 
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cultural development while promoting knowledge of other cultures. It IS In 
relation to others that each culture enhances its own identity. 
The publication of the MacBride Report symbolizes the culmination of decades of 
debates for fairer media flows that were at the heart of the calls for a New World 
Information and Communication Order (NWICO). Although the impact of the cultural 
imperialism paradigm on the history of the discipline has been significant. its 
assumptions and tenets have been criticized recently by numerous scholars. Firstly, 
the assumption that global media corporations bear an influence on national politics 
and local cultural values has been queried. According to Parks and Kumar, cultural 
imperialists have spent too much 'time counting and quantifying unequal media 
flows' and have ignored the sociocultural dimensions of television. ｾ＠ I len Ang has 
pointed out that international media products do not simply homogenize local cultures 
but often create a fusion between local traditions and preferences and global ｣ｯｮｴ･ｮｴＺｾＲ＠
Such phenomenon is clearly at work in the reception of international media products: 
local audiences are capable of re-interpreting global media product and constructing 
their own meaning. ｾＮｾ＠ John Tomlinson also questions cultural imperialists' assumption 
that global media interferes with the homogeneity and purity of national ｣ｵｬｴｵｲ･ｳＮｾＭｴ＠
He contends that cultural imperialism theorists reify the notion of national culture and 
wrongly presume that such a cultural construct exists independently from social 
processes. Thus. the correlation between culture as a form of symbolic representation 
and as lived experience is obscured and the creative power of audiences to re-interpret 
ｾｉ＠ Parks. L. & Kumar. S. 2()(H, "Introduction." in PlanE'! IV: A globaltelnisiofl reader, L. Parks & S 
Kumar. cds .. New York Uni"crsitv Prcss. Ncw York. p. 5. 
ｾＲ＠ Ang. I. 1996. Li\'ifl8 Room W;,rs: Rethillkiflg media llIulietlCt, for a 1'(I.\!modem ,,,oriel Routk'dgc. 
London. p. 154. 
ｾＮｉ＠ Ang. I. ＲＰＰｾＮ＠ "Culturc and cOlllmunication: Toward an cthnographiL' critique of media consumplion 
in thc Imnsnational Illcdia system," in Piallt'l n ': A giobalteleriJiol/ reader. L. Parks & S. Kumar. cds .. 
New York Unin:rsilY Prl'ss. New York. p. ｾＶＷＮ＠
ｾｾ＠ Tomlinson. J. Il)W. Globali:atioll alltl cllltllrt' Polity Press. Camhridgc. 
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global media products is disregarded. The perspective of the 'acti\"e audience' and the 
possib.ility of discursive polysemy have been evacuated.25 Thus, cultural imperialism 
fails to account for patterns of sophisticated media consumption and makes a 
simplistic assumption about the cultural effect of the American dominance of the 
global media flow. 26 
The reductionist notion of cultural homogenization and the erosIOn of cultural 
differences among nations has also been criticized from the angle of the 
regionalization thesis. Considering the consolidation of non-English media 
conglomerates (e.g. Brazil's Globo TV, Mexico's Televisa and Venezuela's Cisneros 
Group) and the rise of regional markets (e.g. Latin America, Middle East, and Greater 
China), the international media context has become far more complex than the one 
depicted by cultural imperialists. In order to account for the rise of 'peripheral 
nations' in the television export market and the ensuing re-structuring of the global 
media flow, John Sinclair coined the term of geo-linguistic region' (see below).27 
Joseph Straubhaar prefers talking about 'geo-cultural markets' since territories that 
participate in the same audiovisual space may not be geographically connected (e.g. 
the Lusophone market in Africa).28 The international media landscape has evolved 
into a multi-polar system 'in which western media domination has given way to 
multiple actors and various flows of media products·?9 
Debates on the global media have thus resulted in different stances adopted by 
ｾ｜＠ Fiske. J. 1987. Tele\"isioll CIIlrure Methuen, New Youk. 
ｾｉ＾＠ Thompson. J. B. 1995, The media alld modernity: A social theory of the media Polity Prc's. 
Cambridge, pp. 169-171. . 
ｾＷ＠ Sinclair. J. 1996, "Culture and trade: some theoretical and practical considerations:' in Mass medICI 
lIIId free trade: NAFTA lIlId tire C11lrural illdustries. E. G. McAnany & K. T. Wilkin,on. cds .. 
Unin:rsity of Tt'xas Press, Texas. pp. 30-60. .. .. 
ｾｋ＠ Straubhaar,1. D. 1997, "Distinguishing the global. regional and nationallcn'ls of world tclcvl>,lon. 
in M('(/iCl ill Cl global COlIText: A reader. A. Srebcrny-Mohal11lllaJi ct al.. cds .. Arnold. London. pp. 
2X4-29X. 
1Q Srcbcrny. A. ｾｏｏｏＮ＠ "The global and the local in international l"l)mmunicatillns." in Man mediLI L111d 
,\(Idi·t.'" . . ｾ＠ t'lin. J. Curran & M. Gurevitch. cds .. Arnold. L.llndon. p. 96. 
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approaches ranging from political economy to cultural studies. Part of the controvers \' 
between the two camps stems from the oxymoron created by the juxtaposition of 
'culture' and 'industry'. Some scholars are interested in the economic and manaoerial 
e 
structure of the media industry, focusing on issues of ownership and concentration, 
while others focus on textual and discursive analysis. The starting point of the 
political economy approach is the ideal values of free speech and access to the public 
sphere. Many of its exponents have been influenced by Marxism or neo-Marxism and 
their application to media and communication (e.g. Adomo's and Horkeimer's 
'culture industry', 1977; Benjamin's decay of the aura. 1977; Marcuse's 
one-dimensional capitalist culture, 1964; and Althusser' 'ideological apparatus', 
1984). It can be traced back to Golding and Murdock (1974) in Europe, proposing a 
political economic concept for analyzing communication industries by focusing on 
class power; Schiller (1969 and 1976) and Smythe (1977) in North America, stressing 
the domination of transnational media corporation. Scholars working in this field have 
formed a critical-based approach aiming at a broad range of targets, ranging for US 
cultural hegemony to the rise of global media conglomerates. They have focused to 
the interaction between global corporations and the nation-state, paying particular 
attention to vertical and horizontal integration in the world media industry.3o In the 
early 1 990s, political economists turned to the issues of managerial structure and 
corporate strategy. Since they are not oriented towards audience research, the focal 
point of their analysis remained the production and distribution of culture 
commodity.31 In addition, scholars have found a more empirical way of describing 
the culture industries by characterizing the processes of cultural industrialization as 
I() Sl'C Garnham. N. ＱＹＹｾＮ＠ Capitalism a1ld comnumicatio1l: Global cullllre alld tile ecollomin of 
i,,/ormatioll. 2nd edn. Sage. London: Hcrman. E. S. & McChesney. R. W. 1997. Tilt' global meelia: TI,e 
II('H" misJiollari('.\ 0/ corporate capitalism Arnold. London: Bagdikian. B. H. 20(X). The mcelia 
m01lopoly. 6th edn. ｂｬｾ｡｣ｯｮ＠ Press. Boston. Mass. 
II Meehan, E. R .. Mosco. V .• & Wasko. J. ＱＹＹＮｾＮ＠ "Rethinking political economy: change and 
continuity", JOIlnllll 0/ Commullicatioll. vol. 44. no. 3. pp. 105-116. 
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'the uses of capital-intensive, technological means of mass production and 
distribution, highly developed division of labour and hierarchical modes of 
managerial organization' .32 
The result of the stand-off between political economy and the cultural studies is 
two distinct bodies of research with two separate fields of enquiry. media production 
and cultural consumption. This divide echoes the shortcomings of the old paradigm of 
cultural imperialism and partly explains the emergence of the theoretical school of 
'global cultural pluralism' over the past decade or so, more attuned to audience 
research. The latter paradigm might offer a fuller view of global communication. even 
though Annabelle Sreberny argues that cultural pluralism is still searching for a 
coherent theoretical basis and that the 'global in the local, the local in the global' 
model offers a better solution for the time being. 33 
1.2 The concept of globalization and the media 
The issue of globalization dominates the current literature in international 
communication. Over the past decades, the combined effects of the emergence of the 
Eurocurrency market, the breakdown of the Bretton Woods monetary system (BWS) 
and the I 970s . oil price shock, have contributed to the growth of global financial 
flows and networks.·14 The growing enmeshment of national economies and societies 
accelerates the interdependence between nation-states.35 
The phenomena) expansion of global financial flows also explains why evidence 
of economic globalization is relatively easy to demonstrate. In the 1990s. accrued 
ｉｾ＠ Garnham. N. 1992. Capitalism (llld communicatioll: Global cllltllre lIIId the ecollomin 0/ 
ill/or",atio1l. 2nd cdn. Sage. London. pp. 156-157. . 
,1,1 Srchcrny. A. 2000. "The glohal and the local in international communications." in Mau medICI alld 
.'IOeiet\'. ｾ＠ cdn. 1. Curran & M. Gurevitch. eds .. Arnold. London. p. 97. 
\.I Hc·ld. D .. McGrew. A .. Goldhlall. D .. & Perraton. J. 1999. Global trclII.fjormatioll \ Politin. 
ecollomic.'> alld elllfllre. Polity Press. Cambridge. pp. 201-205. . 
｜Ｎｾ＠ Ohmae. K. 1990. The borderless world: Power alld strateR." ill the illter/illlced t'CClf/omr Collin'" 
Lllndon. 
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attention was given to the social and cultural dimensions of globalization. According 
to Antony Giddens, globalization can be comprehended as a consequence of 
modernity. The sociologist defines globalization as 'the intensification of worldwide 
social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are 
shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa' .36 Thus globalization is 
marked by the increased level of 'time-space distanciation'. 37 David Harvey also 
develops the concept of 'time-space compression' as a new economic and cultural 
dimension of postmodernity, which refers to the way in which globalization eradicates 
time and geographical distance. 38 Both Giddens and Harvey emphasize the 
importance and complexity of the web of connections between the local and the 
global, such as the impact distant events can have on local life. 
Roland Robertson adds to the idea of world compression the concept of global 
consciousness. He considers globalization as the 'intensification of consciollsness of 
the world as a whole'. 39 Expressing a similar idea, Malcolm Waters points out that 
globalization is 'a social process in which the constraints of geography on social and 
cultural arrangements recede and in which people become increasingly aware that 
they are receding'. 40 Compared to Giddens and Harvey, Robertson and Waters pay 
more attention to the subjective dimension of globalization, the way the 'objective' 
processes of globalization are perceived by individuals of global consciousness, 
people become more aware and conscious of globalization. 
Following a similar path to Giddens but focusing on the role of media and 
communications, John Thompson describes globalization as 'the growing 
interconnectedness of different parts of the world. a process which gives rise to 
.\6 Giddens. A. 1990. The cOl/seqllel/ces of modem it.\' Polity Press. Camhridge. p. M. 
17 Ihid . 
. 18 Harvey. D. 1989. Tire COI/ditio" of postmodemity Basil Blackwell. Oxford . 
. 19 Robertson. R. 1992. ClobClIi:'Cltion: Social tlreory al/d t:lobal cllltllre Sage. Lllndnn. p. X. 
-10 Waters. M. 1995. Clobllli:,atioll Routledge. London. p. 3. 
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complex forms of interaction and interdependency' .. ｾｉ＠ He specifies that globalization 
happens only when the interconnectedness between different locales grows and is 
reciprocal in character, and only when this interconnectedness is global in ｳ｣ｯｰ･Ｎｾｾ＠
John Tomlinson highlights the complexity of the processes at play by talking about 
globalization as 'complex connectivity', referring to it as the 'rapidly developing and 
ever-densening network of interconnections and interdependences that characterize 
modem social life' .43 The key cultural impact of globalization is not that it promotes 
more physical mobility but that it transforms localities themselves. He develops the 
concept of 'deterritorialization' to explain the break up of the relationship between 
place and culture. At the same time, the phenomenon of 'complex connectivity' - the 
awareness of globality - gives people a cultural resource to understand the 
transnational and the impact of the global on the local. 44 
Ulrich Beck, a German sociologist, also provides further insight into the 
understanding of 'globality.' Instead of using the term 'globalization', he purposes a 
concept 'cosmopolitan' to describe a sense of boundarylessness. This cosmopolitan 
outlook suggests that one's life and social relations are possibly moulded under the 
conditions of cultural mixture. 45 Accordingly, a person's horizon of emotional 
imagination expands in a transnational sense. Beck further distinguishes the idea of 
'simple globalization' from the concept of 'reflexive cosmopolitanization·. The 
former exists in the first age of modernity and is interpreted within the territorial 
boundary of state and politics, society and culture. In contrast, the latter appears in the 
second age of modernity and symbolizes not only the shift of relations between 
national states and societies but also the inner quality of the social and political 
-II Thompson. J. B. 1995. The media and modem;t.\': A .\Ocial '''t'(lf!' iif the 11It'llia Polity Pre ....... 
Cambridge. p. 149. 
-12 Ibid .• pp. 149-151. 
H Tomlinson. 1. 1999. Globali::.atio" a"d culture Polity Press. Cambridge. r ') 
.... Ibid. 
Ｍｉｾ＠ Bcd. U. 2006. The cosmopolita" \'i.\;OIl Polity. Cambridge. 
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itself. 46 Thus, cosmopolitanization represents a multidimensional process that 
comprises the development of individuals' multiple loyalties, the increase in diverse 
transnational forms of life, the appearance of non-state political actors (e.g. WTO). 
and the growth of global protest activities against neoliberal globalism and in support 
of a different type of cosmopolitan globalization.47 In terms of media globalization, 
Beck's vision does not merely provide an approach to examine the distribution of 
global cultural goods, the transnational actors, institutions and agreements. More 
importantly, it requires us to rethink the relation between place and culture. 
Tomlinson's notion of 'complex connectivity' refers to the strengthening of global 
interconnectedness, an idea that is also found in the work of Held and McGrew. The 
two scholars define globalization as 'the expanding scale, growing magnitude, 
speeding up and deepening impact of transnational flows and patterns of social 
interaction' .48 The concept of globalization also alludes to the transformation of 
human organization that 'links distant communities and expands the reach of power 
relations across the world's regions and continents' ＺｾＹ＠ In this sense, globalization 
should be understood as a set of processes rather than a singular phenomenon. It 
reflects the appearance of interregional networks and systems of interaction and 
exchange. Moreover, the intensity and 'extensity' of global and transnational 
interconnectedness weave complex networks of relations between 'communities, 
states. international institutions, non-governmental organizations and multinational 
corporations which make up the global order' .50 
Although the concept of globalization is often used to refer to the intensification 
ｾｨ＠ Beck. U. 2000. "The cosmopolitan perspective: Sociology of the second age of modernity". Br;t;sh 
)011,.,,01 Ｈｾｦ＠ Sociology. vol. 51. no. I. p. 79. 
H Beck. U. 2006. The cosmopolitall \';S;Oll Polity. Cambridge. p. 9. 
ｾｋ＠ Held. D. & McGrew. A. 2002. Clobali:.aticmIAIIt;-Global;:'Clfiol/ Polity Pre-.s. Camhridge. p. I. 
-IQ Ihid. 
<'0 Held. D .. McGrew. A .• Goldhlatt. D .. & Perraton. J. 1999. Global trafIJ!ormllt;Ol/.C Pol;t;c\. 
l'cOIwmin tllIll elllfllrt'. Polity Press. Camhridge:. p. 17. 
ｉｾ＠
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of global interconnectedness, scholars have yet to reach an agreement on its full 
meamng. David Held and colleagues distinguished three different positions on 
globalization: the hyperglobalizers, the sceptics, and the transformationalist. "I 
According to hyperglobalizers like Kenichi Ohmae (1995) and William Greider 
( 1997), economic globalization has gradually built up new type of social organization 
and shaped a new world order. Globalization represents the integration of the 
economy on a global scale, hence allowing for a highly efficient allocation of world 
resources. In this scenario, the nation-state will inevitably be emptied of its substance 
by global institutions and gently fade away. This point is based on the emergence of a 
global economy and global management mechanisms, which has been fiercely 
criticized by opponents to the hyper-globalization argument. According to sceptics 
like Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson, globalization is nothing but a myth.s:! The 
world economy is evidently divided into three trade blocs - Europe. Asia-Pacific. and 
North America, and thus the globalization is at most the regionalization or the 
triad-regional interaction.53 Political and cultural globalization is not driven by the 
dynamic of globalism, but by the economic expansion of transnational corporations. 
National governments are the basis of this structure rather than defenceless characters, 
and we are witnessing the 'the end of globalization' rather than 'the end of nation 
statc·. Between the hyperglobalizers and the sceptics, transformationalists like Antony 
Giddens present a compromised argument. This school of thought focus on the 
Iransformative power of globalization on the social, political and economic sphcres. 
World affairs are no longer the preserve of nation-states or a core few states. Rather. 
ｾｉ＠ Held. D .. McGrew. A.. Goldhlatt. D .. & Pcrraton. 1. 1999. Global trallsformatioll.\: Po/irin. 
t'ccmol1lics (lml cllllllre. Polity Press. Cambridgc. 
ｾＡ＠ Hirst. P. & Thompson. G. 1996. Globali:.aticm ill t/llesti(m: the illtemarimUlI (("ollo"n tlllt! ｴｉｬＢｾ＠
possibilitieJ of go\'emclIIce Polity Press. Camhridge. 
ｾＮｉ＠ See Rugman. A. 2(X)(). The elld of globali:.atioll Random House Business Books. London: Rugman. 
A. 2001. 'Thc cnd of glohal strategy". Europeall MllIwg('lllCllt JOllnllll. vol. 19 .. no . .t. pp. ｟ｈＭＬＭＮｱｾＺ＠
Rugman. A. & Girod, S. 2003. "Retail multinationals and gillhalilalion: The eVldenl.:'c IS rq!h1nal . 
Elll"OPt'clII MClIItlg('I1l('IIt JOllrnal. \01. 21. no. I. pp. 2.t-.H. 
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global issues are discussed and dealt with by nation-states alongside organizations and 
institutions present at the local, national, regional and international levels. 
David Held and colleagues separate globalization into political, economic and 
cultural aspects and interpret them accordingly. 54 The problem of such 
compartmentalized analysis is that the role of the media in the globalization process 
tends to be marginalized.55 This shows that despite progress in the political and 
economic study of globalization, the comprehension of the cultural aspect of this 
process remains patchy. There is little doubt that modem technology, particularly in 
the communication field, has had a profound impact on global systemic integration. 
Following the telegraph (second half of the 191h century), wireless terrestrial 
transmission (first half of the 20lh century), satellites and fibre optic cahles (1960s 
onwards) have further facilitated the worldwide transmission of sound and images.56 
In the 1980s, media globalization became clear for all to see. The power of 
communications satellites was made visible with the emergence in 1989 of the 
world's first TV channel with a global distribution: CNN. The ensuing development 
of worldwide communications satellite systems echoed Marshall McLuhan's 
prophecy of the glohal village, which is the transformation of the planet into a 'single 
. d . h 'b I d ' S7 constncte space resonant wIt tn a rums.-
We live today In the Age of Information and of Communication because 
electric media instantly and constantly create a total field of interacting 
events in which all men participate .... That is hecause electricity is organic 
ｾ＠ .. Held, D., McGrew, A.. Goldblatl. D .• & Pt'fraton. J. 1999. Global trclmformatioflS: Politit', 
t'('ollomics ami cllltllre, Polity Press. Cambridge. 
｜ｾ＠ Rantancn, T. 2005. The media alld globali:.atioll Sage. London, p. 4. , 
ｾ｢＠ Chalahy. J. K. 2005. "From internationalization to transnationalil.ation". Global McdILl alltl 
Co"",,,wicllfiOl •. vol. I. no. I. pp. 2K-29. 
\7 McLuhan. M. 1962. The Gute"berg gellaty: Tire makillg of typographic melll Routledge & K Paul. p . 
. l I. 
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in character and confirms the organic social bond by its technological use in 
telegraph, telephone, radio, and other fonns. The simultaneity of electric 
communication, also characteristic of our nervous system, makes each of us 
present and accessible to every other persall ill the world. 58 
A reason why media play a central role in the process of globalization is that 
global media corporations have emerged as the large organizations of transnational 
capabilities. These conglomerates play a key role in the global system of 
communication and information flow. Combined with the development of technology 
and the media industries, John Thompson highlights three trends in the growth media 
since the early 19th century - the transformation of media institutions into large-scale 
commercial concerns; the globalization of ｣ｯｭｭｵｮｩ｣｡ｴｩｯｮｳｾ＠ and the growing 
electronically mediated forms of communication. 59 Systematically exploring the 
structure of media globalization, Jean Chalaby distinguishes four key elements of the 
formation of a global media system:60 
I. The global media industry; 
2. The global communications ｮ･ｴｷｯｲｫｾ＠
3. International flow of communication; 
4. International regulating institutions. 
The global media industry represents the highest len? I of world media 
convergence and integration. The formation of large media corporations is often seen 
as a threat to cultural pluralism and media diversity (e.g. 8agdikian, 2000). As most of 
ｾｒ＠ McLuhan. M. 1964. Understanding media MClhuen. London. p. ＺＺＡｾｈＮ＠ my cmphasis.. . 
ｾＹ＠ Thompson. J. B. 1995. The media and modem;ty: A social theory of the ",('eila PohlY Press. 
Cambridge. p. 76. . .... . 
flO Chalaby. J. K. 2005. 'Towards an underslanding of media transnalionahsm. '" 7 fCllHlltJt'(lfwl 
tele\·i.\h", "'orld,,"it/e: Towards il IIew mcdia order. J. K. Chalaby. cd .. I.B.Tauri". London. p. ｾＮ＠
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these companIes are based in the United States. they also raIse concerns about 
American cultural imperialism (e.g. Herman and McChesney; 1997; Thussu. 2(02). 
However, as Jean Chalaby has recently shown, it is possible to talk about . American 
cultural primacy' 'without the preconceptions and ideological biases of the old 
thesis' .61 The American dominance of the first tier of the global media industry _ 
according to Herman and McChesney who argue that the industry is divided into two 
tiers62 - is a fact that does not need to be construed as an issue. Herman and 
McChesney's 'tier one' of the global media industry includes today six vertically 
integrated transnational media companies that spread worldwide and cross most 
media sectors from book publishing. the newspaper press, audiovisual and 
cinematographic production and distribution (see Table 1.1). The second tier consists 
of multinational companies with a strong regional sales focus or those with a global 
reach but concentrating on a niche market, such as Globo, Televisa, Thomson and 
Phoenix TV. 
61 Chalaby. J. K. ::!006. "American cultural primacy in a new media order: A European pep,pc(li\l· ... 
GCJ:'c'IIe. \'01. 68. no. I. p. 36. .. . . _ . ｨｾ＠ Herman. E. S. & McChesney. R. W. 1997. Tire glohal media: Tire new ｭＧｓｊＧＨＩＱＯｻｭ･Ｎｾ＠ of (mporllf! 
clll'ittl/i.'il1l Arnold. London. 
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Table 1.1 The first tier of the global broadcasting/film companies in 2004 
World ranking by media 
turnover in brackets' 
Headquarters Media turnover 
2003 in US$ 
Media turnOl'er 
2004 ill (ISS 
Pmgrt"uion ill 
mil/ion mil/ion ＲｻＩＨｊＴＯｾｴｊＰＳ＠ (fl) 
lime Warner (1) New York 38.058.3 ｾ＠ 9 0 .6. I .0 -.lO 
ｾ｡ｬｴ＠ Dis;ey (2) Los Angeles 22.014.3 22.293.5 + ｉＮＮｾ＠
,acorn ( ) New York 20.901.7 20.581.2 -1.5 
Sony (4) Tokyo 23.633.6 19.171.7 -IS.9 
NewsCorporation2 (5) Sydney/NewYork 13.651.7 14.759.2 +8.1 
NBC universal (6) Fairfield. CT 7.325.3 12.489.1 + 705 
Note: 'Figures exclude revenues from publishing, theme parks and other activities not related to screen 
entertainment. 2News Corporation includes BSkyB. 
Source: 2005, "Top 50 entertainment companies", Scree1l Digest no. July. pp. 198-199. 
1.3 Regionalization and the concept of 'regional media space' 
The spread of global media companies, particularly the American ones, can be 
interpreted as an expression of cultural and economic imperialism. Some scholars 
mention idioms like 'McDonalidization' and 'CocaColanization' to refer to these 
phenomena.63 However, from a cultural perspective, one of the most significant 
aspects of global media groups is that they bring with them a transformation of the 
relationship between the local and the global. These companies, and the process of 
cultural transnationalization at large, have inevitably an impact on the cultural and 
economic systems of nation-states. The new local/global dialectic transforms national 
cultures through the process of hybridization. Such transformations does not 
necessarily means a weakening of local culture, as claimed by the advocates of 
cultural imperialism, but the deepening of the entwinement between the local and the 
global. 
In order to add nuance to the notion of globalization as worldwide 
homogenization of television and the erosion of national and cultural differences. 
b.1 Slrauhhaar. J. D. 1997. "Distinguishing the global. H.'gional and national k\L'ls of world tc1e\l,lon:' 
in Media ill tl global comot: A reader. A. Srehemy-Mohaml11adi el aI., eds .. Arnold. London, pp. 
ｾｍＴＭｾＹｍＮ＠
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Joseph Straubhaar suggested that the 'regionalization' of television is a signitlcant 
dimension of media globalization. Regional television markets, such as the Middle 
East or Greater China, are called 'geo-cultural markets', a notion that refers to the 
fonnation of multi-country markets linked by geography, language and culture.64 In 
media studies, an increasing number of scholars have noted the trend towards 
regionalization and have analyzed the emergence of multi-level media landscapes that 
cut across the local, the national, the regional and the global (e.g. Chalaby, 2002: 
Chan, 1996; Iordanova, 2002; Iwabuchi, 2000; Moragas Spa & Lopez, 2000; Scriven 
& Roberts, 200 1; Sinclair, 2000; Sparks, 2000; Sreberny, 2000; Strauhhaar, 1997; 
Wang, Ku, & Liu, 2000). Although it is generally agreed that more supportive 
evidence is needed to understand the regional layer, particularly in non-Western 
countries, these authors share the opinion that regionalization is an integral part of 
globalization. Regionalization plays a major role in the current transformation of the 
world media system, but only as a dimension of the process of globalization. 
In addition, some authors believe that regionalization is a more significant 
phenomenon than unequal interregional communication flows. Increased cultural, 
linguistic and religious differences make the regional layer of communication ever 
more pertinent. 65 From this point of view, several geo-cultural markets can be 
identified around the world, such as Europe, Middle East, South Asia, Greater China, 
Latin America and North America. The regionalization of television market reflects 
audience preferences for domestic programmes or 'near domestic' content (i.e. 
programming from neighbouring countries) over imported TV material. 66 This 
confirms the proposition put forward by severa] scholars that audiences tend to favour 
f)4 Straubhaar. J. D. 1997. "Distinguishing the glohal. regional and national ｉ｣ｶ｣ｬｾ＠ of world tck"i,ion," 
in Media ;11 a global colllex': A reader, A Srchcrny-Mohammadi ct a!.. cds .. Arnold. London. p, ｾｋＵ＠
ｨｾ＠ Srehcrny. A. 2000. 'The global and the local in international communications:' in :\1tl\,\ mt'(II" a"d 
.wcief\', 3 edn, J. Curran & M. Gurcvitch. cds .• Arnold, London. pp, 93-1 :!(), 
!I() Cohen. A A. Levy. M. R .• Roch. I.. & Gurevitch. M. 1996. Global Il('II'.\"rOOmJ, IOCClI alld,ella\' A 
.'Iludy o/'"l' £111'0\,;,\;011 New.'I E'cchallge John Lihhcy. London. 
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national or regional feeds over their imported counterparts. John Sinclair and his 
colleagues have made it clear that although USA programmes are exported across the 
world, and even dominate some channels' scheduling, 'they are rarely the most 
popular programmes where viewers have a reasonable menu of locally produced 
material to choose from' .67 
The formation of regional markets and audience preference for similar culture 
highlights Arjun Appadurai's notion of the disjuncture of global cultural flows. 
Appadurai employs five dimensions - ethnoscape, mediascape, technoscape. 
financescape and ideoscape - to capture the immense variety of people. goods. 
economic capital, images and ideas that are constituent to global cultural flows. He 
also uses the concept of deterritorialization to analyze the relationship between 
cultural communities and 'invented homelands'. 68 Deterritorialization echoes the 
concepts of others, such as 'complex connectivity' by John Tomlinson (1999). 
'delocalization' by John Thompson (1995) and 'displacement' by Anthony Giddens 
(1990). All these notions refer, in their own way, to the phenomenon of 'time-place' 
compression in modern society. Tomlinson characterizes deterritorialization as 'the 
weakening or dissolution of the connection between everyday lived culture and 
territorial location' .69 However, unlike the simplistic Marxist view of threat to local 
culture, he describes the experience of deterritorialization as a complex fusion of 
familiarity and difference, cultural expansion and perception of vulnerability, and 
access to the outside world and penetration of private life. Moreover, the 'mundane' 
essence deterritorialization is the assimilation to normality rather than a dramatic 
b7 Cohen. A. A.. Levy. M. R.. Roeh. I.. & Gurevitch. M. 1996. Global "ewsrooms. local alle/it'IIn'.\." A 
!lIfU/\' of the Eurol'isiolf NfI!'J £'(challge John Libbey. London .. p. to. 
fill Appadurai. A. 2003. "DisjunL'ture and difference in the global ｣ｾｬｴｵｲｾｬ･ＨｯｮｯｭｹＺＧ＠ in Plallt't n':;\ '1 
global tt'lel'isicJII reader. L. Parks & S. Kumar. cds .. New York University Press. New York. pr· -to-5_. 
(,'I Tomlinson. J. 1999. GlobClli:.aticm alld e"IIIIre Polity Press. ｃｈｬｬ｢ｲｩ､ｾ･Ｎ＠ p. 12X. 
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revolution of the 'lived life'. 70 
Deterritorialization dissolves the traditional consciousness of geographic and 
nation-state boundary, and hence creates a new imagined community - sometimes a 
region-state - which turns into a new market for television and film companies. The 
deterritorialized experience is intensified by the growing number of diasporas around 
the world, thus making the culture-based communities more essential. The new 
deterritorialized regional market is limited and protected by some natural factors. In 
this regard, cultural homogeneities playa crucial role in the formation of geo-cultural 
markets. This regional dimension has been conceptualized by Joseph Straubhaar's 
concept of 'cultural proximity', by which he means a market based 'on cultural 
similarities that go beyond language to include such elements as dress. nonverbal 
communication, humor, religion, music, and narrative style'. 71 His research analyzes 
audience preference for culturally proximate material in Latin American countries and 
shows that their preference is first for national material. When choice is unavailable, 
viewers next look to other regional Latin American products before turning North 
American material. T2 
This 'proximity' can also be understood as a 'scene of shared experiences' 
hetween programming and audience when applied to television.73 The 'scene of 
shared experiences' is reflected in programming content and it is accepted that an 
audience appreciate TV material that is proximate to their own culture. Hence the 
regionalization of media industry is shaped and facilitated by the elements of 
70 Tomlinson. J. 1999. Globali:.ation alld ClIlture Polity Press. Cambridge. p. 128. 
71 Quoted in Sinclair. J. 1996, "Culture and trade: some theoretical and practical considerations." in 
Mass media lIIId free trade: NAFTA lIIIcI the cllltllral illdustril'J. E. G. McAnany & K. T. Wilkinson. 
cds .. Univl'rsity of Tl'xas Press. Texas. p. -t7. 
Ｗｾ＠ Stmuhhaar. 1. D. 1991. "Beyond media imperialism: Asymmetrical interdependence and cultural 
proximity". Critical Stlldies ill Mass Commullication. \01. 8. no. I. p. 56. . .. .' 
'-, Moragas Spa. M. d. & Lopcz. B. 2000. "Decentralization processl's and 'proxllnate ＱｾＮＧｉｬＧ｜＠ 1"1011 In 
Europe." in The Ill'll' cO""",l1licatiOlu lalldscape: DemystijyillR media Rlobali:.ation. G. Wang. 1. 
Serval·s. & A. Goonasckcra. cds .. Routkdge. London. pp. 1:\-51. 
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geo-cultural markets that act as a complement to the development of media 
globalization. 
The concept of proximity has led Miquel de Moragas Spa and his colleagues to 
create the idiom of 'proximate television' when researching the European television 
landscape. 74 According to these scholars, proximate television (i.e. local 
programming) has continually grown in Europe over the past decade. A typical 
example is news, but local programming is also strong in sports, talk shows and 
drama. In addition, Moragas Spa's concept of 'regional television' shows that 
television with a regional scope covers urban centres which may be spread in different 
countries but nonetheless constitute a 'unit' in the historical, cultural. linguistic. 
geographic and administrative senses. The concept of proximate television constitutes 
a welcome addition to the theories of the geo-cultural market. 
Among the elements of cultural proximity, language is always the foremost 
advantage to be taken in consideration, as exemplified by Spanish in the Latin 
American media space. Richard Collins considered English as the crucial reason for 
the success of the USA audiovisual industry in the global media market. In his 
opinion, linguistic and cultural barriers limit the diffusion of information markets. 
English, as 'the language of advantage', happens to dominate the largest and richest 
world language community. 75 Consequently, producers within large linguistic 
potential markets 'have a financial incentive to create large budget films and 
programs that generally have greater intrinsic audience appeal, a clear advantage in 
international competition' .76 In short, the so-called 'geo-linguistic region' is playing 
an increasingly prominent role in the structuring of global cultural flows. 
74 Moragas Spa. M. d. & Lopez, B. :?OOO. "Decentralization processes and 'pro,imate tclc"j,jon' in 
Europe," in The 1/(',," communications lalldscape: Demy.\ti/yill8 media globali:.atioll. G. Wang. J. 
Servacs, & A. Goonasckcra, cds .. Routledge, London. pp. 33-5 I. 
Ｗｾ＠ Collins. R. 1990. Te/t'\'iJioll: Policy alld CII/ture Unwin Hyman. London. pp. 52-53. 
711 Wildman. S. & Siwek. S. 1988. IIlIematiOlraltrade ill ｦｩｬｭＬｾ＠ allClte/n;sioll programm;fJ8 Amail'an 
Enterprise Institute/Ballinger Publications. Cambridge. Ma", p. b8. 
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Although linguistic differences are the most essential barrier to entry. other 
cultural elements such as religion, fashion, music, nonverbal codes, humour. story 
pacing and ethic types, also play their part in deciding whether a programme is 
acceptable. The 'cultural deficit' for foreign programmes has led to the concept of 
'cultural discount', developed by Colin Hoskins and Roger Mirus. which points to the 
reduction in the value of foreign programmes.77 The phenomenon of cultural discount 
is reflected in the international pricing policy of American film and TV producers. 
who lower the prices of programmes sold overseas in an attempt to reduce the cultural 
gap between their home market and foreign territories. In addition. it highlights the 
difficulty for global media players to penetrate regional and national markets. In Asia, 
local programmes still dominate the market and continue to gain popularity, a region 
where local production is expected to grow over the next two decades. In Greater 
China, the success of Star TV is due to its strategy of localization, which it adopted 
when facing strong Chinese culture-based competitors such as Phoenix TV and 
TVB.78 Likewise, by investing strongly in local entertainment programming, India's 
Zee TV has gained more popularity than any other overseas channel distributed in 
India by satellite.79 In Europe, despite the increasing number of cable and satellites 
homes. pan-European TV channels have had little impact on the audience share of the 
main national channels, both cable and terrestrial. Unless they adapt to local taste and 
11 Hoskins. C. Finn, A.. & McFadyen. S. 1996. "Tde\ision and Film: US dominance and Canadian 
responses." in Ma.u medill llml fret' trade: NAFTA ami the (,lIlf1lml illliustries. E. G. McAnany & K. T. 
Wilkinson. cds .. Univcrsity of Texas Press. Texas. p. 68. 
711 Chan, J. M. 1996, "Television in Greater China: Structurc. cxports. and markct formation," in New 
patterns ill Rlobal telel'isicm: Peripheral ,,is;OIl, J. Sinclair. E. Jacka. & S. Cunningham, cds., Oxford 
Uniwrsity. Oxford, pp. 126-160: Chan. J. M . .2005. "Trans-border broadcasters and TV rcgionalil.ation 
in Gre.Her China: Proccsses and strategies," in Trallsllatiollal rc/e\'iJiotl I\'or!tb"ide: Tmmrds a lie,,' 
mt'dill order. J. K. Chalahy. cd., I.B.Tauris. London. pp. 173-195. 
N Shrikhande. S . .2001. "Competitive strategil's in the internatillflali/ation of Telcvision: CNNI and 
BBe World in Asia", The JOllrnal Ｈｾｲ＠ MediCI Ecollomic's. \01. I .. L no. ). pp. 147 .. 168.: Thussu. D .. 
Downing. D. H. J .. Rantanen. T .• & Zhao. Y . .2005. "Symposium: What is global about global media?". 
Global Mt'd;a alrd CommuI/icatioll. \'01. I. no. I. pp. 9-10 
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customs, international channels remain irrelevant to local audiences.8o 
The cultures of regional ｾ｡ｲｫ･ｴｳ＠ reflect sometime the construction of regional 
identities. Geo-cultural markets are defined by deeply rooted cultural commonalities 
and shared histories among regional nations. 81 The interpretation of history 
establishes a common regional consciousness and can create cultural regionalism 
within a geo-cultural area. In the case of Latin America, Sinclair argues that the 
colonial and postcolonial experiences have grounded key cultural features of these 
countries and defined their relationship to the 'outsiders' such as the United States.8:! 
Moreover, the widespread use of Spanish has made Latin America - with the 
significant exception of Brazil - a model geo-cultural region. In the Middle East, 
Naomi Sakr states that the success of satellite TV channels is partly due to their ability 
to communicate across the region in a single language. Ｘｾ＠
Diasporic communities are constituted by deterritorialized and transnational 
cultural practices. Even though many governments have tried to use television to 
huild up national identity, the growing numbers of international television services are 
heginning to stratify audiences into 'taste culture[s]' that transcend national 
boundaries. 84 Similarly, geo-cultural markets are not based on nationality but on 
linguistic and cultural affinity. It is a type of semi-deterritorialized communities, at the 
same time transcending national borders and dependent on regional geopolitics. 
lill Chalaby. J. K. 2005. "The quiet invention of a new medium: Twenty years of Iransnational 
Ielcvision:' in Trallsllatiollal rele\'isioll u'orldwide: Towards a lieu' medill order. 1. K. Chalaby. cd .. 
I.B.Tauris. London. pp. 53-54. 
III Scc also Slrauhhaar. J. D. 1997. "Dislinguishing the global, regional and nalional le\l:ls of world 
Ielevision:' in Media ill II Rlobal co1I1ext: A reader. A. Srcherny-Mohammadi cl al.. l'ds .. Arnold. 
London. pp. 2X4-29X. 
Rl Sinclair. J. 1999. Lati" America" telel'isiOll: A Rlobal "iew Oxford University Press. Oxford. and 
20(X); Sinclair. 1. 2000. "Geolinguistic region as global space: The case of Latin America." in The "ew 
cO""'''lIlicatiollS itmd.'1cape: Demystifyi"g media globali:;atiofl. G. Wang. J. Servaes. & A. Goonasekera. 
cds .. Routledge. London. pp. 19-32. 
III Sakr. N. 2001. Satellite I"t'lllms: TrclllSfllltiOlwl telel'isiofl, Rlobali:;aticm alld the Middle East I.B. 
Tnuris . London. 
RoI Sinclair. 1.. Jad:a. E .. & Cunningham. S. 1996. "Periplll'ral vision," in New 1'1I11ems ifl Rlobal 
rdt'l'is;ofl: Paip/f(·rall'isicm. J. Sinclair. E. Jacka. & S. Cunningham. cds .. Oxford llnivcrsily. Oxford. 
pp. 1-32. 
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1.4 Media economics and theories of cultural industries 
Mass media can be understood as 'economic institutions' that produce and distribute 
content and services to consumers.85 The institutional analysis of global media has 
developed when conglomeration and ownership concentration began in earnest in the 
1 980s. Scholars have focused on managerial structures, ownership, patterns of 
decision making, the role of management in fostering creativity and the influence of 
media policy (e.g. Curran, 1977; Bagdikian, 2000; Doyle, 2(02). 
Alongside institutional analysis, the fledgling discipline known as media 
economics pays more attention to the relationship between media, business and 
economic issues, dealing with the vanous factors that affect production and 
distribution of media products. Robert Picard points out that 'media economics is 
concerned with how media operators meet the informational and entertainment wants 
and needs of audiences, advertisers, and society with available resources' .86 Similarly, 
Alan Albarran defines media economics as the study of 'how media industries use 
scarce resources to produce content that is distributed among consumers in a society 
to satisfy various wants and needs' .87 The*business operations and financial activities 
of media production and distribution are therefore within the scope of the discipline.88 
Broader issues like international trade, competition and concentration are also part of 
the discipline's remit. K9 
Media economics is divided into two branches: mIcro and macroeconomIcs. 
ｴｉｾ＠ Albarran, A. B. & Chan-Olmsted. S. M. 1998, "A framework for the study of global media 
l'l7onomics:' in Global media ecol/omics: Commerciali:atioll, COl/ceflTratio1l 111ld illtegratiol/ of "'orld 
media market, Iowa State University Press. Ames. IA. p. 3. 
tlb Picard. R. G. 1989, Media ecollomics: COllceptslllld issues Newbury Park. California. p. 7. 
111 Alharran. A. B. 2003. Media eco1lomics: Ullderstalldillg markl'Ts, il/dustries. al/d cOllcepl\. ｾ＠ cdn. 
Surjcct Puhlil'ations. Delhi. p. 5. 
11M 1998. Media eco1lomio: Theory alld practice. 2nd edn. Lawrem:e Erlhaum Asso • .:iates. Mahwah. NJ. 
rei ｾｙｬ･Ｎ＠ G. ＲＰＨＩｾＮ＠ LJmlersttmdil/g mediCI t'cOIlOmics Sage. Lnndon. p. 2. 
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Usually national in scope, macroeconomics examines the economic system as a whole, 
dealing with political economy, economic growth, employment and inflation, 
aggregate figures of production and consumption, and the regulatory framework. 90 In 
contrast, microeconomics analyzes producers and consumers in specific situations and 
organizations.91 While macroeconomics is concerned with the forces that affect the 
economy as a whole and microeconomics investigates particular markets, products 
and companies, both are needed in the analysis of regional media markets. This is due 
to the intricate nature of markets in which economic decisions are taken by three 
categories of players: consumers, companies and governments. 92 The interplay 
between macroeconomics and microeconomics is constant because government 
regulation and policies, at least in Greater China, constantly influence the strategies 
and practices of consumers and producers alike. Conversely, markets performances 
incite governments to intervene. 
Media markets show higher complexity than others, due to the different nature of 
market systems, the unique feature of media goods and the distinctive character of 
media markets. First, regulated by government policies, the structure of media 
markets is subject to the influence of governmental policies and regulations. The 
development of regional alliances and economic blocks (e.g. NAFfA, EU's economic 
agreements and the ASANFfA 93), only add one more layer of decision making - and 
sometimes of bureaucracy - for media organizations to consider when formulating 
t . b . . 94 t leu usmess strategIes. 
Q() Picard, R. G. 1989. Media economics: Concepts and issues Newbury Park, California. p. 8; Albarran. 
A. B. & Chan-Olmsted. S. M. 1998, "A framework for the study of glohal media economics," in 
Global media ecollomics: COf1lmerciali:.atioll. cOllcelllration alld ifllegratioll of "'orld media market. 
Iowa State University Press. Ames. IA. pp. 4-5. 
'II Ihid. 
92 Doyk. G. 2002. ｕｬｬ､･ｲＮｈ｡Ｂ､ｩｬｬｾ＠ mf'dia ecollomics Sage. London. p. 4. 
IH ASANFfA _ The Ass(x:iation of Southeast Asian Nations Free Trade Area. 
9.4 Bergsten. C. F. & Noland. M. 1993. "Introduction and overview." in Pacific dYllami.wl elmi rhe 
ill1erllatiollClI ｾ｣ｯＢｯｦＱｬｩ｣＠ sy.\lem. C. F. Bergsten & M. Noland. l.'ds .. Institute for International Economics. 
Washington. IX'. pp. 3-13. 
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In addition, the nature of media products adds complication to the equation of 
media markets because they are characterized as 'cultural goods' and 'public goods'. 
As cultural goods, media products are not merely commodities but help define a 
culture.95 As cultural goods, media products are also immaterial in the sense that the 
audience consume the content and not the media. Thus the value of a media product is 
based on its immaterial and intangible content, and is not 'consumable', that is, 
destroyed in the act of consumption on.96 The second feature of media products is 
drawn by Picard's distinction between a 'public good' and a 'private good'. The use of 
public goods is universal in principle and in some respects their consumption is 
limitless: the consumption of such goods by some people should not diminish other 
people's access to the same good. 97 
Television programming as a public good 98 or a semi-/quasi-public good 99 , 
contradicts the assumption of traditional private goods based on material scarcity, 
which has led media corporations to adopt strategies to secure their control over 
scarcity. Apart from state patronage, Nicholas Gamham points that the means 
employed include copyright, which commoditiie information; integration of 
production and distribution, which controls the access to consumption; and the 
creation, packaging and sale of audiences to advertisers (see below for the concepts of 
'dual market' and corporate strategies).IOO In addition to artificial manipulation of 
scarcity, television products feature low incremental costs of supply. They have very 
Ｂｾ＠ Collins. R .. Garnham. N., & Lockslcy. G. 1988. The economics of te/e\'isioll: The UK CllW Sage. 
London. pp. 7-10. 
'16 Albarran. A. B. 2003. Media ecollomics: Understanding mark.ets. industries. all£/ cOl/cepts. 2 cdn. 
Surject Publications. Delhi. p. 28; Doylc. G. 2002. UI/derstllnding media economics Sage. London. p. 
12. 
Q1 Picard. R. G. 1989. Media economics: COI/cepts elml issues Ncwbury Park. California. p. IX. 
'18 Ibid. 
',q Ryan. B. 1992. Making capital from culture: Tire corporate form of capirali.\{ cIl/fllral I,rodllclioll 
Waller de Gruytcr. Bl'rlin.: Hcsmondhalgh. D. 2002. 71,e cllitural induslries Sage. London. 
1Ix) Garnham. N, 1992. Capitalism and commlll/ication: Global cullure CIIul 11r(' ('('ol/ol1lics of 
information. 2nd cdn. Sagl'. London. pp. 39-40. 
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high fixed costs and low variable costs (i.e. high initial production costs and low 
replication costS).101 Unlike other material industries, the first copy of a television 
programme always costs a huge amount of capital, time and effort, but once it is made, 
all ensuing copies are relatively cheap and profitable. The profit made from every 
extra copy has led to the drive for 'audience maximization', 102 which again prompts 
media companies to strengthen the copyright mechanisms and controls over the 
production and distribution chain. 
Content is not the only commodity that media companies produce as they also 
create audiences. In order to explain the nature of media markets, Picard includes both 
content and audience in his 'dual product market' concept (see Figure 1.1). In the first 
market (goods market) media companies compete for audience attention. They also 
sell 'access to audience' to advertisers in the second market (advertising market), 
providing intelligence regarding the sizes and characteristics of audiences and 
consumers. In addition, media corporations compete in specific geographic markets 
with strong connections with local and national territories. 103 Not all companies can 
work in both the goods and advertising market. For instance, some public service 
broadcasters do not sell advertising. Likewise, some media companies are confined by 
geographic boundaries (e.g. the local cable operators who have difficulties in 
nationwide expansion). Which media company should operate in which market is 
decided by the nature of their products the geographic boundaries. These parameters 
are defined by the nature of the industry and governmental regulation. A market with 
relatively open boundaries, low levels of government regulation, better provision 
between media goods and consumer needs, and fluid industrial boundaries, leads to 
101 Hoskins, c., Finn. A.. & McFadycn. S. 1996, "Tclcvision and Film: US dominance and Canadian 
responses," in MaS!i media and fret' trade: NAFTA a"d the eulfllml i"dustries. E. G. Me Anany & K. T. 
Wilkinson. cds .. University of Tcxas Press. Texas. p. 67. 
ｉｏｾ＠ Garnham, N. 1992. Capitalism and communication: Global elllfllrt' lind the ('collomio of 
ill[ormatiml, 2nd edn. Sage. London. pp. 160-161. 
10 Picard. R. G. 19X9. Mt'dia ecollom;o: COllcepts alit! issues Ncwhury Park. California. pp. 17-'11 
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competitive media markets. 
Figure 1.1 Elements and nature of media markets 
Good/Service Market + Geographic Market 
Access to Audiences 
Media Good 
(for advertisers) 
(content product) 
Geographic Boundaries 
(Defined by industry. + 
government. or media unil) 
Source: Picard. R. G. 1989, Media economics: COllcepts alld issues Newbury Park. California. p. 21. 
A comprehension of the nature of media economy can help to define the elusive 
term 'cultural industries'. In the USA, the notion of entertainment industries is 
frequently used, although the idiom 'media industries' is widely accepted in the 
contemporary media studies. In Europe, the label 'creative industries' has received the 
official endorsement of the UK's Department of Culture, Media and Sport (DMCS). 
In a document entitled the 'Creative Industries Mapping Document', the DCMS 
defines the activities of the creative industries as the activities 'which have their 
origin in individual creativity, skill and talent and which have the potential for wealth 
and job creation through the generation and exploitation of intellectual property' .Io.t 
The term 'creative industries' is increasingly accepted in policy circles in the analysis 
of the production and distribution of cultural goods. However, the inclusion of no less 
than 13 sectors in the document (i.e. ｡､ｶ･ｲｴｩｳｩｮｧｾ＠ ｡ｲ｣ｨｩｴ･｣ｴｵｲ･ｾ＠ arts and antique 
HW 1998. Crelltir(' illdllstries mappillg documellt 1998 Department for Culture. Media and Sport.; 2001. 
Crt'(lti,'t' illdllJtrieJ mapping docllme", 2001 Department for Culture. Media and Sport. 
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markets; crafts; design; designer fashion; film; interactive leisure ｳｯｦｴｷ｡ｲ･ｾ＠ musIC: 
performing arts; publishing; software and television and radio) also shows the 
difficulty in outlining the boundaries of the creative industries, particularly in the 
periphery. For instance, the cultural industries could encompass the leisure industry 
and include sports and tourism. 105 It is therefore a matter of debate to include the 
gaming industry and leave out sports and tourism. Richard Caves narrows down the 
definition of the creative industries as those industries 'supplying goods and services 
that we broadly associate with cultural, [ ... ] or [ ... ] entertainment value'. 106 
According to Caves, books and magazine pUblishing, performing arts, music, film 
television, fashion and games are within the scope of the category. 
The difficulty of classifying the creative industries has got more complex in the 
digital age when the new information and communication technologies (lCTs) blur 
the traditional boundaries between different media. Taking the development of 
interactivity, convergence, and electronic networks into account, John Hartley 
considers that, as a notion, the 'creative industries' 'seeks to describe the conceptual 
and practical convergence of the creative arts with cultural industries, in the context of 
new media technologies within a new knowledge economy, for the use of newly 
interactive citizen-consumers'. 107 This definition not only emphasizes the 
connections between the creative arts and cultural industries but also highlights the 
significance of the ICTs which bring together different media sectors. From a wider 
perspective, the new media economy is comprehended in the even wider context of 
the knowledge economy, placing the emphasis on the production of information in the 
post-industrial society. This situation leads to the 'information industries' as an 
10:\ Hesmondhalgh. D. 2(X)2. Tire eli/film/ illdustries Sage. London. pp. 13-15. . 
1111> C<tvcs, R. 2000. Creari\'(' illdustries: COlllmcts hetU't't'1I an alld commerce Han ard Un" l'r'oIl) 
Press. Camhridgc. Mass. p. I. 
107 2005. Cremin' illdll.'ltrit'.\ Rlad well. Oxford, p. 5. 
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alternative to 'creative industries', although the term has not been widely used in 
media studies because entertainment is marginalized in the scholarly discourse on the 
.& • 'd . J08 H . d InlOrmatJOn In ustnes. owever, mstea of focusing on large-scale industrial 
production, the creative industries approach has helped the understanding of the 
phenomenon of small-to-medium enterprises (SMEs) that characterize the sector. 109 
In contrast with Hartley, Hesmondhalgh has stuck more to the teml 'cultural 
industries' and described the sector as 'deal[ing] with the industrial production and 
circulation of texts'. I JO From his viewpoint, the fundamental distinction between the 
cultural industries and other fields of activities is that the former produce texts that 
carry social meaning. Because texts are highly complex and compete with each other 
in the marketplace, the cultural industries manipulate 'symbolic creativity' by hiring 
symbol creators and managing and circulating the products. As a result, the cultural 
industry is increasingly important as a source of wealth and employment, and hecause 
it deals with symbols, as an agent of social change. Those industries which 
concentrate on such industrial production and distribution of texts consequently 
establish 'the core cultural industries' which comprise advertising and marketing, 
hroadcasting, film, internet, music, print and electronic publishing. I I I 
From an economic perspective, Hesmondhalgh's interpretation of the cultural 
industries echoes Albarran and Chan-Olmsted's aforementioned notion that mass 
media companies are economic institutions that produce and disseminate content to 
the consumers.112 As an economic institution that commonly takes the form of a 
11111 Wasko. J. 1994, Hol"wood iI/ the il//ormatiol/ age Polity Press. Cambridge. 
ｉｉｾＩ＠ Cunningham. S. 200i. "From cultural to Cfcati\'l' industril's: Theory. industry and poliq 
implications". MediI/a IIIfemariollal Australia no. 102. pp. 58-59. 
110 Hcsmondhalgh, D. 2002. The cllitural illdllstrit'J Sage. London. p. 12. 
III Hesillondhalgh, D. 2002. The culrural illlJIIJtries Sage. London. p. 12. . 
ｉｉｾ＠ Alharran. A. B. & Chan-Olmsted. S. M. 1998. "A framework for the study of global mcdla 
cl'llOomics:' in Global media ('col/omics: Commerciali:.alioll, cOllcnltration and integratiofl of ,,;orid 
IIIt'elia IIIarket. Iowa State University Press. Ames. IA. p. ｾＮ＠
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public limited company, these companies are run by managers rather than owners. 1 IJ 
And the management of most media companies is geared towards profit 
• • • 114 
maxImIzatIOn. 
1.5 Corporate strategies and transnational expansion 
The production and distribution of media goods involves several phases that are 
technically divisible. 1 15 The vertical supply chain (see Figure 1.2) constructs the 
stages from the production to the display and indicates elements involved in making 
and then supplying television programming to the television markets. Doyle points 
out to three essential stages: 116 
- Production, or the creation of media content: 
- Packaging, or the process of assembling the content into a product; 
- Distribution, or the delivery to consumers. 
In order to manage risk, gain greater control over the process of value chain, and 
manage the external environment (particularly on the global stage), media 
corporations adopt various strategies of expansion. Based on the vertical supply chain, 
horizontal and vertical integration serves as a starting point in corporation expansion. 
Horizontal cxpansion takes place when a company takes over other corporations in 
I b . h h . . . 117· d d h I lC same uSllless sector t roug acqUIsItIOns or mergers, III or er to re uce t e 
ficrce competition hetween contestants and strengthen its market dominance. The 
III Doyle. G. 2001. Ul/dt'rSlandil/R media eco1lomics Sag\.'. London. p. 2.t. 
ｉｉｾ＠ Piclrd. R. G. 2002. The ecollomic!i ami jil/(lIIci"R of media compallies Fordham UnJ\l'r,ily Prc:". 
Nl'W York. p .. l
ｉｉｾ＠ Doylc:. G. 2002. U"der.HlllldillR ",t,d;u ecol/omin Sage. l.ondon. pp. 17-1 X. 
116 Doyle. G. 2002. Media ou·IIt'rs"ip: Tire ('('o1lom;o u1ld po/ilics of COll\'erRellce al/d cOf/al/'fCI,iof/ if/ 
'he UK alld Ellropea1l media Sage. London. 
117 Hesl1londhalgh. D. 2002. TIll' ell/111m/ i"cllI.\(rin Sage. London. p. ｾｏＮ＠
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advantages of horizontal integration are to exploit the logic of econom'e - f al 118 1 S 0 sc e 
which has long been deemed as the most important incentive for a company to 
119 pursue. 
Figure 1.2 The television industry supply chain 
Content 
Creation 
Content 
rahll' Nl'twork<> 
ｒｲｯ｡ｲｬ｣｡ｾｴ＠ Network<> 
Conduit 
Display 
Cahle Onc'rator<; 
SOllrce: Todreas, T. M. 1999, Vallie creation and bralldillg ill telel'isiol/ 's digital age Quorum Books. 
London. p . .t. 
Horizontal expansIOn occurs m almost all media sectors. In newspapers. the 
numher of the USA newspapers owned by chains has increased from 10 per cent in 
the 1980s to 80 per cent in the 2000S.1 20 In the music industry. Sony has merged with 
118 Economics of scale occur in any industry where marginal costs arc kss than average co,"". Due to 
the mC!dia goods' semi-public feature, and its Vl.'ry high initial prodUl:tion costs and low n:plicalinn 
I.:osls. the total costs will be di\"ided by its ｡ｵ､ｩ･ｮ｣ｾＮ＠ As the economics of scale go up. Ihe production 
cnsts go down and high profits arc ex.pectable. 
119 1999. Applied economics. 8th edn. Financial Times Prentice Hall. Horlow. pp.90-l) I. 
ｉｾＩ＠ Rodman. G. 2001. Melkillg senJe of me dill: All ;fltrodllClioll to 11/(/.\5 nmm"",iCaliof/ Allyn & Bacon. 
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BMG in 2004. In broadcasting, such integration will remain prevalent In the 
foreseeable future. The cable division of Time Warner and Comcast have bought 
h· C ... 2005 J 2 J I Adep la ommumcatlOns In . n the UK cable market, the two largest cable 
companies, NTL and Telewest have now merged. 122 CBS Corporation and Warner 
Bros have decided to close their terrestrial television networks, UPN and the WB, and 
formed a jointly owned channel - CW in 2006. The network will cover 95 per cent of 
USA television homes and both companies hope to enhance market dominance and 
reduce competition. 123 In addition, Intelsat, the satellite operator, has acquired 
PanAmSat for US$3.2 billion. The merger will create the world's largest satellite 
operator with 53 satellites, combining Intelsat's data and telephony fleet with 
PanAmsat's 25 broadcast satellites. 124 
Table 1.2 The world largest cable companies ranked by number of digital cable homes (200"') 
Cable companies (thousands) 
2002 2003 COllntry 
2(}(}-I 
(thousands) (tlwlIs(JIu/s) 
Corneasl USA 2.245.4 7.662.0 8.655.0 
TIme Warner Cable USA 3.747.0 4.349.0 4.806.0 
Charter USA 2.682.0 2.671.9 2.674.7 
Cox USA 1.797A 2.148.0 2A/o.2 
Adelphia USA 1.762.0 1.801.9 1.856.5 
Cahlevisinn USA 216.5 905.5 ＱＮＴｾｮＮｯ＠
NTL UK 1.229.0 1.330.0 1.382.5 
Tclcwesl UK 857.5 987.LJ 1.122.3 
Rogers Canada 401.5 535.3 675.4 
Shaw Canada 41.'.5 490.2 567.2 
UPC France France 8.3 6.5 545.8 
ttong Kong Cahle TV Hong Kong 228.0 .WO.O 526.5 
ｉｮｾｩｧｨｬ＠ USA 335.4 402.9 45t .. ｾ＠
SOllrce: 2(X)5. "Cahlc (Datahox)". Screen DigeST no. July. p. 223. 
Horizontal expansion's purpose is to increase a company's compeliti\"eness within 
a media sector. By way of contrast, vertical integration aims to enhance the power 
over the supply chain. This happens when a corporation buys up other companies 
Boston, pp. 79-81. _ 
III 2005, "Timc Warner and Comcast agree Adelphia". Scree" Dige.\( no. May. p. 1)2. 
m 2(X)5. "UK cahle groups agree to merge". Sera" Di}:l'JT no. Octoher. p. 311. 
m 2006, "CBS and Time Warner merge US networks", Sera" DigeJt no. Fehruary. p. 56. 
ｉｾｾ＠ 2005. "Satellite groups agn'l' l'llmhination", Sera" DixnT no. Septcmher. p. 2XO . 
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involved in different stages of production, distribution, and exhibition of its products, 
d I . . I' 1"5 or eve ops new compames 10 re atlve fields. - A television programme-making 
company might expand 'downstream' to get involved in distribution and delivery. 
such as cable television companies or satellite television companies. Likewise. a cable 
company may like to expand 'upstream' to the television production business by 
. . ak 126 acqUlnng a programme-m er. 
Vertical expansion helps media companies control both content production and 
distribution - the emphatic components of conduit and content. Historically, 
distribution was the most profitable area and was the bottleneck in both the broadcast 
and cable eras. 127 However, content ownership and packaging will become the 
product's core value because the best content will attract audiences. 1 ｾｸ＠ A producer 
that is able to gain greater distribution means it can lower the per-unit production 
costs by selling it to a greater audience, and that it can benefit from 'the distribution 
bottleneck strategy' by building a barrier against competitors. A distributor that is 
involved in the production of content will ensure that the appropriate content supply 
will be delivered through its own distribution infrastructure. In addition, it will reduce 
the transaction costs and time between different stages of the supply chain. Therefore, 
the media company can improve its efficiency and accumulate market power. 129 
The Hollywood film industry exemplified the most successful vertical integration. 
The five majors (Paramount, 20lh Century Fox, Warner Bros, MGM. and RKO) 
integrated all the production elements (e.g. facilities, actors, directors, and other 
creative personnel) and distribution networks (e.g. exhibition theatres) as early as the 
ＱＱｾ＠ Albarran. A. B. 2003. Media l'co"omicJ: U"dersta"di"R markets. i"dustries. a"d concept.\. 2 l.·dn. 
Surjcet Publications. Delhi. p. 31. 
126 Heslllondhalgh. D. 2002. The ell/lllra/ i"dustr;es Sage. London. p. 20. 
m Todrcas. T. M. 1999. Va/lie Cfl'at;o" and branding in te/nision's digital agt' Quorulll Books. 
London. p. II. 
1211 Ibid .• p. 9. 
11'1 Doyle. G. 2002. Undn.\tclIIding meditll'CO"omics Sage. London. pp. 3-l·V'. 
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19205. The film empires continued until the 1940s when the USA courts ordered a 
b ak f h d· 130 Th " . re -up 0 t e stu lOS. US It IS not new for the first tIer global companies (Time 
Warner, Walt Disney, Viacom, Sony, News Corporation, and NBC Universal) to try to 
control the vertical supply chain. 
The third strategy commonly employed by media companies IS diagonal 
expansion, or multimedia integration. It refers to the development of complementary 
activities (e.g. television plus radio) and such cross-media expansion often results in 
synergies and conglomeration. 131 Both vertical and diagonal expansions are designed 
. f 132 b d' h d' to pursue economIes 0 scope y sprea 109 t e core resources an expertIse across 
various sorts of products and ensuring cross-promotion between different types of 
media. Efficiency gains and profit maximization are usually the advantages of such 
arrangements. For a company involved in expanding diagonally, in order to reuse and 
exploit the core products, a recognizable brand and specialized content are key to 
attract a new audience and retain existing consumers. In addition, with the 
development of digitization, which makes it possible to convert all data into a unified 
format, diagonal expansion has facilitated the concentration of ownership and the 
· . f I 'l' ., I" econ0l11les 0 mu tJtormIty ... 
110 Sklar, R. 1994, Mm'ie-l1Iade America: A cullllral history of American 1II00'ies Vintage Books. New 
York. 
1.11 Ihid., pp. 30-31. 
ｉｉｾ＠ Economies of scale are generally available to the companies which are huge enough to engage 
efficil'ntly in multi-product production and related large scale distribution and advertising (Lipsey. R. 
G. & Chrystal. K. A. 1995. All illtroduction to positi\'e l'COIwmics Oxford University Press. Oxford. p. 
ｾＸＰＩＮ＠ The strategy is commonly adopted because media product. content, is suitahle to ｾ＠ ｲ･ｦｯｲｭ｡ｴｴｾ､＠
and repackaged and sold as a whole range of products to a different audience through different media 
channels, 
1.1.1 Albarran, A. B. & Deimmick. J. 1996. "Concentrations and economics of multiformity in the 
communication industril's". Journal of Mel/ia Ecollomic.\', vnl. 9, nn. 4. p. ·n. 
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Table 1.3 Business operations of first-tier global media companies (2006) 
ｔｩｭｾ＠ "orner nolt lJiSlley Sews Corp. Sony H'acom·1 CBSCorp.J ,VBC Universal ｂ･ｲｴｾＯｳｭ｡ｮｮ＠
TV WB.' TBS. CNN. ABC. DI,nc) Fox Nct\\orks. Sky AXN.GSN MTY. VHI. CBS. UPN.' NBC Universal TV RTL TV (Gennan),). 
Channels TNT. Canoon Channel World\\ ide. TV. Star TV. Zee TV. !'ii(kelndeon. BET Showtime. CSTV Network. CNBC. M() (France). Fivc 
Nelwor\. HBO. A&E. ESPN Channel [V). Phoenix Networks Bravo. S(i Fi (UK). RTL(Benelux 
Turner ｃｬ｡ｳｾｩ｣＠ Channel. National region). Anlena :I 
ｍＨｬ｜Ｂｩ･ｾＮ＠ Boomerang Geographic (Spain) 
TV Warner Bros. TV Tou(h,tone TV. Wah Twentieth Century Son} Pictures CBS Paramount TV. NBC Unin:rsal TV UFA Film & TV 
Production ｄｩｾｮｃＩ＠ TV Fox TV Television. Sony King World Studio Production. 
Animation. Buena Pictures Television Frcmanllc 
Vi,ta TV. Buena Vista International Production. CLT-UFA 
Intcrnational TV Intcrnational 
him Warner H rn\ . New Wah Disney ｐｩ｣ｴｵｲ･ｾＮ＠ Fox Fi Imed Columbia TriStar Paramount Pictures. Univcrsal Picturcs Univcrsum Film AG 
ProdUl:ilon Line Touch,tone pictures. Entertainment Motion Pictures Dream Works 
\Vah Disnc) Feature ｇｲｯｵｰｾＮ＠ Sony 
Animation. Pictures 
[)"nc) toon Studios. 
Miramax Pictun:,. 
Hucna Viqa 
International PiClun:s 
ｾｉｵＢ｣＠ Warner Mu,ic Group Hucna Vi,ta 1\lu,ic Sony BMG Fallh)U' MU'.ic Sony H1\IG HMG 
Group. Walt Disney Music Puhlishing 
RccoHb. Holl yw ood 
Records. Lyric Streel 
Records. Wah Disncy 
\Iu,ic Puhli'hing 
Puhll,hlng Time Warner Hook Disney Magazine and Newspapers including Simon & Schuster The world', largest 
Group:: ESPN Maga/.inc: The Ti Illes ( London). book publisher 
(her 150 magazinc, Wah Disney Book New York Pos!. The Ramdom House. 
world\\ Ide. Including Puhlishing Australian: Gruner + Jahr 
People. Sports I\lagaline, including prodUl'l'S more Ihall 
Illustrated. Southern News America ｾｗＧｩ＠ magalines and 
irving. In SI)'le. Real Marketing. The newspapers in owr 
SImple, Weekly Siandard. ｾｯ＠ l'ountnl'S 
Entertalnmenl Gemstar. and TV 
Weeki). TIme. Guide: Hoob 
Fortune. Cooking including 
Llgh!. and Whal" on HarpcrCollins 
1\ Publishers 
1< •• .1111 AHC Radit). F_SPN Fox Ne\\, Radio. Sk) CHS RadIO q channel, in II 
Radio. RadIO Disney Radio ｬＧｯｵｮｬｮｾＧ＠
Idee"II,,!1 A()L Wah I ＩＢｉｬｬＧｾ＠ Inlernct FIn Interacti\e Media Sony Communication ｾ＠ tTV, I" ll'keloJeon CHS DIgital MedIa 
nlernel (irour Nelwork Corporation Wehsrte 
ｾｸ＠
lbemc: 
PaRI 
Hardware 
Disneyland. 
consumer products 
( So-nell 
Electronics products. 
Sony Pictures 
Consumer Products 
Consumer products 
licensing 
Paramount Parks. 
CBS Consumer 
Products 
Universal Park and 
ReSl)r\ 
Universulll Film AG 
theme Park 
Note: I WB and UPN were replaced by a new channel CW which is ajoint venture between WBE (Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc.) and CBS. in Fall 2006. 2 Time ｗ｡ｲｮｾｲ＠
Book Group Inc. C1"WBG") has been sold to Hachette for US$ 538 million in 2006. 3 On December 31,2005. Viacom Inc. was separated into two public companies. 
Viacom changed its name to CBS Corporation. A new corporation inherited the historic name of "Viacom Inc." 
Source: Company literature. 
w 
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Most large media companies nowadays try to strengthen diagonal and veI1ical 
integration. The most high-profile case of vertical/diagonal integration was the merger 
of Time Warner and America Online in January 2000. Not only was it the largest 
merger ever (valued at US$183 billion), but it was also the first merger of 'old' and 
'new' media, combining an internet service provider with a traditional media 
conglomerate. 134 Besides AOL's 27 million dial-up subscribers,135 Time Warner 
brings in the 13 million subscribers from its cable network (Time Warner Cable) and 
30 million subscribers from its magazines (including Time, People. Sports Illustrated, 
Fortune, and MAD). Also included are Time Warner's content productions including 
CNN News Group, movie studio Warner Brothers, HBO, TNT, and the Cartoon 
Network (key properties include Tom & Jerry, Looney TUlles and Pokemon). In 
addition, following the merger, AOL Time Warner shared interest In Direct TV, 
Gateway, Blockbuster, and strategic alliances with GM, Kodak, Sun, Intuit, and 
Wal-Mart. At the time of the acquisition, it was fifth in US market capitalization, only 
behind Microsoft, General Electric, Cisco, and Intel. I36 AOL Time Warner was the 
largest but certainly not the only case in the corporate pursuit of synergies. In May of 
the same year, Spanish internet group Terra Network (owned by Spain's largest 
telephone company), bought fourth-ranked US internet search company Lycos for 
US$12.5 billion and agreed to a strategic alliance with Bertelsmann. The latter 
company supplies Terra Lycos with content in the form of television. music, films, 
and books. In December, French media corporation Vivendi acquired Canal Plus, the 
European biggest pay-TV company, and Canada's Seagram, owner of Universal 
1.\4 Faulhaber. G. 2002. "Network effects and merger analysis: Instant messaging and the AOL-Time 
Warner casl···. TelecOllll1lllllicaliollJ Policy. \'01. 20. no. 5/6. p. 311. 
ｕｾ＠ At the time of the acquisition. AOL's 27 million subscribers amounted 10 about -W per cent of total 
US marh'l. The second largest online provider was Earthlink. with ｾＮＷ＠ million subscriber\, The third 
was Microsoft·s MSN. with ｾ＠ million subscribers (Ibid.). 
1.'6 Ihid .. pp. 3 I I -3 I 2: Thompson. D. N. 2003. "AOL Time Warner. Terra Lyell\,. V" cndi. and the: 
transformation of marketing". Journal ofBIIJille.\s Research. \'01. 56. no. II. pp. XO I·X62. 
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Studio and Universal Music, creating the renowned Vivendi-Universal. 137 
Table 1.4 Major mergers and acquisitions or media companies (1989-2006) 
Date 
1989 
1994 
1994 
1995 
1995 
1995 
1995 
1998 
1998 
1999 
1999 
1999 
1999 
1999 
20m 
2000 
2000 
2000 
2004 
2004 
2005 
2005 
2005 
2005 
2005 
2006 
2006 
2(Xl6 
2(X)6 
Note: 
AcquirinK company 
Time 
Viacom 
Viacom 
Disney 
Time Warner 
Seagram 
Westinghouse 
AT&T' 
Seagram 
Carlton' 
Viacom 
AT&T 
AT&T 
Infinity Broadcasting 
Gemstar International 
AOL' 
Terra Networks 
Vivendi 
News Corporation 
Sony Music' 
NBC 
Time Warner/ 
Comcast 
Sony 
Intdsat 
NTL 
Liberty Glohal 
Acquired company (new Price (US$ 
name in brackets) billions) EfpandinR ｾｰ･＠
Warner Comms 14.1 
(lime-Warner) 
Paramount Comms 8.0 
Blockbuster 8.5 
Capital Cities/ABC 1.9 
Turner Broadcasting 7.4 
MCA (Universal) 5.7 
CBS 5.4 
TCULiberty Media' 48! 
PolyGram 10.6 
United' 8.0! 
CBS 22 
Tele-communication 69.89 
West's MediaOne 63.11 
Outdoor Systems 63.11 
TV Guide 14.66 
Time-Warner' 183 
(AOL Time-Warner) 
Lycos 12.5 
Seagram/Universal 35 
Direct TV 6.8 
BMG' (Sony BMG) N/A 
Vivendi Universal 14 
Adelphia 17.7' 
ｍｇｍｾ＠ 4.8 
PanAmSat 3.2 
Telewest 6 
Swiss Cablecom 2.18 
Diagonal (publishing with 
broadcasting/musidfi 1m) 
Diagonal (broadcasting/cable \\ ith ｰｵ｢ｬｩｾｨｩｮ＠
g. film and theme park) 
Vertical (distribution) 
Vertical (content creation and distributi,'n) 
Vertical (content and distribution) 
Diversification 
Diversification 
Diagonal (Telecoms-media l:omergenl:e) 
Diversification 
Horizontal (major European media groups 
merge) 
Vertical (consolidates broadcasting/Cable) 
Horizontal (telecoms) 
Diagonal (telecoms with cable) 
Diagonal (broadcasting with ｡､ｶ･ｲｴｩｾｩｮｧ＠
Horizontal (magazine) 
Diagonal (internet with media conglomerate) 
Horizontal (major Spanish internet group with 
LIS internet company) 
Diagonal and Di\ersifil:ation (diversified 
leisure conglomerate dive"ifies further) 
VerticaUHoriwntal (consolidation of umtent 
and distribution) 
Horizontal (major worldwide music groups 
merge) 
Diagonal and Diversification tdiH:rsified 
leisure conglomerate diversifies further) 
Horizontal (media conglomerate and cable 
operator with cable) 
VerticaUHorilOntal (consolidation of conh:nt 
and distribution) 
Horizontal (major satellite groups merge) 
Horizontal (major UK cable groups merge) 
Horizontal (pan-European cable with natiunal 
cable) 
Walt Disney Pixar Animation 7.4 Horizontal and Diagonal (traditional media 
conglomerate with digital animation) 
Viacom DreamWorks 1.6 Horizontal (media conglomerate with film) 
Time Warner' CBS (eW)' N/A Horizontal (major US net\\ork) 
Google YouTube 1.65 Horizontal (Internet giants merge) 
I designates a merger. 2 designates the value of new merged company .. ｾ＠ The acquisition is made 
hy Timc Warncr NY LLC ("TW NY"). a suhsidiary of Time Warner Cable Inc (TWC Inc.). TWC will 
pay US$9.2 hillion in cash plus TWC Inc. stock. and Comcast will pay US$3.5 hillion in cash. 4 MGM 
(Mctro-Goldwyn-Maycr) majors in worldwide distrihution. marketing and sales of thl.: cxpandcd 
catalogue which contains around 7.5(X) films and 45.4(x) tcle\ision cpisodcs. 
Sources: Company literaturc.: 2000. "Top 30 media acquisitions", Adrertising Age, \01. 71. no. 35, p. 
s 16.: 2004, "Pulling it alltogether"', Broadcasting & Cable, vol. D4. no. ｾｏＮ＠ pp. 10-1 I.: ｾＨＩＨＩＵＮ＠ "Liherty 
Glohal agrl'cs Swiss cahlc huy", Screen Digest no. Octoher, p. 31 ｾＮＺ＠ ｾＰＰＵＬ＠ "Sony finali/cs MGM 
acquisition", Seral/ Digest no. May, p. 151.: 2005, "Time Warner and COl11cas\ agrl'l.: Addphia", 
1.17 Thompson, D. N. 2003, "AOL Time Warner. Terra Lyc()s. Vivcndi. and thc transformation of 
marh·ting", JOllrnal of ｂｬｬｳｩＬＬｾＮ｜Ｎ｜Ｂ＠ Rt'St'arch. vol. 56. no. II. pp. X61-X66 . 
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Screen Digest no. May, p. 152.; 2005, "Top 50 entertainment companies", Screen Digest no. july. pp. 
198-199.; 2006, "CBS and Time Warner merge USA networks", Screen Digest no. February. p. 56.: 
2006, "Disney acquires a way into digital future", Screen Digest no. February, p. 55.; 2006. "Google 
buys video site YouTube", Screen Digest no. October, p. 343.: Faulhaber. G. 2002, "Network effects 
and merger analysis: Instant messaging and the AOL-Time Warner case". Telecommunications Policy. 
vol. 26, no. 5/6, pp. 311-333.; Glover, R., Lowry, T., Yang, C, Capell, K., & Kripalani. M. 2004. 
"Rupert's world", Busilless Week no. 3866, pp. 52-60.; Thompson, D. N. 2003, "AOl Time Warner. 
Terra lycos, Vivendi, and the transformation of marketing", Joumal of Business Research. \"01. 56. no. 
J J. pp. 86) -866. 
Although media expansion peaked when an increasing number of mergers took 
place, it also raised serious concerns about the substantial benefit of such merged 
companies. The difficulties of the merger between AOL and Time Warner and the 
break-up of Vivendi Universal have called the compatibility of organizational cultures 
into question. However, those cases of disaggregation seem not to affect the strategic 
media expansion of the other companies. Organic growth in cable, network, and 
satellite pay-TV has kept making large groups bigger. Since 2005, Comcast, Cox, 
Cablevision, and Liberty Media not only major in cable channels. but also operate 
networks. Liberty Media, in particular, has taken full control of United Global 
Communications in 2005 to create a multinational cable group. 1-'8 Diagonal 
consolidation is prevailing in the media industry (see Table 1.4) but it not confined to 
media companies. There is also a trend of diversification, which results in some media 
companies being owned by non-media corporations, or media companies expanding 
in non-media areas (see, for instance, see General Electric's acquisition of NBC and 
Universal Studios). 
Illl :!005. "Top 50 entertainment companies". Scree" Digest no. July. pp. J ｾｾＭＱＹｾＮ＠
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Table 1.5 First-tier conglomerates in the global cultural industry, 2006 (including all related 
industries) 
World ranking by media Media turnO\'er in US$ billion 
turnover in brackets 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Time Warner (I) 35.324 37.3 ]4 39.563 42.089 42.401 ｾｾＮＲＲｾ＠
Walt Disney (2) 25.172 25.329 27.06] 30.752 ＳＱＮＹｾ＠ ｾﾷｴＲｈＵ＠
Viacom (3) J 18.240 19.186 20.827 22.682 ＲｾＮＱＴＹ＠ 2S.7H6 
News Corporation (4) 13.699 15.070 17.380 20.802 23.859 ＲＵＮｾｮ＠
Sony (5) 2 19.019 23.235 23.226 19.048 16.658 18.303 
NBC Universal (6) 12.9 ＱｾＮＷ＠
Bertelsmann (7) 14.862 14.339 13.692 13.324 ＱｾＮＰＰＹ＠
Note: J On December 31, 2005, Viacom Inc. was separated into two public companies. Viacom 
changed its name to CBS Corporation. A new corporation inherited the historic name of "Viacom Inc:' 
2 Figures exclude revenues from electronics and other financial services not related to the culture 
industry. They include music, film, television, game, and telecommunications. 
Source: Company annual reports from 2001 to 2006. 
All the horizontal, vertical, and diagonal expansion has been carried out in order 
to exploit economic benefits at an international level. This international expansion has 
taken place because media executives believe that through acquisitions, mergers, or 
partnerships, their media companies can sell large amounts of extra copies to foreign 
markets. 139 For one thing, economies of scale and of scope gained through 
international expansion can be higher than on the domestic marketplace. In addition, 
the production costs can be reduced by a large sale base, and the foreign operation of 
products and techniques might lead a company to even higher economies of scale. 140 
In order to cope with high risks stemming from foreign markets' political, 
economic, and cultural barriers, the entry modes of an international corporation for 
foreign markets are varied. According to Franklin Root (1994), exporting, licensing, 
joint venture, acquisition, and the establishment of a subsidiary are among the 
strategies applied for cross-border entry. In the television industry, content exporting 
is the easiest way of reaching an overseas market. The advantage of economies of 
I.lQ Heslllondhalgh. D. 2002. The cultllral illdustries Sage. London. p. 20. 
140 Smith. A. 1991. The age of behemoths: The globali:.atioll of milH media jiml'\ Priority Press 
Publicalions. New York. p. 5R. 
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scale is therefore enlarged. However, the exported products do not necessarily have to 
be programmes. A brand, an idea, or a programme format can also be exported by 
licensing a foreign company (the licensee) to use those concepts. Between 2002 and 
2004, the worldwide production value of formats has grown by 32.6 per cent, from 
US$1.406 billion to US$1.875 billion. The total broadcasting format hours reached 
] 5,656 hours in 2004. The most important exporting countries are the UK. the 
Netherlands, and the USA. Celador's game show Who Wants To Be A Millionaire?, 
the BBC's The Weakest Link, FremantlesMedia's Idols, and Endemol's Big Brothers 
are among the best-know television formats. 141 
Table 1.6 Top 10 programme format exporters (ranked by total hours 2002-200"') 
2002 2003 2004 TotaI2002-2()(}.J 
UK 3.010 3.666 3.759 10.471 
Netherlands I, 762 2.480 2.569 6.81 I 
USA 1.758 1.952 2.236 5.945 
Australia 1.02 I 957 718 2.696 
Sweden 261 343 558 1.161 
France 275 3 I 7 340 932 
Norway 35 106 482 632 
Denmark 155 220 202 576 
Italy 144 165 191 500 
Argentina 141 132 182 456 
Source: 2005, "World trade in television formats". Screen Digest no. April. pp. 100-101. 
If a corporation is willing to take risks and wants to invest more substantially in 
foreign markets, gaining ownership control of an overseas entity becomes crucial. 
Establishing a joint venture with a foreign local partner is usually the first step. It not 
only helps to reduce exposure to risk but also enables a company to avoid making 
crucial mistakes due to lack of local knowledge. Besides forming a joint company. a 
joint venture can also be a co-operative project or co-production of teleyision 
I·" programmes. -
141 2005, "World trade in television formats", Sen'ell Digest no. April. pp. 100-101, 
ＱｾＱ＠ Asheghian, P. & Ebrahillli. B. 1990. I",emational busilless: Economics. e1l\'irc"'I1It'IIt. and 
Jtrategies Harpcrcollins Colledge. New York. pp. ｾｮＭｾＲｾＬ＠
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A foreign-local joint venture essentially means that both parties share the risk and 
investment, but the payback period for transnational companies is ex pected to be 
long. 143 In addition, both the cultural and organizational differences between the 
foreign and local companies may cause internal conflict and thus reduce 
organizational efficiency. The break-up of Vivendi-Universal illustrates the internal 
crisis brought into being by the distrust of Hollywood executives and French 
conglomerate - when the Hollywood experts distrusted the capacity of the French to 
handle a US-based media business, the organic synergy turned out to be nominal and 
highly redundant. Thus, most large international corporations tend to foml sole 
ventures, through either acquisition of an existing company or the launch of a new 
suhsidiary. Acquiring a company with its all products and personnel is the most direct 
method of involvement in an overseas ｭ｡ｲｫ･ｴＮｬｾ＠ For instance, the pan-European 
cahle company, Liberty Global, acquired Swiss cable giant Cablecom in 2005, 
whereby immediately adding two million customers to its 15 million pan-European 
suhscriher base. 145 It is the fastest way not only to gain local skills and knowledge but 
also to exploit a local market with a shorter retum-on-investment period. 
In contrast, forming a new subsidiary is the riskiest and costliest strategy. In order 
to gain the greatest possible control, diversified conglomerates like, whenever 
possihle. to estahlish a new subsidiary without any local partner involved. This can 
often heen seen when the international company has a glohal strategy, but it is fatal 
for the parent company if its knowledge of the local market is incomplete. ＱｾＶ＠ For 
instance. in 2004. despite attempting to penetrate the Indian movies market through 
Hollywood hlockhusters and distrihution of local films, Twentieth Century Fox still 
14' Rool. F. R. 1994. Emf"\' stmteRies/or imematiollal markets Lexinglon Books. New York. p. ＱｾＵＮ＠
I .... Gershon. R. A. 2000 .. "The transnational media corporation: Environmental scanning and straleg) 
formulation". The JOllnwl 0/ Media Ecollomics. \0J. 13. no. 2. p.92. 
ＱＴｾ＠ 2005. "Liberty Global agrees Swiss cable buy", Scree" Digest no. October. p .. ｾ＠ 12. 
146 Asheghian. P. & Ebrahimi. B. 1990. IfltematiOlwl nluifle.\.{: Enmomin. t'l1\,;roll",eflt. al/(I 
Jlrtlt('Xit'J Htlrpcrc:ollins Colledge. New York. p. ｾＲＹＮ＠
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suffered losses and had to close its mam Indian theatrical distribution office. I ",7 
Hollywood majors have not yet acquired enough knowledge of the India film market. 
and therefore Hollywood films have yet to make substantial impact on the market. 
On the global stage, companies' international competitive strategy can be 
distinguished on the grounds of two principles: local adaptation and global 
standardization. 148 The proportion of the adoption of both principles depends very 
much on the company's attitude towards international activities. Howard Perlmutter 
distinguishes three orientations towards global expansIon: ethnocentric or 
home-country oriented; polycentric or host-country ｯｲｩ･ｮｴ･､ｾ＠ and geocentric or 
world-oriented. 149 An ethnocentric media company tends to maintain the identity of 
its country of origin, and thus the content and management are inclined to be 
'home-made' and centralized. A polycentric media company. on the other hand, 
recognizes the cultural differences of the host country and admits local taste will 
decide where the market goes. Media content is tailored to local demand and most of 
the programmes are produced specifically for local preferences. In contrast, a 
geocentric media company is keen to avoid being perceived as biased either towards 
the home country an overseas market. Such companies aim to be truly global and 
generate the best products without characteristics of nationality. Thus, media content 
and management are de-nationalized and world-oriented. 150 
The forming of an international expansion strategy depends mostly on the 
attitudes of a company and how they manage the balance between the local and the 
global. Based on the global standardization/local adaptation framework, Christopher 
J.I7 2(X)5. "Fox closes film distrihution arm in India". Scrt'el/ Digest no. Fehruary. p. 55. 
1411 Kumar. N. B. 199R. "Glohal competitive strategies for the European domestil: market:' in Global 
coml'etiti\'(' strategie.\ ill the lIew world ecollomy: Multi/ateralism. regicmali:.atioll III/d the 
trclIIsllll1icmaljirm. H. Mirfa. cd., Edward Elgar Puhlishing. Cheltenham. p. :n. 
ｉｾｾ＠ Perlmutter. H. V. 2(XX). "The tortuous evolution of the multinational ｾＺｮｲｰｯｲ｡ｴｩｯｮＺＧ＠ in Trclll.\lItlfiOlIClI 
mCIIlClgt'mem: Text. ClIS('.\, alld readings ill cro.'iS-horder IIwlIllgem('IIt. 3rd cdn. C. A. Bartklt & S. 
Ghoshnl. cds .. McGraw-HilI. Boston. p. 75. 
ｉｾ＠ Ihid .. p. 77. 
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Bartlett and Sumantra Ghoshal (1998) identified four strategies for companies that 
cross borders: multinational, global, international and transnational. A multinational 
company is very sensitive to local differences, and its products have a low score in 
global standardization. The primary strategy is to build subsidiaries in target markets. 
which are decentralized from the parent company and are self-sufficient.I)1 They 
develop and retain knowledge in accordance with the needs of the host countries, and 
are seen as stand-alone operations. The content they produce is also tailored to local 
needs. 152 A company with a multinational strategy is usually polycentric-orientated. 
Figure 1.3 Variants of cross-border strategies 
high 
Global Transnational 
Strategy Strategy 
International Multinational 
Strategy Strategy 
low 
low • high 
Local Adaptation 
Source: ｾＨＩｏｏＬ＠ Transnational manageme1ll: Text. cases, and readings ill cross-border managemellt. 3rd 
cdn. McGraw-HilI. Boston. 
By way of contrast, global strategy is the common approach adopted by a 
company with high global standardization and low local adaptation. Efficiency at a 
global level is the deciding factor behind this tactic and all decisions - strategic and 
I'>' Bartlell. C. A. & Ghoshal. S. 1998. Managing lICross hore/as: The 1rc1ll.mllliOlIClI .wllllic",. 2nd cdn. 
Hurvard Business School Press. Boslon. Mass. p. 75. 
Ｂｾ＠ Yip. G. S. 2000. "Global stratcgy ... in a world of nations," in Trall.HlCllic",al mtlllClgcl1/c,,': Tt'.\I. 
CCl.\(·J alld readillgft ill croft!i-horcler mallllgemelll. 3rd cdn. C. A. Ban1t:tt & S. Ghoshal. cd ..... 
McGraw-HilI. Boston. p. 391. 
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operational - are highly centralized in the parent company.153 Overseas operations are 
only expected to implement strategies from the parent company. When content is 
transferred to the markets, a standard core product with minimal local adaptation is 
ideal. 154 A company with a global strategy is usually either ethnocentric-oriented or 
geocentric-oriented. 
For a company with low local adaptation and low global standardization, a viable 
international strategy is to transfer and adapt the parent company's knowledge and 
• l"' k 155 Th b . expertIse to lorelgn mar ets. e parent company exerts su stantlal but less 
control over resources of core competencies as compared to that of a global company. 
Overseas units can adapt products and ideas from the centre, but less freely than that 
of a multinational company. Their role is to adapt and leverage the parent company's 
competencies and usually only for content transfer. 156 Those programmes are 
normally produced for the domestic market but will be exported with little adaptation 
to overseas markets once a buyer is found. 157 These companies with an international 
strategy are basically ethnocentric. 
Compared with the above-mentioned models, a transnational strategy is relatively 
eclectic and reflects the notion of 'think global, act local'. The organization is 
characterized as being dispersed, interdependent and specialized. By adopting a 
transnational strategy, some core resources will be centralized within the domestic 
market to protect the parent company's competencies. However. such a strategy also 
ｉｾＮｬ＠ Bartlett. C. A. & Ghoshal. S. I 99tt Mal/aging across borders: The Irclll.maTiol/cJl solut;ol/. 2nd edn. 
Harvard Business School Press. Boston. Mass. p. 16. 
ｉｾ＠ Kumar. N. B. 1998. "Global competitive strategies for the European domestic market." in Global 
compet;ti,'e strategies iI/ the l/eU' world ecol/omy: MlIltiiateralism. regicJIIllli:'lITioll llllli The 
trarwUltiOlwl fi,.",. H. Mirza. cd .. Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenh .. m. p. 35. 
ｉｾｾ＠ Bartlett. C. A. & Ghoshal. S. 1998. Mal/agi"g across borders: The tf(l1l.\l/citicmal .w/uTicJI/. 2nd cdn. 
Harvard Business School Press. Boston. Mass. p. 17. 
ｉｾ＠ Ibid .. 75. 
ＱｾＷ＠ Yip. G. S. :WOO. "Global strategy ... in a world of nations," in Trclll.wcltiollal mal/agemt'I/T: rnt. 
CtlSt'J a"d rt'adi"gs ill cross-border ",a"agt'mt,,,t. 3rd cdn. C. A. Bartlett & S Ghoshal. cds .. 
McGraw-HilI. Boston. p. 391. 
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centralizes some resources abroad and distributes some other resources among its 
overseas operations. The distribution of assets and resources is organized as an 
'integrated network', which highlights the flows of components, products, resources. 
people, and information that are managed in the transnational. Having recognized the 
fact that different parts of the company possess diverse capabilities, the overseas units 
contribute differentially to the integrated worldwide operations and the knowledge is 
jointly developed and shared worldwide. 158 Overseas units are coordinated in order to 
gain global efficiency. The structure and processes of the organization, and the media 
content, are adapted and tailored to meet local needs and tastes. The transnational 
strategy takes into account the synergy of central goals, and overseas units arc chosen 
in accordance with their potential contribution to a)) business operations worldwide. 159 
In general, a company with a transnational strategy is more geocentric-oriented but a 
polycentric orientation is also possible. 
1.6 Objectives and aims of the research 
The consolidation of non-Western media conglomerates and the rise of regional media 
markets have created much interest. After John Sinclair (1996) coined the term 
'geo-linguistic region', research followed on regional media spaces such as Latin 
America and the Middle East. 160 Likewise, this study comprehends Greater China as 
a geo-linguistic region, or a regional media space. As a result of the dual impact of 
liberalization and privatization. the pan-Chinese market has emerged as a significant 
power in the world system. In this dissertation, I claim that the regional television 
ＱｾＸ＠ Bartlcll. C. A. & Ghoshal. S. 1998. Mallagillg across borders: The trclllsllatiolllli soilltioll. 2nd edn. 
Harvard Business School Press. Boston. Mass. pp. 65-81. 
ＱｾＹ＠ Kumar, N. B. 1998. "Glohal competitivc strategies for the European domestic market:' in Global 
compeliti,'e .'ilrategies ill tire IIew u'orld ecollomy: Mllitilateralism. regiollali:arioll alld rhe 
tfCl1I.maticmal fir",. H. Mirza. ed .. Edward Elgar Puhlishing. Cheltenham. p. ｾＨＬＮ＠
IhO See Sakr, N. 2001, Satellite real",,,,: Trclllsllarimwi relel'is;cm. globali:llIioll alld rhe Middle Emf I. B. 
Tauris. London.; Sinclair. J. 1999. Lati" America" relel'i",ioll: A global "i/',,· Oxford Univl'r'"Y Press. 
Oxford. 
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industry has been gomg through a dramatic transfonnation following chanoino 
e e 
patterns of global media flows. Small and local companies in quest of new markets 
have launched countless regional TV channels that expand beyond the boundaries of 
their 'home' territory. Similarly, global media corporations, anxious to set foot in the 
promising Chinese market, have adopted localized strategies to gain market shares in 
the country. This research presents an overview of these transnational corporate 
practices and the resulting transformation of the Greater China's television industry. 
The restructuring of the regional media space, broadcasting policy and the 
implementation of corporate strategies will each be examined in turn. Thus the 
thesis's main objectives are as follows: 
I. To review the development of the Greater China television industry. The 
emerging characteristics and the multi-layered television space will be 
investigated. 
2. To review broadcasting policy and media governance in the region. Policies 
adopted by the governments of Mainland China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, at 
national, regional and global levels, will be investigated with the aim of 
assessing the potential of regional and international co-operation. 
3. To analyze the cross-border strategies implemented by global media 
corporations 111 the region, such as entry tactics, production (i.e. 
programming) and distribution (i.e. TV channels) strategies. These strategies 
playa crucial role in the opening up of the Greater China regional media 
space. 
4. To probe the transformation of local and regional television corporations. 
Strategies deployed by Chinese television companies are vital for the 
establishment of a regional television market. 
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5. To analyze the structure of the Greater China television space. The key 
elements and the general fonnation of this marketplace will be depicted. 
Although regional economies and business strategies have been examined in many 
studies since the 1990s,161 this research looks into aspects of media strategies which 
have been rarely studied in the Great China region before. Therefore, this research 
hopes to make a significant contribution to television studies, media glohalization and 
regionalization studies and strategic management studies. 
1.7 Methodology 
The core of this research is empirical in character. It interweaves in-depth interviews 
and secondary data analysis. The main objective of this dissertation is to analyze the 
process of media globalization in Greater China through a comparative study of eight 
mini case studies. In addition, this study will analyze the correlation between my 
conclusions on the nature of media globalization and the findings from the case 
studies. 
As stated above, this study is based on empirical research conducted in eight 
global and regional companies - six first-tier global conglomerates and two regional 
companies. The research set out to investigate the ethos, cross-operations and 
strategies of transnational television companies on the development of worldwide 
television industry in the contexts of media globalization. I deemed the selection of 
these companies appropriate for this research for the following reasons. 
The six first-tier corporations chosen are News Corporation, Viacom, Time Warner, 
Walt Disney, Sony Corporation, and NBC Universal. The selection of these first-tier 
161 Sl't.'. for example:. 1999. T"'t'IIf-,,-First Cellt"ry Ecol/omics: PenpfCti\'l's of Socioeccmomin for a 
Challging World Macmillan Prl'SS. London. 
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compames IS based on Herman's and McChesney's categorization. 162 All these 
companies are ranked at the top of the world media industry. In addition, the core 
interest of this research is about the changes that are taking place in the television 
industry in Greater China. Thus although there is another global conglomerate _ 
Bertelsmann - among the first-tiers, its television businesses has not expanded into 
the market and the player was not selected. 
The second type of targeted companies focuses on the internationalization of 
regional/national players. Two Chinese second-tier regional players - TVB and 
Phoenix TV - will be analyzed. These two companies were chosen because of their 
revenue, high brand awareness among the Chinese and their substantial expansion 
across the Chinese communities. 
Since the terms of organizational access did not permit ethnographic research (my 
preferred method since it can often facilitate collection of richer, more contextually 
sensitive, longitudinal data), instead I carried out 15 in-depth interviews with 
respondents in a variety of positions across these companies. The interviews were 
carried out between March 2005 and February 2006. I was interested in eliciting the 
opinions of respondents in three categories: representatives of companies' overseas 
units that influence the company policy, media professionals or directors in marketing 
department involved in cross-border activities, and experts from academic centers. An 
initial set of study participants was selected based on Rubin. and Rubin's (1995: 66) 
recommended criteria for study participation: knowledge of the research subject, 
willingness to talk, and diversity in perspectives. To supplement these initial 
perspectives, a form of network sampling helped secure additional interviews during 
the course of the fieldwork. In the end, these respondents included two presidents and 
ｉｦｉｾ＠ Sl'C page IX for F Herman's and McChesney's categorization. Hcrman. E. S. & McChesney. R. W. 
1l)l)7. rllt' global media: TIre Ill'''' mi.uiOllllrit's of corporate capiw!ism Arnold. London. 
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four vice presidents of these companies' overseas subsidies in Greater China. seven 
marketing directors/advisors and managers of their creative/content departments, and 
two academics, giving me a mix of perspectives on the research questions. 
Interviews with high-ranking television executives are vital for the understanding 
of the regional television industry. This is particularly crucial for the analysis of both 
global and regional/local companies, their commercial strategies, attitudes towards 
competition, uses of resources and collaboration agreements. These interviews 
generate important insight into the formulation of regionalized loci and the interaction 
between local, regional and global forces. The semi-structured interviews lasted 
between 40 minutes and one-and-a-half hour and were recorded and then transcribed. 
Most interviews took place at each interviewee's office, except for two interviews that 
were conducted via telephone. Interviews were conducted in the language preferred 
by interviewees (English or Mandarin) and most of them opted for Mandarin. The 
domains of inquiry encompassed operations, priorities for cooperation aspects that 
facilitate and preclude expansion, and the impact of national, regional and global 
regulation. Several participants also provided observational materials for data analysis, 
including newspaper articles, pamphlets, and other printed materials. 
The second phrase followed the analysis of the data collected during the 
interviews. Apart from those materials provided by the interviewees, the data used in 
this study is based on an extensive review of literature, ranging from secondary 
sources encompassing business statistics, academic articles, company yearbooks and 
reports. Governmental sources include policy documents, reports and legislation. In 
this manner, the transcribed interview data and observational materials were read and 
analyzed repeatedly to discover key concepts, or categories. A simultaneous reading 
of the literature on globalization theory, the cultural industries, and the cross-border 
management revealed four fundamental typologies that resonated with groupings of 
ＵＮｾ＠
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transnational companies. Finally, these category groupings emerged and helped to 
construe the architecture of competition and the trend of glocalization in the Greater 
China television space. 
Although there is problem involving the recurrent question of validity. such 
secondary analysis employed is complementary to this research and significantly 
enriches the perspectives of this study. Based on large empirical documentary 
evidence and in-depth interviews, the question of validity is thus reduced. In addition. 
these data were complemented by information obtained from many informal meetings 
and conversations with dozens of television personnel and professionals in the Greater 
China television industry. I have organized the presentation of my findings in the 
following chapters according to the different development and strategies of these 
companIes. 
I should also point out that a key limitation with my study lies in the fact that for 
reasons of confidentiality, I cannot reveal either some names or the occupational 
status of the interviewees. This is pru1icularly the case when doing media research in 
Mainland China where the television industry is regarded as a sensitive state 
apparatus and related information is deemed as a kind of 'national secret'. While I 
have presented their perspectives in the content of this research and tried to indicate 
which organizations the respondents work for as much as possible when I quote them, 
I cannot therefore provide broader overall conclusions regarding the role of their 
organizational status or descriptive characteristics. Having said that, attention is 
drawn in the data presentation to some of the common backgrounds and experiences 
of those tasked across these companies, which seem to have structured their responses 
to the questions in similar ways. FinaJly, all participants contributed equally to the 
findings in this research. no particular set of participants dominate the quotes 
referenced helow. 
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1.8 Framework of analysis 
Television regionalization - not an original phenomenon in itself - can be considered 
to be so in the context of multi-level interaction between the local and the global in 
the television industry. In addition, such complex developments are moulded by 
internal and external forces such as pan-regional cultural similarity, governmental 
institutionalization and business strategies. In this research, the analysis framework 
enables me to highlight the following points (see Figure 1.4): 
Figure 1.4 Research structure 
Distance of differences between global/regionaillocal players to the regional Market 
• .. 
Locall The Glohal 
f---+ .. ｾ＠ ｾ＠Regional ... Greater Players 
Players Regionalization China Localization 
.. I+- .... .. Globalization p Regional Regionalization ..... 
Policy 
Market 
Policy 
Economy ｾ＠ .. +- ｾ＠ Economy ... 
Culture Culture 
ｾｉｬ＠ ｾ＠
Cross-Border Strategies and Models 
• Multinational • Channel Distribution 
• International • Programmes Trade 
• Global • ｓｴｲ｡ｴ･｜ｾｩ｣＠ alliances e 
• Transnational • Local Production Base 
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I. The locus of media development is multi-layered, depending on the specific 
region and context chosen. Intricate changes involved in the processes of 
globalization include regionalization, localization, glocalization and 
hybridization. 
2. Potential profit is the driving force behind these media companies' overseas 
expansion. The extent of their commitment to the process of globalization is 
dependent upon the degree of difference between the companies and their 
targeted market. That is to say, global players will be committed to more 
localization/regionalization in order to approach local audiences. Likewise. 
local firms will have to go regional/global in the hope of gaining overseas 
revenue. 
3. In order to enhance competitiveness, television companies employ various 
strategies such as horizontal, vertical and diagonal integration. In the process 
of globalization, these practices are implemented overseas in the form of 
multinational, international, global and transnational strategies, so that 
cross-border television businesses can be managed. Based on these 
approaches, television players expand into territories beyond by selling 
programmes, launching channels, allying with local partners or even setting 
up their local production units. 
4. The process or globalization/localization IS influenced by three maIO 
conditions: the regional media space, policy and governance issues, and the 
media production system. These conditions are reflections of the cultural. 
political and economic context. In addition, each element (cultural. political 
and economic) depends on the different operating levels (local. regional and 
global) but is connected with one another. Governance and regional culture. 
for instance. might comprise of national. regional. and global force:-.. and can 
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therefore drive the television space towards a different developing path. 
5. This research is grounded on the theoretical framework of political economy. 
The regional media space is driven by the dynamics of globalization, i.e. 
political, economic, sociocultural, and security factors. Thus any 
investigation involving media strategies is incomplete without an in-depth 
contextual analysis. 
This dissertation consists of seven chapters. The first chapter is an introduction 
and a guide to the dissertation. It outlines the development of the theories of 
international communication, based on the successive paradigmatic shifts in this field 
and interpretation of diverse approaches. In addition, this chapter delineates the 
concepts of the global, the regional and the local in the context of media globalization. 
with the ongoing development of global and regional media systems serving as a 
background to mirror the progress of the television industry in Greater China. This 
chapter also sketches this research's aims, objectives and conceptual framework. 
Chapter 2 deals with the structure of Greater China's regional marketplace. The 
concepts of cultural affinity and the geo-linguistic are examined in the context of 
Greater China's regional media space. In the first part of this chapter, the main 
concern is to unravel how the similarities between language, tradition, religion. and 
history give the region is distinctive flavour. The second part focuses on the landscape 
of the tclevision industry. Global and regional/local corporations are differentiated in 
order to clarify their involvement in international activities and map out the rcgion's 
media ecology. The dynamics between the cultures and diversity of television systems 
in Mainland China. Hong Kong, and Taiwan, and the genesis of a convergent market 
are taken into account. 
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Chapter 3 investigates the different layers of regulation that control the reaional 
b 
television industry. Global and national policy regimes are both crucial. The WTO and 
regional trade agreements - such as CEPA - have had a significant impact on the 
television industry. The WTO in particular has driven change in national policy and 
contributed to modify the role of the nation-state across the region. Thus the cultural 
identity and television industry have gone through unprecedented transformations. 
Mainland China's media consolidation, Hong Kong's free market orientation and 
Taiwan's media-order reconstruction symbolize divergent responses to media 
global ization. 
Chapter 4, Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 examine the television production systems and 
corporate players' international business strategies. In Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. key 
transnational channels are reviewed and major global companies in Greater China are 
studied. Apart from the analysis of the general approach adopted by glohal 
corporations such as Time Warner, Disney, Viacom and Sony, the cross-border 
strategies of these corporations are also examined. Transnationalization and 
deterritorialization are identified as key trends in the current restructuring. Television 
industries and networks are analyzed. The structure of those television companies, as 
well as their channel operations and business practice within the Greater China, are 
also analyzed. 
In Chapter 6, I look into the regional television players in Greater China. While 
global companies are engaged in worldwide expansion, major Chinese television 
corporations endeavour to streamline organizational structure and improve their 
performance on the regional television market. I offer two case studies - Phoenix TV 
and Television Broadcasting (TVB). The case studies focus on the international 
strategy of these companies and analyze their husiness practices as a responsl' to thl' 
transfonnation of the regional media space. 
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In Chapter 7, I summarize my findings about the cross-border strategies of global 
and regional television players and evaluate the formation of the Greater China 
television space. It is argued that in light of the impact of globalization, the conflict 
between the local and the global, and the internationalization strategies of 
national/regional media players, the Greater China television industry is moving 
slowly towards a transnational regional media system. 
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The concept of 'Greater China' can be dated from the 1930s but it only gained its 
growing currency because of the growth of the cross-border economy among its 
members in the late 20th century. 163 It refers to the grouping of Mainland China, Hong 
Kong and Taiwan. Officially, Mainland China represents the People's Republic of 
China (PRC); Hong Kong means the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of 
the People's Republic of China (Hong Kong SAR); and Taiwan is the Republic of 
China (ROC) as it calls itself. Although in broader terms Greater China can include a 
fourth group - the overseas Chinese J64 , most scholars exclude this constituency In 
their use of the notion. 
The integration of Greater China is commonly recognized as the economIc 
co-operation stemming from the relocation of the low value-added industries of Hong 
Kong and Taiwan to Mainland China. 165 The interaction within the region, however, 
is far more complex than mere business connections. According to Harding, the 
regional space of Greater China can be identified by three aspects: economically, it 
refers to the growing trade and integration between Mainland China, Hong Kong and 
ｔ｡ｩｷ｡ｮｾ＠ culturally, it recognizes the interaction and exchange of Chinese culture 
between Chinese people all over the world; and politically, it implies a latent 
possibility of building up a sole Chinese state. 166 In the 1990s, Greater China was 
acknowledged as a UFEO (Unknown Flying Economic Object) due to the fact that the 
IhI Harding. H. 1993. ''The concept of 'Greater China': Themes. variations and reser\ations". Chilla 
QlIlIrterly no. 136. pp. 660-686. . ' 
ｉｾ＠ Overseas Chinese are early Chinese migrates and their heirs. The first wave of migrants Jrved 
mainly in the Far East and kept their Chinese nationality and held either Beijing or Taipei ｰ｡ｳＬｰｯｾｳＮ＠
However. as the heirs of the early overseas Chinese have been gaining local nationalities and 'prcadl,ng 
glohally. the concept has now encompassed all nationals of Chinese origins acnw, the world, >L' 
Bnuteiller. E. 1995, "The emergence of Greater China as an economic force", umg Range ｐｬ｡ＢＧＢｉｊＬｾＬ＠
vol. 2X. no. I. pp. 54-60. 
ｉＨＩｾ＠ Ihid. 
1M Harding. H. 1993, "The concept of 'Greater China': Themes, variations and resen'alions". China 
QUClrter/y no. 136. pp. 660-686, 
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growing integration between its components and high-speed economic growth was 
faster than the world average. Economically speaking, Taiwan and Mainland China 
are dependent on each other: investment across the Taiwan Strait has amounted to 
over US$loo billion; more than 70 per cent of Taiwan's foreign investment went to 
Mainland China in 2004; and four Taiwanese companies are among Mainland China's 
top 10 exporters. 167 However, the UFEO (Greater China) remains an unknown object 
in the 2000s because it has not gained an official political identity between Mainland 
China and Taiwan. 168 On the other hand, the so-called 'Greater China Economic Area 
(GCEA), has generated much research interests in the field of economics with more 
and more evidence showing the growth of the integration and closeness between the 
• 169 
constituents. 
2.1 Background of the Greater China media space 
Due to historical and geographical factors, Chinese people expanded overseas. There 
are 1.325 billion Chinese in Greater China, accounting for 97.83 per cent of Chinese 
in the total world population and for over one fifth of the world's six billion people. In 
terms of popUlation size, Mainland China's 95.65 per cent of the world Chinese 
popUlation is disproportionately larger than Taiwan's 1.68 per cent, Hong Kong's 0.51 
per cent, and 2.72 per cent of the other overseas Chinese outside the region (see Table 
2.1 ). 
1117 Calder, K. E. 2006. "China and Japan's simmering rivalry", Foreign Affairs. \'01. X5. no, 2. pp. 
12l}-139. 
Ibli Bouteiller. E. 1995. "The emergence of Greater China as an economic fon:c". umg Rallge 
Plalll,illg. \'01. 2X. no. I. pp. 5.t-60. . 
1119 Sec. for example. Cheng. H. & Glascock. J. L. 2005. "Dynamic linkages between thc Grcater ｾｨｬＮｮ｡＠
Economic Area stock markets-mainland China, Hong Kong. and Taiwan". Rn;('I1' of QlI1l11l11atn'e 
'. . . . & E F ＧｏＨＩｾ＠F",,,,,c(' & AccOImtlllg. \'01. 2.t. no . .t. pp. 3.t3-357 .• Ytn-Wong. C. Chtnn. M. D.. .IJI.. - :: 
"Dimensions of financial integration in Greater China: money markets. hanks and polley effect, . 
''''('malioll,,' JOllrnal of Fillallce ＨＮｾ＠ £cOIlOlllio. \'01. 10. no. 2. pp. I 17-132. 
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Table 2.1 Distribution of Chinese population all over the world, 2004 
Area 
Great China subtotal f 
Mainland China 
Taiwan 
Hong Kong 
Asia outside Greater China subtotal2 
Indonesia 
Thailand 
Malaysia 
Singapore 
Japan 
Others 
The Americas 
Europe 
Oceania 
Africa 
Total world Chinese population 
Source: I World Bank: 
Number of Chinese (mi//ions) 
1.325.8 
1.296.2 
22.7 
6.9 
29.J+t 
7.463 
7.254 
6.115 
2.650 
0.488 
5.374 
6.807 
1.003 
0.775 
ｏＮｉｾｱ＠
1.355.1+t 
By perc-enrage (l1- J 
97.83 
9:'(,:' 
1.68 
0.51 
ｾＮＱＶ＠
OS'i 
0.5-' 
0 .... 5 
0.19 
O.(U 
0.40 
0.50 
0.07 
0.06 
0.01 
100 
http://weh.worldbank.orgIWBSITEIEXTERNALIDATASTATISTICS/O .. contentMDK:20S3S2HS-menu 
PK: J:\902(X)-pagePK:641331 SO-piPK:64 133 I 75-thcSitePK:2394 19.00.html. accessed on July 17. 
2006. II: 10 a.m. GMT: 2 Overseas Compatriot Affairs Commission. ROC: 
http://www.ocac.gov.tw/puhlic/puhlic.asp.?selno=982&no=982lewl=B. accessed on July 17. ｾＨｘＩＶＮ＠
10:10:1.111. GMT 
Mainland China has 56 ethnic groups, among which the Han Chinese make up 92 
per cent of the country's population. 170 As a result Mainland China is formed with a 
homogeneous mass of people predominantly sharing the same culture and language. 
Apart from hundreds of dialects, standard Chinese or Mandarin (Putongizua, based on 
the nOl1hern Chinese-Beijing dialect) is the main and official language in Mainland 
China. Other Mainland China's major languages include rue (Cantonese). Wli 
(Shanghaiese), Minbei (Fuzhou), Minna (Hokkien-Taiwanese), Xillng. Gem, and 
Hllkka. The predominant Mandarin is spoken in over 70 per cent of the population and 
170 Other major ethnic groups arc Buyi. Tibetan. Zhuang. Uygur. Hui. Vi. Miao. Manchu and Mongol. 
(.:!006. COllI/try m·en·it'H". CountryWatch.com.; Van. L. 2000. "China:' in IIcmdb(l(lk (if '''t' mediCI ill 
.. hi". S. A. Gunaratne. cd .• Sage. London. p. 497.) 
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is the medium of the government. 171 Taiwanese mainly speak Mandarin as well. 
Together with the Mandarin-speaking population in Hong Kong, the linguistic 
similarity has made Greater China the largest linguistic regional space in the world. 
over Spanish, English, Bengali, Hindi, and Portuguese. 
In Taiwan, the other major dialect, Minna (Hokkien-Taiwanese). has now been 
juxtaposed with Mandarin as a quasi-official language. However. although the 
majority of the population in Taiwan - ethnic Chinese - are offspring of the 
immigrants from the Chinese provinces of Fujian and Guangdong, they mostly 
consider themselves as native Taiwanese rather than Mainland Chinese.172 Unlike 
people in Mainland China and Taiwan, Chinese in Hong Kong mainly speak 
Cantonese and they are also fluent in English. Cantonese is also prevalent in the 
prosperous regions of Southeast China such as the Guangdong province. Although 
they are linguistic minorities in the whole Greater China region, Cantonese and 
Hokkien ostensibly break the regional space and generate several sub-regions. 
The significance of the sub-regions is not based on the number of people speaking 
a language but their leading media systems which are crucial in Greater China. As a 
result, popular Cantonese dramas are dubbed into Mandarin in order to export them to 
Mainland China and Taiwan, and vice versa. In addition, the prosperity of the 
Cantonese language area in south China, notably the Guangdong province and the 
Delta River area, has been designated as a special administrative and business region 
by Chinese authorities. It has also become a special media pilot area with different 
broadcasting regulations for transnational media companies entering Mainland China. 
Global players such as News Corporation. Time Warner and Viacom, and regional 
companies like Star TV, Phoenix TV and TVB, have all set foot in the area in order to 
171 2006. Social m'en'it'll'. CounlryWalch.com. 
m 2006. "Key facls and oH'rview". Taiu'(111 Co"",ry Profile pr. 3-5, 
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pave the way into the Mainland China market. 
Despite having different pronunciations, Mandarin, Cantonese and Hokkien share 
certain proximities as they are quite similar in grammar and expression. Nevertheless. 
the language of Greater China is not simply a cultural matter but represents a sensitive 
political issue. Due to historical reasons, speaking Mandarin and Hokkien symbolize. 
to a certain extent, different political stances towards Mainland China and Taiwan. 
The political antagonism has thus hindered closer regional integration. The linguistic 
division not only reflects the ongoing rivalry between the nationalists in Taiwan and 
the communists in Mainland China but also represents the dichotomy of national 
identity within Taiwan itself. As a result, in the television trade, unlike the strong links 
between the Cantonese and Mandarin dramas, the Hokkien group is distinct from the 
Mandarin with very few exchanges. 
Cultural similarity contributes to the growth of regional media space. The Greater 
China constituents share connected Chinese culture and social traditions. In terms of 
beliefs, Buddhism and Taoism are by far the most important religions in the region, 
followed by Catholicism and Protestantism. Although Mainland China is not a 
religious country and the 55.10 per cent majority do not have a religion, Buddhism 
constitutes the largest Chinese folk-religion with its own traditional forms. 173 In 
Taiwan, Buddhists and Taoists have accounted for 44.33 per cent of the popUlation. In 
other words, over 77 per cent of Taiwanese who have a religion are either Buddhist or 
Taoist. 174 In Hong Kong, Buddhism and Taoism also account for one third of the total 
I7.l In 20(X). the free thinkers accounted for 55.10 per cent of the Chinese popukltion in Mainland China. 
The hreakdown of those with religion arc as follows: 17 per cenl Chinese folk-religionist. 12.70 per 
cent atheist. 7.5 per cent Christian. 5.30 per cent Buddhist and .2.-tO Muslim (Data hased on National 
Statistical offices. Euromonitor). 
m In 2003. 42.7.1 per cent of Taiwanese are free thinkers. followed by .2-t.2.t per cent ｾｵ､､ｨｩＢｴＮ＠ ｬｏＮＨｾ＠
per cent Taoist. 3.92 per cent I Kuan Tao. l.ll7 per cent Protestant. 1.32 per cent ClIhohc and ＵＨＩＮｾ＠ per 
cent others (Data based on National Statistical offices. EUrlllllonitor). 
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population. 175 Although the lifestyle of many Chinese people is rooted Buddhism, the 
majority have rather vague religious beliefs, which used to be popular among the 
older generation and is recently gaining interest in the educate class and younger 
generation. Consequently, geomantic omen (Feng SllUi) is crucial for daily life and 
business operations. Choosing a 'good and suitable' day or place is important in order 
to bring luck and fortune to people. 
In addition to folk beliefs, Hofstede found that Confucianism still exists In 
Mainland China, Hong Kong and Taiwan. Together with different languages and 
culture from the West, those differences have rendered the Western cultural model 
inapplicable. 176 The most difficult aspect of Chinese culture to understand for foreign 
. . h II d 'G ., h fl' h' 177 G' h' compantes IS t e so-ca e umZXl - teart 0 re atlons IpS. IWllXI means t at In 
order to do business in Mainland China fruitful relationships must be build with 
partners and the local elite network. In the Chinese context, GUll1ui can be viewed as 
an indigenous Chinese concept and can be defined as an informal, personal relation 
between two individuals. People who follow the social norm of GUllIlX; are therefore 
bound by an implicit psychological contract in order to maintain a long-term 
relationship, loyalty and obligation. 178 
Apart form Taiwan and Hong Kong which keep the Guanxi as a cultural 
inheritance, in a centrally planned economy like Mainland China, decision-makers are 
not concerned with issues such as profit, price and quality, and are left to rely wholly 
on such relationships.17'l In order to establish connections with Beijing, Microsoft 
agreed to filter words such as 'democracy' and 'Freedom' from its MSN search engine 
m 2006. "Hong Kong country profile", Ho"g KOIIg COlllltry Profile pp. 1-"2. 
176 Hofstelk'. G. 1991. CII/lIIres alld orgcmi:.atiollJ: Software of the mi"d Md'ra\\-Hill. London. 
1'g160-161. 
2()06. "Informalion resources", Reward, T(·ch"ology MClllagemel/(. \"01. "Y. no ..... p. 61. 
m Chen. X. P. & Glen, C. C. ＲＨｘｾＮ＠ "On the intricacies of the Chinese Guanxi: A pnx:e ...... model (If 
Guanxi deVelopment". Asia Pacific Journal of Mallagemt'llf. \Ill. 21. no. ｾＮ＠ p. ｾｏｏＮ＠
IN Joseph. D. R. 2000. "Empty promisl·s". Ac/hni"(>J ＼Ｎｾ＠ St'Cl/ClIl(.'i /1l£/1I.\rn. \01. ｉＮｾＮ＠ nil 2. p. ｉｾＮ＠
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in Mainland China, while Yahoo claims to obey local data-protection rules. 180 In the 
media industry, failure in recognizing the Chinese culture has led to constant setbacks 
in global media companies such as Time Warner and News Corporation. as 
exemplified by Rupert Murdoch's admission that his business in Mainland China has 
"hit a brick wall" (see Chapter 4).181 
Thus, cultural and religious tradition In Greater China has varied influences. 
Chinese of Taiwan and Hong Kong, as well as those of overseas communities. have 
been clinging to the Chinese values and norms despite being affected by western 
capitalism. In contrast, mainland Chinese have lost more tradition during the Cultural 
Revolution between 1966 and 1976. Thus, for the Chinese in Hong Kong and Taiwan, 
their adherence to traditional culture reflects in way their nostalgia towards the remote 
motherland, the country from which they were estranged after the Second World War. 
On the other hand, the cultural consciousness of the mainland Chinese signals more 
an aspiration and self-identity to return to the days of the grand empire. 
The regional similarity can be understood by Hetten's concept - regionness -
which refers to an inherent regional civil society. 182 In spite of the nuances of cultural 
identity among the region, the common traditional values of Greater China mainly 
come from the same historical context - narrating the splendid past and sharing 
associated Chinese glories. Thus, the regionness of Greater China can be designated 
as an ethos of 'Chinese-ness' towards the imaginary homeland of Mainland China. 183 
Apart form the cultural 'Chinese-ness', the significance of Greater China is also 
vcry much based on its sharp bTfOwth in economy. Despite controversial political 
IXO Free speech matters. eWeek 22[26]. 37. n-6-200S. ZDNet. 
IMI ｾＨＩＰＵＮ＠ "The end nfthe affair", Economist, \'01. 376. no. X44S. p. 80. 
1M! Ill-ttne. B. 1999. "Globalization and the new regionalism: The scCtHld great Iransfomlalion:' in 
Glohllli.\", (lIIcilhe 11(,11' regionalism, \'01. 1 B. Hettne. A. Inotai. & O. Sunkd. cds .. Macmillan. I nndon. 
PR· I -24. 
, SlIlclair. J .. Vue. A. Hawkins. G .. Pookong. K .. & hl\. . .I. 2001. "Chinesl' (l'smopOlilanisl11 and 
I1ll'lJia use:' in Floating /i,.('.\ .. n,t! nlt'ciia anci Asia" ｣ｩｩｴｬＮＧｾｰｯＬＮＨＯＮ｜Ｎ＠ S Cunningham & J Smclalr. cds .• 
Rowlllan & L illiefieid Publishers, lanham. MD. pp. 35-90. 
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conflicts, Mainland China, Hong Kong and Taiwan are officially recognized as three 
entities on the global economic stage. Mainland China and Taiwan joined the WTO in 
December 2001. Unlike other accessions to the WTO, Mainland China's accession 
attracted plenty of attention from the global press. The reason for this interest is that 
Mainland China is one of the world's largest markets. The world most populous 
country implies a potentially self-sufficient market, particularly when there is more 
evidence of Mainland China's significant economic achievement in the global 
economy. Foreign direct investment (FDI) in Mainland China in 2004 reached 
US$S4.9 billion, while the world total amount is US$624.8 billion in the year. 184 
Throughout the 1990s, 50 per cent of the FD I in developing countries was accounted 
for by China. 18s Compared to India's low FDI of US$S.3 billion in 2004, China 
represents not only the most populous, but also the unparalleled potential as the 
largest world market. At the start of the millennium, China has surpassed the USA as 
the world's most popular investment destination. 
Table 2.2 Regional GOP growth (annual 0/0) 
1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 lO()5 20061 20071 
World 4.0' 1.5' 1.8' 2.7' 4.1' 4.4h ＴＮＰｾ｡＠ ＳＮＹｾ｡＠
China 8.4 1 8.3 1 9.i 10.01 10.12 9.92 9.72 9.42 
liong Kong 10.21 0.5 1 1.91 3.11 8.62 ＷＮＳｾ＠ 6.22 5.92 
Taiwan 6.3.\ 6.2 3 -1.7' 4.43 4.1 3 6.1 2 4.12 5.02 3.92 
N(lle: D At purchasing power parity exchange rates. 
Source: I World Development Indicators database.: 2 2006, "Regional indicators (Cover story)", Asia 
Monitor: China & North East Asia Monitor, vol. 13, no. 8, p. 1.: .\ 2006, "Taiwan: Country forecast: 
current data", Political Risk Yearbook: Taiwan Country Forecast pp. 5-10.; "' 2005, "World: Economic 
outlook", Healthcare & Pharmaceuticals Forecast World pp. 8-16. 
Apart from Mainland China's gigantic market, Hong Kong and Taiwan ha\'l' also 
long been vigorous in the global market and were among the . Asia Four Little 
IU 2006 World Dl'n:lllprnent Indicators database. 
ｉｋｾ＠ Huang, Y. 200 I. FDI in China. 1. 
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Dragons' with their robust economies in East Asia. While Mainland China outpaced 
the world by its outstanding GOP of 10.01 per cent in 2004, Hong Kong and Taiwan 
also expanded their GOP exceptionally by 8.6 and 6.12 per cent respecti\'cly (see 
Table 2.2). However, contrary to Mainland China's conservative policy towards 
foreign capital, Taiwan and Hong Kong officially welcomes direct foreign investment. 
Thus, while Taiwan's FOI grew by nearly 21 per cent between 2002 and 2003, and 
Hong Kong's FOI increased by a similar percentage between 2003 and 2004. 
Mainland China's FOI amounted to only merely 2.8 per cent of GOP in 2004. 186 
Table 2.3 Top 15 countries with the largest current account surplus (2003) 
Counlry US$ billion %o/GOP 
Japan 136.2 3.2 
Gennany 51.3 2.1 
China 45.9 2.8 
Switzcrland 44.7 13.9 
Russian Fedcration 35.4 8.2 
Ncthcrlands 29.7 5.8 
Taiwan 29.3 10.2 
Norway 28.3 12.8 
Saudi Arabia 28.1 13.1 
Singaporc 27.0 29.2 
Sweden 22.8 7.6 
Hong Kong (SAR) 16.5 10.6 
Malaysia 13.4 12.9 
Canada 13.4 1.6 
Korca, Rc(!. 11.9 2.0 
Source: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments data files. cited m 2006 World 
Development Indicators. 
Duc to Mainland China's long anti-foreign stance and low GOP before the 1990s, 
its large population does not make it a world leading media system. On the contrary, 
the tclevision industry of Mainland China can barely compete with that of Hong Kong 
and Taiwan. Nevertheless, when taking Greater China as a whole into account, it 
remains the most lucrative marketplace in the Asia-Pacitic market and the glohal 
media industry. Since the 2000s and in the wake of the deregulation of the Indian and 
116 2006. "Taiwan: country conditions: Investment climate'". Political Risk rt'Clrhook 1''''''"(111 COllll111 
For('("(l.\"t pp. 41-50. 
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Mainland China markets, the Asia-Pacific has been a hotbed of direct foreign 
investment. In 2005, five Asia-Pacific markets (i.e. China, Russia, India, Indonesia 
and Japan) were among the ten biggest contributors to the global advertising 
expenditure. 187 In addition, China, together with Brazil, India and Russia supplied 
some 27 per cent of the global advertising growth. 188 In terms of Greater China as a 
whole, the integration of its economy into the world economy has gripped business 
concerns and policymakers alike. Not only does it constitute one of the most dynamic 
regions, there is also ample evidence of its impact on world trade and regional 
f d . 189 patterns 0 pro uchon. 
Table 2.4 Total world advertising spent 2003-2008 (historic/forecast, US$ million) 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 ]()()8 
World I 359,261 385,324 404,108 429,373 452,157 ｾＷＶＮＲＷＶ＠
North America I 158,616 168,250 173,271 182,109 189,878 197,369 
E I 
'urope 98,379 104,567 108,448 113,010 117,726 122,657 
Latin America l 13,703 15,546 18,021 19,754 21,090 ＲＲＮＲｾＴ＠
AfricalM. East/ROW I 14,520 18,160 21,206 24.581 28,043 32,190 
Asia-Pacific l 74,403 78,802 83,162 88,819 95,420 101,816 
Mainland ｃｨｪｮ｡ｾ＠ 7,488 8,879 10,245 11,771 
Hong Kong2 1,881 2.001 1,999 2,085 
ｔ｡ｩｷ｡ｮｾ＠ 2,095 2,271 2,415 2,543 
Source: I ZenithOptimedia, cited m 2006, "Advertising (Databox)" , Screen Digest p. 127.; 
Euromonitor International for World Association of Newspapers. 
Table 2.5 Change in forecast of total world advertising spent 2003-2008 (%) 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
World 3.1 7.4 4.9 6.0 5.6 
North America 1.9 6.1 3.0 5.2 4.2 
Of which llSA 1.7 6.0 2.9 5.2 4.2 
Europe 1.4 6.4 3.7 4.2 4.2 
Asia-Pacific 5,4 6.5 5.5 6.8 7.4 
Latin America 3.5 13.4 15.9 9.6 6.8 
.....::\fricalM. East/ROW 19.1 27.7 16.8 15.9 14.1 
S(lIIr("(': ZcnithOptimedia, cited in 2006, "Advertising (Databox)", Scrccn Digest p. 127. 
5.3 
4.0 
.. U 
4.2 
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ＱｾＮＸ＠
2 
ｉｾ［＠ ｓ｡｜Ｇ｡ｾｬＢ＠ M. 2005. "Region all set to boost worldwide adspend in 2006", .\lcd;a Asia p. :. 
ｉｾｳ＠ Intellagencia.com: http://intellagencia.cl)mnewsasp·.'siteid 4&id '68791. consulted on October 24. 
Ｂｏｏｾ＠ 14 -., ('M'I' • ... ::"1_, p.m. J , . . ... 
IM')Yin_Wl)Jll!. C. Chinn. M. D .. & Liji. F. 2005. "Dimensions l)f fin,lIlClalllllcgratlon JIll,reater (. hma: 
money lIlarkels. banks and policy dleeIS·'. /lIIt'rnalional journal olFinanct' & Enmomu '. \l)l. 10. no, 
2. p. 118. 
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2.2 Television industry in Greater China: Historic overview (1950s - 2000s) 
Despite sharing similar cultural heritage and history, Mainland China, Hong Kong and 
Taiwan started and developed television systems along very different and independent 
lines. The first television broadcast initiated in Greater China is the cable system of 
Rediffusion Television (RTV) (later Asia Television (ATV», on 29 May 1957. 
Television became a mass medium in Hong Kong only after the introduction of 
wireless television by Television Broadcast (TVB) in 1967. In Mainland China, 
Beijing TV Station was the first television station launched on 1 May 1958. After four 
years, Taiwan established its first commercial television station, Taiwan Telcvision 
(TTV), on 10 October 1962, followed by two more stations, China Television System 
(CTS) and China Television Company (CTV) in 1969 and 1971 respectively. 
In Mainland China, the idea of founding television was put on the agenda of the 
first Five-Year Plan of 1955 and came into effect in the second Five-Year Plan. To a 
certain extent, it reflected the ideological battles between the two camps of capitalism 
and socialism all across the world in the Cold War. But for a more direct reason, it 
illustrated the intense competition between the Chinese authorities (the Chinese 
Communist Party led by Zedong Mao) and the Taiwanese government led by 
Kai-Shek Kiang's Kuomintang Party (the Nationalist Party). When the Taiwanese 
government declared that it was going to start a television service on 10 October 1958, 
Mainland China soon began the transmission of Beijing TV on 2 September 1958. 
t(lllowed by Shanghai TV on I October 1958, and Haerbin TV and several other 
. . I' h t' 190 prOVIl1Cla stattons over t e next ew years. 
The early establishment of the television system did not benefit the public in the 
)960s and 1970s hecause most of people wcre not able to atl(xd luxury ･ｬｌｾｴｲｯｮｩ｣ｳ＠
1'10 Bin. I. I QQR. "(jrcater China." in Te/t'I'i.\wII. All imanatiOlw/ }1I.\IOfT. 2 l'dn. A Smith & R. 
Paterson. cds .. Oxford University Press. Oxford. p. 247. 
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like television sets. In 1970, the number of people with TV sets did not even reach I 
per 1000 inhabitants. The number increased to 1.3 in 1975 and 9.0 in 1980 (see Table 
2.6). In addition to the economic setback created by Communist policies. the Cultural 
Revolution from 1966 to 1976 imposed extreme social control and political 
interference to the media system, pushing further back the development of the 
television industry. During the Mao era, television as a medium was tightly controlled 
and used as a political tool by the party-state machine to control the information flow 
and propagate its political doctrine. 
Table 2.6 Growth of Mainland China's television receivers 1970-1997 
Year 
970 
975 
980 
985 
990 
991 
992 
993 
994 
995 
996 
997 
Source: UNESCO Statistics: 
NlImher oj receil'l'rs (OOOs) NlImher oj receiver per 1.000 inhahitaflls 
660 0.8 
1,185 1.3 
9,020 9.0 
69.650 65 
309,001 267 
320,000 273 
340,000 287 
350,000 293 
370,000 306 
374,410 307 
393,630 319 
400,000 321 
hllp:! Iwww.uis.unesco.org/TEMPLATE/htmIlCultAndComlTable_IV _14 _ Asia.html, consulted on May 
25, 2004. 10: 30 a.m. GMT 
It was not until the end of the 1970s that Mainland China's television industry 
began to grow significantly. In 1978, with the pursuit of the "Four Modernizations', 
the new leader Xiaoping Deng promoted advertising and therefore facilitated the 
development and popularization of television. It is estimated that television ownership 
was at 3 million at the outset of Deng's rule in 1978, and soon rose to 125 million in 
1988 and to 300 million by 1997. Itli In addition to that. the total number of colour 
11)1 Huang. Y & Green. A. 2000. "From Mao III the millennium: 40 ｾＧｬＧ｡ｲｳ＠ of Tek\"ision If1 China 
(1951(.98)," in Telcl'i.'l;01' in conlt'nrl'0rmT ,-1.\;(1. D. French & M. Ridlards. cds .. Sa!!c. London. p, 273 
7\ 
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television sets rose from some 18 million in 1977 to 71 million in 1990 and 189 
million in 2000 (see Table 2.7). Deng triggered the transformation of the media 
industry. In 1979, the authorities permitted the first advertisements in public 
newspapers. Later in the same year, the first advertisements for a local brand were 
broadcast on Shanghai Television. 192 With the introduction of the commercial 
mechanism, the advertising market expanded sharply from US$11.36 million in 1983 
to US$1.7 billion in 1995 and US$8.9 billion in 2004, among which the television 
advertising market also increased from US$9.54 million in 1983, to US$758.09 
million and US$4.9 billion in 2004 (see Table 2.4). 
Table 2.7 Growth of TV sets in use in Greater China 1977-2010 (OOOs) 
1977 1980 1990 1995 lOOO 2005/ ＭｾＨｽｉｏｦ＠
Mainland China 18,507 26,660 71,302 116,298 189,466 245,992 309,738 
Hong Kong 874 1,056 1,665 1,971 2,576 3,005 J,,\41 
Taiwan 2,676 3,272 5,556 6,252 7,650 8,088 9,252 
Source: Euromonitor International from Council of Europe. 
The structure of Mainland China's television industry was a pyramid of state 
monopoly (see Chapter 3 ).193 Resulting from a special policy in 1983, it reflected the 
hierarchy of political organization, suggesting a four-level formation: the national 
(zhongyang), the provincial (sheng), the municipal (shi) and the county (xian) 
television stations. In May 1978, Beijing TV was renamed the China Central 
Television Station (CCTV) to reflect its nationwide reach and has become the only 
state monopolistic station ever since. At the top of the tour-tiered structure of controL 
CCTV secured its political influence and economic returns by distributing programs 
through lower tiers of stations at the provinciaL municipal and county levels. The 
1",' Huang. Y. & ｇｲｾ･ｮＮ＠ A. 2000. "From Mao to ｴｨｾ＠ millennium: 40 ycars of Tdc\ision in China 
(195R-98)," in 7"e/t"';sio1l in ('oll/emporan" Asia. D. French & M. Richards. ｾＮＧ､ｳ＠ .. Sage. I.ondon. p. 27J. 
11)\ Bin. /. 1998, "ureater China," in 7"del'i.'iion: All illlanel/iollal "i.,/on". :. cdn. :\ Smith & R. 
Paterson, cds .. Oxford Uni\l'rsity Press. O.'(ford. p. 247. 
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dominant national station has been able to generate sufficient revenue while many 
lower level stations were too poor to maintain a stated proportion of self-made 
programmes. 
The monopolistic nature of CCTV, when taken in conjunction with in the political 
centralism of the country, resulted in Mainland China turning itself into an 
authoritarian media regime. Programmes were therefore always under strict 
ideological control and censorship. It was not until the late 1980s that this situation 
encountered severe challenges when television became an increasingly popular 
medium in Mainland China. The growth of advertising income rapidly increased the 
revenue of a number of stations. In 1996, eight leading channels in Beijing, Shanghai 
and Guangzhou, and 12 individual stations in Shandong, Zhejiang, Tianjin, Liaoning 
and Fujian provinces earned more than US$24 million each. IlJ-t As a result, 
government funding of broadcasters turned out to be unnecessary and has been 
tenninated in many cities. Progressive commercialization has made stations act more 
like businesses than the government's mouthpiece. Thus, the traditional control 
structure was gradually breaking down and programming with ideological 
intervention was facing the challenge of commoditization. 
Table 2.8 Growth of advertising spent in Greater China 1983-2005 (USS million) 
1983 1985 1990 1995 2000 ｾＨＩＨｽＵｲ＠
Total Adspcnd 
Mainland China 11.36 21.51 191. 74 1.701.87 41.137.59 10.24530 
Hlmg Kong 206.86 303.03 780.56 1,940.68 3.545.97 1,9991'14 
Taiwan 1'36.58 1,107.09 1,502.74 2.410.34 1.779.90 2.415.07 
IV Adspcnd 
Mainland China 9.54 17.40 115.99 758.09 2.(140.76 5.1.'5.91'1 
Hong Kong 116.85 172.19 396.25 954.42 1.490 50 629 S2 
taiwan 262.78 358.32 56.'\.15 1'161.67 912.93 1.455 ,s 
Source: Furnnwnitor International for World Association of Newspapers. 
1904 Huang. Y. & (Irt't'n, :\. 2000. "From Mao to the millennium: 40 years of T cit" iSlon III (,hllla 
(1958-98)," in Teh'l'ision in contemporary Asia, D. Irench & M. Richards. eds .. Sagt'. l.ondl)ll. r 27) 
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Hong Kong, where laissez-faire reigned supreme, developed an entirely ditferent 
television industry. In its early years from 1957, RTV functioned as a cable 
broadcaster, supplying imported English programmes to a small number of 
subscribers. It was not until 1963 that RTV started a Chinese channel. Nevertheless. it 
did not dominate the television industry for long. In 1967, TVB, a powerful opponent 
of RTV, set off with terrestrial broadcasting. With two famous channels - Jade TV in 
Mandarin and Pearl TV in English, TVB soon secured an impregnable position. After 
changing hands several times in 1982, RTV became ATV. controlled through capital 
from Hong Kong and Australia. Apart from TVB and AT V, there was once a third 
private television station between 1975 and 1978 - the Commercial Channel. which 
closed down due to its lack of competitivity and financial difficulties. There is also a 
public television broadcaster - Radio Television Hong Kong (RHTV),195 founded in 
1976 but without independent transmission facilities. RHTV makes Hong Kong a 
nominally dual-system broadcasting market but it is far too weak to compete with 
TVB and ATV, and had very limited impact on the media ecosystem. 
The Hong Kong television industry has been dominated by the two free-to-air 
services - ATV and TVB. In 1977, a decade after the launch of TVB, over 76.85 per 
cent of households owned a colour television set. In the early 1990s, the number 
exceeded 99 per cent. Together with 91.54 per cent possession of cassette and radio 
players (Table 2.5), broadcasting has become the most popular leisure activity in 
Hong Kong. l % Nevertheless, the competition between the two major players has 
never been balanced as TVB constantly leads in the marketplace by more than 70 per 
19S RTIIK was the first radio broadcasting using the call-Iellers GOW in 1928. In 194X. GOW was 
renamed Radio Hong Kong (RHK). In 1970, after thc intfl)duction of FM channels and the 
establishment l)f a public Il'In'isil)!l unit. RHK became RTHK. 
1% Chan. J. M. & ll'l', P. S. N. 1992. "Mass communication: Consumption and c\"aluallon:' III 
Indicators ＨｾＯＮ｜ｏ､ｃｬｉ＠ t!c\'('/opment: Hong }\ong, K. S. tau el al.. l'ds., The Chinese University of IIl)!lg 
Kong. Hong Kong. pp. 81-82. 
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cent of audience. 197 In addition, the fierce competition between TVB and :\ TV 
resulted in a war of television drama series. Given the colonial background of Hong 
Kong, the overproduced drama programs without ideological sensitivity were not only 
successful in capturing popular audiences in the 1970s, but also guaranteed Hong 
Kong's status as the largest library of Mandarin and Cantonese language programmes. 
In contrast to Mainland China and Hong Kong, Taiwan followed an ambiguous 
path between commercialism and authoritarianism in television development. 
Regardless of the first short-lived National Experimental Education Television 
(NETV) in 1962, the television market in Taiwan has long been a fierce battleg.round 
between three national stations: TTV, CTV and CTS. Since their launch. n'v 
197 Let'. P. S. N. :!OOO. "Hong Kong television: An anchor fl)r local identity," In Tclni\/tlII in 
cont"mporary Asia. D. Frt'nch & M. Richards. eds .. Sage. Ltlildon. p. 370. 
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depended mainly on light entertainment, CTV was popular for its imported 
Hollywood movies and CTS was famous for its martial arts series with strong military 
undertones. The long-standing dilemma in the Taiwanese television industry was that 
all three stations were characterized as being state-owned and market-led. '9g For 
almost forty years until 1987 when Taiwan dismissed the implementation of martial 
law, with the nature of being state-owned, Taiwan's authoritarian, bureaucratic regime 
subordinated television as the State's ideological apparatus to manage popular 
discontent and subdue political resistance. However, the market-led orientation caused 
government regulation to be ineffectual in the over-commercialized market. Although 
the 1987 repeal of martial law was expected to liberalize television from state control, 
it failed. Not only was the television industry unable to avoid government interference, 
but the trend of over-commercialization went worse. 
It was not until June 1997 that the fourth commercial and also the first private 
terrestrial station - Fonnosa Television (FTV) - was founded. As a strong opposition 
against authorities, FTV broke the state-oligopoly television structure and 
significantly divided the Taiwanese television market with Taiwanese-language 
(Minna) programming, which was taken as a new paradigm of operation strategy. 
After a year, the fifth terrestrial and the first public television station - Public 
Television Service (PTS) - was established. With its educational and cultural missions, 
PTS was expected to remedy the over-commercialization and serve a minority of 
audience. However, with PTS's limited competitiveness, Taiwan's terrestrial 
television market was still dominated by the four commercial stations. 
ｉＧｉｾ＠ lhl' so-called 'state-owned' designates the intL'nelltion of go\'ernmelli. In lTV, the raiwan 
PW\'JIll'ial Glnl'mment has a 49 per cent sInd: ownership with 4 Japanese companies l'lllltrolling 40 
JlL'f n'nt and private 10 per Cl'nt stock. CTV was owned by Kuomintang with 6:-: pef cl'nl slock. <.'1 S 
was controlled by the Ministry of Dl'fense with 72 per cenl SllKk. and the Mmislry of Lducatilln wI,h 
10 per cent stock. 
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2.3 Challenges of cable and satellite television 
Despite the different development paths taken by the television industries in Hong 
Kong, Taiwan, and Mainland China, these industries have all been facing evolution in 
audience taste since the 1990s. In Mainland China, rising interests in popular culture 
demanded that the televisions provide more entertaining programmes. Thus, the 
traditional functions of television (such as being an ideological apparatus or 
propaganda machine of the State) were threatened by these demands and were then 
forced to evolve as well. Even the national monopolistic players had to reconsider a 
way to balance the demands of entertaining with the purposes in education. In Taiwan 
and Hong Kong, however, the problem was the stratification of the audience. Previous 
popular drama series and few choices of channels in oligopolistic marketplaces could 
no longer simply satisfy the emerging affluent and sophisticated middle class. In spite 
of the escalating number of television sets, the rating of channels kept declining. 
A determinant causing the transformation of audience needs is the reshaping of the 
television landscape by the emergence and popularization of cable and satellite 
television. The establishment of cable television can be traced back to as early as the 
1 950s with the launch of Hong Kong"s RTV. Taiwan also developed its earliest cable 
transmission systems in the 1960s, although they were not legal until 1993 with the 
legitimization of cable television. Cable television in Taiwan was originally meant to 
solve poor reception in some locations but with the increasing number of channels 
available, cable became a popular form of entertainment in its own right. Cable was 
called "the fourth station' relative to the three other national stations - TTY, CTY and 
CTS. With the implementation of the Cahle Television Law in 1993. Taiwan was 
widely considered as the most ｣ｯｭｰ･ｴｩｴｩ｜Ｇｬｾ＠ television market in Asia hecause of its 
atlluence, and because of its reach, with the largest cable penetration of somewhere 
hetween 45 to 60 per cent of television households. 
-'7 
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In Mainland China, the first cable system was also built in 1973 at the Beijing 
Hotel in order to serve foreign guests. I99 Cable television in Greater China, however. 
was then developed in a haphazard way and it was not until the 1990s that all the 
areas realized the importance of constructing pan-national cable systems. In Mainland 
China, the establishment of cable systems in the provinces had a twofold advantage: it 
helped produce more popular programmes, thereby attracting a greater audience and. 
and helped build a functional market economy in the television industry. For Hong 
Kong and Taiwan, the modernization of the cable system not only helps attract foreign 
investment, it is also essential for the development of national telecommunications 
which is crucial for their strategic objective of becoming the hub of Asia. 
In 1996, about 51 million households were connected to cable and about 100,000 
kilometers of fibre-optics wiring and 340,000 kilometers of cable trunk lines had been 
laid in Mainland China.2oo From 1990 to 2004, Mainland China's cable television 
showed a rise by more than 370 per cent, from 4.04 to 19.22 per 100 households 
(owning cable television)?OI In Taiwan, there were already about 600 cable operators 
by the early 1990s.202 Cable television possession increased from 24.45 to 90.25 per 
100 households, growing by 268 per cent between 1990 and 2004. Hong Kong also 
saw a rise from 0.56 per 100 households in 1992 to 28.86 per 100 households in 
2004.203 However, this does not mean that Greater China has reached a balanced and 
developed cable television system. Due to the gap between developed cities and 
undeveloped cities, the coverage rate in Mainland China is stilI around 20 per cent 
while Taiwan has reached the highest household penetration rate of cable television in 
IQQ Huang. Y. & Green. A. 2000. "From Mao to the millennium: 40 years of Tdl'\ision in China 
(1958-98)," in TdC>l'ision in contemporary Asia. D. French & M. Richards. eds .. Sage. London, p. 2R 1. 
!()(I 1997, .... \iaCom no. October. p. 10 . 
. '01 Data based on Euromonitor Intcrnational from Council of Europe. 
M Mai. L.-('. 200 I. A" ｡ｮ｡ｾｲＮＢｳ＠ 01 cO'1JOral(' culturt' ami hU.'iines.\ .'ilralcg\· i" TaimJl/n(' CA n' 
cha"nel compcmin, Doctoral disscrtation, UniVl'rsily of Wl'stminster. london. p. 2. 
!O\ Data basl'd on Luromonitor Irllcrnational from Council of Europe. 
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the Asia-Pacific region. In 2003, Taiwan was still the most competiti\'e television 
market in Great China in tenns of revenue and highest cable penetration of 
approximately 90 per cent. 
Table 2.10 Cable TV households in Greater China (1985-2005) 
1985 1989 1990 199] 1995 2000 2005! 
Cable TV Households (000) I 
Mainland China 5,006 11,195 26,685 37,821 60.768 75.52':1 
Hong Kong 9 \09 503 667 
Taiwan 58 988 1,211 1,743 3,076 5.649 6.562 
Possession of Cable TV - per 100 households2 
Mainland China 1.86 4.04 R.90 11.18 17.44 19.69 
Hong Kong 0.56 6.22 n.83 30.44 
Taiwan 1.36 20.53 24.45 33.36 54.34 86.98 91.47 
Source: I Euromonitor International from Council of Europe.; 2Euromonitor International from national 
statistics. 
Table 2.11 Satellite TV households in Greater China (1977-2005) 
1977 1990 1991 1992 1995 2000 2005! 
Satellite TV Households (000) I 
Mainland China 269.14 835.36 3,334.94 7,759.09 13,412.52 
Hong Kong 0.55 1.43 2.28 4.61 
Taiwan 97.95 183.70 201.35 198.64 199.19 200.40 190.85 
Possession of Satell ite TV - per 100 households2 
Mainland China 0.09 0.28 0.99 2.23 3.50 
Hong Kong 0.03 0.08 O. \1 0.21 
Taiwan 2.81 3.71 3.96 3.80 3.52 3.09 2.67 
Source: I Euromonitor International from Council of Europe.; 2Euromonitor International from national 
statistics. 
In companson with cable television, direct-to-home (DTH) satellite television 
systems have a comparatively low penetration proportion In Greater China. Until 
2004, the penetration rates are only 3.29, 0.16, and 2.75 per cent in Mainland China, 
Hong Kong and Taiwan respectively. :!04 In both Hong Kong and Taiwan with their 
well-developed cable television systems. where subscription to cable television is 
rather cheap with a wide choice of programmes a\'ailablc, DTH is unnecessary and 
ｾＰＴ＠ Data based on Euromonitor International from Clluncil of I·urope. 
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unpopular. In contrast, due to the huge mainland and with its laggard cable system. 
Mainland China should be the one in the region requiring satellite technology in order 
to reach further areas. However, after the first satellite television system was launched 
in the 1990s, the government still continues to prohibit the private installation of 
satellite television and strictly regulates the content and operation of foreign channels. 
Table 2.12 Media industry value 2001-2005 (US$ billion) 
Area 2001 2002 2003 2004 l()()5(e) CAGR i :11I1/-_'(}(}5 ('!'II) 
World 735.7 753.6 780.1 813.9 848.8 3.6 
Asia-Pacific 155.6 160.7 166.4 175.7 185.7 45 
Greater China 25.7 29.4 32.7 36.9 41.3 12.5 
.-
Note: ICAGR: compound annual growth rate. 
Source: Data based on Datamonitor. 
Although Greater China is not a financially prosperous DTH marketplace, satellite 
channels, working in tandem with cable transmission systems, have been growing 
rapidly. In 2002, the leasing Asia-Pacific countries in cable and satellite industry in 
terms of revenues were Japan (US$4.3 billion), India (US$2.6 billion), Korea (US$I.8 
billion), and Taiwan (US$I.3 billion). In terms of subscriber base, Mainland China, 
with 95 million subscribers stood at the top and Taiwan's 5.1 million was among the 
top tive. Though not yet a profitable market for foreign companies, Mainland China is 
expected to be the second leading country in terms of revenue of US$II.2 billion 
dollars and the largest pay-TV country with 142 million subscribers by 2015.205 In 
2005, the total value of the Greater China media industry is estimated to be US$41.3 
billion among which the broadcasting and cable television segment accounts for about 
37 per cent. 206 The growth rate in Mainland China alone in the same year reached 15 
per cent, over sevcn times the world's average of 2.1 per cent and 3.5 times the 
!tI\ 2003. "Asia-Pacific cable/satellite industry on the risc", S(ree" Digest 11ll. January, p. ｾＮ＠
'(I(. In 200). thl' broadcasting and cable tele\'ision accounts for :'1.6 pl'r cent of thc total \alul' llf ,Ill' 
mcdia industry 111 China and Hong Kong whik in Taiwan, It amounts tll 365 pcr cent 111 thl' Sal1ll' year 
Data based ('Ill Datamonitor. 
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. p . fi ' 4 2 207 ASla- aCI IC S . per cent. 
The growing cable and satellite industry also raised concerns in Greater China. 
mostly in Mainland China. In tenns of the situation within Mainland China. satellite 
and cable broadcasting raised the competition between provincial stations. Although 
CCTV, with its 12 channels, is still the only national broadcaster in Mainland China. 
there had been over 20 provincial television stations in 1998 broadcasting their 
. 'd' 11' 208 Th programmes nahonwl e vIa sate lte. e number increased to about 50 in :2003 
while there are more than 2,000 television stations, offering more than 4,000 channels. 
In Beijing, for example, viewers can receive about 50 channels for an annual fee of 
less than US$65.209 
The competition for advertising revenue was consequently triggered in the 
affluent provmces and cities, such as Beijing, Shanghai and Guangdong. Beijing 
Television Station and Shanghai Television Station, with nme and seven channels 
respectively, are the leading local broadcasters. 210 CCTV can no longer simply 
dominate the whole country alone. Similarly, the threat to traditional state stations 
also undermine the statuses of ATV and TVB in Hong Kong. The statuses of Taiwan's 
TTV, CTV and CTS were also challenged while there were channels exponentially 
emerging in the national market. The three television networks in Taiwan suffered 
fonn decreasing audience shares year by year after 1993 when the Cable Television 
Law was authorized and legal competition in the market started. The average audience 
share across the seven years is reported to have decreased by about ten per cent. 211 
207 Data based on Datamonitor. 
ｾＨｬｈ＠ Huang, Y. & ｇｲ･ｾｮＮ＠ A. 2000, "From Mao to the millennium: 40 years of lelnision U1 China 
(1958-98}," in Tele\'ision ill contemporary Asia. D. French & M. Richards. eds .. Sagl'. londllfl. p. :!83; 
Bin. Z. 1998. "url'ater China." in Tdel'ision: An inlernaliollal "is/olT. ｾ＠ edn. A. Smith & R. Patl'rsllfl. 
cds., Ox ti.) rd Uni\'ersity Press. Oxford. p. 249 . 
. 'tl') 2003, "China's 4.000 TV channels". China BusinC'ss Illsider. H11. ｾＨＩＨｮＮ＠ no. 4. p. II 
!lo Ihid. 
m Sarrina l.i. S. C. & Chiang. C. C. ｾｯｯ＠ 1. "Market COl1lpl'litil1n and Pn1gral1111ling ()n l'rslly A Stud, 
on the TV Market in Taiwan". Journal of.\/l'dia Economin. \01. I·t. no. 2. p. 10-:" 
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Table 2.13 Growth of China's television channels 1996-2002 
Year 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
Source: 2003, China Broadcasling Yearbook. 
Number of channels 
983 
1032 
1065 
1108 
1206 
2194 
2124 
In tenns of cross-border broadcasting, satellite television set of a debate about 
internationalization and globalization in Greater China, although the impact is mostly 
felt within Mainland China. CCTV, again, was not only facing a crisis as a dominant 
nationwide channel, but also, given the traditional discourse of media imperialism 
prevailing in the country, taking on the responsibility to resist the western cultural 
invasion. Staying vigilant to censor the strong communication influx from foreign 
countries was not the only thing on Mainland China's agenda. Instead, the idea of 
counter-flow of communication and promoting Chinese television as a fonn of 
'retaliation' was considered and soon implemented. With the ambition of turning into 
a global-reaching media, CCTV launched CCTV 4, providing millions of overseas 
Chinese with the latest mainland news in Mandarin, and CCTV 9, offering 
English-language news to viewers as far away as Europe and the USA. 
Satellite and cable television overhauled the landscape of Greater China, but their 
influences differ in Mainland China, Hong Kong and Taiwan. Despite the increasing 
philosophical discourse in media competition and internationalization, Mainland 
China's cable and satellite television industry was still a relativdy closed market 
while tllreign investment and operators were strictly prohihited before 200 I (prior to 
the country's accession to WTO). The situation remains unchanged in spite of the 
limited openness in the tdevision industry after 200 I. To this day. thcrl' is no 
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transnational player that has the ability to make significant profit from this appealing 
market. In contrast, Taiwan has been a prosperous market and Hong Kong has been 
the base of transnational satellite television. As an example, in 1993. TVB launched 
its strong regional ann in Taiwan - the TVBS (TVB Superstation). Star TV also 
initiated their first subscription service for Taiwan. 
However, despite the competitive television market that Taiwan is, Hong Kong 
has outperfonned Taiwan in the transnational television market. In addition to being a 
well-known laisser-faire market, Hong Kong is keen to lure global companies. In 
order to allow foreign investment into the cable and satellite television industries, the 
commercial television market was reconstructed in the late 1980s and 1990s. This 
reconstruction has drawn many major transnational television companies to locate 
their national headquarters on the island. On 22 December 1990, the first Pan-Asia 
television - Star TV - was launched in Hong Kong. This was followed by numerous 
channels such as CNN, Discovery and CNBC Asia. An increasing number of global 
media players have made Hong Kong their regional base in Greater China, triggering 
the transnational TV competition in Greater China. 
2.4 Limited opportunities: Global media corporations' transnational TV 
channels 
Since the 1990s, television has been recognized as the most significant carrier of 
westcrn popular culture, carrying American programmes into homes around the world. 
Many scholars also claim that global television programming has been a onc-way 
flow from developed countries such as thc USA to developing countrics. In the 
context of Greater China, the popularity of the global players' transnational television 
is very much resultant from the demands of multi-channel markets led hy the 
development of cablc and satellite tclc\'ision industries in the region. ｾｨＩｲｌＧｏ｜Ｇ｣ｲＮ＠ the 
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number of channels is expected to increase because Greater China has been 
undergoing the process of converting analogue television into digital platfonns. The 
drastic growth of channels not only requires a great amount of programmes to tilI but 
also demands that local players enhance their abilities in production both in tenns of 
quantity and quality in order to meet the expectations of the stratified audience. 
2.4.1 The array of major foreign players in Greater China 
The expertise of global media companies is attractive to local companies, which 
therefore seek to sign co-operation deals with the fonner. For Hong Kong and Taiwan. 
the economic evolution is good news for major global companies hoping to penetrate 
these markets. The opportunities for their overseas subsidiaries to operate profitably 
in Taiwan and Hong Kong are real as many transnational movie and children channels, 
such as HBO and Disney channel, have been very popular. For Mainland China, 
although it is not possible for a global company to operate a fully owned channel, the 
transfonnation of the market has led the Chinese authorities to open the door, albeit a 
small one, to Sino-foreign co-operation in television production and investment in 
limited cases of joint ventures (JV). 
The first foreign television programme in Mainland China can be traced back to a 
Japanese cartoon that was aired on television as early as 1982.111 1990 was a 
milestone for cross-border TV channels in Asia, with the establishment of Star TV 
network. It started beaming its five channels - Prime Sports, MTV Asia, BBC World 
Television Service, Star Plus and Star Chinese Channel - from the satellite AsiaSat I 
in 1991.213 Within four years, 40 channels of satellite tele\·ision were a\·ailable 
ｾｉｾ＠ Weber. I. 2003. "Localizing the global: Successful strategies for selling televiSltln programmes to 
China", (1o:ell('. \·01. 65. no. 3. p. 279. 
ｾｉｉ＠ Star Plus is a family entertainment channel and Star Chinese Channel nnladcasts mandarin drama. 
mont'S, and entertainment. See Chang. Y.-l . .2003. "Globalization of Idn ISlllll Pwgranlllllng 
strategies of globaltelcnsilln broadcasters in Asia", A.\/oll JOlJrnal ＨｾＬＮＨ＠ 'ommul//( alloll. \ 01. 13. Illl. I. P 
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throughout Asia.214 Global channels including CNN, ESPN, Discovery, TNT and 
HBO commenced their broadcasting either simultaneously or soon afien\'ards, 
followed by special business services such as ABN (Asian Business News) and 
CNBC Asia. Thereafter, the regional players like TVB, Phoenix TV and India's lee 
TV followed SUit.2IS In the 1990s, in most countries the audience gained access to 
these programmes mainly through domestic satellites, and the main intenlational 
stations, including Star TV, HBO and CNN, were distributed via AsiaSat, Palapa and 
Intel sat satellites.216 
Most global media corporations had set foot in the Greater China media industry 
by the early 2000s, television being their main business stream. Fifteen years after the 
launch of Star TV, there are over 30 transnational channels operated by non-Greater 
China companies in the region, among which about 16 channels have achieved a 
pan-Greater China reach. Greater China's astonishing market capacity has attracted 
literally all the first-tier global media and major second-tier transnational players. 
Among the world top 20 audiovisual companies,217 Time Warner, Walt Disney, 
Viacom, Sony, News Corporation, NBC Universal, Cox Enterprises, BBC and NHK 
have launched branded channels in Greater China as of 2006. 
These global stations' pan-regional reach is more a symbol than a profitable 
enterprise. The difficulty of launching a pan-regional channel resides merely on the 
rights to land in Mainland China, which is severely limited to foreign channels. Thus 
the obtaining of these rights is considered a great victory by the global players. 
5. 
ｾｉＮ＠ Such domestic satellites in Asia in the 1990s include Japanese satellites BS-3B and Superbird C. 
Russia's Gorizont, Thailand's Thaicom-I, Australia's Aussat and China's Chinasal. Sl'l' lee, P. S N. & 
W:lI1g, G. 1995, "Satellite TV in Asia: Fonning a new ecol{)gy", Tdccommlll1ic!I(/on\ Pulin, \nl. 19, 
no. 2, p. 135. 
115 Thomas, A. O. 1999, "Regulating aCCl'SS to transnational satellite television: Shifting gnvemment 
r,olicil's in Nonhcst Asia", (;II::(,(I£', ,·n!. 61. no. 314, pp. 24J-244 . 
• If) ll'l', P. S. N. & Wang. G. 1995. "Satdlite TV in Asia: Fomllng :1 nl'\\ l,(tllogy". 
7i.·/,·cOI","1II1inu/o"" Polin. \'01. 19. JW. 2. p. US, 
ｾｉ｣＠ According tn 2005. ＢｬｾＩｰ＠ 50 l'ntl'nainml'nt companies", Sen'cn ｄｉＮｾｴＧＬＧｩＱ＠ no. July. pp. IllS-ll)l) 
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However, in reality, not only are these landing rights limited but the areas that are 
accessible to cross-border channels are even more restricted. As yet, none of the 
satellite television companies have operated profitably. Instead, what they face is 
strong political pressure, regulatory uncertainty and cultural problems. 
Table 2.14 Major foreign companies and channels in Greater China 2006 
TVoperalOr Headquarter Channel Type Landing Area 
News USA Channel [V] Music Greater China 
Corporation ESPN Sport Greater China 
National Geographic infotainment Greater China 
Star Movie Movie Greater China 
Star Sports Sport Greater China 
Xing Kong Wei Shi General entertainment China/HK 
Star Chinese Movies Movie H Kffai wan 
Star World General entertainment HKffaiwan 
Star Chinese Channel General entertainment Taiwan 
Time Warner USA CNNI News Greater China 
HBO Movie Greater China 
Cinemax Movie Greater China 
Cartoon Network Cartoon HKffai\\an 
TCM Movie Cartoon HK 
COX USA Discovery infotainment Greater China 
Communication Animal Planet infotainment HK I Taiwan 
Viacom USA MTV Music Greater China 
Nickelodeon Children HK 
Sony Picture Japan AXN General entertainment Greater China 
Animax Asia Animation HK/Taiwan 
MGM Movie HKffaiwan 
BBC UK BBC World News Greater China 
BBC Prime General entertainment HK 
Hallmark USA Hallmark Channel Movie Greater China 
Walt Disney USA Disney Channel Children HKffaiwan 
Playhouse Disney Children HKffaiwan 
NBC Universal USA CNBC News Greater China 
Bloomberg USA Bloomberg TV News Greater China 
NHK Japan NHK World Premium General entertainment Greater China 
Eurosport France Eurosportsnews Sport ChinalHK 
TV5 France France TV5 General entertainment ChinalHK 
Deutsche Wc:lle Gennany DW - Deutsche Welle TV General entertainment HK 
Zl.'C India ZeeTV General entertainment HK 
Z News News HK 
Z Cinema Movie HK 
Z Music Music HK 
Arirang Korea Arir.lIlg TV Geneml entertainment UK 
Source.\': Company literature; 2006, "China satellite television profile", Screcn Digest no. November. p. 
355. 
Therc are two fonns of pan-regional expansion for foreign companics in Greater 
China. Thc tirst takes thc tonn of channels gi\'cn approval to broadcast in Hong Kong, 
Taiwan, and in threc-star (or abovc) hotels and foreign compounds in Mainland China. 
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These channels include Channel [V], ESPN Star, National Geographic, Star Movie, 
Star Sports, CNNI (CNN International), HBO, Cinemax, Hallmark, Discovery, MTV, 
AXN, BBC World, CNBC, Bloomberg and NHK World Premium. As mentioned 
above, this type of distribution, which is pan-regional in name only, does not deliver 
profit for these companies. Nevertheless, this does not prevent other diversified global 
entertainment conglomerates from queuing up for these rights. It is notably the case of 
Disney Channel and Vi acorn 's Nickelodeon. Despite the opening of Hong Kong 
Disneyland, the Disney Channel is still barred from the mainland.218 In the same way, 
the Nickelodeon channel is unable to complete its pan-Greater China expansIOn 
although its children's programmes have been distributed on CCTV.219 
By way of contrast, the second type of pan-regional distribution rights place 
foreign companies in a much better situation. These rights enable them to broadcast 
with cable operators in the Pearl River Delta, a prosperous area in Guangdong 
province of south China. Only six media companies thus far have secured the 
Guangdong landing rights - Star with its Xing Kong Wei Shi, Viacom with its MTV, 
and four regional players including Phoenix TV, Tom.com with CETV (China 
Entertainment TV, previously owned by Time Warner), ATV and TVB. Among these 
channels, MTV only is a pan-Greater China channel operated by a Western-based 
media corporation. 
Among the 16 pan-Greater China channels operated by foreign compames, 
first-tier media corporations account for 11, followed by tive from second-tier 
companies. In the first-tier group, the biggest player is Star TV. Since Murdoch's 
takeover of Star TV in 1993, its broadcasting output increased from 43 to S8 channels 
in 2005.220 This includes six pan-Greater China channels, a channel that specifically 
m Ressner. J. 2005. '"Mouse in chief'. Time Canada. \'l)1. 166. no. J. p. 3:'. 
119 2004, '"Headlines", Media 04.\;£1 p. 7. . . 
ｾｾｉ＠ Rigby. R. 2003, "Murdoch's new Star TV chieflooks 10 the long lenn in ASI3··. Campdig" ft."') Ill}. 
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targets Mainland China - Xing Kong Wei Shi - and three other channels in Hong 
Kong and Taiwan. Star TV also held a minority stake in Phoenix TV - one of the 
strongest regional players - which acted as Star TV's Chinese arm in Mainland China. 
Time Warner, the world's largest media firm, reaches the market with three regional 
channels - CNNI, HBO and Cinemax. In 2000, Time Warner's presence in Mainland 
China was once very much enhanced by the takeover of CETV, another Mainland 
China-targeting channel which gained landing rights in the Guangdong province. This 
victory, however, turned out to be a setback to Time Warner when a major 64 per cent 
of CETV's stake was sold to the Hong Kong Tom.com group in 2003. 221 Albeit 
disappointing for Time Warner, CETV is still considered to be an essential ann of 
Time Warner in Mainland China today, with Time Warner holding a 36 per cent stake. 
While Star TV and Time Warner have come to the region with as many channels 
as possible, Viacom, Sony and NBC universal are still limited to a pan-regional 
channel for each company to this day. Viacom's MTV debuted in the region as one of 
Star TV's initial channels. MTV Mandarin, after surviving severe financial difficulties 
in the mid-1990s, secured the rights to regional expansion in 2003. By way of contrast, 
Sony's AXN, launched in 1997, is a younger channel. Sony, one of the world's top 
electronics firms, had not shown much interest in television in the early 1990s. 
However, since the tum of the millennium, it had a strategic rethink and has been 
keen to expand into the television industry in Greater China. The Japanese corporation 
is now distributing AXN in Mainland China and has launched a new channel. Animax 
Asia, in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Southeast Asia.222 Moreover, by acquiring MGM 
for US$4.8 billion in 2005,223 Sony is consequently involved in the MGM channel in 
50, p. 15.: 2005 Star 7T compan" report !004·}()05, p. I. 
m Hargraw-Silk. A. 2003. ··Tom.com in talks for AOt's China TV stake" . . \fccl;a ./\;" p. -t 
ｾｾｾ＠ Bowman. J. 2004. "Animax brings 24-hour anime across Asia region". Campaign (l·A.") no. 2. p. I ｾ＠
m 2005. "Sony finalises MGM acquisition", Sen'en [)igt'st no. May. p. 151. 
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Hong Kong and Taiwan. NBC Universal, among the first-tier companies, also 
achieved a pan-regional reach with its CNBC, its sole channel in the region. Disney, 
however, remains the only global conglomerate that is unable to expand into 
Mainland China despite the existence of the Disney Channel and Playhouse Disney in 
Hong Kong and Taiwan (see Chapter 5). 
2.4.2 The presence of second-tier companies 
In terms of second-tier companies, five foreign channels - Discovery, BBC world, 
Hallmark, Bloomberg and NHK World Premium - have accomplished regional 
expansion. Among those channels, four (with the exception of Hallmark Channel) are 
among the top twenty media companies in the world; four (apart from NHK World 
Premium) are among the twenty most popular transnational channels in Asia, 
according to the Pan Asia Cross Survey from 2000 to 2005 (see Table 2.15 and Table 
2.16). In addition, all of them are significant in distinctive fields and do not constitute 
a competitive threat to the other four: Discovery is a factual entertainment network; 
sse World specializes on world news; Hallmark is a prominent family-friendly 
entertainment provider; Bloomberg is worldwide financial expert; and NHK 
represents the unique Japanese entertainment and culture. 
Discol'elY 
Created by Discovery Communication in USA in 1985, Discovery began its 
international expansion in the UK in 1989. It reached Asia (Taiwan and six other 
countries) in 1994. :!:!4 Having recognized the need for localization, Discovery dubs 
and subtitles its global prObJfamming into local languages. In 1999. it was aired in nine 
ｾＺＴ＠ Apart from Taiwan. Discovcry was alsl) available in the: Philippinl's. Papua New tiunea. Indon(·sla. 
Singapore. Japan. and South Korca. 
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languages In Asia, with programmes tailored for each market. 225 In order to 
encourage local non-fiction filmmakers, it launched its first ｩｮｩｴｩ｡ｴｩｮｾ＠ to fund 
first-time programmes in six Asia countries including Taiwan in 2001.226 Until 2004. 
Discovery has been a leader in the factual entertainment arena according to a poll of 
more than 40 pay-TV operators in 16 markets in Asia.227 In addition, as a favourite 
among Asia's elite, Discovery was rated as the most-watched international channel: 
outperforming CNN and National Geographic, according to a late 2004 Pan Asia 
Pacific Cross Media Survey (see Table 2.15). 
Table 2.1S Top TV networks in Asia (a) 2002-2004 (% reach) 
Channel Q4 (lO()l) - Q3 (l()()3) Q4 (1()()3) Q3 C()()-I) 
Discovery Channel 
CNNI 
National Geographic Channel 
MTV 
ESPN 
Star Movies 
Star Sports 
BBC World 
Animal Planet 
AXN Asia 
CNBC' 
Discovery Travel & Adventure 
Channel [V] 
Star World 
Phoenix Chinese Channel 
Channel NewsAsia 
Ilallmark Channel 
Bloomherg Television 
Sport-i ESPN 
Nole: I Includes CNBC Asia, CNBC Hong Kong, CNBC 
CNBC Australia and Nikkei CNBC. 
21.1 
16.1 
15.6 
12.3 
9.3 
9.7 
7.5 
8.6 
5.5 
6.1 
5.9 
1.7 
4.9 
4.2 
3.5 
3.4 
3.1 
21.9 
14.6 
15.3 
12.4 
9.X 
9.6 
8.0 
7.9 
6.2 
6.1 
5.4 
5.0 
.. u 
4.3 
3.5 
3.4 
3.0 
1.9 1.6 
0.8 0.8 
Singapore, CNBC India, MBN-CNBC, 
Source: Bowman, 1.2004. "Discovery leads Asia's PAX pack", Media Asia p. 22. 
ＺＺｾ＠ Madden, N. 1999, "(irowth a challenge t()r TV in ;\sla". Ae/n'rrising Age. Vlll. 70. no. R, p. 3h. 
ｾＮＧｦＬ＠ 2000. "Clips", ,·'-'ill Image p. 6. . 
'.'7 The only ･ｸｮｾｰｴｩｯｮ＠ is in India where DisCll\wy was beaten by National (il.'llgrapluc 2003. "'IBO 
\'otl'd lop cabsat channel for third Yl'ar", Media .4.\/(/ p. 6. 
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Table 2.16 Top TV networks in Asia (b) 2003-2005 (% reach) 
Channel Q2 (2003) - QI (2004) 
Discovery Channel 
CNNI 
National Geographic Channel 
MTV 
ESPN 
BBC World 
Animal Planet 
Discovery Travel & Living 
AXN Asia 
CNBCa 
Star World 
Channel [V] 
('hannel NewsAsia 
Hallmark Channel 
Bloomberg Television 
21.4 
15.1 
15.4 
13.0 
9.3 
8.4 
5.9 
2.2 
6.2 
5.8 
4.3 
4.5 
3.5 
3.0 
2.0 
Source: Murphy, 1.2005, "Intent to purchase slipping: PAX", Media Asia p. 20. 
213 
16.7 
15A 
11.9 
10.2 
S8 
7.9 
7.0 
6.3 
5.S 
4.7 
4.4 
2.0 
Discovery has built a well-distributed network in Asia and in Greater China. 
Before Discovery Channel entered Mainland China, Discovery came to a 
programming partnership with CCTV in 1995 to create a slate of programming from 
and about China, under the title The China Season. This was the first deal on such a 
scale between a western programmer and CCTV, and in exchange, Discovery 
programmes could air on CCTV with the Discovery brand attached.228 Ever since its 
launch in Mainland China, Discovery is seeking new opportunities. It has had talks to 
form a joint venture with Shanghai Media Group (SMG). According to the negotiation, 
51 per cent of the joint venture will be owned by Shanghai Interactive Television 
(SiTV), a subsidiary of SMG, and Discovery Channel is to broadcast via SiTV's 
network, with subscription revenues divided. 229 In Hong Kong, the Flagship 
Discovery Channel has been available on Cable TV since 1998. Until 2004, a 
portfolio of five channels - Animal Planet, Discovery Travel & Adventure. Discovery 
Health, Discovery Science and Discovery Hobbies & Living - was on Now 
Broadband TV and Cahle TV. 2JO With the exception of Discovery Health. these 
Ｚｾｍ＠ Burgi. M. 1995. "Through the wall". BranJu-ct'k. vol. 36. no. 24. p. 32. 
m 2005. "Media". Busint'ss CirinCl. H)1. ."\1. no. 13. p. 9. 
no 2003. "Disl:owry in UK deal with Cable TV" . . \It'dia .-1,;a p. 1 I. 
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channels were also made available in Taiwan when Discovery Science and Hobbies & 
Living reached Taiwan in 2004 on three digital platforms - CNS, Taiwan Broadband 
Communication and Eastern Multimedia, accounting for over 63 per cent of cable 
. T' 231 operators m aIwan. 
It is worth noting that even when its offshoot Discovery Travel & Adventure 
showed strong growth, the splitting-off of this niche channel did not seem to hurt the 
Discovery brand (see Table 2.15).232 Nevertheless, in 2005, in order to broaden its 
appeal to pay-TV audiences, Discovery decided to stake a claim on the lifestyle 
programming niche and re-Iaunched three of its channels in 2005: Discovery Travel & 
Living (replacing Travel & Adventure); Discovery Home & Health (for Discovery 
Health); and Discovery Real Time (for Discovery Hobbies & Living).233 Discovery's 
travel channel in Taiwan was thereafter re-branded as the Travel and Living Channel 
in April 2005. 234 Sy launching the Lifestyle Networks, Discovery separated its 
lifestyle portfolio from the 'factual' suite, which comprises Discovery Channel, 
Animal Planet and Discovery Science. Discovery is ambitious and is willing to take 
risks by creating new niche markets in a new pay-TV environment in the region. 
BBC World 
Apart from CNN, sse World is the other pan-regional news channel in Greater China. 
Having noted the significance of CNN on the global news stage during the Gulf War, 
BBe soon began its global expansion in the early 1990s. As SSC's commercially 
funded international news channel. SSC World Service Television was initially 
launched across Asia and the Middle East though AsiaSat I. The channel was 
ｾｈ＠ Sudhaman. A. 2004. "Dis(ll\'l'rv brings new channels to Taiwan vicwl.'rs", .\ledia ..1.\/(/ p. I·t 
-' ｜ｾ＠ B()wl11an . .I. 2004. "Discovl.'rY ｬｾ｡､ｳ＠ Asia' s PAX pack" . . \It'dia ,·hia p. 22. 
211 Sudhaman. A. 2004. "DisCl)\Cry brings new channels III Taiwan Vlcwcrs". ,\lcd/tl. hili P 14. 
!\.4 2005. "Ikadlines", A/('dia .-hio p. 7. 
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extended to Africa with MultiChoice in 1992. BBC World was then launched in 
Europe, India and the Middle East in 1995 and into Latin America and the Caribbean 
in 1996, and completed global expansion in 1998 by entering the USA.235 In 1999, 
BSC World was available in 65 million households across 187 countries.236 In 2006. 
the number has increased 270 million households in more than 200 countries and 
territories.237 Based in West London, the company has built overseas offices in France, 
Hong Kong, Australia, the USA, Singapore, India, Japan, Dubai, Germany and 
Canada.238 
Although it stepped up its Asian expansion plans through an early co-operation 
with Star TV in 1991, BBC World did not experience a smooth expansion in Greater 
China and North Asia. The main setback occurred when Star TV dropped BBC from 
its northern beam to assuage the Chinese authorities. 239 BBC first angered the 
Chinese authorities as early as 1989 with its coverage of the crackdown in Tiananmen 
Square.240 In addition, BBC aired a documentary in Britain in 1994. which depicted 
Mainland China's former leader Mao Zedong as having an unusual sexual interest in 
young girls.241 As a result, BBC World was thrown off the Star TV satellite bouquet. 
Even regional players such as Hong Kong TVB learnt a lesson in the incident and 
turned down the opportunity to broadcast BBC's documentary on the former 
Communist leader in fear of upsetting the Chinese authorities. 242 Following the 
incident, it took two years for the BBC to get back to northern Asia. In addition, it was 
m BBe World: http://www.bbcworld.com!contentJlcmplate_ ｣ｬｩ｣ｫｰ｡ｧ･Ｎ｡ｳｰＧＡｰ｡ｧ･ｩ､ｾ＠ 140, consultcd on 
July II. 2005. 10: 10 a.m. GMT 
:\6 1999, "International news", Aell'ertising Age, vol. 70, Ill). 21, p. 56 . 
. \' BBC World: http://www.bbcworld.colll colltcnt tcmplate _ dickpagc.asp'!pagcid 141, consulted on 
July 11,2005. II: 10 a.m. GMT 
m 2003, "Company CV", Marketing (0025365(}J p. 46. 
:\Q Rosario. I . d. 1994. "Self-rontrol". Far Eastern Economic Re\"lcH·. \'01. 15'. no. 9. p. ｾｳ＠
.'411 200 I. "down loads .. ", ..rd ..rge Glohal. vol. I. no. 5. p. 5. 
ｾＴＱ＠ Chang. Y.-L. 2003. "(,Iobalization of television: ｐｲｯｧｲ｡ｭｬＱＱｬＱｬｾ＠ strategies t)f gillhal telcn'ltln 
broadcasters in Asia". Asia1/ Journal (1/ CommunicCltion. vol. 13. no. I. p. 10. 
ｾＴｾ＠ Rosario, L. d. 1994, "Self-control", Felr Ea\lem /:"nJl/omic Rnicw. vol. 15"7. no. Q, p. 2s 
93 
Chapter 2 Media development in the Greater China media space 
a blow to foreign media companies that underestimated the importance of political 
correctness in Mainland China. 
BBC World went back to northern Asia by moving from AsiaSat 1 to PanAmSat 4 
and PanAmsat 2 in Asia and the Middle East in 1996. As a result of its two-year gap, 
BBC failed to develop a loyal audience and faced CNN's dominance, in addition to 
the added competition from two newcomers, ABN and CNBC. When BBC World 
came back, it adapted its global feed for the Asian market rather then localizing on a 
country-by-country basis. Thus, Greater China was part of its pan-Asia expansion, 
although it did recognize the differences between the region and the rest of Asia. In 
tenns of content, BBC World only committed to limited localization of its global feed, 
partly because it was following a pan-Asia policy and partly due to the lack of 
financial support from its parent BBC. Most of its programming came from the UK, 
with a five-minute insert of Asia bulletins at the end of each news hour, which were 
broadcast in English and simultaneously dubbed in Mandarin and Cantonese.243 The 
hourly news was not broadcast before 1995, and the Asia-specific programmes were 
produced two years later.244 BBC World's Asian regional commitment was then 
shown on its news programmes Asia Today and Asia Business Report.245 
SBC World's marketing was an even more drastic change than the customization 
of its Asia product. In 1997, in order to aggressively push the channel with cable 
operators and advertisers, it hired 30 advertising sales and marketing personnel.240 In 
Greater China, BBe World returned to Hong Kong when Wharf Cable decided to air 
:H 1992. "And nation shall speak gufTuntll nation", Economist, \'01. 323. no. 7757, pp. 21-2·" 
1 ... Shrikhande, S. 200 I. "Competitiw strategies in the internationalization of Tek\lsion CNNI and 
HRC' World in Asia", The Journal of Media Economics. vol. 14. no. 3, p. 161. 
Ｚｾｾ＠ Osborne. M. 2000, "BBC World pushes into crowded Asia Pacific", Ad .I.t:t· Gloh"I, Hll. I. fl() 2. p. 
:! 5 . 
. ＧｾＨ＾＠ Shrikhande. S. 2001. "Competitive strategies in thl' internationalization of (l."knSltlll CNNI and 
BBC World in Asia", 71", Jo"rnal of.\lt'dia Econom/o. Hll. 14. no. 3. p. 15-:. 
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it.247 By 2000, BBC achieved good ratings in Hong Kong and turned its attention to 
the promotion of the channel in Taiwan. 248 It reached Taiwan with a distribution deal 
with TV Time, giving it access to one million households. 244 Seeing growth in 
pay-TV platforms and multi-channel households, BBC took a further step, launching 
one of its global television channels - BBC Prime - in 2004 through the MEASAT 
satellite network in Southeast Asia, tying up a deal with Now TV in Hong Kong. 25o 
In Mainland China, however, it took BBC World no less than seven years (from 
1994 to 200 I) after the snub to obtain the license to broadcast in hotels and foreign 
residential compounds.251 BBC's re-entry into Mainland China signaled an improving 
relationship between Beijing and the BBC, although the tension between them 
continues. The news websites of the BBC, together with the websites of CNN, Times, 
PBS, The Miami Herald and The Philadelphia Inquirer, are still regularly blocked by 
the Chinese authorities.252 Despite the history of strained relations, BBC World seems 
optimistic about its prospects in Mainland China and is currently trying to establish a 
television channel in Mainland China. In 2005, it met with the Chinese government 
and a potential partner in a bid to establish a joint venture.253 
BBC improves its business in the market by making more programming trade in 
2006. Ten TV movies and mini-series have been sold in Mainland China by BBC 
World. In addition, only a week after the Beijing TV Festival in September 2006, 
BBe World has secured two deals with Chinese broadcasters: the docudramas 
ｾＢＷ＠ 1994, "BBe returns", Far Eastern Economic Review, vol. 157. no. 23, p. 73. 
248 Osborne, M. 2000. "BBC World pushes into crowded Asia Pacific". Ad Age Global, vol. I. no. 2. p. 
25. 
249 Shrikhande. S. 200 I. "Competitive strategies in the internationalization of Television: CNNI and 
BBC World in Asia", The Journal o{.\fedia Economics. vol. I .. t. no. 3, p. 159. 
Ｒｾ＠ 2003. "Company CV". Markc;ing ＨｏｏｾＵＳＶＵＰＩ＠ p. 46.: Sudhaman. A. ＲＰＨｾＴＮ＠ Ｂｾｂｃ＠ pn:r.an:s I\).r 
Prime channel's 11K. SE Asia debut", .\letlia Asia p. 4.; Telford. J. 2005. "Media cholCc RBC Prlmc . 
. \/(·dia Asia p. 14. 
ｾｈ＠ Saxe. F. 200t, .. Newsline ..... Oil/hoard. vol. I \3. no. 3. p. 95. 
ＡｾＡ＠ Zittrain,1. 2004, "China and Internet tilters". Sieman Report.\. \'01. 5:\. no. 2. pp. 105- \07 
m 2005. "Ml'dia", Blisinn'\ Chillll. \'01. 31. no. 13. p. 9. 
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Krakatoa: The Last Days, Hannibal: Rome s Worst Nightmare and The Los/ World 
will be broadcast by over 300 local channels over the coming three years. In addition. 
the natural history series, Life In The Undergrowth, has been licensed to national 
CCTV. 254 On the whole, BBC World has gained ground since the start of the 
millennium. In the 2004 Pan Asia Pacific Cross Media Survey. BBC World was 
recognized as the fastest-growing international news or business channel in Asia (see 
255 h I Table 2.15). T e year 2005 a so saw good development for BBC world. It 
increased profit by 50 per cent in the year to March, and contributed US$262 million 
to its parent BBC, the highest sum to date.256 
Hallmark Channel 
Hallmark Channel is an independent network with a reputation for family-friendly 
programming. It is also a young channel, re-launched in 2001 when the old Odyssey 
Network was renamed the Hallmark Channel. 257 Based in Denver, Hallmark's 
network spreads across 152 countries in Europe, the Middle East, Africa, Latin 
America and Asia. 258 In 2006, Hallmark Channel was distributed to 73.5 million 
subscribers, of which 55 million are full-time households. In addition, it ranks as a top 
IO-rated cable network and expects to generate more than US$170 million in 
advertisement revenue this year. 259 Owned by Crown Media, Hallmark takes 
advantage of its parent company's international rights to more than 640 titles in its 
library, valued at some US$360 million.26o Although it is at its peak, Hallmark faces 
ｾｱ＠ WorldScreen: http://www.worldscreen.comlnewscurrent.php?filename=bbcR2906.htm. consulted on 
Scptrmber 14,2006. II :03a.m. GMT 
ｾｾｾ＠ Murphy, J, 2005, "Competition prompts BBC World to hone core strengths" . . \/t'tlia .-/s/a p. 18. 
!Sb 2005, "Media", Business China, vol. -' I. no. 13, p. 9. 
m 2004, "The Hallmark Channel", Multichanne/.\'t'l\'s. \"01. 25, no. 25, p. 1\:\. 
'\K 
-. Iiallmark Channel: 
http:, tw.hallmarkchannel.t\' "framework.jsp?BODY usCorporatelnf('.jsp&CONTrNT DAM (iTE" r 
ｉＰＵＱｾ｝ＴＮ＠ consulted on July 30,2006. 10:00 a.m. GMT 
"') Moss. l.. 2006, "Making a Hallmark", Multichannel S('ln. vol. :'7, nll. 2X. p. 60. 
Ｚｉｾｉ＠ Ibid, 
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the cnStS of being an independent channel without the support of a diversified 
entertainment conglomerate. Thus, enlarging the distribution of its core titles 
worldwide becomes its main operational model. 
Centered on the most cost-effective distribution strategy, Hallmark centralizes its 
management and operation while simultaneously localizing to a very limited extent. 
In addition, Hallmark Channel locates all of its fundamental components -
programme, promotional, commercial and media libraries - that feed overall asset 
management at the Denver headquarters. Its regional offices such as Hong Kong can 
access these components remotely through an integrated broadband and management 
system. 261 The efficiency and unifonnity of operations has increased with the global 
distribution model. However, the management of Hallmark channel is also sensitive to 
cultural differences. In 2000, Hallmark channel had 11 feeds spanning the globe with 
a subscriber universe of some 30 million homes. It developed a re-branding plan in 
the same year by overhauling the graphic and music presentation and launching six 
new branded blocks of primetime programmes aimed at appealing to its core family 
aUdience.262 
Hallmark is committed to a modest localization programme. Given that it is an 
independent company. Hallmark lacks the advantage and capability of negotiating 
with major distributors. The channel's strategy therefore turns to securing audiences 
and advertisers by airing more and more (roughly two dozen) original family movies 
per year.263 The roles of overseas units are to implement the distribution and promote 
the core brand value of Hallmark. In 2001. selecting Hong Kong as its regional office. 
Hallmark Channel was uplinked from there and then distributed throughout Asia to 
:1,1 Thompson. M. 2003, "The Hallmark Channel celllralizcs managemenl \\ ilh \ ISA locus". 
Bro(ldmst Engineering. \'01. 45. no. Q, p. X7. 
ｾｉＧｾ＠ Spain. W. 2000. "The globally minded Hallmark: Owrcoming Ihe cullural (halkngl's" . 
. \!"'tic/wn"e1 Nt,,,·,, Internatiol1al. \'01. fl. no. Q. p. ｊｾＮ＠
ｾｉＬＧ＠ Moss, L. 200fl, "Making a Hallmark", .\·ttlltic/ram,el Nt'w,\. \'01. n. no. 2R, p, flO, 
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over 13 million subscribers.264 In the same year, it signed the first distribution deal in 
Hong Kong on Yes TV. The deal was not only to distribute the Hallmark Channel but 
also to launch an interactive video-on-demand (VOD) service as a strategy of 
diversification. By then Hallmark Channel's VOD service was only a\'ailable in 
Singapore through the streaming portal Sharkstream.265 Two years later. it expanded 
to terrestrial stations by launching a weekly two-hour block on Hong Kong's ATV 
World.266 As a pan-Asia and pan-Greater China channel, Hallmark has successfully 
positioned itself in a niche market and secured approximately three per cent loyal 
audiences viewing in Asia (Table 2.15 and Table 2.16). 
Bloomberg 
Launched in February 1994, Bloomberg is another pan-Greater China independent 
channel. It has completed global distribution by supplying round-the-clock business 
and financial news channel across the North America, Latin America, Europe, Middle 
East, South Africa and Asia.267 As a television ann of parent Bloomberg, Bloomberg 
TV's competitiveness comes from their core strength of global financial and real-time 
information analysis. "People who are familiar with the Bloomberg name are more 
likely to watch Bloomberg," says Derek Baine, senior cable programme analyst with 
Kagan Research. 268 Bloomberg TV delivers such service via three English-language 
channels in the USA, UK/pan-Europe and Asia-Pacific, two Spanish-language 
channels in Spanish and Latin America, and other five specific language channels 
ｾｍ＠ Hallmark Channel: 
hllp:1 \\·ww.corporate-ir.netlireye/ir .site .zhtml?ticker :crwn&script= 41 O&layout 7 &itc:m id 179307. 
consulted on May 10. 2006. II :00 a.m. GMT _ 
ｾｍ＠ Hogan. M. ｾｏｏｉＮ＠ "Hallmark ponies pp for Dirc:clV carriage" . . \llIllicluu",c/St'\\'\. \oJ. ｾＲＮ＠ n\l, ＮｾＩＮ＠ p, 
J. 
:10(. '00" "11 dl' .. II /' f' ｾ＠
- _. en Illes. It Ct Itl ... .'\10 p. _ . 
ｾＡｬＷ＠ Bloomberg: http:. iabout.bloombcrg.comipressctr, factshects tdl·\·ision.pdf. consultc:d on May 30. 
2006. 09:00 a.m. (iMT 
,'I.K Killam-Williams. S. ｾＰＰＵＮ＠ "Capitalizing on \walthy ｜Ｇｩ｣ｷｾＮＧｲｳＢＮ＠ fl.'/('I'/\Ion Wct'k. nll. ｾﾷｴ＠ no. -P. p. 
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including French, Gennan, Italian, Japanese and Portuguese.2h 'J 
Compared with its main rival CNBC, Bloomberg TV was a late starter in Asia. Its 
arrival signaled that business TV brands soon faced tough competition and struggled 
to make money in a diversified region. It also implied that Asia 's pay-TV market has 
matured especially for media firms that exploit the up-market niche with a focus on 
business news.270 Unlike other major global channels that set up headquarters in 
Hong Kong or Singapore, Bloomberg TV's pan-Asia operation is based in its regional 
headquarters in Tokyo. In 2002, Bloomberg restructured its regional operations, 
downsizing bureaux in Australia, Singapore, and Hong Kong and adding integrated 
newsrooms in Seoul, Taipei, Beijing and Shanghai. The plan was to streamline the 
regional operation and strengthening the Tokyo bureau as a regional hub.271 
Like its arch-rival CNBC, Bloomberg vigorously pursued an expansion strategy in 
Asia. It managed to build up large partial distribution by securing time slots on local 
terrestrial channels. Japan was the main target and has accounted for almost half of 
Bloomberg's reach of more than 27 million households. 272 Bloomberg TV 
successfully reached Mainland China in 2003 with limited landing rights to broadcast 
in commercial buildings, foreign compounds and upscale hotels. A year later, 
Bloomberg pursued its expansion plans by gaining its first all-day slot in Singapore on 
StarHub CableTV and an additional all-day slot in Hong Kong on digital network 
exTV. 273 However, Bloomberg does not localize as much as CNBC. It has a few 
specific feeds for some countries such as Brazil, Thailand and Malaysia, but its 
Chinese service is broadcast from Asia feed and has no specific content adapted for 
ｾｴｯｑ＠ Bloomberg: http:'about.bloomberg.com pressctrfactshecls Ielevision.pdf. cPflsultl'd lll1 Mav .In. 
2006.09:00 a.lll. GMT 
."11 Madden, N. 200 I. "Breaking the Asian market", Ad Age Global, \lli. I. no. II. p. "27. 
ｾＷＱ＠ "2002, "Industry Rill'S". Asia Image p. 4. 
ｾＷＺ＠ Liu. P. 2004. "Bll'(,mberg TV gOl'S eyeball-Ill-eyeballli.,r Vlcwer 1l1lI11bl'rs", .\lc't/ttl "/(/ p. 20. 
m Ibid. 
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Ch ' k 274 the mese mar et. 
Bloomberg also takes advantage of its core resources in Internet operations. It 
integrated its market-specific websites into the main site - Bloomberg.com, in order 
to exploit banner advertising and sponsorship opportunities.275 The efforts seem to 
have paid off in 2006 when Bloomberg started to tap into online advertising sales in 
Mainland China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore and Malaysia.276 As an independent 
channel for a very niche audience, Bloomberg's strategy has helped it survive at a 
time of conglomeration and consolidation. In 2001, Bloomberg TV reached 178 
million households worldwide and this number has risen to 200 million in ＲＰＰＶＺｾＷＷ＠
Bloomberg TV made gains in this Asian elite group of consumers, although from a 
very small base (from 1.9 per cent to two per cent, see Table 2.15), of which more 
than one-third of its Asian audience is based in Tokyo.278 In addition, 42 per cent of 
top executives across the region frequently watch Bloomberg TV.279 
NIIK World Premium 
Apart from first-tier company Sony, Japanese NHK is the only other Asian foreign 
corporation that owns a pan-Greater Chinese channel - NHK World Premium. NHK, 
a public broadcasting company in Japan, has long been an Asian media giant that 
ranked as the world's 17th largest entertainment company with a turnover of over 
lJS$6 billion in 2004.280 Seizing the opportunity offered by satellite technology, NHK 
launched a NHK World plan in order to expand its channels worldwide. In their own 
word, the company aims to 'promote international understanding of Japan by offering 
:?74 Gritliths, A. 2003, "China takes centre stage", Campaign (L'K) no. 22, p. 13. 
m 2003, "Media: Bloomberl! integrates websill's", .\ledia Asia p. R. 
ｾＷ｢＠ 2006, "In brief', MediCi .·1.';0 p. 3. 
m Lowry, T. 2001, "Th\.' Bloomberg machine. (Cover Sll)ry)", Bll.'iincs'i W('('k no. 3729, pp. 7h-84. 
nil Bowman, J. 200.t "Watching more, reading kss·' . .\I('(/ia Asia pp. 30-31. 
2N According to the Global Capital Markets SUf\ll'y, in Murphy, J. 2()06. "traditional media holds 
strong with top finance eXl'cs", .\/t'diCi A.';t/ p. 6. 
JIIIl 2005, "Top 50 entertainment companies", S('/'('('I/ [)/gt·.\/ no. July, pp. 198-199. 
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a broad range of impartial infonnation and Japanese perspectives' .281 In line with its 
plan, NHK launched two world television services in 1998 - NHK World TV and 
NHK World Premium. NHK World TV is a free-to-air and unencrypted channel. 
supplying news and infonnation programmes to audiences whereas NHK World 
Premium is an encrypted channel, distributing NHK domestic news, drama, sports, 
soap operas and entertainment to local cable or satellite operators. 
NHK World and NHK World Premium have covered the world through the 
satellites of TV Japan - PAS-8, PAS-9 and PAS_IO.282 However, although NHK 
World Premium has reached about 100 countries including Taiwan, Hong Kong and 
Mainland China, its influence is limited. Apart from a few English programmes on 
NHK World, its audience is overwhelmingly made of Japanese expatriates. As for 
NHK World Premium, it is encrypted in order to facilitate copyright clearance.283 
Despite the reach of pan-Greater China, NHK World Premium is virtually limited to 
the distribution in hotels in Mainland China, Taiwan and Hong Kong. In terms of 
competition and cultural influence, NHK's pan-regional presence has a very limited 
impact in Greater China, although it is politically significant that NHK is distributed 
in Mainland China at all. 
2.5 National and local players in trouble: Niche strategy in fragmented markets 
The competition of the multi-channel television industry across Greater China is 
sharpening up as a result of the arrival of foreign channels. The growing competition 
is having an impact on the existing transnational, national and local companies. Just in 
the news area, for instance, Hong Kong's 24-hour news channels have increased to 
2111 2006 ,\'IIK on11l/(// report. A\'ailable on NHK Online: http:,' www.nhk.or.jp prikoho-e.hlm. consulted 
on May 14.2006.08: 10 a.m. GMT 
?K.' .':!006 SilK amilia/ report. Available on NHK Online: http: \\'Ww.nhk.or.jplprkoho-c.hllll. consuhl.·J 
on May 14.2006.08: 10 a.m. GMT 
.'K' White. J. D . .2005. (;/oho/ m('clia: The te/t"'i.\Ion rt'I'II/1II10n In .... \/(/ Routledge. London. p. 110. 
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three in 2003 while Taiwan had no less than eight all-news channel by that year. In 
Mainland China, cable TV penetration has surpassed that of the Western Europe. But 
even the local cable operators on the mainland, which were once seen as secure from 
competitors, are gearing up for the upcoming challenges.284 
With less competitiveness and smaller economies of scale, national and local 
players bear the brunt of the challenge. In the face of escalating pressure an increasing 
number of channels adopt differentiation strategies and target specific-interest 
audiences. This development stems from increasing international competition and also 
reflects the fragmentation of the Greater China television market. In Taiwan and Hong 
Kong altogether, some nine million television households have more than 200 TV 
channels to choose from. In Mainland China, the fragmentation is even higher as a 
result of the legacy of China's multi-layered television system, which divided the 
market into more than 30 provinces each with its own provincial, municipal and 
county stations. 
The tiny market shares have made many channels operate with very small rating 
figures in Taiwan and Hong Kong. In Mainland China, the lower level cable operators 
have kept running at a loss, especially for stations below provincial level. The 
pressure leads many channels to go for a niche-market strategy and the number of 
niche television or genre-specific channels has increased radically. In accordance with 
the development, the provision of local content in those channels has also grown 
extensively. 
A typical example is the unique Taiwanese genre of Taiwanese-language (Minna) 
dramas. The Taiwanese cable TV market is notorious for being the most competitive 
in Asia. It also features the fact that its cable TV audiences arc higher than national 
!II .. Davies, S. T. ＲＰＰＮｾＬ＠ "Competition spurs rv industry to otTer more, better. faster", .\lcdla ,-'-"a p. 14. 
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terrestrial channels, a phenomenon unseen anywhere except the USA.285 After the 
legislation of cable and satellite TV market in the 1990s, an increasing number of 
Taiwanese channels have positioned themselves as 'Minna TV', producing 'local 
flavour/native' dramas which are very much rooted in the spirit of the Minna language. 
These Minna dramas are highly appreciated by the local audience because of their 
cultural and linguistic proximity. However, it also reflects Taiwanese hatred against its 
regional rival Mainland. Main Taiwanese people refuse to watch Mandarin 
programming and these Minna dramas offer an alternative to the traditionally 
mainstream Mandarin-language television market. 
SET TV (a cable TV player) and Formosa TV (FTV, one of Taiwan's five 
terrestrial TV stations) are representatives of this trend. Although considered 
low-budget and second-rate, the kind of local dramas produced have created a new 
genre and quickly shifted audiences' loyalty from previous dominant terrestrial 
stations such as TTV, CTS and CTN. The niche-market pursuit and differentiation 
strategy has proved a success as some dramas have gained exceptional ratings on 
cable TV, such as Taiwan Thunderclap, a show which has even sparked off the 
island's terrestrial television stations' popular copycats such as Flying Dragon and 
I ./. ., p 286 ｾｾ＠ l' Will rospecls. 
Another example in Taiwan of niche-interest stations is the thriving shopping 
channels that emerged in the early 2000s, ET TV being the pioneer in this business. 
Since the launch of its TV shopping channel in 1999, ET TV has grown 300 per cent 
every year and boasts five channels with round-the-clock programmes since 2006. 
Such development also attracted a few newcomers such as the Fubon Group, 
-------------
Ｇｾ｜＠
. Mellalieu. s. ｾＰＰＴＬ＠ "Tum on and tune in for major impact \·ia :\sla' S many TVsets", .\lcdio A.\/a p. 
14. 
ｾｬｉ｢＠ SaVa!!l', M. 2005, "Local TV takes action", Media Asia pp. 9-11. 
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Seven-II and Chunghwa Telecom and has led to a new television movement. 28: 
Table 2.17 Top 10 programmes between 2003 and 2006 on a selection of dates 
(programme/typeffV station) 
Rank lulf..152003 lulf.. 152004 lull.' 15 2005 llllv 15 lOO6 
I Taiwan Thunderclap 21 Life with Prospects Unforgettable Unforgettable 
Minna Drama Minna Drama Minna Drama Minna Drama 
(SETTY) (FTV) (FTV) (FTY) 
2 Taiwan Thunderclap Taiwan Tornado Golden Sky Scraping Unforgettabk 2 
Minna Drama Minna Drama Minna Drama ,\Imna Drama 
SET TV (SET TV) (SET TV) (FTY) 
3 Dragon Hero Taiwan Tornado 2 Unforgettable 2 Destined Couple 2 
Minna Drama Minna Drama Minna Drama Minna Drama 
FTV (SET TV) (FTV) (FTV) 
4 Taiwan Thunderclap Taiwan Tornado 3 Golden Sky Scraping 2 CTV Global News 
2115 Minna Drama Minna Drama News 
Minna Drama (SET TV) (SET TV) (TTV) 
(SET TV) 
5 TTV Night News CTV Global News Golden Sky Scraping 3 TTV Night News 
News News Minna Drama News 
(TTV) (CTV) (SETTY) (TTV) 
6 My Japanese Wife Taiwan Tornado CTV Global News Destined Couple 
Comedy Minna Drama 4 News Minna Drama 
(FTV) (SET TV) (TTV) (FTV) 
7 CTS Night News CTS Night News Kind Relatives Golden Sky Scraping 2 
News News Minna Drama Minna Drama 
(CTS) (CTS) (FTV) (SET TV) 
Kind Relatives Bothers and Sisters TTV Night News Golden Sky Scraping 
Minna Drama Minna Drama 2 News Minna Drama 
(FTV) (TTV) (TTV) (SET TV) 
9 CTV Global News Bothers and Sisters Golden Sky Scraping 4 TTV World News 
News Minna Drama 2 Minna Drama News 
(CTV) (TTV) (SET TV) (TTV) 
10 TTV News TTV News CTS Night News CTV News & Weather 
News News News News 
ｻｔｔｖｾ＠ (TTV} {CTS2 {CTV} 
Source: Data based on Rainmaker & XKM International. 
In Hong Kong, terrestrial stations also seek to secure their home advantage by 
increasing investment in local content. In consequence, more channels are shifting 
thcir focus from pan-Asia advertising to more local ad sales. Galaxy, for instance, 
which is part-owned by TYB, relied on a mix of TYB-produced local dramas to 
attract audiences, given the popularity of such content with the Hong Kong puhlic'::!K8 
In Mainland China, the niche television market underwent an unprecedented 
cvolution in the early 2000s. It was partly due to growing competition, as in Taiwan 
!K7 Fay. C. 2005. "Media choiel': Fastern Broadcasting". l/edia Asia p, 12, 
!MM Sudhaman. A. ｾＰＰＴＮ＠ "Galaxy cuts priCl'S as 11K pay-TV flounders". Mcdia Asia p. ), 
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and Hong Kong; but more directly it resulted from the governmenfs media-refonn 
plan. In 1999 and 2000, the Chinese authorities began the transfonnation of the 
television industry by overhauling the country's four-layer system into a two-layer 
structure and implementing the consolidation of media groups (see Chapter 3). As a 
result, a handful of Chinese media conglomerates were established in a few years and 
thousands of local stations were either closed down or integrated into national or 
provincial channels. 
With the Chinese government's strong intervention and protectionism from 
foreign involvement, the television consolidation proceeded efficiently and 
significantly improved the fragmentation of the television market. But accordingly, 
the media transfonnation also led to the commercialization of the television industry. 
Television stations are still government-owned but are entitled to Chinese 
shareholders as well. TV stations can make profit by expanding into entertainment, 
tourism, and cultural businesses, but they also face the increasing pressure of 
self-financing. The total ad spend is limited and most of it goes to CCTY. As a 
national broadcaster, CCTV continuously defends its monopoly status. In 2002, 
CCTV accounted for 68.3 per cent of Mainland China's total television turnover while 
all the provincial satellite television stations share the rest. 289 
Given the immovable monopolistic national CCTV, hundreds of local stations, 
despite being integrated, have to cope with even fiercer competition. Thus an 
increasing number of stations adopt the strategy of brand promotion and specialization. 
Market leaders arc trying to incorporate their resources and strength in order to grow 
as content suppliers. Channels with few resources are converted into content carriers. 
Consequently, there is a trend in Mainland China's currcnt television market where 
ｾｓＧｉ＠ 2004, 71w CI';lIC1le/e\';s;on market I't'port ':()(}3-]004 lIuaxia Publishing. Beijing. p. 64. 
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the stronger becomes even stronger while the weak is left behind.290 In the provincial 
and local television market, some branded local channels have become capable of 
challenging CCTV's supremacy. This is getting clearer especially in southeast China 
(e.g. Shanghai and Guangzhou) where CCTV has been struggling with local stations 
whose programming closely tailored to local taste.291 Even in the national market. 
some local channels have made significant impact (see Table 2.18). 
Table 2.18 China'S top channels in national and major provincial markets (2002) 
Rank Nation market Anhui Province Beijing City Shanghai City Gil ang='10 II 
I CCTVI Anhui TVI Beijing Satellite Shanghai TV TVB Jade 
TV Drama 
2 CCTV6 Anhui Drama and Beijing TV2 Shanghai ATV Home 
Movie Channel C omprehensi ve 
3 CCTV 5 CCTVI Beijing TV4 Oriental News Guangdong Pearl 
and Entertainment River TV 
Channel 
4 CCTV 8 Anhui Economics CCTVI Oriental Culture Guangzhou TV 
and Life Channel Channel 
5 CCTV 3 CCTV 5 CCTV6 Shanghai Sports South Drama and 
Channel Movie Channel 
6 CCTV2 CCTV6 CCTV 5 CCTVI TVB Pearl 
7 Shan dong CCTV 8 Beijing TV3 CCTV6 CCTV 5 
Satellite TV 
8 Anhui TVI CCTV2 CCTV 8 Shanghai CCTVI 
Economics 
Channel 
9 Beijing Satellite CCTV 3 CCTV 3 Oriental Drama Guangdong 
TV Channel Satellite TV 
10 Hunan Satellite Hunan Satellite CCTV 2 Shanghai Life and Guangdong 
TV TV Fashion Channel Sports Channel 
II CCTV4 Zhejiang TV 
12 Liaoning News CCTV4 
and 
Comprehensive 
D Shanghai Satellite Shandong 
TV Satellite TV 
14 Anhui TV CCTV 7 
15 Ileilongjiang Guizhu Satellite 
Satellite TV TV 
Source: Data based on CSM (CVSC-Sofres Media), cited in 2004, The China telel'ision market report 
2003-1004 Huaxia Publishing, Beijing. 
One of the most prominent players in this new order is Shanghai Media Group. 
Already with II channels, SMG proves that local players can be a success. In 2003, 
!Q() 2002. "(,(,TV stamps 'aircraft carrier' TV reputation", .\I('dla ..Isla p. -to 
lQI '1 r. h' .. 1/ /. ,. . ')1.1 
. Liu. C .. Yap. J., & Rodrigues. M. 2004, "SpOt t lor C (lIce. Il e( 'o .. \/L1 p. _il. 
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for instance, SMG launched Mainland China's first ever specialist, round-the-clock 
movie channel, the East Movie Channel (EMC). EMC's main competitors initially 
were channels specializing in current affairs and dramas rather than in films because it 
was only able to fill up half of the content with films. Its main competitors were 
therefore CCTVI (the news and current affairs channel) and Oriental TV (OTV) and 
Shanghai TV (STV) (ironically, both of which belong to SMG as ｷ･ｬｬＩＮｾＹｾ＠ However. 
the channel's plan was to increase the movie component soon after launch. leaving 
OTV and STY to concentrate on youth and dramas.293 In the time it was launched, 
movie channels were unusual in Mainland China. Western channels such as HBO had 
a minimal impact (due to their limited distribution) and the only movie channel was 
the national CCTV 6 which had been ten years-old. Although another movie channel, 
the Western Movie Channel, made its debut at about the same time, it was only 
available in the Shanxi province. Thus, EMC's service was very much a challenge to 
CCTV 6. Just in its first five months, EMC attracted higher-than-expected audiences 
and advertisers, claiming to be the second-most-watched channel in Shanghai.294 
EMC is the first channel in Mainland China's television history that adopts the 
American model of the movie channel, targeting a specific audience 24-hour a day.295 
As a provincial media company, SMG shows its ability to compete nationally and 
provides a model by pursuing innovation and specific niche markets. In 2004, it 
demonstrated its combativeness again by signing a joint venture with the CJ Group 
(South Korea's largest entertainment group) in order to launch a five-hour nightly 
home shopping channel in the city. SMG had no problem in creating a new television 
genre and educating the audience in Mainland China.296 
m Madden. N. 2001. "Anger as Shanghai TV brands merge". Ad A,Rt' Global. vol. 2. no. I. p. 10. 
N.\ ｾｏｏＮｬＮ＠ "Shanghai media group to launch a movie channel". ,\lcdia Asia p. 5. 
:'Q4 long. S. 2004. "OMC mixes US imports and home-grO\\11 content", Campaign ({ '1\) no. 12. p. 19. 
:'I)S Madden. N. ｾｏｏｉＮ＠ "Anger as Shanghai IV brands ｭ･ｲｾ･ＢＬＮＮｉ､＠ Age (;fohal. Hll. 2. no. I. p. 10. 
ｾＧｾｉ＠ Webb. T. 2004. "April date set for shopping launch lln SMG channel", .\It'dia A.\'" p. 9. 
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Hunan TV serves as yet another model in which a local company can distinguish 
itself from the rest of the field. Although it is one of the most influential media 
corporations in Mainland China, Hunan TV is not as large as Beijing TV and 
Shanghai TV, let alone CCTY. However, it is the first provincial group to complete 
horizontal expansion and pursue a market-driven model in the television industry. The 
station positioned itself as an entertainment-oriented television. In 2005. Hunan TV 
bowled over CCTV as well as the whole country with Super Girl, an American Idol 
copycat in Mainland China. Watched by 400 million Chinese and triggering thousands 
of blogs and online chat rooms, Super Girl has become the most successful Chinese 
television show in history. It is also estimated that more than eight million Chinese 
were willing to pay about US$0.02, a considerable amount in local terms, to text 
mobile phone short messages in support of one of the three Super Girl finalists.297 At 
its peak, Super Girl ratings topped CCTV's most popular show and the price of a 
IS-second advertisement slot during the contest reached US$lS,OOO, surpassing that 
of CCTV's prime-time shows.298 
Hunan TV's Super Girl demonstrated how a satellite show can break provincial 
boundaries and burst on the national TV scene. On the other hand, it also signals the 
quandary local players are in when the State Administration of Radio, Film and 
Television (SARFT), Mainland China's broadcaster regulator, issued new rules in 
early 2006 to regulate the nationwide distribution of idol-inspired shows.299 Despite 
the ban, Hunan TV's significance has spurred local television players to seek their 
own positions. Hunan TV is also the first media group listed in the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange and has become a conduit to attract toreign media in search of partners. In 
ｾＧｐ＠ Maddl'n. N. & Wentz. L. 2005, '''Super Girl' ｩｮｴｲｯ､ｵ｣ｾｳ＠ Chinese to Vl1ting". Adn'rti\ing Age. \(li 
76.no.42.p.22. 
ｾｉＧｋ＠ Madden, N. 2006. "How China buys and sells TV" . . ·tt/n·rtising Age. vol. 77. no. 19. p. 26. 
m The directive says contests should help to construct "a hannoniotls sncialist st1cicty .... must nnt 
make a hubbub about things as they pkase and must a\'oid crcating stars". Cited 111 Jakcs. S. 200h. 
"China's Super Girl needs a rescuc", Time. \'01. 167,no. 14, p. 21. 
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December 2002, for instance, News Corporation reached an agreement with Hunan 
TV in order to develop film and television production projects. In 2004. Hunan TV 
held its first programming presentation to marketers and advertisers in Hong Kong. It 
took a further step there by announcing a launch of its representative office in Hong 
Kong. 3OO 
The so-called 'Hunan Model' has encouraged local players to adopt a similar 
niche approach to the TV business. For instance, since Hunan is a popular vacation 
destination in Mainland China, Hunan TV also established a national travel channel. 
Beijing's provincial television specializes in documentaries while Shanghai's Dragon 
TV is news-oriented. A greater volume of locally-produced content and a greater 
diversity of programme genres are being produced in Greater China than ever before. 
TV news, dramas, travel, science, technology, health, fashion, trends, lifestyle, 
business and talk shows programmes all thrive in the region. 
2.6 The emergence of regional television players 
In Asia, "Pan-regional TV seems to be flourishing - several channels seem to have 
improved," claims Jeremy Nye, BBC head of research. 30 I However, it is also widely 
acknowledged that Asia is not a homogeneous market, which is the main barrier to 
global expansion of television in Asia. When compared to the rest of the Asian 
countries, Greater China features a solid cultural homogeneity and historical 
proximity. Since the launch of Star TV, the regional channels of Greater China 
developed and peaked in early 2005 when the Chinese authorities ruled on the issue of 
landing rights. 
The Greater China ｲ･ｾｩｯｮ｡ｬ＠ channels can be separated into two categories - the 
'-
'Ino 1004. "Headlines". ,\I('tlia Asia p. 9. 
101 Bowman, 1. 1004, "Watching more. reading less", .\/cd/a ..1.\1(/ pp. 30-31. 
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regionalization of global players and the regionalization of nationall1ocal players. The 
first type comes as the result of international expansion of global media. \lost foreign 
channels such as CNN, HBO, Cinemax, ESPN, BBC world and Discovery belong to 
this category. Besides these channels, these global companies have launched three 
distinctive local channels that target specific sub-regions. There are two channels 
aimed at Mainland China - Xing Kong Wei Shi (launched by News Corporation) and 
CETV (Time Warner); and a Taiwan-targeting channel - Star Chinese Channel. These 
channels are not regional but are operated in accordance with regional strategies. 
From the wide range of foreign channels, only News Corporation's Star Movies and 
Star Sports are newly established for the main purpose of Greater China. 
Regional channels in the second type have played a substantial role in the Greater 
China television industry, albeit in different ways. Mainland China's CCTV expanded 
to Hong Kong with a Mandarin channel CCTV 4 and an English channel CCTV 9. 
This is part of its overseas expansion plan according to which CCTV 4 promotes 
Chinese identity and culture globally in order to unify overseas Chinese, and CCTV 9 
delivers a Mainland China's perspective on world events and introduces the West to 
the region. With the full support of the Chinese government, CCTV's now endeavours 
to compete in Mainland China and Hong Kong, as well as the Chinese diaspora 
overseas, with the exception of Taiwan. Given CCTV's special mission of propaganda 
and overseas Chinese identity-building rather than commercial purposes, CCTV has 
made a unique case as a regional player in Greater China. 
Hong Kong companies have led the regional competition and arc regarded as a 
typical type of geoculture-based developing model. The national companies - TVB 
and ATV - reached the Mainland Chinese markt:t with a ｳｰｩｬｬｯ｜Ｇｬｾｲ＠ into the Guangdong 
province as early as the early 19C)Os, albeit illegally and unprofitahly. In Hong Kong. 
TVB maintained its lead on .. 'r ATV by investing in domestic programming which 
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attracted large and loyal audiences.302 In 1993, TVB began its regional expansion in 
Taiwan by launching TVBS whereas ATV did not take any action. The TVBS family 
channels have become a big success in the Taiwan cable TV market and are working 
as TVB's Asian arm. In Mainland China, ATV was granted early permission to enter 
the Guangdong province with its ATV Home and ATV World in 2002. TVB then 
secured the rights in 2004. Both of them have secured a substantial number of 
viewers. 
Table 2.19 Major regional and quasi-regional players in Greater China 
Oeerator Headquarter Channel Ere Landing ,4"'11 
(,CTV China Channcl4 General entertainment IlJ(,China 
Channel 9 General entertainment 11K China 
Phoenix TV Hong Kong Phoenix Chinese General entertainment 11K China 
Phoenix Movies Movie HKChina 
Phoenix InfoNews News 11K China 
TVB Hong Kong TVB8 General entertainment China 
TVB Xing He General entertainment China 
TVB &ERA Taiwan TVBS General entertainment Taiwan 
TVBS-N news Taiwan 
TVBS Asia Channel General entertainment Overseas 
Chinese 
TVBS-G General entertainment Taiwan 
Much TV General entertainment Taiwan 
ERAnews News Taiwan 
Asia Plus General entertainment Greater China 
ATV Hong Kong ATV Home General entertainment HK'China 
ATV World General entertainment IlKJChina 
Tom.com Hong Kong CETV General entertainment China 
Sun TV Hong Kong Sun TV General entertainment HKChina 
PCTW Hong Kong NOW General entertainment HKJChina 
i-Cable Hong Kong Horizon General entertainment HKJChina 
JET TV Singapore JETTV General entertainment Greater China 
MSTV Macau Macau Travel General entertainment MacaU/China 
Five Star TV Macau Macau Fin: Star General entertainment Macau/China 
Macau Macau Macao Zhonghua General entertainment Macau/China 
Television 
Eastem Taiwan ETTV News Taiwan 
Broadcasting ET Movie Movie Taiwan 
Yo Yo TV Children Taiwan 
ET News-S News Taiwan 
ET General General entertainment Taiwan 
ET Wc..-stem Movie Movie Taiwan 
ET-Jacky Channel General cntertainmcnt Taiwan 
ET Shopping Shopping Taiwan 
ETTVI General entl'rtainment UK 
Stlur('(': Various. based on company literature. 
IO! Harvey. C. 2004, "Terrl'strials think big to win big", .\leJia Asia p. 27. 
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Apart from TVB and ATV, Phoenix Satellite Television is another powerful 
regional giant. Unlike TVB and ATV, Phoenix TV is rather young but more ambitious. 
Only four years after its launch, it was listed in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. A 
year later it was granted rights to land in Mainland China and reached the Guangdong 
area. The company's uniqueness is that part of its ownership belongs to Star TV. 
which makes Phoenix TV the only Greater China-regional player with direct support 
from News Corporation. As a Chinese television giant, Phoenix has built an 
international network with overseas Chinese (see Chapter 6 for case studies of TVB 
and Phoenix TV). 
An increasing number of Hong Kong local TV players has gone for the regional 
market. At the same time, more local players that expand regionally are based in Hong 
Kong. TVB and Phoenix TV are the strongest regional giants, followed by ATV and 
Sun TV, PCCW's Now TV, i-Cable's Horizon and Tom.com's CETV These channels 
have all gained permission of entry into Mainland China but, with the exception of 
TVB, none has acquired distribution in Taiwan. 
The newest addition on the market from the company Tom.com Group has 
revealed the ambition of another Chinese player. Hong Kong tycoon Li Ka-Shing's 
Tom.com was originally an Internet portal. In 2001, Tom.com diversified its interest 
by acquiring publishing, sports and outdoor equipment companies. Its expansion 
continued in the following year when Tom.com bought another 13 companies. In 
addition to the 20 companies already in its pocket, it acquired another 30 companies 
including outdoor equipment companies in Mainland China and publishing firms in 
Taiwan. 303 The ongoing acquisition allowed Tom.com to evolve beyond its intcrnet 
origins and become a complex regional player. However, the one operation that 
astonished thc industry was its acquisition of Time Warner's CET\' an ailing 
\()\ ffargrave-Silk, A. 2003. "Tom.com in talks t()r :\01 's China .) V stakc:" . . \lcd;a A.\ICI p. 4 
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company of Time Warner's China ann in 2003 (see Chapter 5 for Time Warner and 
eETV case study).304 Taking advantage of CETV's pre-existing landing rights, 
Tom.com was able to begin its television business in Mainland China immediately. In 
addition, Tom.com has good connections with the Chinese Government - a priYiIege 
not enjoyed by most foreign companies - and has thus become a major competitor to 
Phoenix and Xing Kong Wei Shi. 
In contrast to their competitor from Hong Kong, the response of the Taiwanese 
players to the regional market is lukewann. The five Taiwanese national television 
stations remains focused on the domestic market and barely take on the competition at 
the regional level. In addition, few of the Taiwanese players have the contidence to 
take on the Greater China market. The only company to show any ambition in the 
regional/global scene is the Taiwanese domestic media company - Eastern 
Broadcasting. Founded by Gary Wang, Eastern TV (ET TV) belongs to the Eastern 
Multimedia Group (EMG), Taiwan's largest media enterprise and Asia's third largest 
cable TV operator. In 2002, ET TV launched its Hong Kong channel - ET TV 1 - on 
Hong Kong i-Cable, a channel featuring entertainment programme in Mandarin, and 
news from Taiwan's seven cable TV channels.305 This was a signi ficant step taken by 
a Taiwanese company aiming at regional expansion. It also represented an ironic 
situation for ET TV in that its regional reach only began after it built a global network 
in North America, Southeast Asia, Japan, Australia and New Zealand. 
Despite the breakthrough in Hong Kong, Mainland China still remainS an 
inaccessible market for ET TV. In 2003, ET TV experienced a setback in its Greater 
China plan. When it tried to enter Mainland China by way of Hong Kong's Sun TV 
and Japan's Jet TV. the China SARFT withdrew both landing rights as a warning. 
ｉｉｾ＠ ｉｉｬＱｲｾｲ｡｜Ｇ･ＮｓｩｬｫＮ＠ A. 2004. "CFIV revamps III China' s 1\' baltic", .\{('(lia ,·hlel p. II. 
｜ｯｾ＠ Smith. G. 2002. "Taiwan media group launches H K channel". ,\h'ditl A '/(1 P Ｍｾ＠
I ｌｾ＠
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Thus, ET TV's operations in Mainland China stagnated at the time when an 
insignificant number of television programmes was sold. "We want to become the 
leading media for the Chinese-speaking world, but I see huge risks and little return in 
China itself for the foreseeable future," said Gary Wang.306 Thus far, almost all the 
Taiwanese channels have failed to gain a significant foothold in Mainland China. with 
the single exception of Jet TV. Jet TV (Japan Entertainment Television), an 
independent channel, is a Japan-Taiwan joint venture which has gained pan-regional 
distribution. However, aiming at the niche market of Japanese culture fans among 
Chinese people, its impact is quite minimal.307 
The huge potential offered by the Mainland Chinese TV market always makes it 
the region's prime target for global players, but they often find out that they can only 
makc money on the Taiwanese market. Hong Kong has too many players for a 
relatively small market but it plays a more important role as a launch pad into Greater 
China. The interest in globalizationlregionalization of Greater China was ignited by 
the arrival of transnational television in Hong Kong, particularly by the launch of Star 
TV. But Mainland China's granting of landing rights is the chief determining factor in 
shaping the rate of growth in the television industry. The partial entry-promise for 
cross-border operators stems from the negotiations of Mainland China's WTO entry 
but more fundamentally it is embedded in the 1978 open-door policy dictated by the 
late Communist leader Xiaoping Deng. 
The presence of global media companies has spurred domestic players to either 
specialize in a niche market or strengthen in order to face competition. A handful of 
III() Hilk'. K. Bic risks. little return in China's TV market. Financial Times. 8-1':!-200S. 
\07 Jet TV ｜｜Ｇ｡ｳｾ＠ a joint venture between Japanese and Taiwanese capital. sCI up in Smgapore"', :\sia 
Broadcasll'f Center in 1996. Jet TV dehuted in Taiwan in 1997 and rt'ached Hong KIm!:! the next Yt'ar 
lIowevt'r. in 1999. Taiwan's SEC (Satdlite Fntertainment Communication) took llll tht' CI)mpaIlY· and 
dosed the Singapore office. In 2000, Jet TV completed tht' regilmal expansion hy the pcmllsslon of 
landing China. Sourl.'l' fonn JFT IV: http: W\\'W.jctt\".Clml.lw aboulllldc:x.asp, cllnsuht'd on Junt' 25, 
2006. II: 20 a.m. GMT 
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niche channels are currently kept afloat by cashing in on the shares of existing market 
turnover while the regionalization of local or national players is reshaping the regional 
television landscape. Thus the internationalization of the regional television industry 
has facilitated the regionalization of the media space of Greater China. The 
prominence of TVB, the ambition of quite a few local channels and the launch of 
Phoenix have all contributed to the phenomenon of regionalization. The next question 
is: how do these corporate players expand internationally? Chapter 4. 5 & 6 will 
explore the different approaches and strategies employed by the global television 
companies and regional firms. 
liS 
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Chapter 3 State regulation in changing television markets 
In December 2001, Mainland China and Taiwan joined the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), fonnally connecting Greater China with global trade. As a result, Mainland 
China and Taiwan, together with the previously sole representative from Greater 
China - Hong Kong, are now integrated into the international trade framework. It is a 
move that can help the largest Asian market open up for media giants such as Time 
Warner or News Corporation. In addition, it represents an opportunity of restructuring 
conservative media systems for domestic players, who will be able to expand overseas 
more easily. However, how much of the WTO agreements will be implemented, and 
how large areas of the local media markets will be opened up, remains a question. 
Notwithstanding the trend of globalization towards deregulation and liberalization, 
one should not expect thoroughly autonomous media markets in the region. Due to the 
historic legacy, the state will remain a prominent actor in the media sector in Greater 
China. The situation seems to validate the views of the 'sceptics' of David Held's 
typology. 308 The sceptics' argue that the impact of globalization is widely 
exaggerated and, regarding commerce, one should talk at most about the fonnation of 
regional trade blocks in North America, Europe, and Asia-Pacific. 
In the context of trade globalization, the difficulty in bringing the state back in the 
analysis stems from the fact that trade politics involves the state and many other 
governmental sources of authority. A solution is provided by the 'new realist' 
approach, which suggests asking who the authority is, what is its purpose, how it 
exerts its power and with which consequence. Such an analysis reveals a complex 
pattern of power and decision-making. 309 For one thing, this approach points to the 
10K Held. n .. McGrl'w. A. Goldblatt. D .. & Pen-atoll. J. 1999. G/ohal tnlTl.\/orn/alion.'i Poli/iC'. 
('conon/in (1IIe1 cU/lllrc. Polity Press. Cambridge. 
II!') Strange. S. 1996. 711(' 1'''/1'''0/ oltl,l' slall': 71It, dillinioll Of/JOH'('" i" Iht' Hodel ('collom,' Cambndgl' 
University Press. Cambridge. 
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fact that the state is not simply a unitary phenomenon but a cluster of institutionalised 
nexes. For another, it suggests that to investigate regulations and agreements at the 
international level, it is not sufficient to question the state's purpose but analyze the 
domestic power struggles (e.g. domestic lobbies, the opposition, and so on) as well as 
.. 310 the mteractIon among states. 
Considering broadcasting regulation in the region, it is no longer possible not to 
take into account the international context and in particular global market forces. As 
Marc Raboy has shown, television regulation is increasingly set up in the context of 
rapid technological evolution and economic globalization. 311 Technology is 
transfonning television markets (e.g. digitalization and convergence), further 
complicating media regulation. On the other hand, international trade and 
global ization are threatening the state's authority on the media. 
In this chapter, I examine the regulatory policies in Greater China and investigate 
the strategies adopted by the governments of Mainland China, Hong Kong, and 
Taiwan, at three levels (national, regional and global). However, it is impossible to go 
through every single provision of those governments. The conclusion will be drawn 
by exploring what actions have actually been taken with what purposes, and what the 
consequence and implications can be understood. 
3.1 Change and continuity in China's connection to the global market 
The advent of the WTO brought new pressures on members to improve their tenns in 
intemational trade. Mainland China and Taiwan's accession to the WTO in 2001 has 
long been deemed a major step to join the global family, and it is generally accepted 
110 Sakr. N. 2001. Satellite realms: Transnationalte!('\';S;oll. glohali:at;oll alld the .\/iddle fast I.B. 
Tauris . London. 
III Raboy. M. 2004. "Globalization and regulation," in Cvntt''''I'0rary world tc!CI'I\/Of/. J. Smclair & G 
Tumt:r. t:ds .. BrI. London. 
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that Greater China will embrace the unprecedented opportunity to operate in the 
global market. But since Mainland China has acceded to the WTO. has the 
government acted in accordance with global expectations? 
From the end of the Second World War to the 1990s, most East Asian countries 
built up high trade barriers in an effort to protect domestic industries. In Greater China. 
apart from Hong Kong, Mainland China and Taiwan are no exceptions. While 
Mainland China's exclusion from the global economy was due to economic reasons, 
Taiwan's exclusion was more political in character. Taiwan's lack of recognition in the 
global community is ironic, considering the high level of integration of its economy in 
world trade. In order to change their international isolation, Mainland China and 
Taiwan were both keen to become members of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) in the early 1990s.312 It took them more than a decade to be accepted 
at the WTO, following a decision by the organization's Doha ministerial meeting in 
November 2000. 
Two parts of the WTO agreements are crucial to the media industries: the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services, GATS, and the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights, TRIPs.313 The GATS brought pressure on the governments to open 
up their special economy areas which were traditionally heavily protected, such as 
hanking and the financial services. Regarding Mainland China in particular, the GATS 
tried to penetrate telecommunications, publishing, and the cultural and entertainment 
industries, which have long been deemed as off-limits by the state for ideological 
reasons. TRIPs provided a new mechanism for patent owners to protect themscl\'es 
against intellectual piracy in the region. Mainland China being undoubtedly their 
m The GATr was WTO's ｰｲｬＧ､･｣ｾｳｳｯｲ＠ and ended with the implementation ofthl' l'lghth ｮｴＺｾ｜ＩｉｊＢｬｊｬＩｮ＠ oj 
the Umguay Round agrt:ements in 1993. 
'" Rikowski. R. 2005. Ulohllli=ation. ｩＧｾｦＨｭＢ｡ｬｩｯｬＱ＠ and lihraries The implication ... oltht' World fra'/t' 
Orgm,i=atiol1 's G.' rs and TRIPS Agreements Chandos. Ox ford. 
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worse nightmare in the whole of Asia. With their entry in the WTO, Mainland China 
and Taiwan have been forced - in theory - to follow the rules of international trade. 
However, the achievement so far does not lie so much in trade liberalization but in the 
inclusion of Mainland China in the framework of global trade agreements. 
3.1.1 China's ambivalent attitude to media globalization 
As the world's second-largest economy,314 Mainland China IS a very attractive 
destination for foreign investors. In 2002, China surpassed the USA as the biggest 
recipient of direct foreign investment.315 It also posted a tenfold increase in its gross 
domestic product between 1979 and 2005, at an average annual rate of9.7 per cent.316 
In the media sector, although the WTO imposed further limitations on government 
intervention, the prospects for liberalization were limited. Even under foreign pressure 
to liberalize, the Chinese economy's rapid growth has been accompanied by on-going 
communist rule. The command and control culture of the communists has produced 
tensions between international capital and domestic regulation. In addition. the WTO 
agreements as such do not include a specific clause on broadcasting, leaving Mainland 
China much room for negotiations with media TNCs.317 
31. 2005, "China's global impact. (Cover story)", Asia ,\/onitor: China & Sorl" EasllJia .\lOll/for. \01. 
12, no. 2. pp. 1-3. . .. . . . ..' '& s Ｇｉｾ＠ Rawnhill. J. 2004. "Trade politics in East ASia. III Tracie po/wo. 2nd cdn. B. ｉｨｸＺｫｬｬｬｾ＠ . 
McGuire. eds., Routledge, l.ondon. p. 55. _ l' 
116 Allen. P. 2007. "China' s bounty". Wall Slrt'c.'i & Tcchn%gr. \'01. 2). nl) 2. p. - , 
117 Shaw, S. D. 2004. "Riding WTO bandwagon into China". Mt'clia AS/II pp. 24-25 
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Table 3.1 China's WTO agreements and the deregulatory process in the media industries 
Media sector 
Print 
Tele-
communication 
Press Publishing 
Adwrtising 
Audiovisual 
product 
Film 
Broadcasting 
News 
200/: media 
agreements of WTO 
telecommunications 
Books, magazines, 
and newspapers 
Advertising services 
Retailing of 
audiovisual products 
Building and 
reconstruction of 
cinemas 
20 film releases 
imported 
2002: foreign 
invo"'ement allowed 
Print 
Paging, mobile, data, 
domestic and 
international services 
2005: foreign 
in\'O/\'ement allo,,"ed 
As left box 
As left box 
Wholesale and retail As left box 
services allowed 
within 3 and 5 years 
Joint venture As left box 
allowed" 
Majority equity share 
and wholly owned 
subsidiary allowed 
with 2 and 4 years 
As left box As left box 
As left box As let! box 
As left box As len box 
production of tilms 
Production and 
release of 
broadcasting 
programmes 
! II05"jim:lgn 
i" \'O/\'cment 
restriC/t'd 
Publishing. 
releasing and 
importing 
Publishing, 
productipn, 
rekasing. and 
importing: 
Video l',hibiting 
Releasing of tilms 
Publishing and 
exhibitillns 
All k\ cis Ill' radio 
stations, tcle\"ision 
stations, and 
distribution 
networks 
News Institutions 
Source: Mu, L. 2004, '"Changes and consistency: China's media market after WTO entry", Journal Ｈｾｦ＠
Mf'dia Economics, vol. 17, no. 3, pp. 177-192.; WTO agreements, Law of the People's Republic of 
China on Foreign Enterprises, and various reports. 
According to the WTO agreements, the introduction of foreign capital in Mainland 
China should be triggered by publishing, audiovisual products, advertising, 
telecommunications and film, without any scope for foreign investment III 
hroadcasting. Mainland China's WTO accession agreements stipulated the country 
should: 
gradually open to foreign corporations the wholesale and retail husinesses of 
puhlishing within three years: 
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allow the distribution of audiovisual products; 
gradually allow foreign investment in advertising companies within two to 
four years; 
allow foreign investment in basic telecommunication services' , 
allow foreign investment in building and reconstructing cinemas; 
allow 20 foreign movies to be imported annually (lOin previous WTO 
agreements ). 
It is notable that there are no specific requirements for Mainland China to open up 
its broadcasting sector to foreign competition.318 In accordance with these agreements. 
the Chinese government implemented wide-ranging changes to existing media 
regulations by the end of 2001. The 'Regulations for the Administration of Publishing' 
specified that Sino-foreign financial co-operation in the retailing of books, newspaper, 
and magazines needs governmental approval. The "Regulations for the Administration 
of Film' stipulates that the building and reconstruction of cinemas by foreign 
partnerships also needs governmental approval. The . Regulations for the 
Administration of Audiovisual Products' contains a similar clause regarding foreign 
partnerships in the retailing of audiovisual products. 
The deregulation of the publishing industry was the most significant, because 
Mainland China opened up this sector on her own accord. The . Regulations for the 
Administration of Publishing', abolished the 1997 prohibition of foreign sole 
proprietorship and authorized foreign partnerships in publishing and sole foreign 
ventures in packing and ornamental printing. Thus, markets with low ideological 
stakes have been opened to foreign ventures, and those with a higher ideologi(al 
'III Mu. l.. 2004. "Changes and wnsistency: China' s mcdia market alter WTO cnlry". )ou,."ol of 
,\/t''';a Eco"om;c.\'. vol. 17. no. 3. pp. 177-192. 
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stakes have been opened to Sino-foreign collaborative ventures. In 2004, Mainland 
China authorized companies in Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macau to enter the county's 
publishing distribution business without the need to establish joint ventures .. llQ 
However, broadcasting remains strictly prohibited to foreign participation, despite 
pressure from WTO. 
Mainland China's trade policy followed a similar path towards increased foreign 
participation. In Mainland China, the "Law of the People's Republic of China on 
Foreign Enterprises' plays the role of regulating the domestic market for foreign 
players. In the pre-WTO era, the whole spectrum of media industries, including 
publishing, was absolutely prohibited to foreign enterprises. In order to prepare for 
WTO accession, the "Guide for Foreign Enterprises', promulgated in 1997, opened up 
printing to foreign investment. Following the accession, significant progress was 
realised when the catalogue was renewed.32o 
In the Guide's list of limited operation for foreign enterprises, the 'wholesale and 
retail businesses of books, newspapers, and magazines', and the 'retail of audiovisual 
products (except film)' were added under the category of 'wholesale and retail trade'. 
Other additions included 'advertising', placed under the 'agent' category, and the 
· construction and operation of cinema' under' education, culture, art, radio, television, 
and film industries' .321 
Again, it is clear that Mainland China agreed to some extent to media 
globalization by opening up a little bit of its market to foreigners following insistent 
requests from WTO. However, it also put a brake on foreign ambition by publishing 
an increasingly detailed list of prohibited sectors to foreigners. On the list. the 
11'1 2004. "Headlines". M('c/ia A"ia p. 9. 
IJU 200.1. "3, Macro-accessibility in China: 3.8, Openness to foreign lIl\estmenf', Semicondllctor 
Mmll4ilC'tliring Equipmcnt in Clrina: A Srratcgic Re/':rel/n', }()()3 pp. 38-49. 
ｉｾｉ＠ Undl'r the tenll that China's companies hold the majority eqUity of share, 
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·pubJishing, release and import of books, magazines, and newspapers'. the 'publishing, 
production, release and import of audiovisual products and electronic printing', ｴｨｾ＠
'production and release of film', the 'production, publishing, release and exhibition of 
broadcasting programmes', the 'operation of radio and television stations, and 
distribution networks', as well as the last ideological fortress - 'the news ｭｾ､ｩ｡Ｇ＠ - arc 
all within the scope of these new limitations.322 Until 2002, both the media laws and 
trade policies suggested that although Mainland China's media industries were 
increasingly driven by market forces and the commercial demands. strict limits ｷｾｲ･＠
to remain in place governing the activities of foreign investors and companies. 
Mainland China's opening of its media markets did not extend beyond the strict realm 
of the WTO agreements. The prohibition list was promulgated in order to prevent any 
nasty surprise and a domino effect in foreign investment. 
3.1.2 Transformation of China's television industry 
Although Mainland China has made great efforts to protect its domestic media, the 
authorities were not completely successful in warding off foreign involvement. 
Transformations have been subtle and pervasive and went beyond the WTO 
agreements. 
The contradictory policy movements towards openmg and prohibition retlect 
Mainland China's long dilemma in media regulation. This is especially acute in the 
broadcasting sector, which has long been off-limits for all commercial players. but 
which is facing a growing challenge from global majors and domestic private players 
alike. who are ｫ･ｾｮ＠ to profit from a new market. For domestic ｰｬ｡ｹｾｲｳＮ＠ t()reign capital. 
ｴｴｾｨｮｯｬｯｧｹ＠ and management expertise. marketing know-how and local knowledge. is 
ｉＮＧｾ＠ Mu, I . 2004, "Changes and (llilsisll'ncy: China' S I11l'dia markel alter WlO cnlry··. )o/lrnal 01 
Media t:conom;c\. \'01. 17. nl). ｟ｾＮ＠ pp. 182-1 X3. 
1 ")" 
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essential. The local fledgling broadcasting chain would greatly benefit from this 
foreign output, particularly in programming and infrastructure. The current 
deregulation of the television sector is currently benefiting local companies' needs for 
foreign supply. The authorities also sensed that the lack of foreign co-operation was 
damaging Mainland China's competence on the global stage, leading to more 
difficulties for its own international media players, such as CCTY. International and 
domestic pressure has forced the Chinese government to close the gap between the 
development of the television industry and Sino-foreign co-operation. 
For global media corporations, changes in the 'landing righf policy of satellite 
channels have a significant influence on the strategy they adopt in Mainland China. 
Due to restrictions on ground receiving equipment, individuals are not allowed to 
receive a satellite signal except in remote areas where neither terrestrial nor cable 
television is available. Regarding organizations, a limited number only of institutions 
and premises can apply to reception of foreign satellite television. These include: 323 
Three-star or higher and National Standard Class Two or higher hotels that 
cater to foreigners; 
Office or residential facilities reserved for foreigners and persons from Hong 
Kong, Macao, and Taiwan; 
High-level educational and research institutes, media companies and financial 
establishments. 
Institutions and premises that have secured pennission have become a priority ttlr 
foreign television channels. who still hope that it is a prelude to their domination of 
Mainland China's television market. The latest channels to recei n: appn)\'al from the 
｜ｾ｜＠ 2004 "Nolin.' ｣ｯｭＺｾｭｩｬｬｾ＠ ｩｳｳｵｾｳ＠ related to lhl' admmistralion of ｴｨｾ＠ recl'plion llf saldlile Ic:ll'\ ISlllll 
ｰｲｯｧｲ｡ｭｾ＠ from ｯｕｬｳｩ､ｾ＠ ｃｨｩｮｾＧ＠ s borders". Chinese LllW & GOn'mment. ｜Ｇｏ｜Ｎｾ＠ 7. no. 4. pp. 61-65 
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authorities were Malaysia's Celestial Movies and Singapore's Newsasia (December 
2004), bringing the number of accepted foreign channels to 31 (see Table 3.2). 
Table 3.2 Foreign channels with landing rights in three-star hotels and foreign compounds (2005) 
Operator 
News Corporation 
TimcWamer 
Phoenix TV 
TVB 
Sony Pictures 
NBC/Dow Jones 
Viacom 
TCI/COX 
Hallmark 
BBC' 
NHK 
PC'C'W 
MASTV 
TV5 France 
Bloomberg 
Eurosport 
i·Cablc 
Sun TV 
Astro 
SNC' 
Channel 
• National Geographic 
• ESPN 
• Channel [V] 
• Star Movie International 
• Star Sports 
• Xing Kong Wei Shi (Sky) 
• CNN 
• HBO 
• Cinernax 
• CETV 
• Phoenix Movie 
• Phoenix Chinese 
• Phoenix InfoNews 
• TVB 8 
• TVB Galaxy (Xing He) 
• AXN 
• CNBC Asia Pacific 
• MTV Mandarin 
• Discovery 
• Hallmark 
• BBC World 
• NHK World Premium 
• NOW 
• MASTV 
• TV5 
• Bloomberg 
• Eurosports News 
• Horizon Channel 
• Sun TV 
• Celestial Movies 
• Channel Newsasia 
Source: SARTF (The Sate Administration of Radio, Film and Television).; 2006, "China satellite 
television profile", Screen Digest no. November, p. 355. 
Thc opening up of the market is too limited for these companies to make a profit 
In Mainland China. Nonetheless, this small breach in '"fortress China' has begun to 
shape competition among regional and global media players. Time ｗ｡ｭｾｲＬ＠ News 
Corporation, Viacom, Sony Picture, and regional players like TVB, ATV and Phoenix 
TV. all have the scope to compete in Mainland China's marketplace. 
Since 2001, a sccond type of 'landing rights' has emerged in the Pearl Ri\"cr Delta 
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m Guangdong area. 324 It has been designated a 'Special Media Area' by the 
government, where foreign television channels can be accessed by the general public. 
as opposed to a handful of institutions, The policy's initial objective was to legalize 
the natural satellite spill-over from neighbouring Hong Kong. This 'Special Media 
Area' is a test-case for the authorities assessing the cultural impact of the foreign 
television channels on the province. The Pearl Delta area is a large-scale experiment 
for the Chinese authorities, the local television industry and the audience. Predictably, 
the Guangdong landing rights has resulted in fiercer competition among foreign 
channels. 325 Foreign media corporations soon began to fight for the Guangdong 
landing rights for distribution via local cable networks, because of Guangdong's 
relative wealth and its proximity to Hong Kong and Taiwan. However, these 
companies were limited by the government and needed to obtain another authorization. 
So far, only a few cases have been approved, including Phoenix TV (with 17.6 per 
cent stake held by Star TV of News Corporation), Time Warner's CETV, Star TV's 
Xing Kong Wei Shi (Sky), MTV, ATV, and lately, TVB. 326 Needless to say, it 
consolidated the position of the chosen few in the Chinese market, but for these 
players it is also a high-risk strategy to pursue. 
Thanks to the landing rights policy, Mainland China has gained a bargaining tool 
for its own television industry to catch up with international expansion, in line with 
Mainland China's "Going out' policy.327 Foreign channels that apply for landing 
rights have to be ranked among the top three television stations in their own countries 
Ｎ｜ｾＮ＠ Hargrave-Silk, A. 2002, "Will the underdog succeed in China'!"", Media .-/sia p. 18. 
｜ｾｓ＠ See, for example, 2004, "Hong Kong channel gets China break", Far Easlern Economic Re\·iell'. 
vol. 167, no. 39, p. 29.: Chang, L. 2001, "AOL, News Corp. seek broadcast rights in China", ｗｬｬＯｾ＠
Stl'('('1 Journa/- Eoslern Edition, vol. 238, no. 47. p. AI7.: Li. B. 2006. "Dim Sum launches free 1\ 
channel", Media Asia p. 10. . . 
｜ｾｨ＠ Liu. C. 2004. "HK station tipped to win Guangdong entry in September", .\fcdia .-/s/(/ p. ｾＺＺ＠ Shaw. S 
D. 2003. "MTV lines up concert for Guangdong debut". ,\[edia Asit/ p. 12.: ISl'. J. 20{)·t "I VA looks 
for ally in push for south China broadcast", ,\Iedia Asia p. 5. .. 
In Forney. M. 2005, "China's Going-Out party". Time Soulh Pacific (Awtrll/i" .\'('11 lea/and ('cIIlWII' 
nn. 3. p. 34. 
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(in terms of distribution and rating). In addition, they must have the ability of 
conducting "reciprocal' co-operation with Mainland China and assist in the 
international distribution of Chinese radio and television programmes.328 
In 2002, Star TV's 24-hour Mandarin channel, Xing Kong Wei Shi's News 
Corporation had to carry CCTV's English channel CCTV 9 in the US via its Fox 
Cable Network in exchange for China's Guangdong landing rights. ＳｾＴ＠ Likewise, 
SARFT secured reciprocal overseas distribution rights for CCTV 9 in 30 hotels in 10 
US cities via the Viacom and Time Warner cable networks.330 CCTV 4, a Mandarin 
channel, was placed on a package including Phoenix North America and an 
ATV-related channel on the Echostar network in the US. 
However, even Guangdong landing rights were not able to guarantee protits to 
foreign companies. Time Warner, who owned CETV, a well-funded 24-hour Mandarin 
channel - one of the first to be given access to Guangdong access in 200 I - sold its 64 
per cent stake to the Tom Group in July 2003. 331 CETV was founded by Singaporean 
Robert Chua but purchased by Time Warner in 2000. Over the next two years, the 
station incurred total losses of US$ 35 million. Time Warner's effective withdrawal 
from the broadcasting sector illustrates the difficulties faced by foreign channels even 
when they received landing rightS. 332 
Until 2004, the landing rights policy was the most significant progress in the 
Chinese television market for global companies. Then, the deregulation of 'production 
HII 2004, "Provisional measures for the administration of examinations and approvals of the landing of 
satellite television channels from outside China's borders", Chinese Law & GOl'ernment, \01. 37. no. 4. 
ｲｾＧ＠ ｾｾｾｾｾＺＮ＠ S. 2002, "China meets Murdoch", Fortune (07385587). vol. 145. no. 9. p. n 
HO 2003, "China plans intemational news channel", Screen Digest no. March. p. 69.: Sa\age. ｾＱＮ＠ 2004. 
"Viacom extends China presence for MTV and Nick". Media Asia p. 10. 
ｾＱＱ＠ Undcr thc term of the sak. Tom Group will take the responsibility for CETV's futurc funding up tll 
US$.1O million nwr two and half year and take over management control. Nevcrthekss. I InlC Wamer 
retains a call option cxercisable allowing it to buy back its previous stake in CI-.I\· . 
''1 200.1. "Tom.com tl) take major stake in AOL' s Chinese TV station". Wal/ S/rt't'l Juurnal - t(I\/('1"1I 
Edition, nll. 242. no. 2. p. B7.: Hargran.'-Silk. A 2003. "Tom.com in talks 1i.1r :\OL's Chma TV 'taJ...l· ... 
Aft'dia Asia p. 4. 
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of television content and movies' was undoubtedly the most breathtaking change of 
. ed' I' c. h 333 foreIgn m la po ICY lor t e government to adopt. As described above, the 
'production, publishing, releasing, and exhibition of broadcasting programmes', and 
the 40peration of radio and television stations, and distribution networks' had been 
being strictly forbidden by the 'Law of the People's Republic of China on Foreign 
Enterprises' until 2004. Television and film production companies were most often 
state-owned, and foreign companies were only allowed to participate in co-production 
projects.334 This made sense because of the lower production costs and maximization 
of revenue in the local market, as the product could be aired during prime time. In 
order to extract foreign skill, experience, and capital as quickly as possible, SARTF 
issued two decrees (no. 43 and 44) at the end of 2004. These decrees allowed 
domestic private capital to establish movIe production and movie technology 
compames, and also enabled foreign capital to establish movie production and 
technology companies.335 In addition, foreign capital is allowed to invest in television 
programming companies, under the usual terms that stipulate that the Chinese party 
controls no less than 51 per cent stake.336 
The approval of foreign companies involved in TV and film production companies 
will inevitably have an impact on the media ecology of Mainland China. It reflects 
Mainland China's evolving assessment and attitude towards foreign companies. 
HI 2004, "Chinese OK to foreign programme investors", Screen Digesl no. March. p. 83. 
H. The Sino-foreign cooperative productions of television dramas (video recordings) can be applied by 
three ways. Firstly, 'joint production' refers to the method of producing television dramas whereby the 
Chinese party and foreign party make joint investments. jointly appoint key creative personnel, and 
jointly share the profits and risks. Secondly, 'assisted production' refers to the method of producing 
content whereby the foreign party provides funds as well as the key crcati\c personnel. where all or 
some of the scenes are filmed within the borders of China, and where the Chinese party assIsts by 
providing labour services. or equipment. material. locations, etc. Thirdly. ·produl·tion by commission' 
rcfi:rs to the method whl'reby thc foreign party commissil)ns the Chinese party to carry out production 
within the borders of China. See 1004, "Rules for the administration of Sino-foreign cooperative 
production of television dramas (video recordings)", Chinese Lllll' ｬｾ＠ Gon-m",t'nt. \01. 37, no. 4. pp. 
69-73. 
ＬＬｾ＠ 200·t "First new joint production timl emerges in China", Suet'" f)/gn( no. December. p. 376. 
116 2004, "ll1\cstml'nt banking database: Media entertainment", /",'('sln/e1lf DC'll/"'" . D,gl'.\I, vol. 70. no. 
46. pp. 51-53. 
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pursumg several objectives: accelerating broadcasting development and pushing 
domestic broadcasting refonn, providing a shortcut to the global market for domestic 
players, and curtailing the gap between domestic and global standard. In order to 
industrialize Mainland China's cultural industries, the government has resolved to 
open up its broadcasting market far beyond the WTO agreements. 
The first Sino-foreign joint venture to take advantage of the deregulation was the 
China Film Warner Hengdian Company, founded in 2004. It was established by 
Mainland China's largest state-owned film studio - the China Film Group (which 
holds a 40 per cent stake), the largest commercial studio - the Zhejiang Hengdian 
Group, and Time Warner (30 per cent each).33? Despite its frustration in the satellite 
channel business, Time Warner has been the first foreign major to officially operate in 
Mainland China's film industry. The policy also entitles the American corporation to 
produce television films through the new joint venture. Time Warner was followed by 
Sony Pictures, which set up a television digital production company with China Film 
Group in December 2004.338 Even before regulation changed, Viacom established a 
joint venture in March 2004. It opened up a children's programme production unit in 
Shanghai with a local company - the Shanghai Media Group.339 The end of the ban 
on direct investment reflects the Chinese government's recognition that foreign talent 
and funds are essential to improve Mainland China's lacklustre television 
programming and fill hundreds of planned pay and digital television channels.340 
117 2004. "Wamer takes more interest in Chinese film sector". Screen Digest no. November. p .. '45. 
11M 2004. "First new joint production finn emerges in China". Sen'cII Digest no. December. p .. 176. 
\\1) 
2004. "The producers". Business China. \'01. 30. no. 11. pp. 1-2. 
1-4(1 Chan. 1. K., Ellis. M .. & Styles. A. 2005, "The TV ((mtent challenge", Clrina Bu.\int"\ Rent'w, \'01. 
32. no. 4.pp. 46-49. 
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3.1.3 Protectionist measures against global media corporations 
Media policy is a way for states to display their sovereignty in the face of global 
challenges,34I which partly explains why there are still restrictions on the information 
flow in Mainland China. With the WTO agreements, China's doubling of the 
importation of foreign movies from 10 to 20 has stepped up the liberalization of 
media content, but no pledge was made in respect of television programmes. The 
Chinese authorities were concerned by the impact of 'outside border programmes'. 
These terms refer to programmes coming from Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao and 
other foreign countries, and also to TV programmes produced by Chinese television 
organizations in co-operation with foreign companies.342 Foreign content is regulated 
in different ways. Firstly, the Chinese government adopts strict control over imported 
content in order to protect political, cultural, and economic interests. In 2000, the 
previous regulator MRFT limited the foreign material to 20 per cent of the total 
airtime allocated to dramas, and 15 per cent during prime time (from 6 to 10 pm). At 
the same time, according to the "Regulations for the Administration of the Radio and 
Television Dramas', the SARFT tried to lift the ban, at least partially, stipulating that 
foreign television drama should not exceed 25 per cent of total television dramas and 
15 per cent of drams during prime time.343 Ironically, this was not the start of looser 
restrictions but of tighter controls on foreign drama. A ruling and four other directives 
were released to preclude imported dramas from being aired from 7 to 9:30 pm.344 In 
addition, although no official quota is released on the other types of programming, 
purely foreign programmes were not permitted. 
｜ｾｉ＠ Waisbord, S. & Morris. N. 2001, "Introduction," in Media and glohali=ation: Why the state malters. 
N. Morris & S. Waisbord. eds., Rowman & Littlefield, Oxford, pp. 7-16. 
｜Ｎｾ＠ 2004, "Rules for the administration of the import and broadcast of television programs from outside 
China's borders", Chinese Law & GOl·emment. vol. 37. no. 4, pp. 54-57. 
\4.\ 2004, "Regulations for the administration of radio and television", Chinese Law & GOl'('rnmCllr, vol. 
37. no. 4,pp. 9-19. 
\44 Chin, Y.-c. 2003. "China' s regulatory pl)licics on transnational telc\'isillO drama flow". J/cdia 
/)('\·e/opm('nt. vol. J 2003, p. 19. 
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In addition to these limits, another way of controlling foreign imports is through 
import quota. By 1997, the government approved 60 titles ("indexes') per year. each 
of which was equal to 30 one-hour episodes. But after the 1997 Shanghai television 
festival, the number of titles was reduced to 20 episodes, resulting in a 1.200 hour 
annual import quota on foreign drama programming carried by Chinese 
345 broadcasters. 
Regulations on foreign content illustrates Mainland China's stance in the face of 
the global challenge. As early as in the 1980s, the imported dramas from America, 
Hong Kong, and Japan had turned the main characters of these television programmes 
as alternative models to local politicians. The fact that television dramas became part 
of popular culture threatened the government effort of entrenching the media into the 
'ideological state apparatus'. All media programmes should sing from the same hymn 
sheet and television dramas in particular were supposed to praise the virtues of 
socialism. In the 1990s, with the rapid increase of television stations in Mainland 
China, there was a huge gap between demand and supply. Due to foreign dramas' 
delicate production and high entertainment value, the shortage of self-supply made 
domestic broadcasters increasingly depend on imports. 
In the 1990s, the popularity of foreign dramas prompted the Chinese government 
to take action to limit the quantity of foreign imports. In 1991, the television stations 
broadcast 23,815 hours of programmes per week on average, of which 9,593 hours 
were produced in Mainland China and 14,222 hours were imported. In 1994, of the 
39,878 weekly broadcasting hours, 24,187 hours were domestically produced and 
15.691 were imported. In 1997, of the 59,892 weekly broadcasting hours, home 
production rose to 42,056 hours but imports stayed 17,836 hours. 346 However. 
｜ｾｾ＠ Chin. y.-c 2003, "China's regulatory policies on transnational tdeyision drama tlnw", .\ledlo 
f)('\'(·I0l'ment. yol. 3/2003, p. 19. 
ｾ＠ liu, X.-C 200 I. The compelilh'l? lldnJnlllges oral/dim'i.'wal induslrlcs in lire Gn'oler China r('glem 
131 
Chapter 3 State regulation in changing television markets 
imposmg limits on imports did not shift the dependence of domestic tele\'ision 
stations because of the poor quality of domestic products. In 2005, the value of 
imported programmes reached US$ 50.2 million, nearly six times the \'alue of 
exported programmes (US$ 8.5 million). The total number of hours traded was 79,324, 
which included 72,644 hours of imported programmes and 6,680 hours of exported 
programmes. 347 Meanwhile, the government turned to boost domestic production 
through international co-operation of co-production. In turn, co-production ventures 
became another dilemma for regulators because of their fear of foreign capital and 
labour. Without the approval for foreign investment in production companies, 
co-productions became the most common practice. The number of co-produced 
dramas rose from 41 (763 episodes) of 1999 to 51 (990 episodes) the following 
year.348 
Furthermore, In 1999, 18 provincial channels simultaneously broadcast Hong 
Kong's kung fu drama nan Long Ba Bu and royal court (gongling) drama Huan Zhu 
Ge Ge (co-produced in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Mainland China) during prime time. 
The operation started a trend and brought financial rewards to the channels involved. 
The success of these channels caused the Chinese authorities great worry, and 
subsequently, a strict protectionist policy was implemented. In order to protect 
domestic interests and boost the local industry, the government stipulated that the 
proportion of domestic creative personnel must be no less than one third of the staff in 
the drama co-production teams., A directive released in 2000 further strengthened the 
regulations with regards to importing, co-producing and broadcasting television 
dramas. It sought to avoid over-importing dramas and other cultural products from 
Asiapac Books. Taipei. p 85. 
｜ｾＷ＠ 2006, "China notes TV programme trade imbalance", Screen Digest no. Nowmber, p. 375. 
411 Chin, Y. -c. 2003. "China's regulatory policies on transnational television drama flow". ,\ft.·diu 
[)('\'(>/opmt'nI, vol. 3 2003. p. 20. 
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abroad - especially royal court and martial arts (»:uda) dramas - by setting a 
maximum 25 per cent quota for dramas. No imported drama can be broadcast between 
7:30 pm and 9:30 pm, and no imported drama can be broadcast on more than three 
provincial satellite channels within a 24-hour period. 349 In addition, to obtain 
permission to co-produce a 20-episode drama, the Chinese partner must have 
completed at least a 60-episode drama. Finally, all foreign workers have to apply for 
k . 350 wor permIts. 
These policies have had a significant impact on imported programming. American 
imports have dropped from 101 television series (304 episodes) to 55 titles (164 
episodes) between 2000 and 2001, and imports from East Asia (Taiwan, South Korea. 
Japan, and Singapore), have plummeted from 68 series (980 episodes) to 35 (562 
episodes) during the same period.35I Taiwan and Hong Kong suffered most severely 
as they produced popular series in the 1990s. 352 Not only has the number of 
authorisations for co-productions between Mainland China and Taiwan or Hong Kong 
dropped significantly, but dramas from Taiwan and Hong Kong have become ditfIcult 
to find on Chinese television. The once popular royal court genre was vanishing from 
television screens. In parallel, the number of applications for drama co-productions 
submitted to the authorities rose to 1,135 in 2001, a 44 per cent increase compared to 
the year before.353 
W) Liu. X.-c. 200 I. The competitil"e admntages of audiol"isua/ industries in the Greater China reglUf! 
Asiapac Books. Taipei. p 86. 
Hn . IbId .. p. 87 . 
. ISI Chin. y.-c. 2003, "China's regulatory policies on transnational televiSlllll drama Illl\,."·. ,\(('dia 
Dc','C'/opment, vol. 3/2003. p. 19. 
IS! I iu, X.-c. 2001. The competitil'e lldnmtagt's l?(alldiol'isua/ indu.wrie ... in tht' Crnllt"l" China rt'g/lll/ 
:\smpac Books. Taipei. p 86. 
IB Jian-Qiang. Y. 2004. Media strarcgr managemt'tl1l1uaxia Publishing. BeIJing. p 101. 
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Table 3.3 Origins of imported television dramas in 2000 and 2001 
Region Country No. (2000) Episode (2000) So. (2001) £rt.\(}dc COOl) 
N. America USA 101 304 55 1M 
Canada 0 0 2 4 
S. America Mexico I 24 0 0 
East Asia Taiwan 17 313 6 102 
Hong Kong 17 259 19 288 
South Korea 15 249 7 138 
Japan 14 114 1 14 
Singapore 5 45 2 20 
South Asia Malaysia 2 4 0 0 
India 2 4 I 2 
Pacific Australia 6 49 0 0 
Wl.'St Europe France 21 92 7 14 
Germany 7 20 10 ")") 
UK 6 12 ... 8 
Italy I 4 5 10 
Ireland 0 0 2 4 
Portugal 0 0 2 4 
North Europe Finland 1 2 0 0 
Denmark 2 4 0 0 
Last Europe Russia I 2 0 0 
Czech 1 2 0 0 
Total 220 1539 156 12J2 
Source: Chin, Y.-c. 2003, "China's regulatory policies on transnational television drama flow", Media 
Development, vol. 312003, pp. 18-19. 
With import quotas and content regulations, the government of China attempts to 
control the genres and topics dealt with by global and regional players. 354 By 
applying the concept of political correctness, the Chinese government is always 
prompt to prohibit the import of any audiovisual product that it considers slanderous, 
and does not hesitate to take revenge on foreign companies that produced or broadcast 
such material in the past. 355 Sony Picture movies were prohibited in Mainland China 
for two years in 1997, following Red Corner, a film that the Chinese authorities 
considered as insulting. In addition, its protagonist, Richard Gere, was deemed too 
closely related to the Tibet independence issue. 356 In 2005. Eutclsat was under 
Iq Liebman. B. L. 2005. "Watchdog or demagogue'! The media in the Chinese legal s\sll'Ill··. 
Columhiel Law Rel'i('\\'. vol. 105. no. 1. pp. 1-157. 
'H Variety: http:'\\'Ww.varietyasiaonline.conv·content/view 1'\6) II, consulted on Man:h. OL ::!OO7. 
10:15 a.m. GMT 
ｉｾ＠ Grover. R. 1997. ''Forcct the KGB. Hollvwood has a flew \Illain". Bw,im'" Wt'd. no .. ｾＵＵＱＮ＠ p. 56.: 
Orwall. B. 1997. "MGM. Richard Gere clash over China film' s politics". Wall Slrt't'1 Jou,."al - Ea.\/(TII 
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pressure from the Chinese government to stop transmitting New Tang Dynasty ｔ｜Ｎ｟ｾＵｾ＠
from its Asia satellite, W5, in exchange for a co-operative agreement with China 
. C .. C 358 Satelltte ommumcahon ompany. In consequence, foreign conglomerates have 
learnt to operate under heavy political constraint and have become accustomed to 
local sensitivities. News Corporation promised to take off the BBC from the China 
bouquet in exchange for Mainland China's landing right.359 CETV emphasized that it 
carried no sex, violence, and news, only entertainment. 360 The ideology of the 
Chinese Communist Party still defines what appears on television. 
3.2 Why the state (still) matters in domestic media landscape 
3.2.1 Television industrialization: A key broadcasting reform in China 
The . . IncreaSIng number of connections with foreign channels and the 
commercialization of the television industry has transformed Mainland China into a 
rapidly changing marketplace. Private companies should be entitled to the same 
opportunities as state-owned corporations, but they remain weak In terms of 
production and are not yet able to compete with foreign capital and conglomerates.36I 
Therefore it has been the government' s priority to consolidate the domestic television 
industry. Thus, while the foreign policy of the Chinese government aims to delay the 
impact of media globalization, internally it seeks to protect and strengthen the 
domestic television industry. 
A major plank of Mainland China's domestic media policy is 'Consolidation' - a 
Edilion, vol. 230, no. RR, p. B I. 
H7 New Tang Dynasty TV is an independent. nonprofit Chinese language TV broadcaster established 
by overseas Chinese. It proclaims that it is dedicated to assist Chinese people outside China to adapt 
and assimilate to mainstream society. and contribute to pluralism and free flow of infonnation in Ihl' 
Chinese-language media. which irritated China government that took action against it. 
m Meyer, R. 2005. "Future uncertain for US TV signal to China" . . \fedia ..lsi" p. 6 
m 1994. "Murdoch owns up", F"r Eas/el"l1 Economic Re\';c\\", vol. 157, no. 25. p. h). 
1,01.' Stilson. J. 2000. "Time Warner's CETV deal takes steps toward China", .\llIllidrannei St"'n. H)1. ｾ＠ I, 
no. 25. p. 8. 
\61 2002. "Getting stronger as rivals grow \waker", Media Asia p. 23. 
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strategy which has been designed to combat market trends in the television 
industry.362 The origin of the consolidation concept can be traced back to the policy 
of 'Integration of Film and TV' (Ying Shi He Liu) in the 1990s. Following this policy, 
some film studios were integrated to the television industry in order to streamline the 
labour force and produce efficiency gains. The government also hoped that the 
expertise of film studios in producing news and documentaries would benefit the 
television industry. In the early 1990s, the Central News and Documentary Film 
Studio, followed by the Scientific Film Studio, were both integrated to CCTY. The 
renowned Shanghai Aesthetic Film Studio and Shanghai Science and Education 
Studio were placed under the umbrella of Shanghai TV, adding to the company's 
. 363 
expertIse. 
The consolidation programme was first implemented in the film industry, where it 
created the so-called 'six film groups', including the China Film Group (Beijing), 
Shanghai Audiovisual Group, and other film 'groups' in Changchun, Guangdong, 
Xian and Chengdu. However, media conglomeration in Mainland China is far below 
that attained in the West. 364 In the television industry, although CCTV resembles a 
conglomerate, it is still driven by political interests rather than economic efficiency. 
The consolidation turned out to be a means to restructure state-owned media outlets, 
which could then continue to abide by social and political interests. 
1999 was a turning point in Mainland China's broadcasting refonn. The process of 
consolidation was implemented first at local level, combining the Wuxi Broadcasting 
Group, a state-owned company, with eight film & television production centres. The 
government also issued a directive requesting 'the establishment of radio and 
television groups in provinces and municipalities'. further pushing consolidation in 
\62 2002. "China gives rivals unfair advantage", .\fedia Asia p. 15. 
\6.\ Madden. N. 2001. "Angl'r as Shanghai TV brands merge". Ad Age Glohal. \'01. 2. no. I. p. 10. 
I(,.t Shaw. S. D. 2002. "China's TV consolidation creates di\'isions", ,\Il'dia A,/(/ p. 14. 
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the television industry at provincial level. In addition, Directive 82, this time from the 
State Council, was issued at the end of the year which specified the nature of the 
refonn. In 2000, another directive (' Principal Points of Radio, Film. and TV in 2000') 
demanded the immediate application of the reform and the constitution of media 
groups at the municipal, provincial and national levels. 
Figure 3.1 China's previous four-level TV system 
I 
National (CCTV) I I 
+ 
I I Provincial Station I 
+ t 
I Municipal Station II Municipal Station 1 
County Station II County Station II County Station II County Station 
Source: Huang, S.-M., Zhou, Y., & Wang, Y. 2003, 'The transformation of local broadcasting," in A 
new century of China media markets, S.-M. Huang et aI., eds., Citic Publishing House, Beijing, p. 32. 
These senes of directives reshaped the domestic television landscape. All are 
!,'llided by the same three principles. The most important was the replacement of a 
television industry structured in a four-layer system by a new vertical two-level model 
that is underpinned by the provincial and national television stations. Henceforth, the 
role of municipal and county stations was to relay the programming from the 
provincial and national level, adding some news and programming features. With the 
restructuring of its television system, Mainland China aimed to transfonn a 
fragmented industry that responded to an administrative logic rather than to ｾ｣ｯｮｯｭｩ｣＠
imperatives. In 200 I, 1.923 television stations were operated hy the four-layer 
govemments (of those. 1.271 were county stations) with a total of 1,206 l.'hanncIs 
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across the country. In 2002, the central and provincial governments operated 374 
television stations, comprising 45 satellite stations, 234 cable stations, and the ｲｾｳｴ＠
. I b d . 365 wireless terrestna roa cast stattons. 
In addition, the concept of 'separation' appeared that can be deconstructed into 
366 four types: 
The 'separation of networks and stations' ｾ＠
the 'separation of production and exhibition';367 
the 'specialization of channels'; 
and 'the separation of general news and propaganda'. 
Among those the most significant is the 'separation of networks and stations' 
which deprives traditional television companies of their distribution network, Thus 
broadcasting stations and distribution mechanisms are isolated and are requested to 
establish individual groups. For instance, Beijing Cable Network, which was 
partitioned from Beijing Cable Station in 1996, was integrated into Beijing Gehua 
Company the following year. Beijing Gehua Company agreed to a joint venture with 
four investors shortly afterwards, establishing Beijing Gehua Cable Company in 1999. 
The restructured Gehua group was listed on the Shanghai exchange as early as 200 I, 
collecting 1.2 billion Renminbi (US$145 million) to build Beijing's fibre optics 
network. 3M Beijing Gehua Cable Company was a milestone in the short history of 
Mainland China's television industry, because of its successful introduction in the 
stock exchange and its dominant position in the capital's fibre optics market. 
\()S Media Digest: http: \\'W\\,.rthk.org.hkimediadigest20020315 76_1 7707.html. consulted on June :!-t. 
2005 10: 45 a.m. GMT 
\(,b Huang. S.-M .. Zhou. Y., & Wang. Y. ＲＰＰｾＮ＠ "The transfomlation of lo(al bwad(asting." In .f 1/('1\ 
('t'ntury ｾＨｃｨｩｮ｡＠ media markets, S.-M. Huang et aI.. eds .. Citic Publishing House, Beijing. pp. Ｍｾ＠ \-.'\2 
1(,1 The 'sc:paration of production and exhibition' endea\'ored to control the exhibition sc.'rllon whlk the 
ｾｲｮ､ｵ｣ｴｩｯｮ＠ area was open. . ' 
>II Liu, X.-C. 2001. The competilil'e adl'Cln(agt'.\ o(cwdio\'islIal indu!ilrin iI/ II/e (,reClle'" (1"1/,, rt'.1!WI/ 
Asiapac Books, Taipei. p 100. 
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The policy's third principle is "integration', which articulates the concept of 
consolidation through three types of combinations:369 
the integration of cable and terrestrial stations; 
the integration of television and radio stations; 
and the merger of television & radio stations with film studios. 
The integrating approach challenges the traditional classification of television, 
radio, and film as separate industries as cross-media operations were not allowed 
previously. In this respect, the establishment of the Hunan Radio, TV and Film Group 
in December 2000 is remarkable. It is the first provincial media group (after the first 
local Wuxi Broadcasting Group), spreading through seven television channels, four 
radio stations, a website, a newspaper, and several film studios.37o 
The so-called "Hunan Moder was a landmark in the process of television 
industrialization and consolidation, signaling the beginning of a merger trend. In 200 I, 
the movement of combination gathered pace in Mainland China as Shangdong, 
Zhejiang, Shanghai, Beijing and Jiangsu all set up groups. Until the latest group -
Guangdong Southern Broadcasting Media Group - was set up in 2004,371 there have 
been more than 10 renewal media groups launched in more provinces such as 
Guangdong and Sichuan. 
Among them was the newly formed Shanghai Media Group - later called the 
'Shanghai Model' - assembling Shanghai Television, Oriental Television and Satellite 
Broadcast Network, broadcasting 11 channels and owing newspapers, radio stations 
](,1) Huang, S.-M., Zhou, Y., & Wang. Y. 2003. "The transfomlation of local broadcasting:' in I nt'\I' 
ｾＧＨＬＢＧｵｲｹＧ＠ o/China media markets. S.-M. Huang et al.. eds .. Citic Publishing House. Beijing. pp, 31-J2 
70 2002. "Small players take on China's television giant". For Eastern Economic Re\·ic\I·. \'lll 165. no. 
51. p. 92. 
｜ｾｉ＠ AsiaMl'dia: http://·www.asiamedia.ucla.eduJarticie-eastasia.asp.?parentid 64X 1. consulted on June. 
02, 2006. 08:20 a.m. GMT 
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d· 372 and film stu lOS. 
Mainland China's second largest media group, Beijing Radio, Film and Television 
Group (BRFT), was established a month after the launch of Shanghai Mcdia Group. 
The merger including 15 media sectors of Beijing TV, Beijing Radio and seycral 
satellite and cable TV. 373 Moreover, Mainland China's largest national media 
conglomerate, the China Radio, Film and TV Group (CRFT), was set up in Decembcr 
2001, consolidating CCTV, the China National Radio, China Film Group. China 
Radio and TV Distribution Network, and other satellite companies. The company 
employs 20,000 staff and its assets reach an estimated 21.4 billion Renminbi 
(US$2.59 billion).374 The formation of Mainland China's flagship media group, 
CRFT, constituted a peak in the combination movement and signals the coming of age 
of China media giants. 
Table 3.4 China's major media groups 
Year of establishing Name of TV groups 
Jun. 1999 Wuxi Broadcasting Group 
Ike. 2000 Hunan Radio, TV and Film Group 
Jan. 200 I Shandong Radio and TV Station Group 
Feh.2001 Zhejiang Radio and TV Industry Group 
Apr. 2001 Shanghai Media Group 
May 2001 Bejing Radio, TV and Film Group 
Jul. 200 I Jiangsu Radio and TV Station Group 
Dl'C 2001 China Radio, Film and TV Group 
Feh. 2004 Guangdong Southern Broadcasting Media Group 
Source: Company literature and various reports. 
3.2.2 Hong Kong: A strategy of further commercialization to preserve the 
position of the regional hub 
Despite Hong Kong's reputation as a free-market economy, its broadcasting industry 
was tightly regulated in the early 1990s and the prcyious Hong Kong govcrnment had 
imposcd bureaucratic controls on television e\'Cn hcforc thc union with Mainland 
ＱＷｾ＠ Madden. N. 2001. "Anger as Shanghai TV brands Illt:rgc", Ad Age (;to!>"I, \lli. 2. no. I. p. 10 
PI Liu. C. 2002. "Beijing TV mergcs ad sales under Luo. (Cover s10ry)" . . \lcdw .·"ltl p. I. 
n. 2003. "China's scent:: 1I0w rivals stack up against till' national station", .\lcditl .·"w p. 16. 
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. . 1997 315 H H K ' d I' Chtna 10 . ow ever, ong ong s eregu atton of media policy was triggered 
by the hand-over to China. Today, although part of China. Hong Kong's economic 
policy is dictated by the principle of 'One country, Two systems' .376 Hence. unlike 
China government's hardline intervention in the television industry, Hong Kong 
government endeavours to be transparent in its dealing with private ownership, to 
preserve an open and competitive marketplace, and refrain from excessive 
interference. These principles guide Hong Kong media regulation. 
As a free infonnation marketplace, Hong Kong governmenfs intervention In 
content is minimal in practice. Although the SAR government tried to enact laws to 
prohibit sedition, separatism and the disclosure of national secrets after the 
reunification with China in 1997, Hong Kong has maintained a policy of openness. In 
1998, the government announced a package of proposals to further liberalize 
television and programme services. The policy created a battlefield for the pay-TV 
market by allowing both satellite broadcasters and the fixed telecommunication 
network services (known as FTNS) to convey and provide television programmes 
services. In addition, the restrictions on ownership and investment of licensees were 
relaxed to enhance competition through diversification and cross-fertilization of 
telecommunication and broadcasting. 311 Apart from local operators, the policy 
successfully attracted investors from the US, the UK, Taiwan and Mainland China in 
1999 alone. Fierce competition in the pay-TV market was triggered by the issuing of 
five twelve-year domestic pay-TV programme service licenses to Hong Kong 
Network, Yes TV (HK) Limited, Galaxy Satellite Broadcasting Limited (Galaxy). 
ns Thomas. A. O. 2000. "Transborder television for Greater China:' in Tt'iel'ision In (onte"'I'OIlIli 
Ｎ｜ｾＮ｜ＯＨｬＮ＠ D. French & M. Richards. eds .. Sage. London. p. 93. .. ... 
II I.oh. C. 2006. "Hong Kong's relations with China: The future of'One Country. I \\'l) ｓｾｓｴｬＧｉＱｬｓ＠ . 
Sodal Re.'i(·cm:Ir, vol. 73. no. I. pp. 293-316. 
m So, C. Y. K .. Chan. J. M .. & Lee. c.-c. 2000. "Hong Kong SAR (China):' in l/a1/dlwok olthe 
nrt-elicl in Asia. S. A. Gunaratne. cd., Sage. London. p. 5ol3. 
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Hong Kong DTV (HKDTV), and Pacific Digital Media (HK) Corporation.)"')! 
Table 3.5 The licensees of Hong Kong pay-TV in 2000 
Uperator Parent company De!i"ery platform Country based SlalUs 
Yes TV (HK) Ltd Elmsdale Cable UK Withdrew in ＲＨｈｾ＠
Galaxy Satellite TVB Cable HK Started ｾｾＧｲＮ＠ ｩＨＧｾ＠ In 
Broadcasting Limited lk'Ccmhcr 200.\ 
Hong Kong DTV Star TV Satellitc US ｗｩｴｨ､ｲｾ｜｜＠ in 2000 
TV Plus (Pacific Digital Pacific Satellite Satellite Taiwan Withdrc\\ in 2()().l 
Media HK Corporation) 
11K Corporation China Digital Satellite China Withdrcw in 2000 
Information 
Source: Company literature.; Bilan, R. 2000, "Govt static for pay TV licensees"', Telecom Asia, vol. II. 
no. 10, p. 20. 
Hong Kong's pay-TV market regulation reveals several features of its media 
policy. Fair and effective competition in the provision of broadcasting services is 
always a government's objective, particularly since the broadcasting industry is one of 
the few industries in Hong Kong that is regulated by express statutory competition 
provisions which came into effect in early 2001.379 Four competition complaints had 
hcen received by 2004, all involving Hong Kong's leading broadcasters: TVB, ATY, 
and i-Cable. 38o Dealing with competition provisions is a new challenge for the 
Industry and the government alike. 
As a market regulator, the Hong Kong government is keen to put in place a highly 
competitive framework rather than see dominant television players pocket substantial 
profits. The pay-TV market that the government was detennined to open was 
previously dominated by Hong Kong Cable Television (HKCTY). HKCTV was 
joined by five new players to share a 7 million population market, in which the 
majority of households were loyal to ATV and TYB, two terrestrial stations. In August 
\78 Hilan, R. 2000, "Govt static for pay TV licensees", Telecom .1.\/(/. \01. II. IH) 10, p. 20 
1''1 
, 2002-2003 Hong Kong Broadcasting Authorirr annual r('port, p. 5. 
110 The tirst I:as\,' was between two TV programme servin.'s TVB Jnd AIV for the: Joint ;tl"qulslllon and 
sharing of broadcasting rights for two sport \"wnts. The: others IOvolvC'd i-Cablc's al:qul,-ltlon 111 the: 
exclusive ｢ｲｯ｡､｣｡ｳｴｩｮｾ＠ rights for se:\'C'ral sport e:vents. All I: <lSl'S han: been lnl'rrule:d. 
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2003, the penetration rate of the domestic pay-TV service was only }OA per cent of 
the total number of local households.38I Having just been issued licenses durin\} the 
ｾ＠
year, Hong Kong Corporation and HKDTV soon retreated from the market. realising 
that profits were unlikely in such a competitive marketplace. 382 By the end of 2004. 
Yes TV and TV plus also withdrew. However, the only remaining licensee - and also 
the first - Galaxy, was not in a better shape: its previous two shareholders. Astro. from 
Malaysia, and Intersat, pulled out financial support. Not until February 2004 was 
Galaxy able to launch its first channel (exTV) which consequently sutTered a loss of 
US$1.9 million in its initial six months.383 These withdrawals might have signalled 
the end of competition for the pay-TV market, but competition only got fiercer due to 
the entry of two telecommunication operators - PCCW (that launched Now TV) and 
City Telecom, in addition to MATV limited (a satellite player), in 2003. )s-t 
Table 3.6 World digital pay-TV penetration ranked by country in 2005 and 2006 (%) 
COlllllry Cable 
Hong Kong 55.4 
Ireland 51.8 
US 49.8 
SWl'lien 41.0 
Norway 44.8 
Canada 40.4 
UK 37.5 
Singapore 17.7 
I mnce 22.4 
Source: 2006, "'Television (Databox)", Screen Digest no. September, p. 319. 
!prJ' 
66.4 
(H. I 
5.,.9 
53.2 
53.1 
43.5 
42.1 
32.0 
26.8 
\KI 2002-2003 /long Kong Broadccuting .1uthoritl" an"ua/ report. r I Q. 
｜ｋｾ＠ Shu-Ching. 1. C. 2001. "Pay TV operators \Hm't pay the pnn.· ... 7'·/t'd,"1 A\la. \'111 L!. IllI 'i. p, IU 
III I'se.1. 2004. "(,alaxy launch sct to saturate pay-I'\' market". ,\I('''w .·h/II P 3. 
ｉｋｾ＠ 2004, "\'il'WC.'rs pay price for UK's indecision", ,\It'dia.,bra p. 27. 
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Table 3.7 Pay-TV technologies markets split in 2004 (0/.) 
Country Cable Satellite IPTI· l.'HF 
Australia 48 52 0 II 
China 100 0 0 0 
Hong Kong 64 0 
-'4 (I 
India 100 0 0 n 
Indonesia 60 40 0 () 
Japan 62 38 0 () 
Korea 89 II 0 n 
Malaysia 0 100 0 0 
New Zealand 6 80 0 15 
Philippines 96 4 0 n 
Singapore 100 0 0 n 
Taiwan 99 0 0 II 
Thailand 31 69 0 0 
Asia-Pacific region 95 4 0 0 
Source: 2005, "Television (Databox)", Screen Digest no. February, p. 63. 
In addition, Hong Kong's regulation is the first in Greater China to takc 
technological development and media synergy into account by differentiating carriers 
from programme or service providers. The government initiated a technology- and 
transmission-neutral regime for television services under four categories of scrvice: 
domestic free, domestic pay, non-domestic, and other licensable television programme 
services, to replace the carrier-differentiated model of terrestrial. satellite, and cable 
I .. 385 h te eVlslOn. T e model not only enabled the regulator to tackle new 
technology-driven services such as telecommunication-driven pay-TV, but also 
offered more possibilities for television service providers to deliver audience multiple 
choices. In addition, it is apparent that the government encourages invcstment, 
innovation and technology transfer in the broadcasting industry on the hasis of 
provision of a competitive market rather than through profit guarantcc. In 1998, aftcr 
a five-year preparation period and vast investment. HK telecom giant PCCW 
launched the world's tirst commercial VOD interacti\·c television service, hut 
Ｇｉｉｾ＠ See 2002-2003 Hong Kong ｂｲｯｃｬ､｣｡ＮＧｩｴｩｮｾ＠ AfIlitority an"ual report. 
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experienced a temporary setback. PCCW was back in 2003. alongside newcomers 
City Telecom and MATV, abandoning the interactive television market but embarking 
'-
onto a battle for digital pay-TV in the hope of replacing battered Yes TV. and TV Plus 
and Galaxy.386 Until 2005, i-Cable, Galaxy, and PCCW's Now TV remain Hong 
'-
Kong's main competitors In the pay-TV market. 387 In the process of 
market-competition, telecom and digital broadcasting technologies have been 
extensively developed by these companies. 
Table 3.8 Licensees of Hong Kong broadcasting in 2005 
Category 
Domestically 
receivable 
Domestic free 
Domestic pay 
Non-domestic 
Only receivable Non-domestic 
outside Hong Kong 
Souru: Hong Kong Broadcasting Authority (BA). 
Licensee 
ATV 
TVB 
i-Cablc 
pccw 
Galaxy TV 
Starvision Hong Kong Limited 
Starbucks (Hong Kong) Limitt.-d 
MATV 
Turner International Asia-Pacific 
CETV 
i-Cable 
Pacific Century Matrix (HK) Limited 
Skywave TV 
Starvision Hong Kong Limited 
Galaxy TV 
Turner International Asia-Pacitic 
Asia-Pacific Satellite Limited 
Azio TV 
Pacific Centry Matrix (HK) Limited 
Sun TV 
Skywave TV 
Finally, the last feature of Hong Kong's TV policy is the government's ambition of 
maintaining Hong Kong's status as a regional broadcasting centrc. As Table 3.5 shows, 
only one of the five licensees of Hong Kong pay-TV players (Galaxy TV), was based 
in Hong Kong. This also illustrates why protecting a healthy markct is more important 
than ensuring profits for operators. In addition, it also retleds the fad that the 
'II(, Hille, A. ｾｏｏＳＮ＠ "HK teleo enters cable battle with low pri(L's", .\It·dlll .·hi(/ p. 5. 
ｉｾＧ＠ 2005. "HK pay TV provider rebrands prior to IPIV launch", S( 1('('" Dig('\/ ｮｾＩ＠ June, p. I S6. 
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development of regional broadcasting has been sensational since the first pan-Asian 
satellite broadcasting began with Hong Kong-based Star TV in 1990.388 Hong Kong's 
position as a regional media hub was secured when leading international broadcasters 
such as CNN, NBC, and the TNT/Cartoon Network, chose the city as their regional 
base. Until 1998, like in other countries, the government placed a limit at 49 per cent 
of aggregate shareholding by foreign companies of satellite broadcasting. 38Q In the 
late 1990s, Hong Kong's media supremacy faced a treble challenge: the unification 
with Mainland China, Taiwan's forthcoming accession to the WTO, which resulted in 
a minor exodus of transnational broadcasters, and Hong Kong's own loss of 
competitiveness, particularly against the threat of Singapore as a broadcasting centre. 
In order to anticipate a potential shift of the media landscape in the region, the SAR 
government decided to lift the restriction on foreign ownership for regional 
broadcasters and to remove the condition that the majority of directors of such 
companies have to be ordinary Hong Kong residents. 39O The media policy is driven 
by the government's desire to strengthen Hong Kong's position as a regional 
hroadcasting hub. 
3.2.3 Too little too late? Taiwan's new broadcasting project to tackle a chaotic 
market situation 
In ｾｯｮｴｲ｡ｳｴ＠ to Mainland China' s overwhelming broadcasting transformation and Hong 
Kong's persistence in a free-market economy, Taiwan's broadcasting policy has been 
sufTering from a confrontation between political powers and economic interests. The 
problem finds its roots in the country's authoritarian era, hdore the arrival nf 
transnational broadcasters in the early 1990s. when the Taiwanese television industry 
\111 Geddes. A. 1991, "Pan-Asian TV scn'j(1! gclS ofTground" . . ·,dn.,.li.\/1Ig Agt'. \01. ＶｾＬ＠ no. 21. p. 16. 
11\11 Tle, Y. 1998. "Hong Kong TV l'aSl'S up". Ae/n'r/ising Age /1II(',-"olion(11 p. 13. . 
\Q{) So. C. Y. K., Chan, J. M .. & Ll'C. c.-c. 2000, "Hong Kong SAR (China):' In /lalldhook ollht' 
nll-elia ill .. hia, S. A. Gunarallll'. ed., Sage, London, p. 5·0. 
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was dominated by three television networks - TrY, CTV, and CTS. It is \\dl known 
that the three networks were owned for political ends by the provincial gon:rnment. 
the dominant nationalist political party (Kuomintang) and the military. respecti\dy. 
They were operated commercially by the nationalists, in contrast to the PRC (People' s 
Republic of China).391 However, the political nature of these arrangements and the 
resulting low-quality programming spurred an underground cable industry that 
illegally relayed transnational TY channel,392 leading to a small but fiercely 
competitive market in Taiwan. 
Although claiming to be a free-market economy, the de facto primary power that 
dominated broadcasting policy was not market principles, but domestic and 
international political interests. In 1993, the government swiftly passed the Cable 
Television Law under pressure from the United States Government that threatened to 
cancel existing copyright arrangements. The 1993 Cable Radio and Television Law 
was also shaped by local political forces which divided the 23-million-population 
market into 51 political areas that further fragmented the market. 393 In 1994, political 
intervention was necessary again to dismantle the monopoly in terrestrial television. 
The fourth terrestrial license was attributed to Formosa TV (FTV), the mouthpiece of 
the Democracy Progress Party, the main party in opposition. It is ironic that the 
Taiwanese broadcasting industry is shaped by politicians rather than media 
professionals. However, political influence finally triggered the deregulation and 
commercialization of television that consequentially transformed the industry into a 
semi-independent competitive field, as opposed to an obsolete ideological apparatus. 
In the wake of the deregulation of the television industry and the worldwide media 
11)1 l.ee. c.-c. 1993. "The blurprint of Taiwanese broadcasting." in A1Iok:«.' rllt' media 1IIIII"I,,,d( lI'flng 
tmcl/('/c'I'i\ion.I .• C. Jenn. J.-S. Ft'IlI!. & c.-c. Lt't'. eds .. Chen SCl)it'ty. raipci. pp. 5\9-550. 
11)2 Thomas. A. O. 2000. Ｂｔｲ｡ｮｳ｢ｯｾ､･ｲ＠ television for Greater China:' in Ide\"l.\/o1l m cOlI/e"'I'(I''''-.. 
o4.\i(l. D. French & M. Richards. eds .. Sal.!t'. London. p. 104. 
11)\ ｾ＠
1993. "Taiwan' s co\"ert cablers". Economisl, \"01. 329. no. 7838. p. 76. 
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liberalization, the Taiwanese government began to worry about Taiwan's loss of 
competitiveness against the three other 'Four Dragons' (Hong Kong, Japan and South 
Korea). This resulted in the adoption by the Taiwanese government of an 
economy-orientated strategy and a policy of industrialization of the media industry. In 
1995, in a bid to snatch the position of regional media hub in face of the opposition 
(and reinforce its own domestic media industry), the government issued a plan tor an 
. P 'fi M d' C ' 394 Th f' 
'Asla- aCI IC e la entre. e concept 0 regIOnal centre injected more 
business logic into the traditionally self-contained market but fell apart once after the 
governing party stepped down in 2000. 
The deregulation of broadcasting was at its peak during the period of the 
negotiation for the WTO accession. By 2001, the year of Taiwan's official entry into 
the WTO, three major broadcasting laws (including the Radio and Television Act, the 
Cable Radio and Television Law, and the Satellite Broadcasting Act) had been 
modified in order to allow some foreign investment. The reasons were partly to fulfil 
WTO's entry conditions, and partly to compete with Hong Kong and Singapore (who 
were opening up for the media industry). Even though the amendments were some 
way away from Hong Kong's outright removal of foreign investment limits, both 
Taiwan cable and satellite television laws released their restriction on foreign 
shareholding to up to 49 per cent whereas in the cable industry the limit was further 
expanded to up to 59 per cent in 2003.395 
The wave of deregulation attracted foreign attention but also caused an 
irretrievable market failure. Above all, even through broadcasting liberalization. 
Taiwan was not able to attract as much foreign interest in setting headquarters as 
｜ｉｾ＠ The 'Asia-Pacific Media Centre' is one of the six sub-plans of the ',-\sia-PaCltil' Regional 
Operations Centrc'. The otht.·rs are Ihe 'Manufacturing Centre', 'Sea Transportation Cenlfl", 'Au 
transportation Ct.·ntrt.··. 'Financial Ct.·ntrc·. and the 'Tekl'ommunication Centre', 
ＱＹｾ＠ . om 1" 
. 2005. J003-_'()04 Telel'is;on rcarhook Government InfomlatlOn Ice, alpel. 
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Hong Kong and Singapore because of the absence of macro measures taken to 
invigorate the development of the media market. The reasons for which transnational 
television operators such as Star TV were willing to operate in Taiwan \\'ere purdy 
local in scope: to take advantage of a profitable 23 million audience. Thanks to 
Taiwan, which is a much larger market than Hong Kong (seven million people), 
international TV operators were able to generate sizeable profits in Greater China 
even before being full operational in Mainland China.396 
Table 3.9 Star TV's segmental and regional revenue breakdown in 2004 
Category 
by segml.'I1 t 
Advertising 
Subscription and other 
by region 
India 
China and Taiwan 
Others 
Share 
66% 
ＱＷﾰｾ＠
17% 
Source: 2004, "Television (Databox)", Screen Digest no. November, p. 351. 
Furthennore, the commercialization contributed to the fragmentation of the local 
media market which further reduced individual operators' ability and interest in 
improving programming production and infrastructure. Instead, they formed 
partnerships with each other, forming the Multiple System Operators (MSO) which in 
essence worked like local cartels. Until 2004, the five major MSOs accounted for 41 
of the 63 operators, the breakdown being as follows: Pacific Group (7 operators). 
Eastern Group (13), Taiwan Carlyle Group (5), Taiwan Infrastructure Technology 
Group (6) and Total TV Group (11).397 Similarly, there are ten major channel 
providers (GTV, ET TV, Hewei, Taixun, Jiaxun, Asia-Pacific Star, Lianyi. TVBS, 
1% Dhar. P. & Mandese. J. 1994. "Star TV starts thinking local with new channc:ls in :\sla", 
AJI,(·rt;sing Age. "01. 65, no. 39, p. 35.; Rigby, R. 2003, "f\lurdoch's new Star T\' chief IllPb tll the 
long I<:nn in Asia", Camptlign (L'I\) no. 50, p. 15. 
\117 2005. :003.:004 Tclt'\';s;on rt'orbook (ion'mment Infomlation Ollicl'. TaipeI, p ,6. 
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Yongtong and Lianxun), accounting for 62 out of the total 131 channels in satellite 
I b · 398 channe usmess. 
Table 3.10 The number of cable operators and value of output in Taiwan 
Year 1997 1998 1999 1000 2001 :00: _'(}O,? 
_' /1/1./ 
Number of operators 0 II 32 61 63 64 64 Ｖｾ＠
Revenue (USS Million) N/A 36.68 124.59 485.39 771.17 857.10 928.71 N .. \ 
Cost (USS Million) N/A 23.28 93.70 316.92 464.87 733.36 7523 J N:\ 
Source: 2005, 2003-2004 Television Yearbook Government Infonnation Office, Taipei.; 2005. 
"Taiwan", Campaign (UK) p. II. 
Following years of fierce competition, the government was criticized for arbitrary 
political intervention, over-commercialization of the broadcasting system, and the 
invasion of foreign programming. Consequentially, the government was forced to 
begin another wave of reforms that has been restructuring the media landscape until 
2005. The first action taken was to replace the numerous regulatory agencies (the 
Government Information Office (GIO), the Ministry of National Defence and The 
Ministry of Transportation and Communications) with a new independent and 
impartial organization, the National Communications Commission (NCC), in 2003. In 
addition, revisions of the Radio and Television Act, the Cable Radio and Television 
Law, and the Satellite Broadcasting Act were disclosed in the same year in accordance 
with the establishment of NCC. In 2004, a unified and authoritative 'National 
Communications Law' came into effect. This resulted in the reframing of regulatory 
mechanisms, although slight adjustments to the law are still being made. 
The regulatory reforms of Taiwan were far-sighted but still lagged behind its 
neighbours Hong Kong, which proceeded with its' Broadcasting Authority (BA)" as 
carly as 1998, and Mainland China, whose 'State Administration of Radio Film and 
)CJtI 2005. !OOJ-1OO4 fele\'i,'iion }'t'arbook GOVl'rnment Information OtliCl'. LIlpl'I. p. 47. 
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Television (SARTF), was established in the same year. Nevertheless, the NCC plan is 
about to overhaul the Taiwanese broadcasting industry. First, as Taiwan's terrestrial 
television stations are focusing on how to regain market shares lost to cabk 
broadcasters, the government has been planning to restructure the broadcasting market. 
turning the television channels operated by the government, political parties, and the 
military into a new public service. The 2004 Communications Law stipulates that 
political party workers, political appointees, and elected public officials may not 
invest in television businesses. It also specifies that the existing five terrestrial 
television stations - TTV, CTV, CTS, FTV and PTS, have to be merged into a single 
public broadcaster. 399 Hence, apart from PTS (today's only existing public channel), 
Hakka TV, Aboriginal TV, Macroview Satellite TV, and state-owned stations TTV and 
crs, all the others are given to the Taiwan Public Service Foundation.4oo In 2006, the 
government gave the public service US$137 million to develop its terrestrial digital 
broadcasting platform.401 It is expected that the newly formed public broadcaster and 
private companies will compete but also co-operate, providing a balance between 
culture and business in the Taiwanese broadcasting industry. 
In addition, Taiwan's new regulatory framework (similar to that of Hong Kong), 
also breaks traditional boundaries between various media because of the trends 
towards digitization, convergence and integration. Cable, terrestrial, satellite and other 
transmitting channels have been placed in the same 'communications' category by the 
2004 law. The broadcasting industry is therefore turning out to be an element of 
'media platforms' that encompass content platforms, transmitter platfom1s and 
operation platforms. In order to harmonise the concept of media platforms. the 
gO\'crnment is taking two accompanying measures. The 'Digital Entertainment Plan' 
'QI) ｓ｡ｶ｡ｾｬＢ＠ M. 2004, "Revamp planned for Taiwan broadcastl.·rs", Media Asia p. 6 . 
• 1., 2004. "Taiwan to merge public broadcast interests", ...... en·en Digest no. June, r 179 . 
• UI 2006. "Planet media", M"dia A.'Iia p. 14. 
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and the 'Creative Audiovisual Plan' are parts of Taiwan's plan of 'Challenge 200S' (a 
Two Trillion Twin Star framework development) - a 5-year plan aiming to upgrade the 
communications infrastructure and ultimately transform Taiwan into a regional ｨｵ｢Ｚｭｾ＠
Until 2005, the Taiwanese government has endeavoured to restructure wild market 
competition and reshape the domestic media. Moreover, it is also seeking a regional 
leadership position by securing the region's media hub. The effects of the reforms 
remain to be seen but their application will be an interesting challenge for the new 
NCC. 
3.3 Co-operation at the regional level: Progress and contradictions 
Despite the fact that Mainland China, Hong Kong and Taiwan have all been WTO 
economies for a few years, media interaction and co-operation have mostly occurred 
between global broadcasters and domestic media players in each country. In other 
words, although WTO, the only global governing organization that includes Greater 
China, helps the connection between the local and the global, it is of little help in 
terms of regional co-operation. It would be unrealistic to count on regional 
organizations such as APEC and ASEAN. These institutions are not as efficient as 
NAFTA and the EU and have so far avoided regional trade agreements.403 If APEC. 
the only regional institution encompassing Mainland China, Hong Kong and Taiwan. 
is unable to make substantial progress on regional media co-operation, needless to say. 
the formation of a regional governing body coordinating the regional broadcasting 
industry is not even imaginable at the present time. Nevertheless. given the 
sociocultural affinities between the three countries, the media flow among them has 
ne"er stopped, and this has propelled the regionalization of broadcasting and pushed 
.0' '1 11 I 
. 2004. "Taiwan open broadband R&D centrc", Scrcen Dignl no. Apn , r .... 
• 0\ Rawnhill. J. 2004. "rrade politics in I'ast Asia:' in Tradt' politics, 2nd cdn, H lIockmg & S. 
Mc(iuire. cds .• Routlcdge. London. pp. 51-64. 
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policies forward. In 2003, significant achievement was made between Hong Kong and 
Mainland China by the latter's endorsement of a sub-regional free trade deal - the 
Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA). CEPA has been negotiated in 
three parts (CEPA 1, 2 & 3), and implemented in 2004, 2005 and 2006 
respectively.404 CEPA offers preferential access to the Chinese market. over and 
above commitments made by Mainland China under WTO agreements, and more 
importantly, it helps to promote Hong Kong's status as the regional hub by otTering 
benefits to companies that choose Hong Kong as a regional base . .l05 
CEPA has been a breakthrough in the media industry in Greater China. In the film 
business, Hong Kong films imported to Mainland China will be exempted from the 
quota restriction and a profit-sharing basis has been negotiated. Hong Kong-Mainland 
China co-produced films will also be treated as mainland products and will benefit 
from the extensive distribution networks reserved for domestic production. Although 
only at a pilot stage, Hong Kong companies are allowed to establish fully-owned 
companies in Mainland China that are permitted to distribute films co-produced in 
Mainland China and Hong Kong as well as purely domestic movies. Commitments 
made for the broadcasting industry are equally dramatic. Apart from the permission to 
distribute video and sound products, approved Mainland China-Hong Kong 
co-produced television programmes may be broadcast and distributed in the same way 
as domestically-produced Mainland China programmes. Thus, these programmes are 
subject to fewer broadcasting restrictions as hitherto only a few imported and 
co-produced programmes can be broadcast by Mainland China's television stations 
during prime time. Moreover, approved Hong Kong cable operators may now pro\'ide 
404 Cheung, S. 2004, "Business welcomes trade agreement". IntcrnatiOlwl Financial La\\' ｒ･｜ＢｬＨｾＧＢ＠ \01 
2.1. no. 5, pp. 100-10 I.; Oibencdetto. B. 2006, "CEPA.3 China and Hong Kong sl)hdlly Ihl'Jr 
economic pannership. (CoVl"r story)". ｐ｡｣ｾｻｩ｣＠ Shipper. "01. XO. no. 47, pp. 10- 14. 
ＴＨＩｾ＠ Holland, T. 2003. "Hong Kong-China: Chapter wilh CEPA", Far /:"t/\{tTn /:"t mlOl1l1l RCl'It'H. vol 
166. no. 28. p. 30. 
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professional technical services relative to the operation of cable television networks in 
Guangdong Province (currently all the services must carried out by licensed Chinese 
operators). In the same way that transnational channels started landing in Mainland 
China in the southeastern area of Pearl Delta, not only does the Chinese government 
use the Pearl Delta as a pilot area to develop the symbiosis between Hong Kong and 
southeast China, but also paves the way for Hong Kong's advantaged position for 
their Chinese operations over that of transnational broadcasters.406 
The substantial benefit brought by the CEPA is still obscure but a positive climate 
has been generated for the regional players to make progress in Mainland China. The 
present engagements concern all types of media players apart from television, due to 
the fact that broadcasting is still strictly regulated in Mainland China. At the end of 
2002, Global China Media, a subsidiary of Global China Technology signed the first 
joint venture with People's Daily, establishing the Greater China Media Service 
Limited. In 2003, regional media giant Tom.com also reached an agreement with 
Beijing Joint Publishing to fonn the Beijing Joint Publishing Century Culture 
Communications Limited. Moreover, another regional player, Golden Harvest 
announced the first deal in cinema through CEPA, a joint venture with China 
Resources to establish Shenzhen's largest cinema theatre - the Golden Harvest 
Shenzhen. As a result, companies including Universal International, UA Group, and 
Chinachen Group all planned to invest in cinema chains in Mainland ｃｨｩｮ｡ＺｾｯＷ＠
ＴＧｾ＠ 200-" "China opens doors III forl-ign agency start-ups", Campaign (CA'") no . .t.t. p. 15. 
4'1, V' h' .. I' , . 707 c') • It·J on t:·,brua ..... · 0" "n07 ancty: ttp: Iwww.\,anetyasI8on me.com content ,'ll'W I.'.' . consu t: ... .!. -.-
10:15 a.m. GMT 
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Table 3.11 Commitments in the audiovisual industry following CEPA 1,2 & 3 
CEPA I 
CEPA2 
Sectors 
Videos distribution 
services; Sound recording 
products distribution 
services 
Cinema theatre services 
Chinese language motion 
pictures and 
jointly-produced motion 
pictures 
Specific commitments 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
To allow Hong Kong service suppliers to provide, in the form 
ｯｾ＠ ｪｾｩｮｴＮ＠ ｶ･ｮｴｵｾ･Ｌ＠ ｾＧｩ､･ｯｳ＠ and sound recording ｰｲｯ､ｵｾｴｳ＠
dlstnbutJOn ServiCes In the Mainland. 
To allow majority shareholding, not exceeding 7()o .. for Hong 
Kong service suppliers. 
To allow Hong Kong sen ice suppliers to construct. renOYah: 
and operate cinema theatres on an equity joint \enture or 
contractual joint venture basis. 
Motion pictures produced in Hong Kong may be importl..-d for 
distribution in the Mainland on a quota-free hasis. 
Motion pictures jointly produced by Hong Kong and the 
Mainland are treated as Mainland motion pictures for the 
purpose of distribution in the Mainland. 
No restriction on the percentage of principal ｾｲ･｡ｴｩｶ･＠
personnel from Hong Kong, hut at least one-third of the 
leading artistes must be from the Mainland and the plot or the 
leading characters must rdated to the Mainland. 
Videos distribution services; sound recording products distribution services as CEPA I 
Cinema theatre services 
Chinese language motion 
picture and 
jointly-produced motion 
pictures 
Technical service of cable 
television 
Jointly-produced 
television dramas 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
To allow Hong Kong servicc suppliers to construct or renovate 
cinema theatrcs for the operation of tilm screening business on 
a wholly-owncd basis. 
To allow motion pictures co-produced by Hong Kong and the 
Mainland to be processed outside thc Mainland. 
To allow Hong Kong service supplicrs to establish wholly 
owned companies in the Mainland on a pilot hasis to cngage 
in the distribution of Mainland produced motion pictures. 
To allow Hong Kong companies engaging in the operation of 
cable telcvision network to provide professional technical 
services for cablc television networks of Guangdong Province 
on a pilot basis. 
Television dramas co-produced by the Mainland and Hong 
Kong are permitted to be broadcast and distributed in the same 
way as Mainland produced television dramas. 
CEPA 3 Video distribution scrvices, sound recording products distribution, cinema theatre services, Chinl..'Se 
language motion pictures and motion pictures jointly produced, technical sen icl.'S of cable 
tclevision and jointly produced television dramas. 
SfX.'Cial commitments: The SARFT has delegated to the provincial radio and tde\ ision 
administration the authority of examining the tinished tapes of Mainland tde\'ision dramas 
produced by the production organizations under the pro\inct..'S, autonomous regions or 
municipalitks and participah.-d by artistt..'S or production crew from Hong Kong. 
Source: Edited from the 'CEPA Annex 4: Specific Commitments on Liberalization of Trade in 
SerYicl's·. the 'Supplements and Amendments to the Mainland's Specific Commitments on 
Liberalization of Trade in Service for Hong Kong'. and the 'CEPA 3 Annex: Supph, .. mcnlS and 
Amendments 3 to the Mainland's Specific Commitments on Liberalization of Trade in Sernccs for 
Bong Kong', 
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CEPA is the first and so far only regional Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA) in 
Greater China relating to wide-ranging media businesses, whereby China not only 
strengthens its links with Hong Kong but also provides a show case of an interaction 
model in order to lure Taiwan into softening its political stand.408 Compared to thc 
improvement of Mainland China-Hong Kong partnerships, regional co-operation 
between Mainland China and Taiwan so far has been greatly limited by political 
considerations, to the frustration of Taiwanese broadcasters. In 2003, after an cyer 
increasing number of Hong Kong satellite channels were granted landing rights in 
Guangdong, Taiwan's ET TV tried to enter the mainland market through a joint 
venture with Hong Kong's Sun Media and Japan's Jet TV, as both companies had a 
good relationship with China. However, it abandoned its plans after the SARTF 
surprisingly withdrew both Sun TV's and Jet TV's landing rights. In the same year, 
Taiwan's GIO banned CCTV 4's broadcasting in Taiwan as a form of protest. 
So far, the development of the television industry in Greater China hinges on 
governments' attitudes and policies. At the global level, the Chinese government 
undoubtedly plays the most crucial role in deciding what and where international 
broadcasters can do, while Hong Kong and Taiwan are continuously seeking global 
investment to strengthen their regional advantages. However, strong differences 
remain between these two players. Hong Kong being a key centre for film and 
television production not only for Greater China but also the Chinese diaspora, the 
government's efforts are geared towards maintaining a free market that is transparent 
and works dliciently for global broadcasters. Meanwhile, the Taiwanese government 
is still trying to sketch a domestic media framework in order to placate public 
criticism and cure the ills of its marketplace. Taiwan is still vying tllr international 
Q Emch. A. 2006. "Servic\.'s regionalism in the WTO: China's trad\.' agreements with Hong Knng and 
Macao in the light of Article V(6) GATS", Legal /s.\u('s o( Enmomic bUt'gration. \lll .n. nll. 4. pp 
351-378. 
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attention, striving to compete with Hong Kong and finding a balance with China. In 
contrast, the Chinese government slows down globalization in order to buy time to 
foster domestic media constitutions. Mainland China's policy also directs 
neighbouring media industries towards regionalized co-operation in order to protect 
the country against domination from global broadcasters. Having been introduced to 
Greater China, CEPA represents a potential international regime for a region that has 
cultural affinities and already possesses a great amount of economic co-operation. 
Therefore, the pressure towards media regionalization will rest on the relations 
between Taiwan and Mainland China. Nevertheless, given the current divergences 
between Mainland China and Taiwan, further regional co-operation may not 
materialize any time soon. Apart from the preliminary CEPA agreement, the success 
of media regionalization so far rests entirely on satellite channels, domestic operators 
and programme producers in each of the constituent territories. Meanwhile, it would 
be premature to decide whether or not the so-called media regionalization of Greater 
China will be achieved, but the transformation of media development in each area 
towards regionalization is getting clearer as the co-operation between Hong Kong and 
Taiwan has been lasting for more than a decade and the collaboration between 
Mainland China and Hong Kong has made substantial progress. 
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Chapter 4 Case studies (1): Global media companies in Greater China 
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 focus on transnational companies and their operations in 
Greater China. All the six media conglomerates examined in the following pages are 
first-tier companies, fetching the world's highest revenues in the cultural industries in 
2005. However, these companies are not analyzed in the light of their revcnues but 
rather for their relevance to the Greater China media space. These are: Ncws 
Corporation, Viacom, Time Warner, Walt Disney, Sony and NBC Universal. Apart 
from Sony, which is based in Japan, all the other companies are based in the USA. 
However, the headquarters of Sony's film and television segments is also in America. 
Chapter 4 deals with News Corporation and Viacom while Chapter 5 examines Time 
Warner, Walt Disney, Sony and NBC Universal. The objective of Chapter 4 and 
Chapter 5 is twofold. First they aim to examine these companies' entry strategy in the 
Greater China media space and second to analyze these companies' pan-regional 
channels and Mainland-specific services, should they have any. 
4.1 News Corporation 
With revenues of US$23.86 billion in its fiscal year of 2005, News Corporation is the 
world's fourth largest diversified entertainment conglomerate (see Table 1.5). 
Following a stable growth, its revenue has increased to US$25.33 billion in fiscal year 
2006:H)Q Originating in Australia, News Corporation expanded geographically from 
its home country to the UK, the USA, Asia, Continental Europe and tinally Latin 
America. Today, Ncws Corporation has become one of the most di\'crsiticd mcdia 
companies in the world. It manages media segments from newspapers, magazincs and 
hooks, to film, tclevision and mcdia technology, many of which include thc world's 
4()Q 
2006. New,\' COl1>OI'ClIion a""ualll'port. p. 37. 
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most influential media outlets such as Fox Filmed Entertainment, the American 
all-news channel Fox News and newspapers like The Times in London and the Yew 
York Post. 
News Corporation is particularly strong in the television industry, which accounts 
for a major proportion of the company's revenues. In 2006 the telcyision-related 
sectors, including cable and satellite television, brought in USS 11.2 billion. 
representing 44.36 per cent of the News Corp's income (Table 4.1). Its global 
television businesses include satellite and cable systems worldwide, including 
DirecTV, BSkyB, Sky Italia, Star TV, Innva, Sky Brasil, Sky Chile, Sky Colombia. 
Foxtel, and DirecTV Latin America.4lo 
Table 4.1 News Corporation's revenues by segment between 2004 and 2006 (USS millions) 
Segment 2004 ｾＨＩＨＩＵ＠ ＭｾＨＩＨｽＨＩ＠
Filmed Entertainment 5,187 5,919 6,199 
Television 5,027 5,338 5.334 
Cable Network Programming 2,409 2,688 3..158 
Direct Satellite Television 1,665 :U13 2.542 
Magazine and Inserts 979 1,068 1,090 
Newspapers 3,425 4,083 4,095 
Book Publishing 1,276 1,327 1,312 
Other 834 1,123 1,397 
Total revenues 20,802 23,859 25.327 
Source: 2004, 2005 & 2006 News Corporation annual reports. 
Most of News Corporation's activities are conducted in the USA. In this market, it 
owns Fox Broadcasting Company and Fox Television Stations (FTS), which, as a 
subsidiary, owns and operates 35 local broadcast stations, reaching 44.5 per cent of 
US households.411 FTS is also the second largest station group in thc US. just behind 
Viacom. In addition, News Corporation runs cable networks such as Fox Ncws 
Channel, FX, Fox Sports Net, Speed and the National Geographic Channcl. In 20(H. 
410 GloVl'r. R .. lowry. T .. Yang. c.. Capell. K .. & Kripalani. t-.1. 2004. "Rupert's world". Hu.\lfrt'\\ 
II'c'('k no. 3R66. pp. 52-60. 
411 2005. N('w.'i C0I1Wrtltion, Ltd. SWOT (II/alrsis. Datamonilllr Pic. p. 5. 
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News Corporation strategically invested in DirecTV. the largest satellite broadcaster 
in the US.412 With the US$6.8 billion acquisition, News Corporation obtained a 34 
per cent stake in DirecTV, which enabled it to sell content through Fox and distribute 
content through the new national direct satellite platform to nearly 12 million 
413 homes. 
Internationally, News Corporation has invested in several cross-border businesses 
with regards to both content and distribution segments. Its huge global 
satellite-broadcast footprint serves as the main carrier for global expansion. In Britain. 
its subsidiary BSkyB is the market leader in the pay-TV market. As of 2006 .not only 
has the satellite company distributed its own programming services directly to its 
8.176 million direct-to-home (DTH) households, it has also delivered BSkyB's 
channels through 3.8 million Cable TV and 7.3 million digital terrestrial TV (DTT) 
homes.414 
Based on its UK experience, News Corporation then acquired Telepiu, a Vivendi 
Universal's loss-making subsidiary, and then merged Telepiu with News 
Corporation's Italian Stream TV to establish Sky Italia. The acquisition was finalized 
in 2003, when News Corporation purchased the remaining 19.9 per cent stake for 
US$108.4 million and gained full control.415 Today, Sky Italia's subscribers have 
grown to 3.8 million from 2.3 million in 2003 and have started to contribute to the 
parent company's profit.416 
News Corporation's television operation is worldwide. In its country of origin, 
Australia. News Corporation shares ownership of Foxtel. the cable and satellite giant, 
41' 
. 2003, "Washington NOTES", Telel"is;on Week. \'01. 22. no. 32. p. 30. 
41\ (ilovcr. R .• lowry. T., Yang. C. Capell. K., & Kripalani, M. ｾＰＰＴＬ＠ "Rupen's world". BU.\Ult'\\ 
WC,(.#; no. 3866, pp. 52-60, 
414 
2006 BSJ.. .. rB annual report. p. 10. 
:1' Nguyen. M. 2004, "Global dispatches", B& T ｊｲｴＧ｣ｫｾｲＮ＠ \'01. 54. no. ｾＴＹＲＬ＠ p. 14 . 
• t. Kapadia, R. 2006. "Rupert gel" it". Smart MoneT. vol. IS, no. 8, p. 26. 
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417 I L . A . . 
with Telstra. n atm menca, It operates with Canal Fox and Fox Sports Latin 
America. Even in Russia and Eastern Europe, News Corporation made its presence 
known with its participation with Balkan News Corporation and TV station bTV",11! 
Asia is another battleground for Murdoch. As of 2006, Star TV. the strongest Asian 
arm of News Corporation, already broadcast 43 channels to millions of households. 
This success is especially evident in India, and in 2006, News Corporation reached 
another milestone when Star TV successfully launched Tata Sky - a joint ｜Ｇｴｾｮｴｵｲ･＠
between the Indian company Tata and Star TV. 419 
4.1.1 News Corporation in Greater China: Negotiating with a political colossus 
News Corporation's initial interest in Greater China took place as early as 1963 when 
Murdoch made his first acquisition outside Australia with a 28 per cent participation 
in Hong Kong-based Asia Magazines.42o Two decades later, News Corporation made 
its first foray into Mainland China. In 1985, in order to build a good relationship with 
China, Twentieth Century Fox presented 50 movies to CCTv.421 With the ahTfeement, 
News Corporation regularly supplied non-sensitive films such as the Hollywood 
classics The Sound of Music and Patton: Lust for Glory for free. Twentieth Century 
Fox became famous thereafter and the collaboration between China and News 
Corporation began. 
Murdoch's expansion into Greater China raised to a higher profile in late 1986 and 
early 1987, when he acquired the Hong Kong newspaper South China l\1orning Post 
from the Hong Kong & Shanghai Corporation and Hutchison Whampoa. The US$300 
W Hargraw. S. 2004, "Fox tel takes the upper hand down under"', Scw .\/edia Ag(' pp. 12-1_' 
ＴＱｾ＠ Glowr. R .. Lowry. T., Yang, C, Capell. K., & Kripalani. M. 2004. "Rupert' s \\orld", 811.\/11('\\ 
Wed no. JR66, pp. 52-60. 
41'01 Dc Souza, 1.. 2006. "Insider's \'iew: India", Campaign (['1\) no. 12. p. 19. 
Ｔｾｏ＠ 1994, "Murdoch milestones"', Ad,·('/'ti,'iinO Al!c, vol. 65, no. 25. pp. 68-69_ 
4'1 ｾ＠ , 
. Wdx'r. I. 2003, "Localizing the global: SucCl.'ssful stratcgil's fllr selling tdC\,ISJllIl pwgralllllles to 
(,hina", Ga:('/tt', \'01. 65, no. 3, p. 283. 
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million acquisition proved to be a big success for News Corporation, made abundantlv 
clear by their net margin of 53 per cent in the 1992 fiscal year, compared with the six 
per cent for the New York TImes and the seven per cent average of the Dow Jones 
Index in the same year.422 Despite the fact that it was profitable, News Corporation 
sold a 34.9 per cent stake of South China Morning Post to a Chinese businessman 
Robert Kuok Hock Nien's Kerry Group.423 The move was an early attempt by News 
Corporation to localize the newspaper and also to finance its acquisition of Star TV. 
Star TV is Asia's first and most influential satellite operator. In 1993, Murdoch 
acquired Star TV from Hong Kong tycoon Li Ka-Shing, setting up the foundation for 
his television empire in Asia. However, just as the fledgling Star TV began to prevail 
across Asia, Murdoch declared in a London speech that "advances in the technology 
of telecommunications have proved an unambiguous threat to totalitarian regimes 
everywhere. ,,424 This careless proclamation resulted in a direct response from the 
Chinese government, which declared that controlling foreign channels and foreign 
operators is an important measure in the exercise and safeguard national sovereignty. 
In 1994, the Chinese authorities issued the State Council Proclamation No. 1]<) . In 
this 'proclamation', the government was able to keep a tighter rein on private 
ownership of satellite dishes and international television signals beamed in Mainland 
China were to be regulated even more stringently.425 Murdoch, however, was not the 
only 'foreigner' that riled Beijing. Among Star's five initial channels, China was 
particularly annoyed by BBC World, which distinguished itself with not so favourable 
news coverage of the Chinese authorities. In addition to the wrath of China, News 
422 Tanzer. A. 1993. "The Murdoch touch". Forhes. vol. 151, no. 10. pp. 51-56. 
4B 1993. "News Corp. sells shares in Hong Kong paper", Editor & Puhlisllt'r, vol. 12h. no. 40. p. 23.: 
1993. "SCMP sold to Kuok". Far Eastern Economic Rc\·icll'. vol. 156. fill. 41. p. 75. 
ＴｾＴ＠ Cook. W. J. & Lawrence. S. V. 1994. "The great Asian TV sweepstakes". e SSt'\\'\ l\ World 
Rq/()rt. \'01. 116. no. 12. p. 68. 
ＴＡｾ＠ Thomas. A. O. 1999. "Regulating aCl'ess to transnational satellite Ide\ISlllfl: Shilling glln:mmenl 
policies in Northeast Asia". Ga=el1('. \'01. 61. no. 314. p. 24S. 
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Corporation in Asia was under fire from the governments of India, \talaysia and 
Singapore who denounced its take-over of Star TV was as a fonn of cultural 
imperialism.426 In order to appease the Chinese authorities as well as these Asian 
governments, Star TV soon embarked on a policy of compromise by promising to be 
culturally sensitive. Murdoch then took up residence in Hong Kong to direct Star 
personally and tried to reduce the Chinese complaints. To soften his earlier statements. 
he declared that Mainland China "is the society they have chosen to be. That is their 
business.,,427 Despite Murdoch's milder stance, the Chinese government's hostility 
towards foreign influences was hard to pacify. In 1995, News Corporation attempted 
to set up a joint venture with the People s ｄ｡ｩｾｶ＠ - a firm specializing in electronic 
publishing and data retrieval. The proposal was immediately ruled out by the Chinese 
h ., 428 aut onhes. 
News Corporation tried to appease the Chinese authorities by dropping BBC 
World from Star TV's services in 1995 and substituted it with a dedicated Mandarin 
channel - Phoenix Satellite Television. 429 Murdoch's attempt to build a better 
relationship with the Chinese government went beyond the exclusion of BBC World. 
In the same year, Murdoch's HarperCollins underwrote the cost (estimated to be 
US$100,000) of the publication of China's former leader Deng Xiaoping biography, 
written by none other than his own daughter.'no The decision was all the more 
significant in the light of Murdoch's decision later to back out of HarperCollins' initial 
intention of publishing a memoir written by Chris Patten, the last colonial governor of 
Hong Kong. It was quite evident that this decision was made in order to please the 
4:(> Chang, Y.-L. 2003, "Globalization of television: Programming strategies of global teleVIsion 
broadcasters in Asia", Asian Journal a/Communication, \'01. 13. no. I. p. 5. 
4." Cook, W. J. & LmTcnce. S. V. 1994. "The great Asian TV sweepstakes". lJ..\' .\','1\'.\ & World 
R'·port. \'01. 116. no. 12. p. 68. 
4.'M 
1995. "Comrade: Murdoch", Economist. vol. 335. no. 7919. p. 39. 
4,"1 1994. "Third time unlucky,?". Economist, \\)1. 330. no. 7856. pp. 74-76.: 1995. "CCllnradc 
Murdoch". Economist. \'01. 335. no. 7919, p. 39. 
410 1996. "The new world of publishing", BusiTlns & Soc/err Rent'H' ((}(}.J53f1lJ9) no. 96, p. 74. 
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Chinese authorities, who feared that the book would bring them into disrepute:'3 I 
Furthennore, in 1996, News Corporation sponsored the exhibition displaying Chinese 
culture in the British Museum amounting to some US$I.4 million. Two years later. 
another US$I.04 million was donated to areas in China affected by ｦｬｯｯ､ｩｮｧＮｾﾷＧＺＡ＠
Rupert Murdoch's connections to Mainland China were also getting increasingly 
personal. He married a young Mainland native as his third wife - Wendi Deng, the 
Star TV executive who was the network's liaison officer with Beijing. The couple 
bought a Confucian-style compound near the Forbidden City in Beijing in order to 
establish a firmer link with Chinese culture. He also invited and shared a viewing of 
the movie Titanic with the then-president Jiang Zemin. Thanks to all his good work, 
Murdoch was eventually called a 'trusted mentor' of the Chinese television industry 
when he lectured at the Central Party School which trains future ｬ･｡､･ｲｳＮｾﾷｈ＠
Star TV's efforts in friendship-building did not stop even when James Murdoch 
became Star's chairman and chief executive in 2000. In 2001 at an annual business 
conference in Los Angeles, he expressed sympathy for China's totalitarian 
government, labelled China's Falun Gong as 'dangerous' and an 'apocalyptic cult', 
and defended Chinese government's crackdown on the religious group. He also 
advised Hong Kong citizens to accept their fate under an "absolutist' regime and 
suggested that foreign media were too critical of China's human rights record and 
Beijing's policy against Taiwan.434 
Hence, News Corporation's efforts allowed it to forge ahead of the competition in 
Mainland China in the 1990s although most of these activities wen: mainly in 
peripheral fields of the television industry. In 1995 for instance News Corporation 
411 Madden, N. 200 I, "Vil'W from Hong KllOg". Ad Age Glohal. \'01. I, no. R. p. 17. 
ＴＱｾ＠ Weber. I. 2003, "Localizing the global: Successful strategil's for ｳｾｬｬｩｮｧ＠ tek\isil1n progralllllll" tll 
China", (1(1;('11(', vol. 65, no. 3, p. 2R3 . 
. " 2005, "The end of the aflair", Economist, vol. .H6. no. R445. p. RO. 
44 Madden. N. 2001, "View from Hong Kong", Ad Age G/ohal, \\11. I. no. R, p. 17. 
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made progress when it secured a 20-year joint Internet service - chinab)1C - with 
China's largest newspaper - the People s Daily. 435 In addition, as of :WOO, Star 
developed 10 joint ventures and four major factories producing television sets. audio 
products and DVD players etc., both for the domestic market and export.436 
In the core television business, News Corporation's first signi ficant success was 
with a production company in Tianjin. The Tianjin Golden Mainland Development 
Company - a joint-venture between News Corporation and the Tianjin People's 
Committee, was formed in 1995. It was the result of News Corporation's sponsorship 
of a Tianjin Bureau's table-tennis tournament. News Corporation invested US$20 
million in this company - accounting for a major 60 per cent stake of the venture - in 
digital editing facilities and cameras and filming equipment, while the Tianjin Bureau 
of Radio and Television controlled the remaining 40 per cent.437 Between 1996 and 
1998, Golden Mainland specialized in programming packages for domestic stations 
including CCTV and Beijing TV. In 1999, the company turned to the creation of 
television advertisements and also offered post-production services. Thereafter, due to 
China's separation policy (see Chapter 3), it moved into the production of television 
documentaries and series. 438 It then co-operated with China's other stations to 
produce cultural and entertainment programmes such as China s Tea Culilire and 
Cultural Leisure. 439 The establishment of Golden Mainland represented an early 
milestone in News Corporation's road to establish its operations in China with a local 
partner at a time when most foreign players were still kept at bay by the authorities. 
Apart from Golden Mainland, Murdoch's biggest success in China in the 1990s 
4lS C'Iitlord. M. 1998. "Murdoch: Penny-wise. pound-foolish in Asia", Blisint' , , Jrt'!"k no. 35tl9, p .. 'X. 
ｾｉＨＩ＠ 2000, "Experts pick key emerging markets for 2000: China. India, Poland", ＮﾷＧ､｜ＧＨＬＬＮｻｩｳｩＱｬｾ＠ Age 
Int('marion,,1 p. 26 .. 
m Kahn. A. R. 1995. "China business". Chin" BII.'\i1l(,.\'\ R('\'i('\\" \01. ｾＲＮ＠ no. 5. p. 55 
H8 
:!OOO, "When hefl)l'S are born", Asia Image p. 20. 
m Weber. I. 2003. '·l.ocalizing the global: Successful stratcgH:s for selling tele\lSlllO programl1l1..·s to 
China", Ga=euc. vol. 65. no. 3. p. 284. 
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was the launch of the Mandarin-language station Phoenix Channel. In a bid to 
overcome the difficult Mainland China market, Star brought in Mainland Chinese 
partners to establish Phoenix Satellite TV in 1996. Liu Changle, an ex-anny officer in 
charge of military broadcasts was Star's first choice to set up the joint venture. which 
was unsurprising as he was on excellent terms (Guanxi) with the Chinese authorities. 
The strategy of alliance with local partners has paid off, as Phoenix is not only 
popular in Mainland China, but is also publicly praised by China's leaders. In 2003, 
Phoenix secured landing rights to broadcast its news channel in Mainland China, 
which made Murdoch the first foreign owner of a Mandarin-language station allowed 
to broadcast 24-hours of current affairs and news in the country (see Chapter 6 for the 
case study on Phoenix TV).440 
Despite its relative success, Star's operations in Phoenix TV are still confined as 
Phoenix was a joint venture in which Star owned only one third of the ownership. 
Murdoch's next move was the launch of Star's own channel - Xing Kong Wei Shi 
(direct translation: Starry Sky Satellite) - in Star's Hong Kong base to take on the 
Mainland China market. Unlike Phoenix's pan-Chinese orientation, Xing Kong is 
dedicated to Mainland China and is committed to a high degree of localization. In 
tcnns of Mainland China expansion, Xing Kong signaled News Corporation's 
ambition (which was also the aim of most global majors with regards to China): to 
operate a fully-owned branded channel in the market. In 2002, Xing Kong was given 
the green light to broadcast in the Guangdong province and it was granted the landing 
rights across Mainland China to top hotels, foreign compounds and government 
offices the following year. 4," 
Aller the creation of Phoenix TV with its local partners, News COfJ1(lration made 
440 2003. "Murdoch-ownl'd I>hocnix channel wins China entry", A/cdia Asia p. 4. 
441 2003. "Headlines: Star and Blol)mberg win landing rights in China", Media .-"'/(1 p. 3. 
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another significant breakthrough by fonning a strategic alliance in 2002 with one of 
China's most significant and adventurous local players: Hunan TV. According to the 
agreement, Star TV and Hunan Group are committed to television programming 
co-production and content exchange. In order not to infringe government regulations, 
both sides claimed that the alliance was nothing more than a friendly agreement. Thus 
News Corporation made progress in the grey area of policy by testing the limits of 
regulation. As foreign investment was still strictly forbidden for television production, 
Star's alliance with Hunan TV was considered a privilege. which made Murdoch the 
first global player to "break' the policy restriction. 
Murdoch's operations in Greater China seemed set for a bright future in 2004 
when the Chinese government deregulated to a certain extent co-operation between 
domestic and foreign television companies. Taking advantage of CEPA, Star TV set 
another record of being the first company to gain the authorities' approval to set up a 
wholly foreign-owned advertising company - Star (China) - in July 2004.44 :! Based in 
Shanghai, Star (China) specifically manages Star's advertising for Xing Kong, 
National Geographic Channel, Channel [V], as well as some other channels elsewhere 
in Asia.443 This was News Corporation's heyday in Greater China. Apart from the 
joint ventures, New Corporation had nine channels distributed in Mainland China. 
These channels remain the same until today, comprising of five pan-Greater China 
channels: Star Movie, Star Sports, Channel [V], National Geographic Channel and 
ESPN Star; three Phoenix channels and Xing Kong Wei Shi. For the Taiwanese and 
Hong Kong market, Murdoch offers Star Chinese Channel. Star World, and Star 
Chinese Movies which form the core of the Star family channels . 
.. ｾ＠ Reuvid. J. 2005. "Key sector reports and notes: The mc-dia market", DOing BusilU'\\ I\'ith Chow PI' 
'5J·354. 
ＴｾＧ＠ Madden. N. 2004. "News Corp. unit starts China ad biz". Atin'rtisi"g Age. vol. 75, nn. lX. p. II. 
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4.1.2 Murdoch's Asian platform: Star TV 
The greatest transfonnation in the Asia television industry was initiated hy thc 
establishment of Star TV - a pan-Asian satellite television service - authorized in 
December 1990 by the Hong Kong government for a 12-year license. Based in Hong 
Kong, Star TV was initially a joint venture between Hong Kong's Hutch\ision 
Whampoa conglomerate and Hutchvision's chairman, Li Ka-Shing . .;-t-t In August 
1991, Star TV launched a freeview service with an innovative five channel package-
Prime Sports, MTV Asia, BBC World Service Television, Star Plus and Star Chinese 
Channel.445 The move threatened the then-prominent CNN channel. which had just 
won the race into Singapore. As private satellite receivers were considerably more 
expensive in the early 1990s, the audience soon preferred Star TV's tivc channels 
from AsiaSat 1 rather than the isolated CNN through the Palapa satellite. Star TV's 
advance forced CNN to seek external collaboration in order to strengthen the 
competitiveness ofPalapa, thus leading to the alliance of the so-called 'gang of five' -
ESPN, HBO, Australian AusTV and Hong Kong's TVBI.-t';6 
Despite being threatened by CNN's new coalition, Star TV still triumphed. First, 
AsiaSat had a much better Asian footprint than Palapa. In addition, Star was able to 
sign exclusive agreements with AsiaSat because Star's parent company Hutchvision 
owned the AisaSat satellite.447 Thus in Asia's early satellite era Star TV took the lead 
in the market. In 1993, Star TV's five-channel satellite service enjoyed a 45-million 
strong audience in 38 countries across Asia and the Middles East.-t4S 
ｾ＠ Geddes. A. 1991. "Pan-Asian TV service gets off ground". Adn'rlising Age. vol. 62. no. ｾ＠ I. p. 1 fl. 
W Star Plus is a family entertainment channel and Star Chinese Channel broadcast mandarin ､ｲ｡ｬｾｬ｡Ｎ＠
mO\ll'S. and entertainment. See Chang. Y. -L. 2003. "Globalization of television: ｐｲｯｧｲ｡ｭｭｬｮｾ＠
strategies of global television broadcasters in Asia". Asian Journal o/Commllnication. \01. 1\. no. I. p. 
5. 
w. Lovelock. P. & Schoenfeld. S. 1997. "The broadcast media markets in ASia." III 
TdcconrmunictlliclIJs in Asia.' Poli(r. planning and dc\'t·lopmen/. J. Ure. cd .. Hong Kong ＱＱＱｬＱ｜ＱＮＮＧｲＭｬｴｾ＠
Press. Hong Kl'ng. p. 15S. 
U7 Ibid. 
UK 
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Table 4.2 Households viewing Star TV (0005) 
Country January /993' October /993/ 
_'1111.," 
China 4,800 30.506 
·tt.7S0 
India 3,300 7,278 31,700 
Taiwan 1,980 2.376 :'.717 
Israel 410 621 
Saudi Arabia 0 369 
Hong Kong 304 331 
Philippines 137 187 
South Korea 18 ｉｓｾ＠
Thailand 32 ＱｾＲ＠
United Arab Emirates 73 117 
Pakistan 61 77 
Indonesia 36 50 
Kuwait 13 31 
Rest of Asia 1:',942,99,; 
Total 11.164 42.269 95.140.143 
Source: '1994, "Third time unlucky?", Economist, vol. 330, no. 7856, pp. 74-76.: :Rigby. R. 2003, 
"Murdoch's new Star TV chief looks to the long term in Asia", Campaign (UK) no. 50. p. 15. 
Star TV's early prominence, however, did not enable the company to generate 
sufficient profit. By 1993, Star TV had only sold less than 20 per cent of its 
advertising airtime.449 Based on an advertising (i.e. rating) model, Star TV continued 
to run at a loss of approximately US$50 million per year over the period.450 It was not 
until 1993 that the Asia giant underwent its first overwhelming restructuring - when 
Rupert Murdoch spent US$525 million acquiring a 63.3 per cent stake in Star TV 
irom Li Ka_Shing. 451 In 1995, He spent another US$346.6 million buying the 
. . ＴｾＱ＠
remammg stake and took full control of Star TV. .-
When Star TV was launched in 1991, its strategy was to target the top 5 per cent 
of Asia's socio-economic elite who could afford the services and, more importantly. to 
make up an attractive advertising market with strong buying power .. ｾＵＧ＠ Programmes in 
ＴＴｾ＠ l.t)\'dock. P. & Schoenfeld. S. 1997. "The broadcast media markets in :\sIa." in 
Tt'/('nmrnlllllications in Asia: Poliq. planning and development. J. Un:. l'J .. Hong Kong Uni\l'r-Ily 
Press. Hong Kong. p. 159. 
4\(1 
1994. "Third time unlucky'.''', Economist, vol. 330. no. 7R56. pp. 74-76. 
ＴｾＱ＠ , 
1996. (ah/e StlIcl/ile .-/ sia no. Mayl Jun. p. 9 . 
. \' 
. 1996, AsiaCom no. May. p. 2. 
m Ghcmawal. P. ｾｏｏｬＮ＠ "Distance still matters. The hard reality l)f global l'XpanSIPll . lI"r",ml 
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the English language were therefore the audience's preferred stations above and o\er 
local programming. Since the complete takeover of Star the intent was to le\'erage 
News Corporation's huge Twentieth Century Fox film library across the Asia region. 
In its early programme mixtures, Star TV provided Asian audiences with Fox's 
entertainment, films and TV shows from Home Alone to M*A *S*H.454 
The strategy of blanketing Asia with programmes from the USA did not work as 
planned. Star continued to lose an estimated US$80 to US$l 00 million a year.455 This 
setback forced Murdoch to change Star's strategy by adopting the principle of 
localization. Star TV began its regionalization scheme by splitting its signals into two 
beams - the northern beam targeting the Mandarin-speaking region in China, Hong 
Kong and Taiwan, whereas the southern beam covered the Hindi-language in India. 
Murdock offered six channels in the southern beam, of which Zee TV, Channel [V] 
and SBC World had gained great popularity and exerted a strong impact in the 
industry.456 The northern beam, however, did not see as much of a strong growth. 
Star TV supplied five channels in the northern beam mainly focusing on Mandarin 
programmes such as the Star Chinese Channel, which carries programming from 
China, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Japan.457 As for the channels broadcast on both the 
northern and southern beams, such as Star Plus and Prime Sports, the programmes 
were slightly differentiated. For instance, more soccer and gymnastics programmes 
were given to the Chinese, whereas more cricket and hockey matches were added into 
the Indian feeds. 458 
The strategy of localization was taken further as Star TV split its 
BU.fint'.\'.\ R(,\';c\\" vol. 79, no. 8, p. 137 . 
• ｾＮ＠ McCarroll, T. & Burton, S. ＱＹＹｾＬ＠ "New star over Asia", Time. \'01. 142. no. 6, p. 5.' 
4SS Yee-lin, T. 1997, "Star TV finds its brilliance in localization", Adn'rlising Age Inlematiollal p. 1 S 
H(l ShawcfllsS, W. 1995, "Reaching for the sky", Ne\\' Statesman & Societ\·. \'01. 8. no. 345, p. 12 . 
• ｾＱ＠ Cook, \\'. J. & Lawrencl.', S. \'. 1994, 'The great Asian TV sweepstakes", L' ,\\'t'"'' & World 
Rfp0,." \'01. 116, no. 12, p. 68. 
HI (,h.mg, Y.-L 2003, "Globalitation of television: Programming strategies of glohal tek\l'wll 
broadcasters in Asia", Asian Journal o/Commun;cation, \'01. 13, no. I, p. 6. 
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language-block-by-language-block signals into the country-specific channels and 
consequently built a multi-layer market. In the mid-1990s, Star's best single-country 
markets were -India and Taiwan, although China was gaining an increasing interest 
from the advertisers. In the multi-layer market, advertisers can choose a specific 
country such as Taiwan, a regional market such as Greater China, or pan-Asian 
campaign to operate. As of 2006, apart from Phoenix TV, News Corporation operates 
nine channels in Greater China, including the Star Chinese Channel. Star Movie. Star 
Chinese Movies, Star World, Xing Kong Wei Shi, Star Sport, ESPN, Channel [V] and 
National Geographic channels. 
Star Movies and Star World are Star's two typical pan-Asia channels with a certain 
degree of localization. Star Movies brings audience the blockbusters from Hollywood 
such as Pirates of the Caribbean: The Curse of the Black Pearl, Die Another Day, ,X.:: 
X-Men United and Bruce Almighty, while Star World supplies US and UK 
programming, featuring a wide range of entertainment, covering action and drama 
series, comedies and live international events. Signature shows include American Idol, 
Rock Star: INXS, Desperate Housewives and Little Britain. In the light of Star's 
practice of localization, both Star Movies and Star World were partially localized by 
splitting their feed into stations catering different territories. Star Movies has four 
feeds in Mainland China and Southeast Asia, Taiwan, India and Pakistan, and the 
Middles East.459 
Star World, on the other hand, is a more recent channel which has not yet been 
made available in Mainland China. Its localization was implemented in 2005 by 
comhining the Taiwanese market with that of Southeast Asia, splitting the Southeast 
Asia and India feeds and finally launching a new feed for the Middle East.
4hO 
Star 
." 2005 S{tlr TJ' comp""r repor{ l()()-I __ 1()(}5. p. 18. 
*'" While. A. 2005, "Slar rl'\'amps on-air look, AP feeds", MediCI .·hiu p- 4. 
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World therefore split itself into three services - one for Greater China and ｓｯｵｴｨｾ｡ｳｴ＠
Asia, another for Indian and Pakistan, and a third for the Middle East. Taking the 
Asian market as a whole, Star Movies and Star World are popular in the region but 
mostly in parts of India and South East Asia. In tenns of Greater China. Taiwan 
remains the major market so far. According to AGB NMR Taiwan. 7.3 million ｶｩｾｷｾｲｳ＠
in Taiwan watch Star Movies every week, representing a seven per cent increase year 
461 
on year from 2003 to 2005. 
Table 4.3 Comparison of top TV networks in Asia Q2 2004 and Q2 2005 (% reach) 
Channel Q2 l()().f 
Discovery Channel 31.2 
National Geographic Channel 23.3 
CNNI 18.6 
LSPN 14.6 
Star Movies 14.7 
MTV 16.5 
Star Sports 11.5 
BBC World 10.2 
Animal Planet 8.1 
Discovery Travel & Living 3.6 
AXN Asia 8.3 
Star World 6.7 
Channel [V] 6.6 
CNBC 5.8 
Channel NewsAsia 5.2 
Hallmark Channel 4.6 
Phoenix Chinese Channel 5.3 
_ Bloomberg Television 1.9 
Source: 2005. "PAX pendulum swings back to good times", Media Asia p. 23. 
ｑｾｾ＠ }1I1I5 
2S 
22.7 
20.') 
16.7 
16.3 
15.3 
14.S 
12.2 
112 
11.1 
8.7 
8.2 
7.1 
6.8 
6.1 
5.1 
4.6 
24 
Like Star Movies, Star Chinese Movies is a Chinese-targeting channel showcasing 
Chinese blockbusters such as Infernal Affairs Trilogy. Hero, Silver Hawk and Turn left 
iii", Right. With its entry into Singapore in 2004, the channel provides three services 
catering to audiences in Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore and the Philippines.
4b2 
When 
compared to other Chinese movie channels. Star Chinese Movies stands out hecause 
ｾｉ＠ Dala according to AGB NMR Taiwan peoplemeter: 7 Jul 2003-27 Junt: 2004 and::; July 200-l-ll) 
ｾｮ｣＠ 2005. citt:d in 2005 Star n' company n'port ｾＨｽＨｽＭｉＭｾＨｽＨｽＵＮ＠ p. I X. . 
. 2004. "Slarllub \,i\.·w\.'rs try oul nt:w Slar ｃｨｩｮｾｳ｜ＮＧ＠ ｍｯ｜ＧｩｾｳＢ＠ . . \ft'dia ..I,"/ p. 6. 
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the station has secured television rights to 80 per cent of existing and upcoming 
Chinese titles from the leading Hong Kong Studios.463 In 2005. for instance. Star 
committed US$3.8 million to help bankroll new content that will be produced by 
Focus Films, the film company masterminded by Hong Kong legendary actor Andy 
Lau. 464 By investing in local production companies Star can secure content 
provision - which has long been an obstacle - to fill in the channel's lineup with 
Chinese programming. In addition, the upcoming films will be produced by local 
talent from Mainland China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore and Malaysia, so that 
Star's localization can be amplified. Star Chinese movie's strategy bolstered its top 
movie channel status in Taiwan. For instance, with the exclusive premiere of Chinese 
blockbuster Infernal Affairs over two days in 2004, the channel attracted an average 
viewing share of 2.3 per cent and 9 per cent respectively, which meant that nearly two 
million viewers tuned in within the two days.465 In addition, almost nine million 
people watch the channel every week.466 
Star's strategy of localization has paid off in Taiwan, with its results particularly 
evident for Star Chinese Channel. Star Chinese, since its free-to-air launch in October 
1991, has been a dedicated Mandarin entertainment channel for the Taiwanese 
audience. It soon gained preeminence in the market which was then dominated by the 
three domestic television stations. In addition, Star Channel was the most watched 
Star channel in the mid-1990s, not only in Taiwan, but also in Mainland China.467 
Unsurprisingly, the channel is consistently one of the most popular cable channels in 
Taiwan. It outperfonns all its competitors and is now the leading Mandarin cable 
4(.1 
2005 Star H J company report ｝ＨｽＨｽＴＭ｟ｾＨｽＨｽＵＬ＠ p. 17, 
4b4 Savage, M, 2005. "Star taps Focus for new conten .... ,\/c(lia Asia p. ｊＺｾＮ＠
4M 2004, "Headlinl's", Media Asia p. 7, 
4(,(, According to AG13 NMR Taiwan. cited in 2005 Star rJ" company report ]004-_'/J()'i. p. 17. 
4(.' Cook, W. J. & LawrenCl', S, V. 1994. "The great Asian IV ｳｷｾ･ｰｳｴ｡ｫｴﾷｓＢＧＮ＠ FS St'''' & II"0,./d 
R,.port, vol, 116. no. 12. r 68, 
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channe1.468 Signature shows include Gossip Queen, Stolen Heart, Sorry I LO\'e }(JII 
and Lucky Star, among which the talk show Gossip Queen attracted an audience of 10 
million in Taiwan in the two months following its launch in March 200S.46Q 
Contrary to the success of Star Chinese Channel, Xing Kong Wei Shi's fortunes 
have gone the other way. In early 2002, Murdoch's effort seemed to ha\'c paid off 
when Xing Kong Wei Shi - Star TV's dedicated station for Mainland China market -
was approved by Beijing to transmit on the Guangdong Cable TV Network. Xing 
Kong was then granted landing rights to broadcast across Mainland China to upscale 
hotels, foreign compounds and government offices in 2003.470 However, despite this 
unprecedented achievement, Xing Kong Wei Shi is still restricted to the rather 
unprofitable provinces. However, this setback has not prevented the management 
from pursuing its effort to localize the channel in the hope of gaining the loyalty of 
340 million television households which would make the market potentially very 
profitable 
Xing Kong is Star's most ambitious engagement in China. It positions itself as a 
24-hour distinctive general entertainment Mandarin-language channel. Apart from 
being a window for Fox's hit shows such as The X Files, The Simpsons and 24, the 
launch of Xing Kong also symbolizes the peak of Star's localization in Greater China, 
and more significantly, in Mainland China. Its strategy is to make a library of local 
programmes which steer clear of news and news-related programmes. Such tactics 
have been considerably successful in the other markets of News Corporation, with 
shows like Joe Millionaire and American Idol in the USA and a Hindi-language 
version of Who Wants to Be a Millionaire in India. Star TV hopes that local reality TV 
ｾ＠ According to AGB NMR Taiwan (June 2(05), cited in 2005 Star TIt compmn' r('port ｾＨＩＨｽＴ＠ ___ '(}(}5. p 
II. 
4M Ibid. 
470 2003, "Headlines: Slar and Bloomberg win landing rights in China", M('dia ..lsi" p. 3. 
174 
Chapter 4 Case studies (1): Global media companies in Greater China 
or dramas will prove to be the key to unlock the pan-Asian market. "We wanted that 
international format and energy - but you have to go local to succeed," according to 
Jamie Davis, president of News Corporation China.47J Thus, Xing Kong features oyer 
1,000 hours of original programming each year for local audience, accounting for 60 
per cent of prime-time programming, offering a mix of drama series, comedy, variety 
shows, talk shows and game shows.472 Reality TV in particular figures prominentl\' in 
its programming, examples including the real-life police show, Wanted.' In China, and 
China's first male beauty contest, Women in Control.'n3 
Table 4.4 News Corporation's major Chinese-produced TV programmes. 
Title 
TV Court 
Wanted! In China 
Joyful Youth 
Laic Night Talk 
Live! From Xing Kong Dance Club 
Women in Control 
Wu Zhuang Yuan (Dancing Champion) 
Campus Challenge 
Source: Arranged by this research. 
ｔｾＧｐ｣＠
A simple version of Judge Judy 
A takeotT on America's Most Wanled 
A copycat of USA's Friends 
A talk show with a wisecracking host 
Rock music on a Shanghai stage 
A beauty pageant and contest 
A alternative dancing contest 
A university game show 
Although considerably localized, Xing Kong's content does not really placate the 
Chinese authorities. TV Court, a copycat of America's courtroom series Judge Judy, 
employed a genuine judge, but the government would not allow Her Honor to rule on 
real cases. Star TV then had to try to use non-professional actors, and based their 
scripts on Chinese court cases. In addition, some other spin-off situations have gone 
even worse. Joyful Youth, a copycat of the American hit sitcom Friends was thought 
to be an achievement in Xing Kong's early days when Star signed thc production deal 
with Beijing-based Yings Production.474 The localized programme, howc\'cr, was 
4'1 forney, M. & Gough, N. 2003. "A dose ofreality", Time ,Ius/mlio no. R. p, 54 . 
.,.." -
'. 2005 SIal' 71' companr r('porl ｟ｾＨｽＨｽＭｉＭｾＨｽＨＩＵＮ＠ p. 10. 
41\ • 
n Considine, P. 2()()'t "Reality in Asia", Campaign (L'K) no. :! I, p. 35. 
l.ee, F. 2002. "Star signs deal with Beijing production housl''', ,-hia Image p, 6, 
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then refused a broadcast pennit, due to the sole reason that in the drama, the malt? 
characters lamented about the small size of a neighbour's breasts. News Corporation's 
disaster became apparent as several episodes were not shown on this channel and 
eventually, the programme was completely pulled off the air. 
Until today Xing Kong is still restricted to a limited area in Mainland China and 
has not gained significant ground on its competitors in the Guangdong market. In 
January 2003, the channel was ranked 14th in the area, not counting the households 
using illegal satellites - a number which exceeds 40 million.475 Xing Kong's etTorts, 
however, in Star's perspective, are crucial to the long-tenn development in operating 
the global Chinese market. The co-production with Chinese partners helps News 
Corporation build up a good local relationship and also to attract an untapped overseas 
pan-Chinese market. According to Davis, Star is "building a library that will become 
the backbone for channels in Chinese-speaking markets around the world." However, 
before it achieves global expansion, a larger Mainland China distribution is needed. 
"If I thought we'd be in Guangdong forever, it wouldn't make sense to invest in 
. " h 476 programmmg, e comments. 
4.1.3 News Corporation's pan-regional channels in Greater China 
Channel I V} 
When Star TV adopted the strategy of localization in the mid-l 990s, the tirst problem 
Murdoch encountered was the reluctance of MTV - the popular music channel - to 
Co-operate with Star's approach. In view of Star's northem and southem beams. Star 
requested MTV to split its signals in two as well: both channels would still play some 
music in English, but one would place the emphasis on Hindi pop for India while the 
Ｔｾ｜＠ Fomey, M. & Gough, N. 2003, ":\ dlN.' ofreality'", Time ..I/1s/r(/lia no. X. r ＵｾＮ＠
4 f> Ibid. 
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other would focus on Mandarin and Canto-pop for Greater China.477 MTV did not 
deign to comply, however, as its world standard formula proved to be popular. In 
consequence, MTV was dropped from Star in May 1994. Star then created Channel [V] 
to fill up the vacuum left by MTV. Channel [V] was created as a joint venture between 
Star TV (50 per cent) and Sony Pictures Entertainment, BMG, EMI Music. and 
Warner Music Group (12.5 per cent each).478 Star TV later bOUght over the entire 
combined stake in the early 2000s, in a series of moves that involved acquisition and 
investment, and it now owns 100 per cent of the channel.479 
In its early stage, Channel [V] focused on two fronts - the Chinese and the Indian. 
Following its relative success in India, Star began replicating the concept in local 
versions for Thailand, Taiwan and other markets. Until 1997, Star had Channel [V] 
International which focused on Southeast Asia, Channel [V] Asia for its Mandarin 
service, together with Channel [V] India and Channel [V] Thailand.480 With Channel 
[V)'s takeover of the Australian 24-hour music channel RED,481 Channel [V] is now 
split into five stations. The five Channel [V] channels introduced various feeds 
catering to the different markets and placed heavy emphasis on local music and local 
Video Jockeys.482 However, the five channels are all relatively similar in format: 
Video Jockey-based and video-clip formatted programming.483 
Like Star"s other channels, India and Taiwan are the major sources of revenue for 
the music channel. In the 1990s, most effort in the northern beam has been spent on 
Taiwan, due to Taiwan's $1 billion ad spending market, but Mainland China remains 
ｾＢ＠
1994. "Third time unluckyT. Economist. ｜ＧｬｾＱＮ＠ 330. no. n56. pp. 74-76. 
HI Eliezcr. C. & Burpee, G. 1997. "Channel V. MTV in Oz", Billboard. \"01. 109. no. 13. p. 6. 
41Q 
2000. "Newslinc··. Billboard. \"01. 111. no. 31. p. 76. 
4110 Yee-lin, T. 1997. "Star TV finds its brilliance in localization" . ..feln·lti ... ing Age Ifliemational r 1 s 
411 Eliezcr, C. & Burpee, G. 1997. "Channel V. MTV In Oz", Billhuarel. \"01. 109. llll. ｉＮｾＮ＠ p. 6. 
411;1 Ellis. P. 200 I, "MTV \'S. Channel V". Asian Case Research Journal. Hl\. 5. no . .2. p. 169. 
m Hughes, O. 1999, "Steve Smith". Billhuard. \"01. 111. no . .32. p. ("\'-2. 
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Star TV's long-tenn target. 484 Despite its rapid grO\\1h, the 1990s was still a 
zero-profit period and Mainland China was a particularly tough market to operate in. 
Thus in 1999 Channel [V] underwent a complete operational restructuring, reducing 
its divisions to four - "networks', which is the regional headquarter and support 
operation for three sub-regions. These sub-regions are: the Greater China feed with 
has a strong Taiwanese flavour; the India feed which is a youth channel with lifestyle 
programming; and the other Asia programme which is entirely dedicated to Western 
. 485 
musIc. 
One of the obstacles Channel [V] had to overcome was the perception of its brand 
name in Mainland China, because it was considered a foreign programme provider 
although it was actually based in Hong Kong. In order to localize its image. Channel 
[V] in Greater China split in 1999 and changed the name of its mainland channel from 
Channel [V] Chinese to Channel [V] Mainland China.486 By virtue of the on-going 
localization programme, Channel [V] has split into six dedicated services as of 2006, 
including India, China, Taiwan, Southeast Asia, Thailand and Australia.487 Channel 
[V] also planned a "'Made in China" campaign, during which Channel [V] Mainland 
China's base was shifted to Shanghai.488 
The replacement of Channel [V] 's Chinese with Channel [V] Mainland China in 
1999 indicated that the focus of the channel was changing from being a pan-Chinese 
music service to become one centered on the audience in Mainland China. It also 
symbolized the diversified tastes within Greater China itself. In the music industry, 
Taiwanese audiences prefer pure Mandopop singers but have also branched out into 
41'4 Hughes. O. 1999, "Steve Smith", Billboard, \'01. Ill. no. 32. p. CV-'2 
Ｎｾｾ＠ Ellis. P. 2001. "MTV \'s. Channel V", Asian Case Research Journal, \lli. 5, Ill'. 2. p. I X7. 
- Hughes. O. 1999, "Targeting mainland viewers with a highly varied musIc menu". HillhmmJ. \'01. 
III. no. 32, p. CV-4. 
4M' 2005 Star n' cO"'l'anr report l004-10(}5. p. '22. _ 
4U McClure. S. 200.'. "Star network synergy drin's Channel V's viewership", Hil/hoard. \\ll ｉｉｾＮ＠ 1\\1 
21. p. APQ-1. 
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the genres of hip-hop, rap, blues and R&B, whereas Hong Kong audience remain 
interested in Cantopop. However, both types of programming are unlikely to fit into 
the market of Mainland China where the average income is much lower. Channel [V] 
Mainland China was launched to create programmes which were hoped to han: a 
more direct impact upon the audience in Mainland China, including groups that were 
not wholly interested in music - for instance, the mass of English learners - in order 
to satisfy the growing need of millions of Chinese to speak English. 
Hosting televised music award ceremonies is another major fonn of marketing for 
music channels in Greater China. It is also crucial for the music industry to promote 
the Chinese artists and for the Cantonese pop stars to achieve pan-region status. 
Before Channel [V] obtained access to the Mainland China market. most 
programming distribution was via syndication and illegal satellite dishes. On 8 
February 1999, Channel [V], for the first time, held the Chinese music awards in 
Shanghai by collaborating with Shanghai Oriental TV. The show, which was broadcast 
across Asia, received three million votes through ballot boxes distributed in Taiwan, 
Hong Kong and China.489 The fact that merely five awards went to Hong Kong artists 
while the rest were taken by Taiwanese perfonners suggested that the 
Mandarin-language market had started to outperfonn the Cantonese in Greater China. 
"Awards ceremonies like this will raise your status," according to Tina Liu. 
channel director of Metro Broadcast's Hong Kong radio station 104 FM ｓ･ｬｴＮＮｾｴＮＴＹＰ＠
Holding on-ground events such as the Channel [V} Chinese Music Awards and 
Slimmer Shake, while collaborating with local partners, has become Channel [V)'s the 
model for expansion in Greater China. The events help to promote the channel and 
raise Channel [V]'s brand awareness. In 2000, the Awards were stagl.'ti in conjunction 
4119 Ellis. P. 200 I. "MTV \'S, Channel V". ,lsian Cast' Rnl'arch Journal. \'01. 5. nl1, 2. p. 171. 
.''11 Hughes. n. 1999. "Channel \' bows swards show In Mainland China", Hil/hoard, \01. 111.11\1. 'J. P 
48. 
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with Beijing Cable Television and gained 3.6 million votes from Greater China. 4Q1 In 
addition, its 9th music awards were watched by 210 million viewers.442 The channel 
was also ranked as the top music channel in Taiwan between July 2004 and May 
2005.493 Between 2001 and 2006, Channel [V] has been able to work with CCTV and 
SMG It also collaborated with the SMG and Chinese NBA basketball star Yao Ming 
to raise awareness of the 2007 Special Olympics.494 From these events. Channel [V] 
has built a firmer relationship with the local partners. In addition. as more 
China-based artists appeared in various events, the localization of Channel [V] has 
paid off when an increasing number of China ｾｳ＠ audience accepted and welcomed the 
celebrities as well as the channel. 
ESPN Star Sport 
ESPN Star Sports (ESS) is a 50150 joint venture between Star TV and ESPN and is 
based in Singapore. Before the merger Star TV and ESPN were competitors. When 
Star made its debut in Asia through the AsiaSat 1 satellite in 1991, a sports channel -
Prime Sports - was launched as one of the channels in the five-channel package. The 
channel was then split into two as Star Sports North (Greater China and Southeast 
Asia) and Star Sports South (India). in accordance with Star's localization strategies. 
ESPN. however, was in the alliance comprising of the main competitors of Star TV -
CNNI. HBO, AusTV and TVBI - and was broadcast through the PaIapa satellite. By 
1995, ESPN had reached 13 countries in Asia. It also opened a 50,000 sq. ft. 
production headquarters in Singapore in the same year.495 ESPN later separated itself 
into the three feeds: ESPN Asia. ESPN India and ESPN Taiwan. 
4'/1 Mok. D. 2000. "Mainland China artists get boost at awards". 8ill"oard, \ 01. 112, no. -;, p. 45. 
49! Hargrave-Silk. A. 2003. "All eyes on Star's dark horsl' CH r', .\lcdi" ./sltl p. 1<). 
49} According III the AGB NMR Taiwan peoplemeter, cited in 2005 Star rl' ('Ontl'(lII\' I't'fJOrt ｾＨＯＯｉＮｊ＠ :(/(1,'. 
ｾＮ＠ 23. 
.: 2004, "Channel V ropes in Yao Ming for Olympics promo", .\{edia A.\ltI p. ｉ＿ｾ＠ ., 
s 1995, "Disney's ABC buy creates media ell. ofthl' future", Br""d",('(·/... Hll. ＮｾｨＮ＠ no. ,I. P " 
IRO 
Chapter 4 Case studies (1): Global media companies in Greater China 
Sports broadcasting rights in Asia became hot commodities because of the fierce 
competition between Star Sports and ESPN. In order to prevent them from outbidding 
each other and driving up the prices of broadcast rights, the two companies merged to 
form the ESPN Star Sports channel - a strategic alliance - in October 1996. The 
merger benefits both Star and ESPN, as they were granted the broadcasting rights for 
events such as the English Premier League, the FA Cup, NBA basketball, Australian 
and Wimbledon tennis championships and the Super Basketball League. In addition, 
the broadcasting rights also entitle the network to host more sports events. which has 
become another crucial way of localization in Asia. The UEFA Champions League, 
for instance, has renewed its broadcasting rights with ESS in 2006. Not only has the 
deal extended their 13-year-Iong partnership through the 2008/09 season, it also 
entitles ESS exclusive live broadcast rights in Hong Kong and Mainland China and, 
for the first time in history, live Internet and broadband rights.496 
ESPN Star Sports is another channel in the Star network that is highly localized. 
In 2001, it launched two new feeds - Star Sports Asia and Star Sports Southeast Asia. 
Two years later, two more new channels, ESPN Singapore and Star Sports 
Singapore - were added,497 making it a grand total of 13 dedicated services (as of 
2006) branded under ESPN and Star Sports, as can be seen from their names - ESPN 
Asia, ESPN India, ESPN Taiwan, ESPN Singapore, ESPN Philippines, ESPN-MBC 
(Korea), ESPN Hong Kong, Star Sports Hong Kong, Xing Kong Sports, Star Sports 
• ｾＧｉＱｩ＠
India, Star Sports Taiwan, Star Sports Southeast Asia and Star Sports Smgapore. 
The sophisticated feeds not only give ESS (and its advertisers) greater flexibility in 
targeting specific audience, but at the same time. the feeds also reveal the diversity of 
I I . h k d·,t·'rml·ncd hv the oca tastes. The programme priorities of cac nctwor are '- '-
ＺＺｾ＠ Bowman, J. 2006. "ESS extends UEF A coverage de.al" . . ｜ｉＨＧ｣ｬｩｾｾ＠ Asia p. 1 ｾ＠ . 
2003. "ESPN Star Sports cites flexibility in S'pore ked bOllS! . ,\/('dw .. hw p. 14 
NI 
2005 Star Jl' company rCI'0rt!004-.'()(}5, p. 24. 
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favourite sports of the local audience and the sports celebrities. In Taiwan ESS 
devotes more airtime to baseball, basketball, bowling, boxing and snooker while in 
Hong Kong and Mainland China, sports like footbalL Formula One and golf are 
preferred and supplied.499 As for the non-local programmes, ESS customizes them for 
the audience in Taiwan and Mainland China by means of dubbing, subtitles. local 
500 hosts and commentators. 
ESS has seen a brighter future in China since the tum of the millennium. The 2002 
World Cup has kindled the national pride of the Chinese when China qualified for the 
competition. In the same fashion, since the advent of NBA superstar Yao Ming in 
Houston Rockets, basketball has become a more popular sport in the country. There 
was already eager anticipation for the sports market to be offered by China during the 
2008 Beijing Olympics. Such optimism, however, was overshadowed by the conflict 
between ESS and the authorities over the issue of piracy. In 200 I. ESS accused 
China's Foreign Ministry of attracting renters by latching an illegal decoder to its 
satellite dish and ·pirating' Major League Baseball matches and other programmes, 
thus incurring a loss of up to US$I billion in 2000 in foreign firms. 501 The incident 
shows the dilemma ESS faces - how is it possible for foreign channels to have a 
dispute with the authorities that they are attempting to curry favour with? 
Despite the dispute, when compared to the other foreign channels, ESPN Star in 
China has had a rather good performance, thanks to its distribution network which 
covers more than 100 million households. ESPN and Star Sports have gained landing 
rights to upscale hotels and foreign compounds. In addition. ESS has built a large 
partial distribution by supplying programmes to cable operators. Such distribution 
4W 2003. "ESPN Star Sports citcs flexibility in S 'pore ft.'cd hnos .... . \lcdia ..I.\;a p. I". 
soo Chcn. P._II. 2004, "Transnational cable channels in the Taiwanese market: :\sludy of dllll1«>.lllJtMl 
through programming strategit.'s", Ga=ellc, \'01. 66. no. :!. pp. 173-17" 
501 Forney, M. 2001. "In Beijing. opening day means cable foul play", Time, \01. 15,. rIll. 1". p. 16. 
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through syndications has acted as a crucial tactic for ESS to expand as widely as 
possible. For instance, in 2003, ESS added the UEFA Champions League to China's 
TV I' fl' 502 Hunan me-up 0 lve sports programmes, Under the agreement, eight hours of 
live football will be broadcast to every cable home via Hunan Tv.503 Syndication thus 
helps ESS expand its viewership and establishes a new source of revenue, 
Table 4.5 Top five foreign TV players in China 
Rank 
I 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Channel 
ESPN Star Sports (operates ESPN and Star Sports) 
MTV 
Star (operates Xing Kong, Channel [V], Star Movies) 
National Geographic Channel Asia 
Phoenix TV 
'\fillion Homes 
110 
", Ｌｾ＠
61 
55 
42 
Source: Bowman, 1, 2003, "ESS rides on China sports interest to make new inroads", Media Asia p. 
16. 
Since the 2000s, ESS has grown even further through cross-media promotion in 
the Greater China as well as the Asian market. In publishing, ESPN and the Vertex 
Communications & Technology Group Limited partnered to publish ESPN The 
Magazine in China and Hong Kong.504 It is the first Mandarin-language international 
sports title available to the readers in China. 40 per cent of its content was generated 
locally, and the remainder was syndicated for ESPN's worldwide coverage, 505 On the 
mobile front, ESS has signed a deal in 2006 with Bridge Mobile Alliance to distribute 
sports content in seven Asian markets, including Taiwan Mobile and CSL of Hong 
Kong,50b Online businesses, among others, also highlight the importance of the 
Greater China market. Apart from a general website espnstar.com. ESS has three other 
channels - espnstar.com.cn. espnstGl:com.hk and espns/GI:com./U' for Mainland China, 
\(1' 
. 2004. "Headlines". Media Asia p. 7. ｾｾ＠ Bowman, J. 2003. "ESS rides on China sports intl'rl:st to make new inroads". ,\lCdl(1 "'.\1<1 p. 16. 
ｾ＠ 2004. "Roster". Circulation Management. vol. 19. no. 9. p. 20. 
: Sudharnan. A. 2004. "Discovery hones life-style edge in revamp" . . \ft'dia ａＮＧ｜ｩｾｾ＠ p. '.6. . ., ' .. 
2006. "Bridge Mobile Alliance to distribute FSPN content 111 ASIan markl:ts . R( R H In I( " .\t 1\ '. 
vol. 25. no. n. p. 9. 
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Hong Kong and Taiwan respectively. The diagonal expansion has become essential to 
its strategy in Greater China, adding advantages to their existing market possession of 
ESPN's 110 million households and Star Sports' 54 million homes in Asia. 507 In 2003, 
ESS is ranked as the top foreign channel in Mainland China (Table 4.5). In the 2004 
Pan Asia Pacific Cross Media Survey, ESPN and Star Sports held a substantial 
viewership of 9.8 per cent and 8.0 per cent while in the 2005 survey, ESPN has seen a 
slight increase to 10.2 per cent (Table 2.15 and Table 2.16). 
National Geographic Channel 
National Geographic Television is the television arm of the 118-year-old National 
Geographic Society, and the National Geographic Channel (NGC) was a 50/50 joint 
venture between NBC and National Geographic Television. In July 1998 its television 
specials developed further into a full-fledged 24-hour cable channel - NGC Asia -
and made its debut in Asia, in place of NBC Asia, to approximately seven million 
subscribers. 508 In the following year, the ownership of NGC underwent a drastic 
restructuring as Murdoch's Fox Entertainment Group acquired a 50 per cent stake in 
NGC, leaving NBC and National Geographic Television with a 25 per cent stake 
each.509 The terms of this deal allowed Fox to contribute to NGC's distribution 
capabilities while National Geographic Television maintains editorial control. As of 
2006, NGC is distributed in 27 languages to over 290 million households (including 
day-part households) in 164 countries. 5 \O 
Soon after Murdoch's acquisition of NGC, the NBC's Asia headquarters was 
S07 ESPN Star Sports: hup: I/www.espnstar.com!corporate/aboutus. corpo corpoinfo.html. consulted on 
May 05.2006. 10:20 a.m. GMT 
ｾ＠ McComh. M. 2004, "Media choice: National Geographic", ,\leciia Asia p. lol. 
SQI) Donohue 1999, "National Geographic Net gets launch deals". Multichannel .\'t·"'. \ 01. 20, no. 52. p. 
') 
-. 
ｾｉｏ＠ National Geographic Channel: hup: Ichannel.nationalgeographic.com channel intI', nlllsulted on 
June II, 2006. 09: 10 a.m. GMT 
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moved from Singapore to Star's base in Hong Kong. The channel's strengthening 
connections within the Asian market were the fruits of its commitments to 
programming localization in south Asia, following the acquisition by Murdoch. Thus 
far, NGC has broadened its reach in Asia and exemplified its core values of 
exploration, research and education. 511 NGC Asia reports that its Asian-made 
documentaries are drawing in ratings three times higher than the regional average. 512 
Localization posed many challenges as far as heterogeneous Asian tastes are 
concerned. "What Singaporeans like, Hong Kong people half like. and Taiwanese 
definitely don't like;' says David Gunson, NGC Asia's vice president of programming 
and broadcasting.513 In Greater China, NGC has a well-established stronghold in 
Hong Kong, whereas the reaping of profits in the markets of Mainland China and 
Taiwan is certainly an uphill task. Since the year 2000, it has adopted language 
customization by introducing the use of subtitles in Taiwan and dubbing to China. 
Local interstitials were also introduced in the channel's Taiwan feed. 
In 2000, National Geographic signed a major global deal with Toyota Motor 
Corporation and Hong Kong Tourist Association, making Hong Kong the first major 
cross-media advertiser that owns National Geographic's fledgling television, print and 
Internet assets around the world. 514 Having seen the advantages of cross-media 
promotion, National Geographic, together with lOG, Hearst and Trends Magazines of 
China, launched the National Geographic Traveler in China in 2003. The magazine 
became the largest monthly travel magazine and ad leader in the market with a 
monthly circulation of 38,000 volumes and 240 advertising pages a year.
515 
511 N(iC boasted that it will become the first channel in history to eamlark a pl'rCl'ntage of its profits 
directly for the support of exploration. research and education. See Donohue 1999, "National 
Geographic Net gets launch deals". Multichannel SCII'S. vol. 20. no, 52. p. 2. 
ＵＱｾ＠ Savage. M, 2004. "Asian TV audiences looking to see more of their own", ."ofcdia, /\111 p. II). 
ｾｉＮｉ＠ Ibid, 
\14 Madden, N. 2000. "Asian media deals get creative", Adn'rtising Age, vol. 71. 1111 40, p, "'0. 
ｾｵ＠ Garbi, J. 2()().t. "A slel"ping media giant?". Folio: The Maga:i"e/or A/aga::i1lt' ,\ftllltlgcmclll, Hll. ,\ 
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NGC's efforts to seek local partners were also apparent in Singapore, when NGC 
signed a deal in 2004 with Singapore's Economic Development Board to make 12 
documentaries using local talent. It also set up workshops to train local staff after their 
initial struggle to locate experienced film-makers in Asia.5lb In the same year, NGC 
underwent another restructuring, but this time, the overhaul occurred in the 
programming sector. It launched a 'Think Again' repositioning plan. Now Wildlife 
programmes were rescheduled to appear in a new channel - National Geographic 
Wild - and this move allowed NGC channel to cover a wider range of different genres. 
The new channel was launched in Hong Kong in early 2006, broadcast in English and 
dubbed in the local language Cantonese. The channel focuses on one of NGC's most 
important genres of wildlife, in the hope of retaining NGC's existing market and 
appealing to younger audience and those who might develop an interest in wildlife.517 
The new launch, once again, reinforces NGC's approach towards localization in 
different markets. 
4.1.4 The Qinghai story: A setback for News Corporation 
Though Star TV was well-accepted in Taiwan now, it did not have any substantial 
impact in the Taiwanese market until 1993 when cable television was legalized. SIS 
Since the legitimization of cable television, the relay of satellite television via cable 
television has become the main system. Star TV thus unwittingly triggered the fiercest 
competition against the domestic television oligopoly, and at the same time, also led 
to the launching of numerous rival satellite channels targeting the 
Mandarin-dominating region. The rapid growth of the cable television market and the 
no. I. p. 27. 
\11> Savage. M. 2004. "Asian TV audiences looking to see more of their own", ,\lec/ill .hw p. IQ .. 
\17 Savage. M. 2006. "Transfonning chaos into triumph in television". ,\/cciiCl .. hio p. 15. 
\IX Sarrina Li. S. C. & Chiang. C. C. 200 I, "Market Competition and ｐｲｯｧｲ｡ｮｬｬＱＱｩｮｾ＠ Diverslly: :\ Study 
on the TV Market in Taiwan", Journal of.\Icditl El'onomio. \'01. I·t, no. 2. p. \07. 
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impact of satellite channels resulted in further deregulation of the Taiwan television 
industry. In tenns of the competition within the cable television market, Star TV also 
controls a 20 per cent stake of China Network Systems, one of Taiwan's largest cable 
. • . 519 
televISIon compames. 
Despite its significant achievements in Taiwan, it was not until 2002 when Star TV 
managed to reverse its losses and make a profit. 520 The total loss from 1996 to 1999 
came to approximately US$500 million whereas for the previous 10 years it lost an 
estimated US$1 billion.521 According to Michelle Guthrie, chief executive officer of 
Star Group, the problem was that "in Hong Kong and China, distribution is still 
limited. The most important markets for regional advertisers are Hong Kong, China. 
Taiwan and Singapore".522 
Mainland China is still the main reason why Murdoch could not reap a profit in 
Asia. Despite being ahead of the other foreign players, Murdoch's relationship with 
the Chinese authorities was still not solid enough to prevent its company from 
suffering during the government's crackdown on foreign channels. In 1998, the 
government announced that it would start to enforce a ban on the unauthorized 
reception of foreign channels, including Star TV.523 This placed Star, in particular, at 
a disadvantage, since most of the viewers from Mainland China outside the 
Guangzhou province picked up Star's signals from unauthorized cable operators or 
illegal dishes. It was not the first time News Corporation encountered hostility from 
the Chinese authorities. Unsurprisingly, Murdoch survived this stonn and since then, 
has seen more significant achievements until 2005. 
In 2005, Murdoch encountered an unprecedented crisis in Mainland China. The 
SI9 2006. "Six sponsors line up in bids to win Taiwan cable auction". EU1"OU't'ck no. 968. p. s. 
\:!O Forney. M. & Gough. N. 2003. "A dose ofn:ality". Time Australia Illl. 8. p. 5'" 
Ｇｾｉ＠ Ghemawat. P. 2001. "Distance still matters. The hard reality of global l'xpanslon". lIarnml 
ｾＬＡｳ［ｮ･ＮＧ｜Ｎ｜ﾷ＠ Rel'i('w. \"lll. 79. no. 8, pp. D 7 -138 . 
.... lIargraw-Silk. A. 2003. "AlIl'ws on Star's dark horse CEO" . . \/t't/ia .. /.\/(/ p. 19. 
,'I . 
. Rose. F. 1999. "Think globally, script locally". Fortune. \lll. 140. no. 9. pp. 156·160 
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setback for News Corporation was as a result of his impatience to expand in \1ainland 
China, which made the government uneasy and suspicious. As foreign capital is 
expressively forbidden in any television distribution network in Mainland China. 
Murdoch decided to beat the legal system by investing indirectly in Qinghai Satcllite 
TV. Qinghai province is one of China's poorest provinces in the west of Mainland 
China but unusually it boasts of a nationwide satellite network - Qinghai Satellitc 
TV - which covers most of the country's cable television systems. In 2003. a 
governmental body - The Central Network Audiovisual Centre - bought the sole right 
to advertising on Qinghai Satellite, at a price of US$3.8 million per year. Compared to 
the first-tier domestic satellite channels such as those in Beijing and Shanghai. whose 
advertising revenues per annum were at least seven digits in US dollars. Qinghai 
Satellite performed pretty poorly, considering its nationwide capability. Subsequently, 
the Central Network Audiovisual Center had to seek external investment in order to 
finance the operation. 
In 2004, News Corporation's major competitors moved quickly, following the 
Chinese authorities' partial deregulation on content co-production. Time Warner 
fonned the first joint-venture in movie production, while Viacom reached a 
co-production agreement with CCTV and SMG These moves pressurized Murdoch 
into the exploration of alternative distribution platforms to deliver News 
Corporation's content nationwide. Later that year, News Corporation reached an 
agreement with the Central Network Audiovisual Center and some other partners to 
tornl a joint-venture advertising company. whose function was to operate the 
advertising business for Qinghai Satellite. As the authorities had yet to open up the 
broadcasting industry. having control in the advertising business practically meant that 
Murdoch had. to a certain extent, control over content supplied to the whole of 
Mainland China. Hitherto. bet(lre the fonnation of the joint venture. the Cl'ntral 
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Network Audiovisual Center was primarily in the business of provision of 
programmes. The right to provide programmes was then, in effect. transferred to the 
joint-venture where Murdoch, being a most capable partner, managed dav to dav 
affairs. 
Murdoch's move In Qinghai was an unprecedented step for a foreign media 
company who had operations in Mainland China. It was also an illustration of News 
Corporation's global strategy which focuses on the expansion of distribution segment 
through acquisitions and mergers. In terms of political risk, Murdoch could always 
seek protection behind the 'fa<;ade' of Central Network Audiovisual Center, because 
the Center was and still is an official institute with authorization to operate the 
television business. Although Murdoch had, at that time, Xing Kong Wei Shi and 
other eight transnational channels in Mainland China, these channels were confined to 
limited areas and had not made any substantial profit yet. Participating in the Qinghai 
Satellite enabled News Corporation, for the first time, to accomplish nationwide 
coverage, which resulted in the massive Chinese audience being fed Star's 
programmes. In addition, the participation helped News Corporation break through 
the dominance of eCTV, while avoiding the potentially tricky negotiations with the 
authorities. 
Via the Qinghai Satellite, Murdoch uplinked Star's programming throughout the 
country. On I January 2005, Qinghai Satellite repackaged the channel, repositioning 
itself as a new entertainment channel. Star TV's programmes such as IV" Zhuang Yuan 
(Dancing Champion) and Campus Challenge were soon aired. However, the alliancl' 
between Murdoch and Qinghai Satellite soon incurred the wrath of the govemment 
when one of the prObYfammes - Run Dc l1zeater caught the attention of the authorities. 
The government decided to ban the programme and subsequently. all of Star's 
programmes on Qinghai Satellite were cancdkd. As a result of this han, SARF I 
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re-tightened the media policies, not only by condemning domestic companies' illegal 
distribution of foreign programmes, but also by forbidding the further expansion and 
secret investment by any foreign player in the television industry. As of 2006, content 
distribution is still restricted to companies with landing rights, which are very limited: 
and programmes trade, which can only be arranged and authorized by the exclusive 
governmental institution - China International Television Corporation. Foreign 
broadcasters have access to less than one per cent of total television advertising in 
Ch ' 524 mao 
In August 2005, Star TV's innovative joint venture with the Central Network 
Audiovisual Center and Qinghai Satellite was cancelled. There was also an 
investigation by the government on the grounds that Star TV illegally sold decoders to 
its citizens in order for them to receive restricted News Corporation channels.525 
Murdoch finally admitted that his own business in Mainland China had '"hit a brick 
wall" and he blamed the policy makers in China as "paranoid' for reversing the 
opening-up of the media market. 526 Thus in 2006 News Corporation's strategy, which 
was based on the assumption that China's broadcasting sector would gradually open 
up, is forced to change. Murdoch withdrew part of his investment in the television 
sector and transferred it into other new media opportunities.527 Star sold a 19.9 per 
cent stake of Phoenix TV to the China Mobile Group (Hong Kong) for US$164 
million while Star retains a 17.6 per cent stake.528 From the transaction, Phoenix is 
able to leverage its content via China Mobile's platform, getting access to China 
Mobile's network and its 260 million subscribers across Mainland China and Hong 
SN 2006. "Dl)l'S News Corp' s latest China move signal media trouble?". ,\let/ia Asia p. 16. 
m 2005. "The end of the affair". Economist, vol. 376. no. R445. p. 80. 
S26 Ibid. 
m 2006. "Docs News Corp' s latest China move signal media trouble'?" . .\/edia Asia p. 16. 
ｾｾｋ＠ 2006 .\'('\1'.\ Corporation ann"al report. p. 119. 
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Kong.529 Its alliance with the existing China Mobile symbolized Murdoch's attempt 
to re-enter the region by relying on the support from on local giants and through an 
alternative platform. On the other hand, the partial withdrawal of its most influential 
regional player - Phoenix TV - signalled the setback that a foreign company would 
encounter in Mainland China, despite its success in Hong Kong and Taiwan. 
4.2 Viacom 
Before Viacom split into Viacom Inc. and CBS Corporation, Viacom was the third 
largest media conglomerate in the world, with a revenue of US$25. 786 billion in the 
year 2006 (see Table 1.5). Since the 1980s, after Sumner Redstone's acquisition of 
Viacom, the cable giant broadened its services across the whole media platform, 
ranging from cable television to film and publishing. Television networks and radio 
followed soon after. Redstone acquired Hollywood majors Paramount Pictures and 
CBS in 1994 and 1999 respectively. Thus, the media empire of Viacom, as a 
vertically-integrated conglomerate, was achieved. Apart from television business, 
Paramount Pictures is another crucial segment in Viacom, which produces and 
distributes theatrical motion pictures. In addition, the CBS Corporation owns CBS 
Radio which operates a total of 179 radio stations.53o It also has its own outdoor 
properties through Viacom Outdoor, and operates publishing and distribution of 
consumer books under imprints such as Simon & Schuster, Pocket Books and 
Scribner. 
S29 World Screen: http://www.worldscreen.com!newscurrent.php?filename=star60806.htm. consulted 
on August 30. 2005. 08: 10 a.m. GMT 
HO CBS Radio: http://www.cbsradio.comlaboutindex.php. consulted on July 30, 2006. 09:30 a.m. 
GMT 
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Table 4.6 Viacom's revenues by segment between 2004 and 2006 (USS millions) 
Viacom CBS Viacom CBS ｾＧｩ｡｣ｯｭ＠ CBS Segment Inc. (20042 (20042 Inc. (20052 (20052 Inc. (20062 ( lO(){') 
Television 5,745.5 9,448.5 6,757.8 9,325.2 7,240.9 9AX7.1 
Radio 2,096.1 2,114.8 1,959.9 
Outdoor 1,880.2 1,949.3 2.103A 
Parks/Publishing 1,160.8 1,187.1 807.9 
Entertainment 
(Feature film exploitation) 2,513.7 2,995.3 4,379.2 
Eliminations' ( 127.0) (38.3) (143.5) (40.0) (153.6) (37.2) 
Total revenues 8,132.2 14,547.3 9,609.6 14,536.4 11466.5 1.t.302.2 
Note: 'Eliminations reflect intercompany transactions related to the sale of advertising time to 
Paramount Pictures and the sale of feature films to cable networks. 
Source: 2005 &2006 Viacom annual reports.; 2005 & 2006 CBS Corporation reports: Fourth quarter 
and full year results. 
Although Viacom has a well-established distribution segment, Redstone's 
philosophy is that of • content is the king, brand is the queen', hence the distribution 
segment plays a secondary role to content production. This explains Redstone's three 
costly acquisitions of Viacom, Paramount Picture and CBS. Apart from Paramount 
Pictures' studio and huge library, the Paramount theme park, Simon & Schuster and 
Famous Music are all attractive content producers in each field. In the television 
industry, CBS Corporation constitutes a formidable force in both its production and its 
distribution, and includes in its impressive line-up the CBS Television Network, The 
CW Network, CBS Television Stations, CBS Paramount Television and King 
World.53I Established in 1928, CBS Television Stations stands as one of the largest 
and oldest networks in the USA. Thus far, CBS owns more than 200 affiliates in this 
market and operates its programming arms, which include CBS Entertainment, CBS 
News and CBS SportS.532 In order to reduce competition in the USA market, CBS 
and Wamer Brothers Entertainment made a horizontal integration in September 2006. 
The two giants launched a joint-venture network - The CW network - to replace CBS 
5.\1 2006 CBS C0I1JOrat;on reports: Fourth quarter andfull year 2005 reslilts, P. 9. 
51! CBS Corporation: http:, www.cbscorporation.com/our _company 'divisions cbs network indcx.php, 
consulted on September 9,2006. 11:30 a.m. GMT 
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Corporation's United Paramount Network (UPN) and the Warner Brothers Television 
Networks. 533 
Apart from these broadcasting networks, cable networks account for the largest 
proportion of the new Viacom Inc. 's combined revenue, with contributions of 70 per 
cent, 71 per cent and 65 per cent for the years 2005, 2004 and 2003 respectively.534 
Viacom operates many essential cable and satellite networks worldwide, reaching 
more than 165 territories through over 120 worldwide cable networks, broadcast in 
over 25 different languages and reach over 440 million subscriber households 
worldwide. 535 MTV, Nickelodeon, CMT (Country Music Television) and VH 1, 
among others, constitute Viacom's stronghold as a content player. MTV is the world's 
largest television network and the leading brand for youth. In 2004, MTV was ranked 
in the top 50 of The World's Most Valuable Brands overall and was named the 
"World's Most Valuable Media Brand" for the fifth consecutive year. 536 MTV's 
programming consists primarily of youth-oriented programmes, including music 
video, music-based programming, reality-based programming, comedy and dramatic 
series. VH 1, on the other hand, presents music programming, including music video, 
long-form programming, live music events and reality-based programming, whereas 
CMT primarily presents original programming related to country music. Nickelodeon 
consists of two separated programme units appealing to two niche audiences; 
Nickelodeon targets 2 to 11 year-olds while Nick at Nite appeals to audience aged 18 
to 49. 
Based on the popular worldwide networks, Viacom's operation IS first and 
foremost brand-centric, after which it attempts multi-platform and global distribution. 
HJ 2006, "Dawn of a new network", Broadcasting & Cable, vol. 136. no. 33, pp. 3-12. 
s,. 2005 Viacom annual report, p.I-2. 
ｾＬｾ＠ Ib'd I 
. I., p. -3. 
ｾＧｦＬ＠ 2006, "MTV Asia/(iolden Bytes Interactiw join torces". Worldwide Videotex Update, vol. 25. no. 2. 
p. 133. 
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Internationally, MTV Networks operates and participates in joint-ventures, or grants 
license to a third party to operate, over 95 MTV Networks services, such as MTV, 
VH 1, Nickelodeon, TV Land, Paramount Comedy, CMT and etc. These programme 
services have expanded globally, from the USA, Canada and Europe, to Asia, 
Australia, Latin America, the Caribbean and Africa. In 2005, for instance, Viacom 
launched 19 programme services internationally, including MTV in Norway, Finland 
and Denmark, Nickelodeon in Germany and France, and VH 1 in Brazil, Poland and 
Russia.537 As of 2006, MTV Networks International reaches more than 400 million 
households in 166 territories.538 
4.2.1 Viacom in Greater China 
Unlike News Corporation's sweeping acquisitions and dominance in the distribution 
sector, Viacom's Asia business depends on the MTV, Nickelodeon and VH 1 channels 
which are its most crucial content providers. In fact, MTV is Viacom' son} y 
pan-regional channel in Greater China thus far. Nickelodeon only came to Hong Kong 
in 2004, the result of a tie-up with Galaxy Satellite Broadcasting to broadcast its 
24-hour Nickelodeon Asia channel. 539 Soon after MTV Asia returned to Greater 
China, but this reappearance took place in Taiwan. In 1994, MTV secured a deal to 
launch six hours of its music television in Mainland China. 54o Two years later, MTV 
advanced further and managed to gain landing rights to foreign compounds and 
upscale hotels. However, as Viacom devoted much of its attention to the content 
segment, it did not seek to obtain the Guangdong landing rights until 2003 -later than 
S17 2005 "Clcom annual report. p.I-3. 
ｾ｜ｓ＠ 2006, "MTV Asia· (iolden Bytes Interactive join forces", Worldwide hdcolex ('pdale. vol. 25. no. 2. 
ｾ＠ I.H. 
g 2004, "Headlinc-s" . . \letlia As;a p. 7. 
S40 Weber. I. 2003. "localizing the global: Successful strategies for selling television programmes to 
China", Ga=ellc. vol. 65, no. 3, p. 279. 
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Star's Xing Kong Wei Shi and Time Warner's CETV. 
Vi acorn 's early strategy in Mainland China was to promote its advantage in its 
content. After entering Mainland China in 1995, Viacom set up local offices in Beijing 
and Shanghai. It then sought co-production deals with cable operators, creating 
programmes such as MTV Tianlaicun [A Place Where Heavenly Melody Dwells] and 
MTV Learn English, which are now aired via hundreds of local cable televisions to 
reach 70 million households. "We think globally, and act locally. To act locally is to 
think locally first with policy, second with culture," said Lufeng Gu, vice president of 
Viacom China. Considering the Chinese authorities' rigid regulations on the landing 
rights of foreign channels, Viacom's emphasis on content promotion allowed it to 
keep a wide berth from the taboos of distribution and at the same time, merge 
successfully into the market through programme promotion. In addition, by means of 
co-production with local partners, Viacom has now developed a very keen awareness 
of the local Chinese taste and the threads of thought of the Chinese government. Thus, 
Viacom is able to avoid the production of material that invites criticism from the 
authori ti es. 
Viacom's content promotion saw growth in Mainland China but it also faced 
difficulties from the start of the millennium. This was due to its foreign competitors' 
intense effort to secure a position in order to launch their own channels into the 
market. A secure position is particularly crucial to a market like Mainland China, 
where television carriers remain the center of the whole industry. Thus, besides the 
promotion of content, Viacom also has to seek more distributing platforms. In order to 
strengthen its distribution segment, Viacom has decided that its top priority is to 
overcome the cultural differences and deal with the establishment of Gllanxi. 
For the past few years, Viacom's effort has been concentrated, for the most part, 
on "building relationships of friendship and trust with the various otlicials of the 
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Chinese government," said Redstone. 541 Since 1999, due to his participation in 
Shanghai's Fortune Forum, Redstone has made a total of five visits to Mainland China, 
in the years 1999, 2001, 2002 and 2004. In 2000, President Jiang Zhemin met 
Redstone during Jiang's visit in the USA. Redstone then met President Jiang time and 
again in 2001 and 2002, during Redstone's visits in Mainland China. In 2002, Viacom 
partnered with SAFRT and the China Radio Film and TV Group to hold a conference 
on 'The Development of the Media Industries in the 21 st Century', and Redstone gave 
an address in the forum. In his 2004 visit, he also made a speech in Tsinghua 
University, Beijing. In addition to Redstone's effort, Mr. Tom Freston, Viacom's 
president and chief executive, also paid a visit to Minister Ding Guangen, the head of 
China's Propaganda Department in 2002. In return, President Jiang agreed to meet 
Vi acorn 's chief executive Mel Karmazin when Karmazin visited Mainland China later 
in the same year. 
In order to enhance its relationship with the Chinese government further, Viacom 
sponsored five-year scholarships in the Chinese Conservatory between 1999 and 2003. 
It also supported the "Chinese Cultural Week' held in the USA in 2000. Three years 
later, during the outbreak of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) 
epidemic, Viacom donated 100,000 Renminbi (US$12,658) through the MTV 
International Network towards medical research and treatment. The next year, in the 
2004 Cannes TV festival in France, Freston was the only high-ranking executive of a 
foreign company who made a speech on 'the Chinese Day.' In October 2005, Viacom 
sponsored a speech of the Chinese cultural minister during the Chinese Cultural 
Festival in Washington, and Redstone himself was present to welcome the minister. 
Viacom's relationship-building with the Chinese authorities has facilitated the 
promotion and spread of Viacom's popular content in Mainland China. In addition, its 
ｾｉ＠ Gough, N. 2004, "10 Questions li.lr Sumner Redstone", Time, vol. 164. no. 14. p. 8. 
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moderate pursuit of distribution channels made Viacom seem, in the eyes of the 
Chinese government, like a foreign corporation which is less hostile. The efforts paid 
off in March 2001, when Viacom's Nickelodeon reached a deal to get children's 
programmes into Mainland China. According to the terms of the deal, as of I May 
200 I, Nickelodeon was allowed to reach 40 million households. Considering the fact 
that few children's programmes are actually allowed in Mainland China, Viacom's 
breakthrough in this area is certainly a triumph. 542 
Since 2002, Viacom assisted CCTV 9 in its distribution to upscale hotels in the 
USA and the number of hotels has reached 71 thus far. In addition, in order to endear 
itself to the government, Viacom exports CCTV's products through MTV Music 
Awards, which is a joint venture with CCTv.543 In return, MTV gained landing rights 
in the Guangdong province in 2003. MTV's landing in Guangdong not only makes it 
one of the most recent broadcasters to secure landing rights in the province, but also 
makes it the only global brand to enter the province via official channels. Since both 
of MTV's programming and channels have been popular in the market, Viacom's next 
step was to promote Nickelodeon in the market. 
Viacom's biggest success in Mainland China took place in 2004, when it signed a 
deal in March to establish a co-production joint venture with state-owned SMG 
Accordingly, the venture will produce Mandarin-language children's programmes for 
distribution on SMG's channels.544 The uniqueness of this agreement was that the 
deal was reached before the introduction of decrees no. 43 and 44 - decrees allowing 
the investment in domestic production companies from foreign groups - which were 
introduced at the end of 2004. The deal made Viacom the first foreign company to 
S4! 2001. "Making thl' music video world go round". Multichannel Yeu's International, H)1. 7. no. 4. p. 
38. 
S4l Gough. N, 2004. "10 Questions t(1r Sumner Redstone", Timc. vol. 1M, no. 14, p. 8. 
S4. Hargrave-Silk. :\. 2004. "Foreign TV netwl)rks get China green Iight'· . . \{edia Asia p. 12. 
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hold an equity stake in a Mainland China's content production company. Later in the 
same year, Viacom started developing its first production with SMG, even though the 
venture has yet to be officially sanctioned.545 
Viacom's tie-up with SMG was not its only partnership with domestic media 
companies. In September the same year, Viacom fonned a strategic partnership with 
Beijing TV to co-produce Mandarin-language musIC and entertainment 
programmes.546 The programmes will be similar in style and content to MTV, even 
though it will not be allowed to carry the MTV brand. After the alliance with SMG, 
this is Viacom's second production venture in the same year. 547 
Furthennore, Viacom signed a deal with CCTV to broadcast 90 minutes of 
Nickelodeon content daily on CCTV's new children's channel. This deal helped 
Nickelodeon's content spread across the country, reaching as many as 386 million 
households. 548 This deal also has a strategic value. According the agreement, Viacom 
will license all available episodes of two Nickelodeon shows airing on CCTV -
CarDog and The Wild Thonberrys. In return, Viacom airs CCTV-produced content 
outside Mainland China.549 Thus far, the Nickelodeon channel has not been able to 
gain full distribution in Mainland China yet. This is partly because of the tightening of 
the media policies by the Chinese authorities in 2005, but apart from this small hiccup, 
Nickelodeon, together with MTV, has made significant progress in Greater China. 
4.2.2 MTV: Think globally, act locally 
Launched in 1981, the MTV Network is one of Viacom's most valuable global 
divisions and a catalyst for the globalization of youth culture. MTV expanded globally 
ｓＴｾ＠ Savage. M. 2004. "Viacom extends China presence for MTV and Nick". Media Asia p. 10. 
S4() Fowler. G. A. 2004. "Viacom, boosting China toehold, enters Beijing television venturc". Wall 
Stn'et Journal - Eastern Edition, vol. 244. no. 60. p. B4. 
ｾＷ＠ 2004. "What's ncw in your industry", Business China, vol. 30, no. 19, pp. 8-9. 
ｾ＠ .. x 2004. "The producers", Busint'.\.\ China. vol. 30, no. II. pp. 1-2. 
ｾＹ＠ Savage. M. 2004. "Viacom extends China presence for MTV and Nick", Media ,·hiLl p. 10. 
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from its USA base into Europe in 1987, followed by South America (MTV Brazil) 
and Central America (MTV Latino) in 1990 and 1993 respectively.55o MTV made its 
debut in Greater China as one of Star TV's initial five channels. Due to its reluctance 
to localize in accordance with Star TV's Asia plan, MTV Asia was the second channel 
to be dropped (in 1994) by Star after Murdoch removed BBC World. 
In 1995, the MTV Asia Network was formed as a joint venture of MTV Network 
and Polygram NV of the Netherlands.55 ) Based in Singapore, MTV Asia was then 
relaunched from Taipei, with MTV's Mandarin-language programmes being aired on 
cable and satellite television.552 MTV's distribution deals in Taiwan, India, South 
Korea, and Thailand were soon in place, but in some other countries, such as Hong 
Kong, Singapore and the Philippines, MTV's presence was still pending because the 
governments considered MTV a form of Western cultural imperialism.553 Today, 
MTV is delivered to Taiwan via PanAmSat 8 and to Hong Kong and Mainland China 
via another satellite, Apstar 1.554 
MTV's early programming strategy in Asia was to re-broadcast MTV's popular 
music videos from the USA, and adding country-specific shows tailored to specific 
markets. In contrast to its arch-rival - Star TV's Channel [V] - that endeavored to 
cater to local tastes, MTV channels' operations mostly followed its basic global 
fonnula and cast the similar global image. When it was unceremoniously dropped by 
Star, MTV saw the success of Channel [V] in some countries such as India, which 
made MTV change its former one-size-fits-all approach in Asia. However, although 
MTV follows its much-heralded 'Go Local' strategy, its operations can still be 
SSO Chang. Y.-L. 2003, "Globalization of television: Programming strategies of global tde\'ision 
broadcasters in Asia", Asian Journal o(Communicalion. vol. 13. no. I. pp. 13-14. 
\\1 1995. "Asia Pacific news review":Billhoard. vol. 107. no. 20. p. A-fl. 
ｈｾ＠ Levin. M. 1995, "MTV Asia relaunches in a much more crowded market". Billhoard, vol. 107. no. 
19, p. 66. 
m Ibid. 
ｈｾ＠ MTV Chinese: http://www.mtvchncsc.comlMis·Aboutus.html. consulted on July 7.2006. 10:25 a.m. 
GMT 
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characterized as 'limited localization' or 'global localization'. MTV redesigned its 
product to cater more to local tastes but at the same time, it claimed that it did not 
intend to compete with local music channels. In addition, although some content can 
be considered local, MTV still emphasizes on foreign music programmes and delivers 
them using MTV's global-style format. 
In the first eight months when MTV was relaunched in 1995. it managed two 
24-hour services: MTV Mandarin and MTV Asia. MTV Mandarin was created for 
Taiwan, Hong Kong and Mainland China, but with Taiwan as its primary audience. In 
1996, in the light of the huge difference between South Asia and Southeast Asia or 
East Asia, a new channel - MTV India was added into Asia operation. 555 As of 2006 
MTV Asia operates ten 24-hour programming services: MTV China, MTV Mandarin, 
MTV Southeast Asia, MTV Australia, MTV India, MTV Indonesia, MTV Japan, 
MTV Korea, MTV Philippines and MTV Thailand.556 
An increasing amount of MTV programming is being broadcast in local languages 
and features local VJs. In Greater China it relies mainly on bilingual ABCs 
(American-Born Chinese) or locals who prefer to regard themselves as American. In 
addition, an increasing amount of MTV programming is produced locally. In 1996, 
MTV Asia moved a Mandarin music-production center - a key function of its 
Mandarin service - from Singapore to Taipei. The move enabled them to focus further 
on the localization of production and marketing facilities. 557 By 2001, the 
locally-produced programmes accounted for 70 or 80 per cent of programmes 
broadcast on the MTV Mandarin Channel. 558 Most of these programmes are produced 
m Sulton. R. A. 2003. "Local. global or national?:' in Planer rr: A globalre/el'ision reader. L. Parks 
& S. Kumar. cds .. New York University Press. New York. p. 324. 
ｾｾ｢＠ 2005 "(lcom annual report. p.l-I O. 
m Burpee. G. 1996. "MTV Asia's Taiwan shift proceeds". Billboard. \'01. 108. no. 39. p. 66. 
HM Chang. Y.-L. 2003. "Globalization of television: Programming strategies of glohJI tdcvlslon 
broadcasters in Asia". Asian Journal o{Comnllmicarion. vol. 13. no. I. p. 14. 
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in Taiwan. 
Furthennore, In addition to its 24-hour satellite transmission, MTV negotiated 
time slots with terrestrial broadcasters and sold propramming blocks in order to reach 
an even larger audience.559 Combined with its global brand and relentless marketing, 
MTV has developed a strong ground which enabled MTV to outperform Star's 
Channel [V] since the mid-1990s. In 1998, MTV Asia's viewership and distribution 
grew as high as 35 per cent.560 The 1990s can be characterized as the investment 
stage of the Asian television music channels. However, the Asian Economic Crisis in 
1997 drastically reduced the spending power of consumers on CDs. The impact of the 
crisis on the music industry turned out to be good news for music channels. because 
more audience turned to watch music television instead of purchasing records. As a 
result, there is an increasing intensity in the competition between the two foreign 
music television companies for the teenagers of Asia. 561 
Nevertheless, Greater China still proved itself to be a difficult market for foreign 
music channels in the 1990s. Although MTV Mandarin broadcast to 43 million 
households across Mainland China and Taiwan, MTV only made profits in Taiwan, 
which was once dominated by Channel [V].562 In contrast, Hong Kong was a market 
whose response to both MTV and Channel [V] was lukewarm at best. Since 1994 
when MTV Asia was dropped by Star TV, MTV's presence in Hong Kong was limited 
to six hours a week with MTV Southeast Asia, which was broadcast by a local 
television station. It was not until 1999 that MTV Mandarin was launched in Hong 
Kong as a 24-hour service through a deal with local cable giant Hong Kong Cable 
Television. )03 The deal also made MTV Mandarin a service which covered the 
HII 1998. "Star woes". Economist. vol. 346. no. 8063. p. 51. 
5611 Madden. N. 1999. "Growth a challenge for TV in Asia", Al/l'ertising Age, vol. 70, no. 8. p. 36. 
ｾｉ＠ 1998. "Star woes", Economist. vol. 346. no. 8063. p. 5). 
ｾｾ＠ Mok. D. )999. "Hong Kong gets 24-hour MTV". Billboard. vol. ) I ). no. 40. p. 82. 
ｾＮｉ＠ Ibid. 
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Greater China region. 
Despite the potential reach of Taiwan and Hong Kong, Mainland China is still the 
biggest market for music channels. Apart from the landing rights to hotels and foreign 
compounds, promoting MTV programmes to the growing cable TV industry in 
Mainland China was the primary means of expansion in the 1990s. Before 1998, for 
instance, MTV only reached 26 million households and most of the audience received 
the programmes through illegal dishes. 564 However, after MTV struck a deal with 
Beijing cable TV, the deal added another 45 million households to MTV's potential 
d· 565 au lences. 
Like Channel [V], hosting a music award remains the primary method to gain 
audience loyalty for MTV. It also allows MTV to localize itself in the market. For 
instance, before channel [V] held the first Chinese Music Awards in Shanghai with 
local partner Shanghai Oriental TV in February 1999, MTV hastily announced that the 
inaugural MTV Music Honors would also be held in the same month, but a few days 
before that of Channel [V]. In MTV's case, however, the music awards was to be held 
in Beijing and the local partner chosen was CCTV.566 Unfortunately, the MTV-CCTV 
Music Honors was postponed until May due to a series of 'procedural delays'. 567 In 
contrast, the MTV-CCTV Honors in 2000 and in the subsequent years took place 
successfully. As of 2004, six annual MTV-CCTV Music Honors have been 
organized. 568 
Hosting MTV-CCTV Music Honors sets a model for foreign channels to co-operate 
ｾＨＩＴ＠ 1998. "Star woes". Economist. vol. 346. no. 8063. p. 51. 
SM Pride. D. 1999. "MTV awards aired in China, Europe". Billboard, vol. Ill. no . ..JR. p. 64. 
S66 Hughes. O. 1999, "MTV Asia Awards delayed". Billboard, vol. III. no. 21, p. 8. 
ｾＷ＠ The 1999 inaugural presentation was originally arranged for February but was delayed after 
objections foml the Chinese Ministry of Culture. The music award was then held in May but it was 
showing on CCTV until November after NATO forces mistakenly bombed the Chinese Embassy 111 
Belgrade. Serbia. 
ｾ＠ Kuo. K., Worden. M .. Brandle, L.. Eliezer. c.. & Sexton. P. 2004. "Newsline". Billboard. \'lli. 116. 
no. 32. p. 53. 
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and build up good relationships with local giants. "Partnering with CCTV was one of 
our main goals," said William Roedy, MTV Networks International President. )hQ In 
2002, MTV co-staged a Guangdong South Tianlaicun Concert with the Guangdong 
South Broadcasting Group. Furthermore, MTV has reached an agreement with SMG 
to co-stage the SMG MTV Fashion Awards annually between 2002 and 20 I O. Besides 
the strategic alliances with local partners, such music awards also help to promote 
programmes and the MTV (and Channel [V]) brand awareness throughout the 
regional distribution network. The 2000 MTV-CCTV Music Honors, for instance, was 
aired on eeTV to more than 500 million households in Mainland China, in addition 
to being aired on MTV Mandarin and MTV Southeast Asia. 570 
In a similar fashion to all other foreign players, MTV faced the tightened 
restrictions from the Chinese authorities in the television industry. As a result of the 
re-regulation and the development of wireless technology, MTV then turned to the 
mobile carriers to establish a multi-platform presence. In 2005, MTV signed a 
partnership deal for digital music content with China Mobile - China's biggest mobile 
phone company and the world's second-largest mobile phone service provider. 571 The 
deal is similar to MTV's global distribution expansion, which has allied itself with 
major carriers such as Virgin Mobile USA, Verizon Wireless, Sprint and DoCoMo 
(Japan).572 Thereafter, MTV launched the subscription-based music service - MTV 
Music Zone - on China Mobile's Monternet service.573 In the following year, MTV 
went further and joined forces with Singapore's Golden Bytes in creating a new 
interactive television on mobile for the audience in Taiwan, as well as Singapon: and 
SbQ Chan, 1. 2000, "Trouble-free 2nd year for CCTV, MTV show", Billboard, Vl)1. 112. Ill). 27. p. ·n 
570 Ibid. 
q, 2005. "Sign here", .\fll.\'ic Week p. 2. 
'1' 
• 2005 "Cleom tllllllwl report. p.I-4. 
m Madden, N. & Wentz. I.. 2005, "MTV inks cellphone content deal with China Mph,Ic" . . ·,tln'n/\w.\: 
Age, vol. 76, no. 20, p. 28. 
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", 574 PhllIppmes, 
MTV's localization and partnership with local finns are the key factors to its 
success in Greater China and Asia, apparent from the fact that it reaches more than 
180 million households in Asia.575 In addition, according to the annual Pan Asia 
Pacific Cross Media Survey, it is Asia's most watched music channel. 576 In 200J. 
Viacom boosted the number of households receiving MTV in the Guangdong 
province from one million to three million, which brought MTV's combined 
distribution in Hong Kong and Mainland China to 10 million households. 577 
According to the Cable and Satellite Broadcasting Association of Asia, MTV China 
has reached 87 million households nationwide in 2003, making it the second-largest 
foreign channel after ESPN Star Sports' 110 million.578 In addition, MTV Mandarin 
has reached 5.9 million households - 99 per cent of Taiwan's homes in 2006.579 
S7. 2006, "MTV Asia/Golden Bytes Interactiw join forces", Worldwide "idco!cx lJptia!l!. vol, 25. no. 2. 
p.133 .. 
ｾＷｓ＠ Ibid. 
q6 Ibid. 
m 2004, "What's new in your industry", Business China. vol. 30. no. 19. pp. 8-9. 
HI Shaw. S. D. 2003. "MTV lines up concert for Guangdong debut", .\/t'dia Asia p. 12-
ｾｊｱ＠ M1V Chinese: http:! w\\'w.mtvchnese.comMis Aboutus.html. consulted on July -:. 2006. \0:25 am. 
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5.1 Time Warner 
With revenue of US$44.2 billion in 2006, Time Warner is the world's top media 
groUp.580 Beginning with Time Magazine about 80 years ago, Time Warner today 
owns famous publications such as People, Time, Fortune and Sports Illustrated. In the 
film industry, it owns two companies, and Warner Bros. Entertainment Group, a 
Hollywood major. In 2000, Time Warner merged with AOL at a cost of US$183 
billion, creating the well-known AOL-Time Warner (see Table 1.4). The merger drew 
the world's attention because Time Warner was already one of the largest media 
companies in the world, while AOL was the largest Internet service provider. The deal 
was expected to combine AOL's two-way interactive technology with Time Warner's 
high-capacity cable TV wires, so that AOL consumers would have access to Time 
Warner's vast programming libraries on demand.58I The greatest merger in media 
history, however, failed when AOL-Time Warner deleted the" AOL' in 2003 and 
returned to the familiar "Time Warner' . 
Time Warner's cable division is called Time Warner Cable. In April 2005, its 
subsidiary, Time Warner NY Cable LLC, in conjunction with the Comcast 
Corporation, reached an agreement to acquire the Adelphia Communications 
Corporation.582 With this acquisition which was worth US$17. 7 billion. the scale of 
Time Warner cable operations has expanded even further. Although Time Warner 
Cable operates 24-hour news channels in the USA, its television business comes 
mainly through its business units - Warner Bros. Television. Turner Broadcasting 
System and Home Box Office (HBO). Warner Bros. Television is one of the world's 
SIlo 2005 Time 'fi/mer t111T1lIllI report, p. 34. 
\81 Graser, M., Goldsmith, J., & Wilson, W. 2000, "AOL-Time Warner deal opens new avenues for 
content", J'ideo Business. vol. 20, no. 3, p. I. 
ｾｉＡ＠ 2005, "Adelphia gets S 17.7B in sale to Time Warner, Corneas''', Tclc(ommun/u/IIOII.\ Rt'I'0rl.\. \lll. 
71. no, 9, pp. 38-39. 
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leading compames In creating, producing, licensing and marketing television 
programming. However, since September 2006, the Warner Bros. Television Network 
was replaced with a new network CW - a 50-50 joint venture combining CBS' UPN 
and Warner Bros. Television.583 
Table 5.1 Time Warner's revenues by segment between 2003 and 2006 (USS millions) 
Segment 2003 2004 2005 :OOfl 
Film Entertainment 10,967 11,853 11.924 10.625 
Cable 7,699 8,484 8.812 11.767 
TV Networks 8,434 9,054 9,570 10.273 
AOL 8,598 8,692 8.2S3 7.866 
Publishing 5,533 5,565 5.278 5.249 
Source: 2004,2005 & 2006 lime Warner annual report. 
The Turner Broadcasting System consists of entertainment networks such as TBS, 
TNT, Cartoon Network and Turner Classic Movies, and 24-hour cable news services 
CNN and Headline News. CNNI, among others, is Turner's global ann which has 
extended its reach to over 200 countries and territories as of December 2005.584 In 
addition, Tuner distributes about 45 region-specific versions and local-language feeds 
of TNT, Cartoon Network, Turner Classic Movies and Boomerang to more than 125 
countries globally.585 The HBO network is a pay television service. It operates HBO 
and Cinemax that consists of theatrical motion pictures, original drama and comedy 
series, and mini-series such as The Sopranos, Entourage, Rome and Sex and the City. 
5.1.1 The multi-platform operation and the frustrated CETV 
Although Time Warner is the biggest global media company, its television business in 
Greater China is less ambitious than that of News Corporation and Viacom. In the 
early I 990s. Time Warner was given an opportunity to introduce its magazine to 
SRI Grala. A. 2006. "The: 5ifth network". Lln'I/.\('!. vol. 9. no. 2. p. 36. 
SI4 2005 lim" "(/nlt',. annuClI1l'port. p. 8. 
Sll\ • 2005 Time "elrner annual n'port. p. 9. 
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Mainland China. Time Warner then conducted a market survey which concluded that 
an estimated market in the region of the hundred thousands was not worth the 
investment they would have to put in. Time Warner thus missed the potential 
advantage it could have wielded over its other competitors. When Star TV sought 
investors, the then-Time Warner and Turner Broadcasting were also reported to have 
an interest in the bid. However, when Murdoch won the bid to become Star's investor , 
Time Warner once again failed to establish an initial foothold in the potential 
television market of Mainland China.586 
On the whole, Time Warner operates in Mainland China through various media 
sectors, which reflect the advantages of being an integrated global media 
conglomerate. For instance, in autumn 2006, Time Warner's Sports Illustrated was 
available in Mandarin. This new magazine would cover basketball, soccer and other 
sports that are considered major events for the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games. 587 
In the realm of internet and wireless technology, Time Warner has also achieved 
some considerable success. After the merger between Time Warner and AOL, the 
then-AOL Time Warner reached Mainland China and became the first foreign Internet 
service provider by fonning a joint venture with the country's leading computer 
manufacturer Legend. Under the deal, AOL took over Legend's portal - fm365.com. 
Each company contributed US$l 00 million to the venture, with AOL holding a 49 per 
cent stake.588 In 2004, Time Warner reached a deal with Linktone, a provider of 
value-added wireless services to China Mobile and China Unicorn customers. Turner 
Broadcasting System then started introducing Cartoon Network characters such as 
Tom and Jerry and the Flintstones on wireless products in China. 589 Taking advantage 
IKI1 McCarroll, T. & Burton. S. 1993. "New star owr Asia", Time. \'01. 142. no. 6. p. 53. 
IS 7 
2006, "FY''', Al/l'ertising Age, vol. 77, no. 14. p. 24. 
IKK 
20m, "You've got mail", Business Clrina. vol. 27, no. 14. p. I. 
ｾＢ＠ Madden. N. & Wentz. I . 2003, "Cellphones to add cartoon characters". Adl'C'rtising Age. vol. 74. 
no. 45. p. 16. 
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of the technological platform, AOL also announced the broadcasting of news 
programmes by AOL in Mainland China (supplied by the broadband unit of SMG) in 
April 2006.590 
In Mainland China, Time Warner's most significant achievement is in the film 
industry. Taking advantage of the deregulations that took place in 2004. Time Warner 
fonned the first Sino-foreign joint venture, the China Film Warner Hengdian 
Company, with the China Film Group and Zhejiang Hengdian Group. Through this 
joint venture, Time Warner is authorized to operate in the film industry and produce 
television films. In addition, in February 2005, Warner Home Video formed a joint 
venture, the CAV Warner Home Entertainment Company, with China Audio Video.591 
The deal made Warner Bros. the first American studio to establish a DVD/VCD 
distribution and marketing operation in Mainland China, thus providing Time Warner 
with additional opportunities for growth. 
In the television business, Time Warner's advancement into Greater China began 
in 1995, when its CNN opened the Asia production center in Hong Kong. Since then, 
CNN Asia programmes have been produced from that production center. However, 
foreign news is always a sensitive issue with the Chinese government. Like the other 
foreign players, Time Warner offended the Chinese authorities more than once with 
their news coverage. In 1999, CNN was banned by the Chinese Communist Party in a 
bid to restrain foreign news reports ahead of the 10th anniversary of the 
demonstrations in Tiananmen Square.592 Even so, CNN's coverage of government 
crackdowns on the Falun Gong religious movement still angered the authorities. As a 
result. its TNT & Cartoon Network Channels were banned from the country until the 
\QtJ 2006. "AOL to broadcast news in China", Wall Street Jourllul- Eastern Edition. \'01. 247. n{), 90. p, 
A6. 
Sq, 2005. SWOT analysis. Datamonitor Pic. p. 8. 
ｾｃｪｾ＠ romey, M. 1999. "China curbs foreign news reports ahead of Tiananmen ｡ｮｮｩ｜ｴｾｲｳ｡ｲｹＢＮ＠ Wall Street 
lournal- Eastern Edition. \'01. 233. no. 107. p. A23. 
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The Chinese government's hostility towards foreign media companies made Time 
Warner realize the importance of Guanxi. Gerald Levin, the chief of Time Warner, 
worked hard to build a good relationship with the previous President Jiang Zhemin. In 
May 2001, at a dinner in Hong Kong, he introduced President Jiang as "my good 
friend Jiang Zhemin, a man of honor dedicated to the best interest of his people:,w4 
The same year, Time Warner, along with News Corporation, began to enter 
negotiations with the Chinese authorities regarding landing rights in Mainland China. 
Time Warner's CETV received Guangdong landing rights soon after, in exchange for 
Time Warner's carriage of CCTV 9 into New York City, Los Angeles and Houston 
through its cable operations.595 The reciprocal carriage deal made Time Warner's 
CETY (China Entertainment TV) one of the first foreign broadcasters to win the right 
to provide cable programming on the Mainland China. 
Time Warner's most ambitious move in Greater China was the acquisition of 
CETY. CETV was a Hong Kong-based 24-hour Mandarin-language family 
entertainment channel (founded in 1995) owned by Peggy and Robert Chua. In order 
to gain access to Mainland China, CETV was very careful to ensure that its 
programmes steered clear of sex, violence and controversial news. 596 CETV 
emphasizes traditional Chinese virtues such as family values, which helped establish 
it as a non-confrontational television player. Its avoidance of sensitive political news 
prohibited by the authorities, particularly those in relation to democracy, human rights 
and religion, can be said to be a major factor contributing to its success. 
ｾＨｮ＠ Osborne. M. 2000, "Different Chinese strokes for different folks". Multiclrannel Sews International, 
vol. 6, no. 8, p. 8. 
ｾＱｊＬＴ＠ Madden, N. 2001. "Media moguls charm their way into China"'. Ad Age G/ohal. Vl)l. 2. no. 1. p. ). 
ｓｑｾ＠ Donohue. S. 2001. "AOL Time Warner Net gains access to China", .\fultichannc/ Scws. vol. ＲｾＮ＠ no. 
44, p. 3. 
5% Osborne. t-w1. 2000, "Different Chinese strokes for different folks", .\fulticlumncl .\'Cln Inlt,,-,wtwnal, 
vol. 6, no. 8, p. 8. 
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CETV's strategy worked well and the channel was accepted by the government. 
However, CETV had a problem - it lacked substantial advertising revenue. Since the 
1997 Asian financial crisis, CETV encountered even more serious financial 
difficulties. This forced Peggy and Robert Chua to seek investors and make on-air 
pleas for money. Thus, in 2000 Time Warner reached an agreement (through its Turner 
International Asia Pacific) to acquire 85 per cent of CETV. Through CETV. a channel 
dedicated to Mandarin programmes, Time Warner could finally enter the region as a 
competitor to the other players. 
CErv is Time Warner's first and only Mandarin-language channel. The deal was 
made in order to gain a greater presence in Mainland China. CETV's satellite 
coverage across Asia reached 33 million households but for Time Warner its greatest 
asset was that it was carried by cable systems with about five hundred thousand 
subscribers from the Guangdong Region. 597 Thus this acquisition gave Time Warner 
ownership of an international channel that was well-established. In view of the 
success of Phoenix TV, which is an alliance between News Corporation and local 
players, CETV served as a perfect opportunity for Time Warner to compete within the 
market. In addition, CETV could offer Time Warner a channel which could have the 
potential to reach Mandarin-speaking audiences all over the world. 
Time Warner brought plenty of resources into CETV, which ranged from cash and 
programming to expertise in distribution, sales and marketing and channel operations. 
The acquisition involved a commitment by Time Warner to help CETV produce 
Mandarin programmes. Warner Bros. International Television would also help to 
revamp CETV's programming and enable CETV to access Turner's and Warner's 
massive libraries. 
sen Slilson. J. 2000. "Time Warner's CLTV deal takes steps toward China". ,\fulticlwlIlId X('\n. vol. 
21. no. 25, p. R. 
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In spite of Time Warner's substantial support for CETV, CETV's strategies ｷ｜＿ｲｾ＠
more conservative in comparison to its main competitor - Murdoch's Xing Kong \\'l:i 
Shi. Instead of creating a large number of new programmes for Mainland China. 
CETV relies on imported products such as Tom and Jerry, The Hest Wing (an Emmy 
Award-winning White House drama) and dubbed series from Taiwan and Korea. Thus. 
CETV tends to operate within a very low budget and did not make any significant 
investment in programming. Though this strategy was cost effective. the drawback 
was that programmes of high quality suitable for this region were not being produced. 
In addition, most of the audience in the Guangdong province prefers 
Cantonese-language programmes which are available from llong Kong and there is 
little interest in Mandarin programmes. 
As a result, CETV (as well as Xing Kong) was not able to exert any impact upon 
the audience in the Guangdong area. Although CETV's programming is largely 
entertainment-driven and most of its self-produced programmes are produced in Hong 
Kong or Mainland China, it has no strong identity in Mainland China. It could not 
establish any connection with the local viewers nor command any loyalty. There are 
about 30 other channels offering exactly the same programmes as CETV and as a 
result it is unable to appeal to a large audience. As of 2003. two years after being 
given the landing rights to the Guangdong province. CETV had only a two per cent 
share of the Guangdong market, according to AC Nielsen figures. 59K Its share of 
ratings in Guangzhou was a mere three per cent, even though it was sometim\?s ranked 
as one of the top 10 television channels. In 200 I and 2002. CETV made loss\?s of 
US$16 million and US$19 million respectively. and its ad\'ertising rc\'\?nuc was only 
• 'i()') 
US$1.2 million and US$0.45 million respedlvely.· 
'911 Jlargrave-Silk, A. 2003. "Tom.clll1l in talks fllr AOL's China TV slakl··· . . \/t'dw ,·h/d p. '" 
ｾｷ＠ ｾ＠2003, Clrina nlt't/ia markel. Lehman Brothers. p. L. 
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Table S.2 Top 10 TV channels and rating shares in Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou (2003) 
Beijing Share Shanghai Share ClIang::holi Siron.' (%2 (%2 (n nJ 
Beijing 13.6 Shanghai TV News 14.1 Jade Channel 170 
Satellite 
(CTV I 11.3 Oriental TV News & 13.1 Jade Channel l·tS 
Entertainment 
Beijing TV4 7.1 Shanghai TV Drama 11.3 Guangzhou TV <).1 
Beijing TV2 7.0 Oriental TV Arts & 7.5 ATV Home 1.1 
Entertainment 
CCTV6 5.3 CCTV I 4.9 ATV Home 6.4 
Beijing TV3 4.0 CCTV6 4 Zhujiang TV 5.S 
CCTV 5 4.0 Shanghai TV young 3.7 CCTV I 3.-t 
CCTV 8 3.6 Shanghai TV Great 3 South TV Movies & Telep13ys 3.3 
Sports 
CCTV3 3.3 SHA Education TV 2.8 CETV 2S 
Beijing TV8 2.7 Shanghai Broadcasting 2.8 CCTV S 1.9 
Network 
Source: CSM for period Aug. 24 - Sep. 13, 2003. 
2003 proved to be the low point for Time Warner's television operations In 
Greater China. In addition to CETV's low market share (see Table 5.2), another 
possible reason for CETV's lack of success was the absence of 'local connection' with 
the local operators, which was the main way to ensure a wide pan-regional 
distribution in order to boost the share in the market. This was in contrast with the 
popular Phoenix TV, where Murdoch formed an alliance with a local giant. Three 
years after purchasing CETV, Time Warner decided to sell a majority of 64 per cent 
stake of CETV to the Hong Kong tycoon Li Ka-Shing's Tom.com Group. 600 
Tom.com not only has strong connections in Mainland China but also a good 
relationship with the Chinese authorities. Thus, CETV will have more relevance and 
success within Mainland China if it is run by a local Chinese group and it will be 
easier to negotiate distribution issues with the authorities. 
The difficulties global media companies face in Mainland China is illustrated by 
the withdrawal of Time Warner from the television sector. Despite being gin:n 
ＨｾＮＬ＠ 2003. "Tom.com to take major stake in AOL's Chinese TV station", Wall Street Journal - £Q.\tan 
Edition, \'01. 242. no. 2. p. 87. 
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nationwide broadcasting rights, the outcome of this seemed to indicate that the 
expectation of profit in the Mainland Chinese television market is rather premature, 
particularly when the distribution is limited to upscale hotels, foreign compounds and 
the Guangdong province. Even so, Time Warner still owns three pan-Greater China 
channels in the region - CNN, HBO and Cinemax, apart from Cartoon Network and 
TCM Movie in Hong Kong and Taiwan. 
5.1.2 CNN International in Hong Kong 
CNN is Time Warner's 24-hour cable television news service which was created in 
1980. Five years later, Turner Broadcasting System began a new international service, 
expanding CNN into the global market. Today, CNN operates 36 news bureaux, of 
which 10 are located in the USA while 26 are spread around the world.601 CNN 
Headline News is available in the Asia Pacific region and Latin America, and CNN en 
Espafiol is a separate Spanish network in Latin America. In Asia, one of CNN's two 
newest services is CNNj, a joint venture launched in 2003 with its local partner Japan 
Cable Television. The other is CNN-IBN (launched in 2005), a co-branded and 
English-language general news and current affairs channel in Indian. 
CNN entered Greater China in 1992 through the Indonesian satellite Palapa 82P, 
which covers Southeast Asia. At first, CNN implemented a global strategy for its 
global news channel. It targeted the growing middle class in various countries which 
demanded international news in English. Accordingly it did not localize its Asian feed. 
However, as CNN relied on its worldwide affiliates to put together programming for 
the international network, it set up six bureaux in Asia in Beijing, Tokyo. Seoul. 
Bangkok and New Delhi.bo :! 
flO 1 
2005 Time IVtll'ner annual report. p. 8. 
Ａｊｕｾ＠ Shrikhandc. S. 2001. "Competitive strategies in the internationalization of Tdc"ISH)n: CNNI and 
RBC World in Asia", 71,e Journal o.fMedia Economics, vol. 14. no. -'. p. 156. 
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CNN's overseas expansIOn soon encountered difficulties. First. CNN was 
confronted by increasing competition from local and regional news channels. 
particularly SSC World which was carried on Star TV in as early as 1991. In addition. 
its news faced the criticism of being too American-oriented and did not display any 
awareness of local and regional factors. As CNN's broadcasts were irrelevant to 
non-Americans, CNN planed to refine their programming worldwide. In the initial 
stages of this process, it was very careful to avoid too much association with the 
United States in the reporting of global news so that it could not be criticized of being 
overly American-centered.603 Following that, CNN turned to pursue a regionalization 
strategy and began investing more regionally. The Asian market is one of its regional 
blocks and Greater China is part of the Asian block. 
In 1995, CNN made a substantial commitment in Asia by opening up a regional 
programme sales, distribution and production center in Hong Kong.604 "There will be 
more regional programmes, more investment in staff and technology, more use of 
independent producers and the planned introduction of a major documentary 
strand ... ," according to Chris Cramer, executive VP-managing editor of CNNI.605 
Since then, CNN conducted a three-year regionalization project (with a budget of 
US$3 million to US$4 million per year) for Asia. It also increased the number of local 
staff based in Hong Kong. 
CNN then embraced localization - including region-related or region-originated 
content, language customization in the form of subtitling, and the use of local on-air 
talent. A two-hour Asia-focused block of programming, such as World Neu's Asia and 
BUSiness Asia, which contained news and international features. was added into the 
1,(11 Privat, P. & McKillop, P. 1991. "The BBC's new baby", NewsH'eek. \'01. 118. no. IX. p. 40. 
ＱｾＱｯｉ＠ MA 1993. "Turner Broadcasting opens Hong Kong ofTicc", Broadcasting & Cable, \'01. 12.\. no. 45. 
p.46. 
ｦ＾ｏｾ＠ 1997, "CNN Infl bl'l't's up distribution. programs", Ach'erl/s/IIg Age. \'01. 68. no. 40. p. ｟ｾＶＮ＠
214 
Chapter 5 Case studies (2): Global media companies in Greater China 
Asian feed. 606 At that time, CNN claimed that 80 per cent of its programming was 
provided for an international audience. 607 In 2000, the amount of regional 
programmmg increased to 90 per cent. CNN Hong Kong regional centre itself 
produced more than 31 hours of programming per week, including CNN This .\!orning, 
Asia Business Morning, Asia Tonight and Asian Edition, Bi:: Asia, Inside Asia and 
EB ' A . 608 IZ sw. 
Local versioning took place in Taiwan, Japan and Thailand.609 In 1996, CNN 
launched a test project in Taiwan to provide 10 to 15 hours of programming available 
with Mandarin subtitles. Nevertheless, the most radical change for CNN was seen in 
) 997, when CNN created four custom-tailored services outside its domestic market: 
Europe, Africa and the Middle East, Asia, and Latin America.6lo CNN took another 
step towards localization in 2000 by launching the CNN South Asia Network which 
targeted India and Pakistan. In order to have a good relationship with local 
governments, CNN offered local governments an equal amount of air time for them to 
tell their side of the stories.611 
]n order to be close to Asia, CNN produces, distributes, packages, brands and 
communicates on a local basis. CNN does this by distancing its international news 
service from American influence and by branding local language stations in Europe, 
Asia and the Middle East.612 CNN's regionalization strategy seemed to work well. 
Before 2000, CNN was the world's leading 24-hour global news network and the only 
one that was making a profit.613 Since the millennium, CNN faces more competitors 
(>()(, CNNI in HK debut. South China Morning Post, 9. 19-4-1995. 
1>01 1997, "CNN Int'I beef" up distribution, programs". A,h'erlising Age, \"01. 68, no. 40, p. 36. 
!lOll 2000. "CNN's first fully integrated television and Internet newsroom". Asia Image p. 6. 
(IOQ 1996, "CNNI goes local in Taiwan", Asia A,h'erlising & Marketing p. I. 
1>10 1997, "CNN Int') beef" up distribution. programs", At/n'rtising Age, \01. 68, no. 40, p. 36. 
MI Shrikhande. S. 2001, "Competitive strategies in the internationalization of Tek\ision: CNNI and 
BBC World in Asia", TllcJournal of Media Economics. vol. I .. t. no. 3. p. ISR. 
M] (iadiesh. O. & Colberg, A. .2004, "How to risk-proof a brand? Watch CNN", Brand\\"('(,k, \01. 45, 
no. 25,p. 22. 
/,"W . " . I ｾｯ＠ ." '4\ aIdman. A. 2000, "A global perspective ,Broac/caslmg & Cah/t', H) . 1_, . no. _.'. r .. 
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including Euronews, Bloomberg and CNBC in Asia and the numerous national 
channels broadcasting in their own languages. However. only CNN and BBC World 
continue to invest in world news coverage, and CNN continues to lead in the region. 
According to the 2006 Global Capital Markets survey, CNN was the most-watched 
TV channel, with 80 per cent having watched the network in a month. compared to 55 
per cent watching BBC World, 51 per cent watching CNBC and 42 per cent watching 
Bloomberg Tv.614 According to the last quarterly Pan Asian Cross Media Survey in 
2005, CNN remained the top international news channel. The result showed a growth 
from 14.6 per cent to 18.9 per cent among the total sample, and from 18 per cent to 
27.4 per cent among top management personnel who watched CNN.615 
5.1.3 HBO and Cinemax 
HBO was created in 1972 in the USA cable television market as a premiere movie 
channel. In the early 1990s, HBO began investing internationally. It then launched its 
sister channel - Cinemax - in Latin American in 1995. Through various joint ventures, 
HBO-branded services are distributed in more than 50 countries and reached 16 
million subscribers in Europe, Latin America and Asia. 616 In 1992, HBO Asia, 
backed by Warner Bros. and Paramount, was launched In Singapore as an 
18-hour-a-day home movie channe1.617 A year later, facing the threat generated by 
Star TV's five channels, HBO Asia joined in the alliance of the "gang of five' with 
CNN, ESPN, TVBI and AusTV. As of 1998, HBO expanded to 18 Asian countries 
and the number increased to 22 in 2006. 
The headquarters of HBO is in Singapore but it also has a representative ofticc in 
"'. Murphy, J. 2006, "Traditional media holds strong with top finance execs" . . \/cdiu .·hw p. 6. 
Ｑｴｉｾ＠ Bowman, J. 2006. "News drives gro\\1h at top end of PAX audience scale", .\fcciia .·hio r 19. 
bit. 2005 7im(' Hemler a"""alll'port. p. 9. 
t117 IIBO Asia: http: .. www.hboasia.comlhbo/milestones.consultedonJune1-;.2006.111:. a.m. (i \ II 
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Taiwan. HBO reached Greater China in 1994 when it added Taiwan to its list of 
territorial conquests. A year later, HBO extended its reach to include Hong Kong and 
was made available in upscale hotels and foreign compounds in Mainland China. \Vith 
HBO's strong position in Asia, HBO then introduced Cinemax Asia in the region (in 
1996) and swiftly made the channels available in Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand and the 
Philippines.618 Two years later, Cinemax gained the landing rights to hotels and 
foreign compounds in Mainland China. A further two years later. Cinemax expanded 
to Hong Kong as a premium service. Since then, both HBO and Cinemax ha\'e 
become Time Warner's strongest pan-Greater China channels. 
Unlike Star Movie's partial localization strategy, HBO's Asia programming is a 
universal service. HBO was able to bring the best of Hollywood to the region because 
of its exclusive licensing agreement with Warner Brothers, ColumbiaiTriStar, 
Paramount, Universal and Dreamworks.619 At the same time. Cinemax offers action 
and suspense movie programmes. Research was carried out which showed that Asian 
audiences are most attracted to this genre. This spurred Cinemax to reposition itself 
and it relaunched in 2003 as a channel devoted exclusively to action and suspense 
movies.62o HBO Asia's advantage lies in the programming. As of 2003, it aired 80 
movies a month, of which 20 were new and 10 per cent of its programming was 
exclusive to the channel, such as the popular Sex and the City.621 The strategy has 
proved successful, as HBO has won over audience in almost every country which 
favours HBO's content over that of their competitors. Thus it can be seen that 
localization was not necessarily the only strategy and the form oflocalization adopted 
hitherto was the use of subtitles in local languages, as seen in Taiwan. 
"'8 Holman. R. I . 1996, "Postscripts", Wall Stre('t lournal- Eastern f:dition. \01. ns. no. ｾＶＬ＠ p. :\ 15 
ｾＱＹ＠ Hille, A. 2003. "A ｣｡ｳｾ＠ of going from Ben Hur to Ben Afileck", .\lcditt .h111 p. \7. 
ｨｾ＠ Hille, A. 2003, "Cinemax takes action route". ,\/edia Asia p. 6. 
｢ｾＱ＠ Hille, A. 2003, "A caSl' of !!lling from Ben Hur to Ben Afileck", .\fcdia Asia p. 17. 
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In addition to its content, HBO's success can also be attributed to the excellent 
distribution scheme it set up with local partners. Though the nature of distribution in 
Taiwan and Hong Kong is different, these local carriers were important conduits for 
the dissemination of HBO's programmes. In Taiwan, HBO is distributed as a basic 
service (like in most other Asian countries). This is different from the preferred 
practice in the United States, where HBO is supplied as a premium service. Before 
2004, HBO and Cinemax could only position themselves as premium channels in 
Hong Kong as well as Singapore in Asia. However, this situation changed when HBO 
surprisingly became the first movie channel to broadcast to residential households 
through CCTV in Mainland China. 
HBO began negotiations with CCTV for the distribution of a movie channel 
tailored for Mainland China in 1996.622 Despite having access to hotels and foreign 
compounds, the presence and influence of HBO in Mainland China was negligible, 
due to limitations on the landing rights. In October 2004, HBO signed a deal with 
eerv for a five-hour programming block on CCTV's premium channel. According 
to the deal, three HBO films will be broadcast across the country each day.623 
Because of the increasing competition in Mainland China 's pay-TV market, this deal 
allows CCTV to import programmes from a foreign channel and maintain its 
competitive edge. This agreement is also a significant development for HBO because 
eeTV has the potential to take HBO nationwide at a time when other foreign 
channels are still confined to the Guangdong province. Although pay-TV channels 
have only limited audience numbers in the country, the deal with CCTV has 
strengthened HBO's distribution in Greater China. 
As mentioned above. HBO's main issue in Asia's operation is that the channel is 
ＬＬｾｾ＠ Warner. F. 1996, "lIBO Asia is negotiating an agreement for movil.' I.:hannel tailoft-d to China", 
"'111/ Street Journal- Eastern Edition. vol. 227, no. 49, p. B7. 
11]1 Hllrgraw-Silk, A. 2004. "lIBO in major deal for eerv airtime" . . \ledia ..1.\/0 p. ) 
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not carried as a premier channel in most countries. In order to exploit the potential of 
the South Asian market, HBO created HBO South Asia in India, Pakistan. Bangladesh 
and the Maldives Islands.624 The objective of the channel was not to localize the 
brand but to gain revenue from the countries where HBO struggled to get a fair price 
from cable operators. HBO South Asia illustrates a channel that is supported by the 
revenue generated from advertisements. HBO did consider the adoption of this 
strategy in Taiwan but it has yet to materialize.625 
Apart from HBO South Asia, HBO Asia began a multi-channel strategy in 2005 
by launching a new channel, HBO Signature. featuring critically acclaimed 
programmes. HBO Signature is HBO's first diversified channel and was initially 
rolled out in Hong Kong on the largest cable operator - PCCW's Now Broadband.o26 
It delivers about 140 programmes per month to over four million subscribers in the 
region.627 The launch reflected the necessity for more premium programmes for the 
increasing number of digital channels. It was also a platform for HBO to try out its 
new strategy - to satisfy the needs of the different groups of viewers. Following this 
launch, HBO created two more channels a year later - HBO Family (featuring family 
oriented films) and HBO Hits (featuring the biggest blockbuster hits) - catering to 
different audiences. 
HBO Asia and CNN are Time Warner's best two channels in Greater China as 
well as in Asia. In 1997, these two channels were placed in the top Asian international 
services according to AMI Research.628 Between 2001 and 2003, according to a 
Television Asia report, HBO was voted Asia's best cable and satellite channel by 
1124 Osborne, M. 2000, "HBO Asia may expand ad-supported approach", .\lultidl£lnnel .\'(,\I'S. \01. 21. 
no. 34, p. 34. 
ｉｉｾｓ＠ Osboml" M. 2000, "Seeking 'fair value: HBO Asia launches ad-hased channel", Ad ａｾＨＧ＠ G/aho/. 
vol. 1. no. I. p. 6. 
11]11 Slump. M. 2006. "H igh inleresl, liltle payoff in Hong Kong" . . \llIltidwnncl Xc\\".'. Vlll. 27. nll 1 s. 
pp.38-39. 
1 •• '7 Sudhaman. A. 2005. "Signalure tirsl ofne\\' IIBO 0Plions to (l1me", .\I(·dia .'/\117 p. 12. 
IIll Kalz. M. 1997, "CNNI and IIBO Asia top survey". Broadcasting & Cahit'. \'01. 12-. no .. W. p (w 
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cable operators.629 Also, HBO was named best in terms of programming quality. sales 
and marketing, on-air promotions, channel popularity and viewer feedback. and value 
for money. As of 2005, HBO remained the top station and maintains a strong lead in 
the film channels despite the growing challenge from competitors such as Star 
. 630 MOVIes. 
Table 5.3 Subscription costs for PCCW, Hong Kong (Monthly rate, US$) 
Networks 
Movies 
HBO Signature 
HBO/Cincmax 
HBO 
Cincmax 
Star Movies 
MGM 
Hallmark 
TCM 
News 
ATV News 
CNN/headline 
CNN International 
CNN Headline 
BBC World 
CNBC 
Sky News 
Fox News 
Kids 
Playhouse Disney 
Disney 
Nickelodeon 
Cartoon 
Boomerang 
12 Months 
8.96 
8.32 
5.12 
5.12 
5.12 
2.69 
2.69 
1.92 
3.20 
2.56 
1.54 
1.54 
1.54 
1.54 
I.S4 
I.S4 
S.63 
3.84 
I.S4 
I.S4 
1.54 
6 Months 
8.96 
9.60 
6.40 
6.40 
6.40 
3.58 
3.58 
2.56 
3.20 
2.56 
1.54 
1.54 
2.0S 
2.0S 
2.0S 
I.S4 
7.04 
S.12 
2.05 
2.05 
I.S4 
I .\lonths 
X.96 
10.XX 
7.68 
76S 
7.68 
-tAX 
.lAX 
).20 
3.20 
2.56 
1.54 
1.54 
2.56 
2.56 
2.56 
1.54 
8.96 
6.40 
2.S6 
2.S6 
I.S4 
Sports 
ESPN/Star 21 .SO 21 .50 21.50 
ESPN 11.26 11.26 11.26 
Star Sports 11.26 11.26 11.26 
Golf Channel 9.60 9.60 12.80 
Golf Tour Channel 9.60 9.60 9.60 
Sourct>: PCCW, cited in Stump. M. 2006, "High interest, little payoff in Hong Kong", Multichannel 
Nt'w.\', vol. 27, no. 18, pp. 38-39. 
S.2 Walt Disney 
In October 1923, Walter E. and Roy O. Disney established The Disney Brothers 
Studio to produce a series of animated short programmes titled the Alice Comedics. 
ｴＮｾ＠
. 2003. "I1RO voted top cabsat channel for third year" . . \f('dia Asia p. 6. 
b\O 2005. "I1RO retains lead as top station in industry sur .... c:y ... . \/I'd;a .·hio p. II. 
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Six years later, the name of the company was replaced by Walt Disney Productions.hq 
Today, Walt Disney has grown to become the world's second largest media company 
with an annual revenue of US$34.285 billion in 2006. It is Time Warner's closest 
competitor, operating a total of four business segments ranging from television 
networks and film studios, to theme parks and consumer products (see Table 5.4). In 
the 1980s, Walt Disney was a company which focused on theme parks and real-estate 
development and 75 per cent of the company's revenues came from these 
businesses.632 It was not until the early 1990s that Disney successfully transferred its 
focus from theme parks and resorts to its television and film operations. 633 Its 
detennination in its development of the media entertainment was strengthened in 1995 
when Walt Disney purchased Capital Cities/ABC in a US$1.9 billion deal. hq 
Through this acquisition Disney transformed itself from a content producer to an 
integrated global media conglomerate. A year later, the global operations of Capital 
Cities/ABC and Walt Disney Television International were combined and started to 
promote the Disney Channel overseas.635 
Today, Disney boasts of a strong television business including broadcasting assets 
and cable networks. In the USA, the ABC Television Network has 10 ABC television 
stations which are included in the top markets and 226 affiliated stations reaching 99 
per cent of American households. It also owns ABC News, ABC Daytime and ABC 
Kids network. In the arena of television production, Disney operates Buena Vista 
Television and Touchstone Television in order to develop and produce general 
entertainment programmes. Buena Vista Television and Walt Disney Television 
III I 
I,\' 2005. TIre Walt Disney company/act book ]()()5, p. 93. _ 
. 1986. "Disney's empire is still growing". U.S.News & World Report. \'01. 101, no. b. p . .w. 
M.\ Hemlan, L S. & McChesney, R. W. 1997, The glohal media: Tire nt'u' m/\.\ItIf/(Jr/t" 01 CIllP""I/ft' 
ｾＧｦｦｩｴ｡ｬｩＮＧｩｮｲ＠ Arnold. London, p. 81. " ) , . ., 1 
Cardona. M, M. 1996. "Disney. Cap Cities pension funds merge. f t''''lOns & /m (,\tm( f/l\. \l I. 24, 
no. 14. p. 3. 
1.1\ Lafayette. J. 1996. "New DisneYi ABC global unit looks ahead", Elt'dronh· .\It'd/II. \01. 15. nil ｬｾ＠
p.4, 
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Animation also focused on children's animated programming. In addition. Disnt:\ 
owns branded networks such as ESPN, Disney Channel Worldwide. ABC Family. 
Toon Disney, SOAPnet and Jetix.636 
Table 5.4 Walt Disney's revenues by segment between 2001 and 2006 (USS millions) 
Segment 2001 2002 2003 2004 ;}O1l5 ｾＯｉＯｬｦｴ＠
Media Networks 9,569 9,733 10,941 11,778 13.207 ＱＴＮＨｬＮｾｓ＠
Parks and Resorts 7,004 6,465 6,412 7,750 9.023 4.425 
Studio Entertainment 6,009 6,691 7,364 8,713 7.5'1.7 ｾ＠ ,524 
Consumer Products 2,590 2,440 2.344 2.511 2.127 ＲｙＩＮｾ＠
Total revenues 25,172 25,329 27,061 30,752 31.9+l )·UX5 
Source: 2005 & 2006 Walt Disney annual reports. 
Internationally, Buena Vista Television International distributes Disney's senes 
and films overseas. In 2005, the unit distributed more than 30,000 hours of 
programming to more than 1,300 broadcasters across 240 territories. 637 Disney 
Channel Worldwide is the world's top children channel, consisting of 24 Disney 
channels, eight Playhouse Disney Channels, nine Toon Disney Channels and 18 
intemational Jetix channels. In addition to this impressive line-up, there was also 
approximately 100 Disney-branded blocks of programming. 638 Disney Channel 
Worldwide has distributed to viewers in more than 70 countries, reaching over 600 
million viewers.639 
5.2.1 Mickey Mouse in Greater China: All set except for Disney Channel 
Since the turn of the millennium, Disney has turned its focus upon developing 
countries such as Mainland China, India and Russia. As China is the country with the 
world's largest population and one of the fastest growing economics. entry into the 
1116 
1,\1 2005. Tlu' Walt Disney companY/llCl hook 2005, p. 13. 
illS 2005 milt Disn('y annual report .. p. 41. 
"'" 2005. rhl' Walt Di""tT companyltlct hook 2005. p. 21. 
Ihid .. p. 61. 
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Mainland Chinese market was high on the priority list. Disney has been present in 
Mainland China since the late 1930s, when the cartoon Snow While and the S('\'('1I 
Dwarfs was screened in Shanghai. However, some 70 years later. Disney still has yet 
to introduce Disney Channel to the country. If the joint venture channel ESPN,Star is 
disregarded, Disney is the only first-tier global broadcasting and entertainment 
company which has yet to establish a pan-regional channel in Greater China until 
today. 
Even so, Disney's Mickey Mouse has always exercised intluence in Mainland 
China. With more than 1,800 'Disney Comers' in departmental stores, Disney's 
merchandising is readily available. Consumer sales in Mainland China topped 
US$128 million in 2003, which is the double of Disney's global average of eight per 
cent.b4O Disney on lee has been performed in Beijing, Guangzhou and other cities on 
a regular basis since 1996. In publishing, Disney Publishing has grown ten-fold since 
the Mickey Mouse magazine was launched in 1994.641 In 2005, the magazine became 
the top-selling magazine for kids in Mainland China.642 
Disney's Mainland China plan includes developing a theme park in Shanghai, 
starting the Disney Channel, increasing Disney's presence on new media platforms 
. c . M3 
such as broadband and cell phones and finally export more Disney leature movies. 
However, all of Disney's segments and operations are based on the core brand equity 
of Disney and Mickey Mouse. "No company in the world is better than Disney at 
marshaling all its business lines for brand building," claimed Rasulo, president of 
D· . 644 Isney s theme parks and resorts. 
MO Chandler. C, Levinstein. J.. & Ting. W. 2005, "Mickey Mao". Fortune (07385587), \oJ. 151, no. 7, 
pp.4R-53. 
MI 
2005 Walt Di.'inel' annual n''P0rr, p. 53. M' . 
. Ihid., p. 33. 
MI R ' , -
eSSlll'r, J. 2005, "Mouse in chief', Time Canada. vol. 166. no .. '. p . .'). 
ｉｾ＠ Chandler, C, Levinstein, J.. & Ting. W. 2005. "Mirkcy Mao", Forlllllt' (073S'.',\'-,. \lll 151. ntl 7. 
Pp.4R-Sl. 
Chapter 5 Case studies (2): Global media companies in Greater China 
In Greater China, Disney's first important move was triggered by the company's 
new media unit, the Walt Disney Internet Group. In 2001, Disney successfull y 
launched disney.eom.en, Walt Disney's official online entity in Mainland China. More 
importantly, the website is a joint venture between the Walt Disney Internet Group 
and Searainbow Holding Corporation, a national online giant which was founded in 
1986 and has been listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange in Mainland China since 
1992.645 The strategic alliance was considered an important step for Disney's foray 
into Mainland China. In the same year, Disney also launched another website -
www.disney.eom.tw-inTaiwan.Boththedisney.eom.enandwl1..»:disner.eom.tw 
. . 
domains are home to a rich array of online content from the Walt Disney Company. In 
2003, Disney extended its range of web-content via a partnership with another 
Mainland China online giant - Sohu. In this deal, not only did Disney authorize Sohu 
to redesign and host disney.eom.en, it also licensed Disney Mobile's SMS and MMS 
content for distribution through Sohu.eom. 646 In 2006, Disney signed a new deal with 
Shanda Interactive Entertainment to bring Disney's online entertainment content to 
Mainland China by spring 2007.647 
Apart from Internet business, the most significant move made by Disney into the 
Greater China market was the opening of Hong Kong Disneyland. After six years and 
an investment ofUS$3.5 billion, the newest Disneyland opened in September 2005.648 
Along with the opening was a television commercial campaign 'Storytelling', which 
spread the 'magic of Disney' through local channels in Hong Kong, Taiwan and 
Mainland China, as well as regional television stations and the Disney channe1s.649 It 
seemed to be a sensible economic decision to set up the Hong Kong Disneyland, and 
MS 2001. "DisneY/Searainbow launch Disney.com.en", Worldwide rideotex [I>d(l(', \'01. 20, no. 10. p. 
2. 
f>.4h 2003, "Disney hooks up with Sohu.com for site redesign". Media Asia p. 12. 
f>.47 2006, "Planet media", Media Asia p. 1 I. 
f>.4N Demos, T. 2005. "Say 'cheese' in Cantonese", Forlllne (073X5587). \'01. 152. no. 6. p. 18. 
f>.4l} While. A. 2005, "fairies and flying elephants make an impression in HK", .\I('dia Asia p. 25. 
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the local culture was presented in a rich variety of ways.650 However, it was deemed 
by many that this was mostly a dress rehearsal for the main event - a theme park in 
Shanghai. 
In the realm of film industry, Disney's wholesome fare has facilitated the presence 
of its films in Mainland China's cinemas. In 1995, The Lion King was one of the first 
Western films to premiere in the country since the communist party took over 
Mainland China in 1949. It was followed by Hollywood blockbusters such as The 
Incredible and National Treasure. Disney, until 2006, had more than 15 films allowed 
in Mainland China.651 Given that the Chinese authorities allow only 20 foreign films 
to be shown in cinemas, Disney has made a significant impact in the film sector. 
Furthennore, Disney has teamed up with the China Film Group and their first 
Mainland movie The Secret of the Magic Gourd - a children's story based on a 
popular Chinese tale - is underway.652 In addition, Disney is developing a local 
version of the popular Snow White. In this film, set in China in the 1880s, the female 
protagonist is protected by seven Shaolin monks instead of the familiar seven dwarfs. 
In television, Mickey Mouse is a familiar figure to most viewers. In 1986, Disney 
signed a licensing agreement with CCTV. In this agreement, Disney gave programmes 
to CCTV in exchange for a two-minute commercial slot every week to sell its 
consumer products. As a result a 30-minute Mickey & Donald animated series was 
shown on CCTV every Sunday evening, dubbed in Mandarin.653 That was largely the 
extent of Disney's presence in Mainland China until the 1990s, when ESPN reached a 
deal to syndicate international sports programming and Disney was granted 
pennission to publish a weekly comic magazine for children. 
1.50 Ressner, J. 2005. "Mouse in chief', Timc. vol. 166. no. 3, p. 53. 
(·SI Schuman. M. & Ressner, J. 2005, "Disney's great leap into China". Time Canada, vol. 166. no. 3. 
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In 1994, Disney forged a partnership with Beijing TV. The Sino-foreign joint 
venture was put together to create a Chinese version of the Mickey Mouse Club - the 
Dragon Club. After a decade, Dragon Club is distributed via more than 40 stations 
across Mainland China, reaching approximately 60 million households.654 Winnie the 
Pooh also figures prominently in CCTV's flagship kid's show, The Big fVindmill. and 
on CCTV's children's channel. Disney animation is seen by more than 91 million 
children; 23 Disney-branded blocks of progamming and Disney clubs are distributed 
to more than 380 million households. 655 In addition to children's programming, 
Disney also exports general television series to Mainland China. Desperate 
Housewives, for instance, is the latest Touchstone TV's hit series that made its debut 
in Mainland China on CCTV 8 in 2005, albeit with dubbing in Mandarin.656 Today, 
with 24 hours of programming each week, Disney claims itself to be the largest 
foreign player providing films for Chinese television.657 
As a foreign media company, the extent of Walt Disney's business in the region is 
impressive. Unfortunately for the company, the potential of the market has yet to tum 
into a profit. Since 1997, Disney has released almost 500 films on DVDs for the 
market, more than any other foreign players.658 Despite being popular, the rampant 
media piracy activities have hindered Disney from making profits. For instance, about 
only a quarter of a million DVDs of Finding Nemo were sold in Mainland China. 
However, 15 million DVDs of this movie were sold in North America during the first 
two weeks of its release alone.659 
b54 Chandkr. C .. Levinstein. J .• & Ting, W. 2005. "Mickey Mao", Fortune (07385587). vol. lSI. no. 7. 
PR· 48-53 . 
b, ｾ＠ 2005 Walt ｄｩｳｮｴｾｲ＠ annual report. p.53. 
ｨｾｬＮ＠ 2005, 711e Walt Disney company/act hook ]{){)5, p. 79. 
ｉＮｾＧ＠ Chandler, c.. lc\'instein. 1.. & Ting. W. 2005. "Mickey ｾｬ｡ｯＢＬ＠ Fortune ({)738558-:'), \'01. 151. no, 7, 
pp.48-53. 
ＯＧｾｉｉ＠ Ibid. 
I,W Schuman. M. & Ressner. J. 2005. "Disney's great leap into China", Time Canada. \'01. 166. no .. '. 
pp.34-36. 
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Furthennore, Disney is hampered by the strict regulations targeting the television 
industry by the Chinese government. These regulations limit the ability of foreign 
companies to sell, distribute, market, and brand the content they produce. Even 
cartoons are tightly controlled. Thus Disney's main achievement so far is the 
co-production of the Dragon Club with Beijing TV. The name Dragon Club was 
adopted instead of Mickey Mouse Club because the government did not want the 
famous Western brand to become too well-known within the Mainland. Moreover. 
Disney was not able to introduce its Disney Channel in Mainland China despite all the 
effort and investments made in the market. Just before the opening of Hong Kong 
Disneyland, the Chinese government laid down new laws on cultural imports and the 
Disney channel was once again, barred from the Mainland. In response, Disney 
provisionally postponed plans for the Shanghai park to 2010, hoping that Hong Kong 
Disneyland will change Beijing's mind.660 
5.2.2 The Disney Channel and the promotion of Mickey Mouse 
Since 1996, when Disney reorganized its international arms into a single division -
Walt Disney Television International - international expansion has been the 
cornerstone of Disney's overall strategy. Disney's priority is to expand the Disney 
Channel into a global force, capitalizing upon the massive resources it owns. In 
addition, Disney's global television operation aims to establish joint ventures in film 
channels around the world in order to distribute its film programming.66 I Apart from 
establishing the Disney Channel overseas, Disney is also successful in selling its 
programming. such as The Mickey Mouse Club and the Wonderful World a/Disney, to 
101>0 Demos, T. 2005, "Sav 'cheese' in Cantonese", Fortune (07385587), \"01. 152, no. 6, p. 1 R. 
MI I h:nnan, E. S. & M<.:Chesney, R. W. 1997, The glohal media: Till! new missionaries or corporate 
ClIpitali.lim Arnold, London, p. RJ. 
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non-Disney channels worldwide.662 In addition, Disney centralizes all the creatiYe 
functions in Disney's headquarters and at the same time, it regards all cultural 
adapting as an important and necessary step. Dubbing is therefore meticulously 
carried out as Disney demands strict translations for its characters.663 
The Disney Channels air in most of the markets in Asia, including Hong Kong, 
Taiwan, Singapore, Indonesia, Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Korea, Thailand, 
Palau, Australia, New Zealand and India.664 Taiwan, among others, was one of the 
Disney Channel's first overseas markets (established in 1995), followed by the UK, 
France and Australia.665 Thereafter, Disney's global plan in Asia was strengthened by 
the launch of a regional office in Hong Kong and the investment of US$1 O-million in 
a satellite uplink office in Singapore.666 In Asia, most countries share a single feed 
except Taiwan and Australia, where Disney launched separate feeds. Disney Channel 
Taiwan was launched as a Mandarin-language service. The programmes on the 
channel were dubbed into Mandarin, and featured local hosts to introduce the 
programmes. Locally produced interstitials were also used to explore the life of local 
children. 
In 2004, Disney took another step in Greater China by launching a new 24-hour 
Playhouse Disney Channel in Hong Kong, targeting pre-schoolers (three- to 
five-year-olds). The launch is part of the plan to roll out Asia's first dedicated 
pre-school learning channel. The launch also makes Hong Kong the fifth market in 
the world to receive the commercial-free channel following the UK, Spain, France 
ｉ＾ＨＬｾ＠ Wasko. J. 2001. "Is it a small world. after all?," in Saz.::Ied by Disney? The global Disney audience" 
project. J. Wasko. M. Philips, & E. R. Meehan. eds., Leicester University Press. New York. p. 20. 
M.\ Rohn. U. 2004, Media companies and their strategies in fiJreign tele\"l' .... ion markets, MA Thesis. 
Freie University, Berlin. p. 89. 
11M White, A. 2005, "Disney rolls out two channels for Vietnam \,iewers", ,\ledill Asia p. 12. 
MS I.afayette, J. 1996, "New Disney/ABC global unit looks ahead". Electronic .\/t'dia. \'01. 15. no. 27. 
p.4. 
t.t.t. Chang. Y.-L 2003. "Globalization of television: Programming strategies of global televisillll 
broadcasters in Asia", Asian Journal ofCommunicatiun. \'01. 13, no. 1. p. 22. 
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and Indonesia. The channel features award-winning pre-school programmes as well as 
locally-produced segments. The channel in Hong Kong, is carried by Hong Kong's 
Now Broadband TV, and therefore has the potential to reach the 240,000 subscribers 
. H K 667 to ong ong. 
Despite its prominence in Taiwan and Hong Kong, Disney's long-term target is 
still Mainland China, where the Disney Channel is barred by the government. 
Through the experience it gained from Disney Channel Taiwan and Hong Kong, 
Disney is developing programming compatible with Chinese ancient civilization and 
tradition to please the Chinese authorities. As seen above, Disney Channel's presence 
in Mainland China is still confined to the joint venture with Beijing TV and certain 
blocks of programming. It was apparent that local political correctness and cultural 
sensibility in Mainland China have an impact on the ways in which Disney's promotes 
the Disney Channel and Mickey Mouse. In the 1990s, Disney backed Martin 
Scorsese's film Kundun which depicted the life of the Dalai Lama and China's 
invasion of Tibet. As Tibet and Taiwan are considered parts of China by the 
government, the move immediately roused the anger of the authorities. As a result, in 
1996, Disney's Mulan, a classic Chinese story describing a girl who fought in the 
Chinese emperor's army, was blocked as a form of retaliation by Beijing. The warning 
from the government worked. In 2004, in order not to anger the Chinese authorities 
(and in consideration of the country's tight control on foreign programming), Disney 
discreetly cancelled its first live relay of the Oscars.668 
The difficulty for Disney is not merely political but also cultural. Although the 
film Mulan was finally shown in 1999, it was still considered a flop. Despite the 
story's Chinese origins, the film was heavily criticized as being too westernized. The 
bf.1 Tong. S. 2004, "Walt Disney Television targets Asia's pn.·-schoolers", Campaign (['A) no. 19. p. 
17. 
lib!! OJijnyk, Z. 200.t, "The Mickey Mao club?", Canadian Busilless. vol. 77, no. 20. p. 14. 
229 
Chapter 5 Case studies (2): Global media companies in Greater China 
setback of Mulan has reminded Disney of its lack of cultural sensibility. Thus, in 
Hong Kong Disneyland, the character Mulan is added and has her own pavilion. 
designed like a Chinese temple. Mickey even has a new red-and-gold Chinese 
costume to wear. Besides, part of the architecture is also redesigned in order to 
comply with Feng Shui, a traditional Chinese form of placing objects in a location, 
which from the Chinese' point of view, will ensure the park's prosperity. 
However, Disney's largest hurdle in Mainland China is the fact that the average 
person is not even aware of the existence of Disney's leading characters, even though 
its products are widely available today in urban areas and shops. Disney characters 
were banned for almost 40 years since the Communist takeover. After the ban was 
lifted, its brand is still deliberately prevented from being shown on national television. 
Nowadays the children in Mainland China have limited knowledge about the Disney 
legend. '"This is the first market where we've opened a park in which we don't have a 
long-term relationship with out guests," said Rasulo.669 Although there is no shortage 
of Disney products in Greater China, Chinese consumers do not generally understand 
the connection between the animated characters and the Burbank-based company that 
owns them. 
In order to educate the children and promote the Disney brand through local 
groups, Disney made another key move in 2004 by partnering with Mainland China's 
Communist Youth League, a 70-million-member organization. In the partnership. 
Disney organized 'outreach porgrammes' through the group's 'youth palaces'. The 
co-operation includes storytelling, interactive games and lessons in how to draw AJi 
Lao Shu, the name of Mickey in Mandarin. 67o In addition. Disney triggered a 
large-scale publicity drive in Hong Kong a year prior to the opening of Hong Kong 
6641 Schuman. M. & Ressner. J. 2005. "Disney's great leap into China". Time Canada. \'01. 166. no. -'. 
Pc.· ｢ｾｩ［ｾｾｫＮ＠ I. 2004. "The Mickey Mao club'!". Canadian Business, \'01. 77. no. 20. p. 14. 
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Disneyland. Disney teamed up with TVB to bring its three new series of Disney TV 
programmes - Hong Kong Disneyland Fun Time, Hong Kong Disneyland Viva Club 
Disney and Magical World of Disney - on TVB and TVB's Mandarin-language station, 
Jade.671 Through TVB's regional signal across the border, Disney was able to make 
its programmes reach the audience in Mainland China. 
In 2005, Disney launched another dedicated channel on Now Broadband TV. the 
Hong Kong Disneyland Channel, targeting Hong Kong's high-income families. 672 
Unlike the Disney Channel and Playhouse Disney, the channel aims to educate the 
audiences "on the Disney heritage and its brand values", according Roy Tan Hardy, 
Disney Hong Kong's vice-president of marketing and sales.673 Thus, the channel 
includes infonnation on Disney as a company and its ･ｶｯｬｵｴｩｯｮｾ＠ background stories on 
its founder Walt Disney and infonnation on its animated films. With three Disney 
channels, the Hong Kong Disneyland Channel makes Hong Kong a special market. 
Although Disney's temporary goal is to expand Disney Channel into Mainland China, 
its long-tenn strategy is still to inculcate a greater awareness of the 'Mickey Mouse 
culture' in China. Its Greater China operations show yet again the struggles of the 
global media companies with the Chinese authorities as well as the Chinese culture. 
5.3 Sony 
Since Murdoch moved the headquarters of News Corporation to New York, Sony 
became the only non-USA media company to be ranked in the first tier of companies 
worldwide. The range of Sony's operations is extensive and includes electronics. 
game, music, film, financial services and Internet services. In 2006. the electronics 
segment alone generated 68.8 per cent of Sony's revenue. Sony's entertainment 
671 Hargrave-Silk. A. 2004. "Disney big splash hits China TV, kids", Media Asia p. 3. 
67] Murphy. J. 2005, "Disneyland eyes 11K elite with new channel on Now", .\leJia Asia p. II. 
61.\ Ibid. 
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segments, the divisions of music, film, television, game and telecommunications also 
gained revenues of US$18.303 billion, making Sony the fifth largest media 
. h ld 674 conglomerate In t e wor . 
Sony operates one of the world's largest music companies, Sony BMG, which was 
the result of a merger between Sony Corporation and Bertelsmann AG in 2004.675 
Sony Pictures Entertainment (SPE) is the integrated unit that operates Sony's film and 
television businesses. In film, SPE is one of the firms in the group of Hollywood's 
finest studios - the Columbia TriStar Motion Picture Group - which includes 
Columbia Pictures (founded 1924), Sony Pictures Classics, Screen Gems and TriStar 
Pictures. In addition, Sony Pictures Home Entertainment is responsible for the 
distribution of SPE and acquisition of third-party products on DVD worldwide. Until 
2004, Sony gained box office sales in excess of US$l billion both in the USA and 
overseas markets. Spider-Man 2, for instance, grossed nearly US$800 million in 
worldwide box office revenues.676 
Table 5.5 Sony Corporation's revenues by segment between 2003 and 2006 (US$ millions) 
Segment 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Electronics 43,216 45.217 43,882 44.607 
Game 8.750 7.044 6.320 8.302 
Pictures 7,502 7,068 6,354 6,460 
Financial Services 4.760 5.287 4,855 6,436 
Others (e.g. Internet. music) 5.156 5,440 3,983 3,541 
ｾＩｴ｡ｬ＠ revenues 69,847 70,059 62.008 64.743 
Source: 2005 & 2006 Sony Corporation annual reports. 
SPE's television operations is the first television business created by a major 
Hollywood studio - which can be traced back to the founding of Screen Gems in \94X. 
SPE's Sony Pictures Television (SPT) is a premier producer and distributor for the 
()14 
2005 Sonr "nnualll.>port. p. 2. 
ＨＩＷｾ＠ Spahr. W·. 2003. "SonyIBMG: The fallout". Bil/hoard. \'01. 115. no. -lX. p. 6X. 
6'6 2005 Som' "nnual report. p. 17. 
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network, syndication and cable market. With 50 years of history in television, SPE 
owns more than 3,500 feature films, 35,000 television episodes and 275 television 
series.677 In terms of the overseas market, Sony Pictures Television International 
(SPTI) continues to expand its worldwide distribution capabilities and pursue its 
branded transnational channel strategies. In addition to AXN, Animax, SET and the 
latest SAB and PIX, SPE has investments in the international channels HBO and 
Cinernax as wel1.678 Thus far, SPTI has invested in about 40 international networks in 
more than 100 countries, reaching over 240 million viewers worldwide.67Q 
SPT and SPTI grant license rights worldwide in order to capitalize upon their 
large libraries of television programmes and motion pictures, particularly from SPT's 
library. In 2005, Sony Corporation of America (SCA) completed the acquisition of 
MGM - among the world's best content producer and distributor - through a 
consortium comprising of SCA, Providence Equity Partners, Texas Pacific Group, 
Corncast Corporation and DLJ Merchant Banking Partner.680 Through this deal which 
amounted to almost US$5 billion, SPE also acquired MGM's 4,000 films and 10,000 
television series and its reputation as a global content provider was further 
enhanced. 68 1 Since then, SPE entered into a new agreement to co-produce new 
motion pictures with MGM and to distribute MGM's renowned titles. In addition, the 
members of the consortium will launch a new channel that features content from both 
SPE and MGM.682 
bn Sony Pictures: http://www.sonypictures.comlcorp/corporatefact.html#sptg. consulted on May 28. 
2006. II :25 a.m. GMT 
117K Goll. S. D. 1994, "HBO Asia adds 2 shareholders to TV channel". Wal/ Street Journal - EII\ttTII 
Edition. vol. 224. no. 109. p. A9B. 
bN 
2005 Sony a1111l1al report, p. 19. 
bliO Tarr. G. 2005. "MGM to support Blu-ray with its TV shows. films. Ｈｃｯ｜ｴｾｲ＠ story)". nn(·f: TIm 
ＧｾＧｦＧＨＧｫ＠ in Comllmer Electronics. vol. 20, no. 24. pp. 1-8. 
hNI 2005, "MGM deal could close by mid April", Broadca.'iling & Cab/e. vol. 135. no. 14. pp 4-RR. 
b112 Moss. I.. 2005. "Shell: Sony gives us an edge". Multichannel New.'. \"01. 26. no. 7. p. J. 
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5.3.1 Think globally, script locally 
SPE has developed both domestic and international production capabilities. Its yision 
of global expansion is built on the strategy of localization, evident in its worldwide 
spread of dedicated local offices in France, Gennany, Hong Kong, Miami. Mainland 
China, Spain, and the UK. In addition, SPTI has established local-language 
production capabilities in overseas markets in order to meet the significant growth in 
demand for content in local languages. This has made SPTI a leader in this field. 
enabling it to create local programmes in 13 languages and produce an excess of 
9,000 episodes across 30 countries.683 Sony was the first global company to venture 
into foreign-language production in Gennany in 1998, although the production was in 
film rather than in television. At that time, only Sony and News Corporation 
committed themselves to localization to a considerable extent in Asia. The degree of 
localization was then expanded into the foreign-language television production. In 
India, Sony has become a powerhouse, with its production of 33 hours of 
Hindi-language programming every week. These programmes were delivered not only 
within India, but also to Africa, Britain, North America, and the Middle East. Sony 
Entertainment TV, the Hindi-language channel launched in 1995, also manages to 
fi ｾ＠ h . 684 generate some pro It trom t ese regIons. 
Sony has been involved in the television business of Greater China since the 
mid-1990s when Sony Entertainment bought a 50 per cent share of Star TV's music 
station Channel [V].685 However, Sony adopted a slightly more aggressive stance and 
went on to launch AXN in 1997, an action-oriented satellite station. In the same year, 
Sony acquired a 25 per cent stake in Taiwan's Super TV, a Mandarin-language 
Nil 
WI 2005 Sony annual report, p. 19. 
• Rose, F. 1999." rhink globally. script locally", Fortune. \'01. 140, no. 9. pp. 156-160. 
611$ [l'vin. M. 1995, "Hong Kong comes into focus in '95", Billhoard. \"01. 107, no. 51. p. 62. 
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channel that reached 77 per cent of Taiwan's 5.1 million households.6s6 A year later. 
Sony became the station's sole owner. The company thereafter produced or 
co-produced approximately 35 hours of Mandarin-language programming a week. 
ranging from soap opera City of Love to a copycat of Charlie s Angels starring a trio 
h· . I 687 Th . I d of C mese glT s. e programmes were seemmg y rna e for Super TV. However. 
the true reason for the programmes was that Super TV gave Sony the potential to 
attract loyalty from the 300 million households in Mainland China through a satellite 
feed, rather than merely selling programmes to terrestrial stations. 
In Hong Kong, Sony relied more on film than television production when it 
opened Columbia Pictures Film Production Asia in Hong Kong in 1998. Its first deal 
was a financing and distribution partnership with Mainland Chinese director Zhang 
Yimou, whose movie Raise the Red Lantern became a box office hit in the West. 
Many observers considered this decision to lack any logic. Firstly, this investment 
came at a time when Hong Kong, as well as the whole of Southeast Asia, was still 
floundering from the impact of the Asian economic crisis, and it was not logical to 
expect profits at that time. In addition, the Chinese authorities are notorious for 
disallowing domestic distribution of foreign material. Considering Sony's DVD 
business, its future looks bleak considering the rampant media piracy in the region. 
Furthennore, the competition faced by local players in the region was already intense 
and the market was already flooded with low-budget kung-fu shows. In fact. even 
established local giants such as Golden Harvest and Shaw Brothers cut down their 
production sharply in this region. 
Nonetheless, Sony's investment m Mandarin-language production was not a 
complete waste. Most of their locally-produced pictures thus far have gone to Sony's 
f>8I> 1997, "Sony Pictures grabs ＲＵｾＯｯ＠ stah' in Super TV". Broad('asting & Cahfe. Hll. 127. ntl. n. p. :'2 
1>111 Rose. F. 1999. "Think globally. script locally". Fortune, Vlli. 140. no. 9. pp. 156-160. 
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satellite beams across Asia - Super TV, AXN and HBO. Although Sony's hope of a 
long-tenn operation in the Mandarin-language region has yet not paid off. their eHort 
at least seems to have revitalized the television market. In addition, through this 
investment Sony is able to generate business with promising local actors and directors, 
who have now turned out to become global stars. Some of these films have also 
become Hollywood blockbusters. Taiwan's Ang Lee, for instance, who made Eat 
Drink Man Woman and Sense and Sensibility, has delivered another Oscar-winning 
Mandarin-language feature movie for Columbia TriStar with Crouching Tiger. Hidden 
Dragon. His latest movie Brokeback Mountain added to his already impressive list of 
achievements. Sony's investments in Greater China represent the complexity of 
transnational media operations today - an American studio owned by a Japanese 
conglomerate investing in an artistic director from a little-known country able to 
produce a cultural product embraced by the global market. 
In Mainland China, programme licensing is a way for Sony to export its massive 
library, since an increasing number of stations are looking for content to fill up their 
schedules. For instance, in 2004, CCTV secured an exclusive programme licensing 
deal with SPTI's comedy series Mad About You. The show was then aired on CCTV 8 
daily as part of the channel's programming block.688 In addition, co-production and 
localization are Sony's keys of entry into Mainland China. In 1999, Sony tried to 
reduce its dependence on American imports and started to customize the company's 
products to local taste. It produced a new series - Chinese Restaurant - which was 
about a young Chinese woman working in a struggling restaurant in Los Angeles. 
However, Beijing Garden - the restaurant's name - is actually a television set in 
Beijing rather than in Los Angeles, and the actors speak Mandarin rather than English. 
The series was premiered on 100 television stations across Mainland China instead of 
I>8l 2004, ',(,CTV lands deal to air popular US comedy on Jiayi", Media .·hia p. 12. 
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Through the expenence acquired from Hong Kong Columbia Pictures Film 
Production Asia, Sony seems to have found the formula for film production in 
Mainland China. Kung Fu Hustle and Hero both gained immense popularity and were 
produced with local partners for US$15 million and US$30 million respectively.690 
The production model was strengthened in December 2004 when Sony formed the 
first Sino-foreign television digital production joint venture in Mainland China. 
Taking advantage of the partial deregulation exercised by the Chinese government, 
the joint venture, named Huaso Film/Television Digital Production, was established 
by SPE and the Hua Long Film Digital Production (which was owned by the China 
Film Group). The new joint venture was designed to produce sitcoms, dramas and 
television movies. 691 Through this company, Sony also produced localized 
programming, including children's shows, movies and scripted series based on 
popular terrestrial formats and live shows.692 
5.3.2 AXN 
Sony launched the English-dominated and action-skewed AXN satellite channel 
across Asia in November 1997. Targeting young adults aged between 18 and 34, 
AXN features series, blockbusters, adventure and lifestyle sports programmes. A year 
after its launch, Sony gained about 5 million subscribers.693 During this period, AXN 
was hit by the Asian economic crisis which slowed down the growth of the channel. 
but Sony's brand was at least secure because ofAXN's entry into various countries. 
India was AXN' s first success when AXN signed a carriagt! agreement with India's 
fII9 Rose. F. 1999, "Think globally. script locally", Fortune, vol. 140, no. 9, pp. 156-160. 
b'lO 
2006, "Fantastic voyage", Business Clrina, vol. 32, no. 4. pp. 4-6. 
(191 Hargrave-Silk, A. 2005, "Join the queue", ,\1cdia Asia p. 12. 
(oil' 
. 2005, "Sony's mainland JV targets kid's shows for China", ,\lcdia Asia p. 3. 
1191 Donohue. S. 1998, "Sony tilling Asian action niche", Electronic ,\Iee/ia, yo\. 17. no. 50. p. 52 
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largest cable operator Hindujas in 1998, adding to Sony a potential 1.5 million 
subscribers.694 Including the latest two offshoot niche channels in Central Europe, 
AXN Crime and AXN Sci-Fi, AXN was viewed in 50 countries and is now part of 
SPTI's diverse portfolio comprising of over 40 global networks.695 
With the launch of AXN, Sony integrated the content and distribution sectors, 
which enabled Sony to place its own shows on its own networks. Accordingly, Sony 
turned itself from a content supplier to a capable carrier. However, as Sony was a 
content provider before the launch of AXN, Sony also risked sacrificing immediate 
fi . I 696 d revenues rom programmmg sa es. In or er to make up for the losses of 
programming sales, Sony aggressively rolled out its AXN channel in Asia starting 
from the late 1990s. Strategically, AXN operates in the action niche market where 
there is no direct competitor and Sony hopes that AXN can grab a substantial share of 
the youth market, an elusive but lucrative public. 
AXN is also committed to localization strategies. The aim is to increase the local 
content in order to become more relevant to local audience, and to make inroads into 
the territories occupied by terrestrial stations. In Asia, AXN relies on local production 
units in Hong Kong and India to fill the channel's schedule.697 For instance, in 2002, 
AXN produced Who Dares Win in India, which was its biggest investment in a show 
produced for a specific territory.698 After a period of steady growth in production of 
programmes locally, AXN not only featured winning TV series from the USA such as 
CSl, Alias, Boomtown, Amazing Race and Fear Factor, but it also produced action 
programming lineup by Sony itself. Apart from its own productions, AXN also 
obtained local content through acquisition, especially in Asia. In 2002, only 25 per 
IIQ4 Donohue. S. 1998. "Sony tilling Asian action niche", Electronic ,\/ctlia, \'01. 17, no. 50, p. 52. 
ｉｉｑｾ＠ AXN: http:i.www,axn-asia.colll into/aboutaxn index.php, consulted on May 28. 2006. 08:55 a.m. 
GMT 
(Jill! Donohue. S. 1998. "Sl)ny filling Asian action niche", Elcctronic M('dw, \'01. 17, Ill'. 50. p. )2 
1m Ibid. 
(,'/K franns, I . 2002. "AXN increases relevance to go up against terrestrials", ,\Iedia ,·h;a p. 19. 
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cent ofAXN Asia's content makeup originates from Sony, with most of the remainder 
bought for the Asian market.699 
The diversity in its staff had also contributed to the success in the localization 
operations ofAXN . In 2004, Sony took on 29 new staff members in Asia for the AXN 
and Animax channels. These recruits included nationals from Indian, Hong Kong. 
Singapore, Taiwan and people from many other countries, who ""not only bring a 
global flavour to the two channels, but also the all-important local market knowledge 
to the team," according to Todd Miller, managing director ofSPE network Asia.7°O 
Sony's strategy of specialization and localization is also apparent with Animax, an 
animation channel. In 2003, Asia's first 24-hour Japanese animation channel was 
launched, broadcasting three dedicated feeds for Japan, Hong Kong, and Taiwan and 
Southeast Asia. 701 The feeds are dubbed in local language: Mandarin for Taiwan, 
Cantonese for Hong Kong and English for Southeast Asia (covering Singapore, 
Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia).702 Animax targets 94 million 
viewers whose ages range from 7 to 35 but the core target group is between 15 and 
24.703 Animax is also one of the top pay-TV channels in a universe of 184 channels in 
Japan, with a viewership of four million households. 704 Given its popularity, Sony 
replicated the formula in the new markets. Focusing on distinctive genres, Animax 
serves up a diet of animated films and series to an audience of young adults. 
Although Animax has not yet been made available in Mainland China, Sony's 
operations in AXN have been prominent in Asia in terms of distribution and 
localization. In this region, AXN can claim almost 40 million viewers across the 
bW Osborne. M. 2001, "AXN takes on the world", Ad Age Global. \'01. 1. no. II. p. 9. 
700 White, A. 2004, "AXN. Animax channels beef up with 29 new hires", ,\leditt Asia p. 29. 
701 2003, "Sony Pictures to expand Animax to HK, Taiwan and SEA", .\ledia .. hia p. 8. 
702 Bowman. 1. 2004, "Animax brings 24-hour ｡ｮｩｭｾ＠ across Asia region", Campaign (( 'K) no, 2. p. 17. 
70, 2003. "Sony Pictures to expand Animax to 11K. Taiwan and SLY', ,\/e,lia Asia p. 8. 
704 Bowman, 1. 2004. "Animax brings 24-hour anime al.'ross ASia n:gion", CClmpaign (L'K) no. 2. p. 17. 
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region's 21 temtones. n reater C ma, AXN was Sony's only pan-regional 
channel apart from HBO and Cinemax, two joint ventures. Taiwan (as well as India) 
is also one ofAXN's largest markets because of cable television distribution. although 
it has yet to gain profit even after five successive years of growth. 706 In 2003, AXN 
was the most watched international channel among pay-TV audiences aged from four 
and above in Taiwan, according to the Nielsen Media Research. 707 In Mainland China 
, 
AXN is available in upscale hotels and foreign compounds. It also can be seen in 40 
million cable television households on a partial-distribution basis.708 
S.4 NBC Universal and CNBC 
NBC Universal was formed in May 2004 when NBC and Vivendi Universal 
Entertainment merged. Through the merger, 80 per cent of NBC Universal was owned 
by NBC's parent company General Electric and the remaining 20 per cent remained 
with by Vivendi.709 Vivendi, originally a French waste and water-treatment company 
acquired Seagram and the result of the acquisition - Vivendi Universal - was created 
in December 2000. Seagram was a company which owned television, film and music 
assets (including a Hollywood major, Universal Studios, a French satellite platform, 
Canal Plus, and a series of European cable channels). In 2002, Vivendi Universal 
expanded further when it merged with USA Network. However, these acquisitions let 
Jean-Marie Messier, the conglomerate's CEO, to built up an unmanageable amount of 
debt, which led Vivendi Universal into financial difficulties. These troubles forced 
Messier to dismantle Vivendi and sell its USA media interests to NBC. 
70S Murphy. J. 2006, "Brands bite. now real race kicks off for viewers". Media Asia p. 17. 
7tl() Shuk Wa, T. 2003. "Can AXN hit profit before reality shows lose appeal in Asia'''', .\/l·Jia .·"io p. 
15. 
"0' 
:'01 Hamdi, R. 2004. "AXN sharpens action offer with 'B!G ''', ,\/t'dia Asia p. 4. 
2002. "AXN Asia reach increases to 70m households", Media ,·hill p. 8. 
'YW NBC Uni\'ersal: http://nbcuni.comlAbout NBC Unin.'rsallCompany Owr.iew. consulted on May 
17. ｾＨＩＰＶＮ＠ 10: 15 a.m. GMT -
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In 2003, NBC and Vivendi Universal agreed to merge and in 2004 they fonned 
NBC Universal. With revenue of US$14.7 billion per annum, NBC Universal was 
ranked the sixth largest media company in the world in 2005 (see Table 1.5). It 
operates Universal Studios Hollywood as well as theme parks and resorts. In the 
television industry, NBC Universal operates 10 NBC stations in its domestic market. 
The number increased when NBC acquired Telemundo (with 15 stations), Bravo, and 
KNTV in San Jose/San Francisco in 2002.710 These stations deliver programming to 
more than 30 per cent of households in the country and generate about US$2 billion in 
revenue from advertising sales annually. 7 1 1 
After the merger of NBC and Universal, Universal Network Television and NBC 
Studios formed NBC Universal Television Studio to produce series and dramas. In 
addition, the new NBC Universal Television Distribution division is responsible for 
the global distribution of NBC products throughout the world. This includes more 
than 4,000 feature films and more than 40,000 episodes of television ｰｲｯｧｲ｡ｭｭｩｮｧＮＷｉｾ＠
As far as television activities are concerned, NBC Universal focuses on the American 
market. Apart from the American market, NBC Universal Global Networks operates 
12 television channels in Europe and Latin America, reaching over 70 million 
households across 40 countries.713 
In Asia, the company manifests its presence through the CNBC Asia channel. 
CNBC was launched by NBC in the USA in 1989 and the business news channel 
710 
NBC Universal: 
hllp: !\\'ww.nbcuni.coml About NBC UniversaUCompany _ Overview'overview09 .shtm!. consulled on 
May 17,2006.10:25 a.m. GMT -
711 • 
NBC Umversal: 
hltp:llwww.nbcuni.comlAbout NBC Universal/Company _ Overview/overview02.shtm!. consulled on 
May 17,2006. 10:55 a.m. GMT -
'1' 
. NBC Universal: 
hltp:, 'www.nbcuni.comlAbout NBC Universal Company Overview lwerview05.shtml. cnnsullcd nn 
May 17,2006.10:40 8.m. GMT -
m NBC Universal: http://www.nbcuni.comGlobaINetworks.consultedonMayI7.2006.11 :40 a m 
GMT 
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CNBC Asia went live in July 1995. The headquarters of CNBC was first in Hon u 
e 
Kong, and it broadcasts 12 hours of live news from Asia. In addition. other news from 
CNBC Europe and CNBC in the USA were also broadcast. However. when CN BC 
first appeared in Asia, there was already another business news channel in the form of 
Asia Business News (ABN). ABN was a dedicated business and financial ne\\'s 
channel created by Dow Jones and TCI in November 1993. The addition of a new 
channel inevitably triggered off a fierce competition in the region. A similar scene 
took place in Europe, when Dow Jones's European Business News (EBN) 
encountered CNBC Europe. As a result, all four channels suffered considerable losses. 
In order to soften the competition, CNBC's and Dow Jones' money-losing 
channels in Europe and Asia were brought together in 1997.714 Through the merger, 
('NBC Asia gained the opportunity to reach a potential 30 mil1ion households in the 
region.715 After eight years, however, Dow Jones could still not generate a profit and 
the company had to give up the channels. To illustrate the scale of losses sustained, 
Dow Jones lost approximately US$17 million in the joint venture up to 2004. 716 In 
2005, Down Jones finally relinquished its 50 per cent stake in CNBC Asia and CNBC 
Europe, as well as a 25 per cent stake in the digital service CNBC World.?I? CNBC 
then returned to it original status as a NBC subsidiary. 
CNBC is NBC Universal's sole pan-regional channel in Greater China. After the 
merger between CNBC Asia and ABN, CNBC was relocated to Singapore and shifted 
to a localization strategy.718 First. CNBC divided itself into seven feeds, including 
Kikkei ('NBC, CNBC India, CNBC Asia, CNBC Pakistan, and CNBC in Australia, 
Singapore and Hong Kong. In addition, it produces eight hours of live co\'cragc from 
Ｇｉｾ＠ • 
, 1 afayene. J. 1998. "Synergy at CNBC Dow Jones". Electronic ,\/edia. \'pl 17. np IS. p. 4. 
1\ KI)ranreng. J. 1997. "NBC biz networks to link with Dow JI)l1l·S" .. ,'c/nTf/Wlg Age. vol hX. no. 50. 
p.60. 
1(. 2 005. "Financial 10ssl'S force Dow Jones to cut CNBC". Media ,·"hl p .. ｾ＠
'I' 
"I Went', 1.. 2005, "FYI". Ac/\'('rlising Age. vol. 76. no. 30. p. 1 h. 
Balch. R. 1998. "Regional rl'vil'w: Asia", Asian Husint'ss Rel'i('u' p. X. 
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its Asian headquarters.
719 
In Asia, CNBC fonned strong alliances with local finns. In 
Japan, it fonned a partnership with the Japanese Nihon Keizai Shimbun, thus creating 
Nikkei CNBC.720 In India, CNBC set up a joint venture with a local channel TV 18 
and CNBC India channel was launched. 721 Although it does not have a dedicated feed 
in South Korea, CNBC still has a partnership with one of the local top business 
722 
channels, Etomato. 
In Greater China, CNBC provides Greater China with live on-location reports 
from key business centers including Shanghai and Hong Kong. Before CNBC Asia 
was launched, the NBC-owned business channel Asia NBC (ANBC) had already 
reached Hong Kong.723 Through a deal with Hong Kong Wharf Cable, AN BC added 
140,000 subscribers to its customer base.724 After CNBC Asia was launched, Hong 
Kong was CNBC Asia's headquarters until the merger of CNBC and Dow Jones. 
CNBC Asia provides a dedicated feed CNBC Hong Kong and the programmes in both 
channels were largely similar. CNBC Hong Kong however, has a dedicated sales team, 
offers some opt-out programming and also provides a local ticker. 725 
At first, CNBC Asia tried to secure a local partnership in Taiwan. In 1999, CNBC 
Asia launched ET-CNBC with Taiwan's largest cable TV operator ET TV. However, 
the joint venture folded in 2000. In contrast with ET-CNBC, CNBC seems to have 
enjoyed a greater success in Mainland China. In tenns of its distribution, CNBC Asia 
is NBC's only channel to be granted landing rights in hotels and compounds. However, 
the most significant achievement of NBC Universal in Mainland China took place in 
71Q ('NBC Asia: http://www.cnbcasia.comJabout_ ｣ｮ｢｣｡ｳｩ｡ｬ｡｢ｯｵｴｾＩｮｴｲｯ､ｵ｣ｴｩｯｮＮ｡ｳｰｸＬ＠ consulted on r-.tay 
18, 2006. II: 15 a.m. GMT 
ＧｾＱ＠ 1999, "Nikkei Satellite ｎｾｷｳＮ＠ CNBC Japan to merge", Wall Sired Journal· I:·(/.\/t.,.n Ldilwn. \o\. 
fl33, no. 104, p. B2. . 
ｾＺ＠ Dasgupta, s. 2000, "Bloomberg TV has sights set on India", Eleclronic .\ledia. \ll\. 19, no. 2X. p. S 
,:. 2006, "Planet media", Aledia AJia p. 11. 
,: I McClellan, S. 1994, "NBC plans Asian channel". Broadwsling & Cahie, \lll 124. Ittl. 29, p. 2.' 7;: 1994, "Chinese shopping network launched", AdweC'k Wcstern Edilion, "lli. 4·t, ｉｬｬｬｾ＠ ｾＲＮ＠ P 12 
Madden, N. 2001. "Breaking the Asian market", Ad Age Global, \'o\. I. no. II. p. - 7. 
243 
Chapter 5 Case studies (2): Global media companies in Greater China 
2003, when CNBC signed a strategic alliance with the China Business Network 
G 726 (CBN), owned by SM 
Through the joint venture, CBN produces two live shows for CNBC \. : Sla, 
including the Chinese Business and Financial Newsletter and the afternoon news 
update. These programmes are distributed worldwide in English through CNBC's 
gJobal television networks. In return, CNBC distributes global business news and 
programmes in the country through the CBN channel. Asian Manager, for instance, 
was a programme produced by CNBC Asia and repackaged by SMG, and was then 
broadcast on CBN in the same month when the deal was announced. In addition, 
CNBC Asia's programming localization in Mainland China went a step further in 
2004, when it produced a new series called New China.727 
The alliance was seen as a huge leap forward in the ways foreign media 
companies could co-operate with domestic companies. To everyone's surprise, it 
gained SARFT's full support and permission. The first strategic alliance in Mainland 
China between a domestic player and a western giant was, in theory, the alliance 
fonned between News Corporation and Hunan TV in 2002. However, that partnership 
was mainly nominal in nature, as very little co-operative work resulted. In the light of 
this, the CNBC-CBN coalition can be deemed as a breakthrough in terms of content 
co-operation, and it also happened a year before the well-known alliance between 
SMG and Viacom's Nickelodeon in 2004. 
CNBC's significance is attributed to its localization and local partnerships. In 
contrast to Bloomberg TV's operations which moved towards a pan-regional approach, 
CNBC's strategy was to localize in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Mainland China. In 
Mainland China, in particular, its strategic alliance with CBN provides it with a huge 
"6 
,:, 2005, "Sponsors profiles", Media Asia p. 35 . 
.. 2003, "('NBC tums focus on mainland with New China ShllW", .\fedia .,bia p. 5. 
Chapter 5 Case studies (2): Global media companies in Greater China 
potential for future expansion. In Asia, CNBC reaches 145 million households in over 
34 countries across Asia as of 2005.728 According to the Pan-Asia Cross Media 
Survey, CNBC's viewership in 2003 to 2004 was 5.9 per cent and 5.4 per cent 
respectively. The number outperfonned Channel News Asia's (a Singapore-based rival) 
3.3 per cent and Bloomberg TV's 1.5 per cent in 2004. Based on a niche business 
market, CNBC retained 7.7 per cent viewership among top managers. 729 As of 2005. 
the number went up to 9.8 per cent.730 Although it is still lagging behind international 
news channels such as CNN and BBC World, CNBC is ranked the top among the 
business and financial news channels. 
ＷｾＮ＠
. 2005. "Sponsors profiles" . . \leclia Asia p. 35. 
Ｌｾ＠ Bowman. J. 2004. "Discovery leads Asia' s PAX pack" . . \lec/ia Asia p. 22. .' 
10 B : d fPA'" d' 'c' ",Ic:" \/t'dw ,·",u p. 19. owman. J. 2006. "News dnves gro\\1h at top en 0 ..... au lem: Sl. • . 
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The case studies of two second-tier media companies in Greater China - TVB and 
Phoenix TV - are presented in this chapter. These two companies were chosen not 
merely because of their very large turnover but also for their rapid expansion in the 
markets of both Greater China and global Chinese communities. They are classified as 
second-tier media firms in the global television landscape because of their successful 
expansion strategies, and the cultural proximity helped to ensure a strong niche. The 
objective of this chapter is twofold. Firstly, the regional operations of the two 
companies are examined, and the focus is upon their strategies in exploiting the 
market in Greater China with their local advantage. Secondly, the evolution of 
regional (Greater China) to international (overseas Chinese communities) operation 
will be studied. 
6.1 TVB 
Established in 1967, Television Broadcasts (TVB) was the first terrestrial commercial 
television station in Hong Kong. When News Corporation acquired Star TV in 1993, 
Murdoch's attempted to buy a 22 per cent stake in TVB but was prohibited from 
doing so by the Hong Kong authorities.73I Apart from Murdoch, both Time Warner 
and ESPN were also in negotiations with TVB and were enthusiastic about linking up 
and co-operating with the best television company in Hong Kong. 732 In 1994, TYB 
Won government approval to establish a regional satellite television service. 73' In the 
same year, another Mandarin network - the Chinese Television Network (eTN) - also 
made its debut in Taiwan with separate 24-hour news and entertainment channels. 
'11 Amdur, M. 1993, "Ballie Iincs drawn in Asian satcllite TV". Broadcasting & Cahlt,. wi 12.', no 
26. p. 21. 
'1' ｾＬ［＠ 1994, "Sponing chancc", Far Eastern Economic Rent'\\', \01. 157, no .. 12, p. 14, 
1994, ''TVB wins satellite nod", Far Eels/ern Economic Rel'ieU', \01. 1')7, no. 4.'. p. 8Q 
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Thereafter, CTN expanded across the region. With the launch of the two new 
Mandarin-language networks which targeted the region, Star TV no longer had Asia's 
.' t 't If 734 satellite aIrwaves 0 I se . 
As a result, TVB - then already a front-runner in the increasingly competitin: 
Chinese television scene - became Star's major rival in the region. At that time. TVB 
was already producing 5,000 hours of programmes a year, only second to Brazil's 
Globo TY. Even today, TVB is ranked among the top five largest TV producers 
globally.735 With a staff of only 200 at its inception, TVB today has become the most 
important cross-border Chinese television firm. Its statT, both in Hong Kong and 
overseas, has now reached an impressive figure of ＴＵＰＰＮＷＮｾＶ＠ TVB's ethos is to deliver 
excellent programmes and cutting-edge broadcasting technology to the audience of 
Hong Kong and Chinese communities around the world. 
TVB focuses on a variety of television businesses which ranges television 
broadcasting, programme production, domestic and cross-border channel operations, 
and related activities such as programme licensing and video distribution. In Hong 
Kong, TVB's dominance is attributed to its free-to-air television channels that gain the 
overwhelming majority of rating shares against its major competitor ATY. TYB's 
international marketing effort and the popularity of its programmes accounted for the 
success in its overseas operations. Its major revenue comes from the operations of two 
terrestrial television channels: the Mandarin-language Jade Channel and the 
English-language Pearl Channel, on which TVB transmits 16,000 hours of 
programmes per annum. 737 
Ｚｾ＠ Levin, M. 1994, "Two Chinese networks to challenge Star TV", Bil/hoard. \lli. 106. no. 4h. p 42. 
" Meas..lt to invest RMI14m in new \'enture with lVB. Nl'W Straits TIIlH.'S (MalaYSia). 16·11-19<)<) 
16 n'B: http://www.t\.h.com/afTairsfaq/!\.bgroup/t\.he.html.(onsultedl1nJuly13.2006 .1 O' \0 a III 
(iMT 
'\' 
lVB: http://www.t\.h.comJafTairsfaq/t\.bl!roup1tvb.html.(onsultedllflJuly) •. .?OOhOS)O.11ll GMT ｾ＠
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T,blt 6.1 TVB's revenues by segments between 2001 and 2005 (LSS millions) 
Segment 2001 2002 2003 
_' 1111-/ :!Oo5 
258.29 2:-:7.'\" 
ＸＷＮｾＲ＠ '1:-: 04 
ＲＭＺＺＮＵｾ＠ Ｎｾ＠ IS I 
11872 12:-: ｾＩＨ＠
14.96 16.44 
Terrestrial television Broadcasting 261.09 229.50 222.12 
programme Licensing and distribution 74.01 78.68 s4.07 
Overseas Satellite Pay-TV Operations 21.57 25.06 29.76 
Channel Operations 64.96 77.15 91.35 
Other Activities 22.79 22.07 15.15 
Elimination 24.26 25.53 16.23 15. -;on 17 S I 
Total revenues 420.16 406.93 426.15 
-t91.24 :\.' 7.:\., 
Source: Company announcement of annual results from 2001 to 2005. 
TVB is the largest producer of Mandarin-language programmes in the world and 
owns the biggest library of Chinese programmes around the globe. It produces a wide 
array of programmes ranging from television series and sitcoms to documentaries, 
news, music specials, talk shows and travelogues. The signature drama At the 
Threshold of an Era, for instance, attracted an average of 1.8 million viewers during 
the first 50 episodes. A kindred Spirit, the longest soap opera in Hong Kong's 
television history, drew 2.5 million viewers on average and was broadcast for more 
than four years over 1,128 episodes. 738 TVB's production advantage is strengthened 
by its US$2.83 billion investment in the construction of a new state-of-the-art TVB 
City.739 With the completion ofTVB City in 2003, TVB thereafter owns two outdoor 
shooting locations and 22 production studios, and its' Studio l' is Asia's largest studio 
among commercial television stations. 
TVB's international units are managed by its worldwide operating ann of 
Television Broadcasts International (TVBI). Established in 1976, TVBrs major 
activities thus far include Video, VCO and OVOs licensing, telecast licensing, cable 
and satellite television operation, IPTV, Internet VOO and 3G Mobile, among other 
services. Based on TVB's strength of content and production capability, T\,BI 
distributes TVB's annual output of 6,000 hours of programmes and TYB's 
.... 
7)9 1999 /elf!\·;.\"iOlr Broacicasts annual report. p. 13. 
I.ee. F. 2002. "Heavyweight hub". Asia ｉｭ｡ｾＨＧ＠ p. 18. 
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l'b 740 Th 80,OOO-hour programme 1 rary. ese programmes are distributed to more than )0 
countries, reaching over 30 million viewers every day.741 
In order to support and complement TVB's traditional television hroadcasting 
business, TVB also runs an Internet-based venture, TVB.COM. The Internet unit is a 
joint venture between TVB and MWASAT Broadcast Network Systems (MBNS) with 
MBNS injecting US$30 million and taking a 30 per cent stake in 1999. ＭＴｾ＠ In 
publishing, TVB owns TVB Weekly magazine in Hong Kong and n"BS JJ ('eklr in 
Taiwan, both of which are among the leading titles. 
6.1.111ong Kong's dominant TV player 
Though there seemed to be stability in the television scene in Hong Kong, careful 
examination would reveal the imbalance in the distribution of market share and 
strength of the players involved. As a result of free-market competition, TVB has long 
maintained its lead over the only other free-to-air player - ATY. In 2003, TVB 
attracted 60 per cent of the audience and 69 per cent of television ad spend, whereas 
ATV drew 23 per cent of viewers and 20 per cent of ad spend. The rest of the market 
share went to cable and satellite channels with 17 per cent of the audiences and 11 per 
cent of ad spend respectively.743 TVB Jade alone, for instance, gained 74 per cent of 
the Cantonese viewers. Since 2005, Jade has increased its share of viewership to an 
<I\'crage of 83 per cent while TVB Pearl attracted 75 per cent of the English-speaking 
audicnce. All the top 10 rated shows in the year originated from TVB channels. ｾＴＴ＠
TVB's long-standing presence in Hong Kong's evolving pop culture gave it a 
hcad-start in the ensuing competition, particularly in the area of Canto-pop. In the 
'4<, 
:41 ｾ･｣Ｎ＠ F. 2002, "Heav)'\wight hub", Asia Image p. 1 R. 
lVB: hnp:l/www.tvb.comiafTairs ｴｾｬｱ＠ t\"bgroupit\"b l'.htm!' ｣ｯｮｳｵｬｴｾ､＠ on July 13,2006. III 10 a m 
<iMT -
'4' 
.• ｾ＠ Mensat hl inYl'st RMl14m in new venture with IYB. New Straits Til1ll's ＨｾＱ｡ｬ｡ｹｳｬ｡ＩＮ＠ 16-11-IQQQ 
'44 ｕ｡ｲ｜ＢｾｹＮ＠ C. 2004, "Terrestrials think hie. to win big", .\(c"ia ..Is/(/ p. 27. ., 
Shaw, s. D. 2005. "Dominant HK bro;dcaster SllllWS restraint WIth 2006 raIlos", ,\It'dio . hill p. _I 
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mid-1970s TVB used Cantonese theme songs in its popular drama serials. A great 
number of potential pop stars were thus discovered in many low-budget singing 
contests. These 'best talents' were then contracted and used in primetime shows. and 
this method of tapping talent proved to be very lucrative for the company. This model 
is applied to the audience of Mainland China today but the most popular singers in 
Mainland China are the Hong Kong and Taiwan pop singers who record in Mandarin 
for the Mainland China market. 
Table 6.2 Top 10 Mandarin-language programmes in Hong Kong 
Ranking Programme 
I La Cite Green Ville Theatre: To Grow With Love 
2 At Home With Love 
3 15/16 TV Fans Chanpionship 
4 Welcome To The House 
5 Macau StarWorld Hotel Special: Deal Or No Deal 
6 Travelicious 
7 More Than Words 
8 Scoop 
9 Hong Kong Connection 
10 Country Garden Presents: Living Up 
Note: Dale: October 23 - October 29,2006. 
Source: TVB company literature. 
Channel Rmiflgs 
TVB Jade Xl> 
TVB Jade X7 
TVB Jade 89 
TVB Jade 7X 
TVB Jade 73 
TVB Jade 77 
TVB Jade X., 
TVB Jade 76 
TVB Jade XII 
TVB Jade 79 
TVB also owes its dominance to the popularity of its dramas, which appeal to a 
large and loyal audience. ATV, in contrast, does not produce any drama series. At the 
same time, despite its line-up of sports, news, documentaries, game shows, and 
imported dramas, ATV's Cantonese channel ATV Home rarely approached the success 
ofTVB Jade. The only exceptions in history were ATV's local version of Who JlclIlts 
(0 Be II Millionaire and the drama Mv Fair Princess. which drew a large audience. 
The statistics in the English channels also tell a similar tale. TVB Pearl leads the 
market by broadcasting Hollywood movies and series. and it also imports 
programmes from BBe and Hollywood studios. ATV World (ArV's Fnglish-Ianguagl' 
channel), on the other hand. provides audience with sports. talk sho\\ s, do\:ul11cntancs 
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and imported entertainment programmes, but these failed to attract as much audience 
as TVB Pearl's impressive line-up. 
TVB's prominence in Hong Kong allows the regional giant to challenge the 
powers of the government as well as that of the advertisers. In 2002, TVB attacked the 
'colonial' policies of the Hong Kong government, which involved compulsory 
English-language programmes during certain hours. 745 According to the policies, 
TVB and ATV's English channels are required to show English-language programmes 
during prime time and during off-peak hours, only 20 per cent of the content can be 
broadcast in other languages. Furthermore, during peak hours, only two non-English 
commercials are allowed every hour.746 According to the explanation given by the 
government, Hong Kong is no different from any other city in Mainland China should 
there be a reduction in the English language content. TVB and AT V, however, 
challenged this very policy, their counter-argument being that 98 per cent of the 
population in Hong Kong conversed in Cantonese. TVB criticized the regulation as 
being a hangover from the pre-1997 colonial days. It also claimed that deregulation 
would lessen their dependence on USA imports and films, enabling them to screen 
Japanese, Korean and other European language programmes. However, the real 
reason behind the attack is the fact that TVB's English-speaking audience constitutes 
a niche market that is not profitable. Although it has not been able to exert enough 
pressure to result in policy change, TVB's vocal assault on the policies astonished the 
authorities. 
W Lee. M. 2002. "TVB attacks 11K government for 'cl)lonial" TV rule", .\fcdi(/ Asia p. I. 
Ｇｾｴｬ＠ 2002. "War of words for Hong Kong TV", .\Ic";(/ Asia p. 25. 
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Table 6.3 Top programmes during the controversy on regulation of English-language 
programming 
Ranking English Programme on English channel Non-English programme on English Channel 
I Annageddon (Movie on TVBP) Little Cheung (Movie on TVBP) 
2 101 Salmatians (Movie on TVBP) Not One Less (Movie on ATVW) 
3 Independence Day (Movie on TVBP) Road Home (Movie on ATVW) 
4 Dante's Peak (Movie on TVBP) Johnny's Hour (Musid Arts on TVBP) 
5 Mars Attacks! (Movie on TVBP) Be My Valentine (Movie on TVBP) 
6 Deep Impact (Movie on TVBP) Imagine (Drama on TVBP) 
7 Species (Movie on TVBP) Les Miserables (Movie on ATVW) 
8 Virtuosity (Movie on TVBP) Taiwan News Express (News on TVBP) 
9 Con Air (Movie on TVBP) Life Is Beautiful (Movie on TVBP) 
10 Jason & The Argonauts (Drama on TVBP) Prepare For Awards (Documentary on TVBP) 
Note: TVBP - TVB Pearl; ATVW - ATV World. Date: January 1- January 30, 2002. 
Source: 2002, "War of words for Hong Kong TV", Media Asia p. 25. 
In addition to its bold opposition to the government, TVB likes to test advertisers. 
TY8's influence has always been notable in the market, particularly when its stock 
price increased 70 per cent within few months in 2003. 747 TVB also benefited from 
the recovery of Asian economy and the promising future of the market in Greater 
China. In 2004, TVB stunned the market by raising its advertising price by up to 10 
per cent. 748 While some advertisers looked for other media alternatives, many had no 
choice but to accept the new price because TVB possesses a quasi-monopoly on the 
market. A year later, the price went up even further, with a 12 to 15 per cent increase. 
Although advertisers attempted to boycott TVB, their efforts failed miserably because 
a number of advertisers were engaged in private negotiations with TVB.749 It was not 
until 2006 that TVB slowed down the rate hike with a seven per cent increase. In 
contrast, ATV opted for a modest increase, together with a better plan that gives 
advertisers guaranteed rating slots. TVB still manages to retain its dominance in the 
advertising market as ATV lags too far behind in tenns of ratings. 
14' Fenez. M. 2003. "All signs pointing to a much-anticipated recovery". ,\/('dia Asia p. 20. 
748 Liu. C. Hille. A.. Hargrave-Silk, A.. Eavt's. G., Yap. 1.. & Mulchand, S. 2003. "Media rates sll,wly 
on rise rates hikes ahead". Media Asia pp. 32-34. 
'4'1 Hargrave-Silk. A. 2004. "Brands form bloc to protest TVB hike", ,\{edia A.'iia p. I. 
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Table 6.4 Hong Kong TV: Rate card increment history 
Year rVB Jade rVB Pearl An' Home 
2002 0% 0% 0°0 
2003 0% 0% 0% 
2004 8% 8% I.SOo 
2005 12% 15% 
2006 7% 7% 
.5 
Source: Hargrave-Silk, A 2005, "ATV steps up offer in HK TV ratecard battle", Media Asia p. 4.: Liu, 
e., Hille, A, Hargrave-Silk, A., Eaves, G., Yap, J., & Mulchand, S. 2003, "Media rates slowly on rise 
rates hikes ahead", Media Asia pp. 32-34.; Shaw, S. D. 2005, "'Dominant HK broadcaster shows 
restraint with 2006 rates", Media Asia p. 21. 
Although terrestrial television still retains its status as the dominant segment in 
Hong Kong, its revenue has gradually been chipped away by the pay-TV players. In 
2004, cable and satellite players increased their share of television ad spend from 11 
per cent in 2003 to 16 per cent, while at the same time, the share of TVB and ATV 
decreased slightly by four per cent and one per cent respectively.75o In response to the 
increasing competition, TVB also ventured into the pay-TV market, which 
unfortunately turned out to be TVB's biggest setback in the television industry. In the 
initial stages of the pay-TV era in Hong Kong, Wharf Cable's i-Cable 
Communications operated unchallenged for seven years in the 1990s. In a market with 
approximately 2.1 million households, i-Cable already had 630,000 subscribers when 
competition materialized in 2000. 75 I In addition to its market share dominance, 
i-Cable also controlled the majority of the internal building distribution systems in 
Hong Kong. 752 
The situation was thus unfavourable to new competitors. To make the situation 
worse, the government's change in policy added to their woes. The Hong Kong 
government ended i-Cable's monopoly in 2000 by issuing six pay-TV licensl:s one 
ＷｾＨｬ＠ Harvey. C. 2004. "'Terrestrials think big to win big", Media Asia p. 27. 
HI Fenez, M. 2003. "HK cable TV boom should hopefully hit the pirates". ,\fedia Asia p. 21 . 
. ｾ＠ . 
'. 2004, "Vil..'wers pay price for 11K's indecision", Media Asia p. 27. 
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of which went to TVB's Galaxy Satellite Broadcasting (GSB). After securing a license 
successfully, the broadcaster was infonned that TVB must reduce its ownership in the 
company. According to the new pay-TV policies laid down by the government TVB 
could not own more than 50 per cent of the company. Even after the resolution of the 
ownership dispute, Galaxy still needed to wait 12 months before it could begin 
broadcasting. In order to comply with the government's requirements. TVB allied 
itself with Intelsat, refonning Galaxy into a joint venture by disposing of a 51 per cent 
stake in Galaxy for US$45.05 million.753 In February 2004. the joint venture finally 
launched its pay-TV services - ex-TV - through satellite and set-top boxes.754 The 
new subscription satellite services offered more than 30 channels, including TVB's 
subscription channels, new drama channels, and two Mandarin-language channels. 
The troubles did not end with the channel launch, as Galaxy was forced to reduce 
its service charge by almost 25 per cent barely three months after it went on air. With 
subscriber figures below 10,000, the monthly charge was slashed from US$21 to 
about US$16. 755 Galaxy's move, however, was still not quite enough to serve as a 
threat to i-Cable even though i-Cable charged a price of US$37.25 per month. 
Galaxy's difficulty was caused by the new pay-TV licensees and also internet 
competitors. Whilst Galaxy struggled to have a foothold in the market, another new 
competitor, Now Broadband TV, was able to maintain its grip on its 200,000 
subscribers. 756 Now Broadband TV entered the television market without a pay-TV 
license since it was able to deliver its content through the Internet. Thus, the pay-TV 
sector is to fiercely competitive for new entrants. Of the six new pay-TV licenses 
issued, iTV was the first to cease operations in 2002 because of a low subscription 
m 2005 Telt'l';s;on Broadcasts Limited announcement of }OU5 annllal n'.w/ts. p. :'. 
7S4 Tsc. J. 2004. "Galaxy launch sel to saturate pay-TV markd', ,\lcd;a As/a p. 3. 
ｬｾＵ＠ Sudhaman. A. 200 .. t, "Galaxy culs pricl's as HK pay-TV flounders" . . \I('dia .t'1'11i p 5. 
Ｗｾ＠ Ibid. 
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base.757 Yes TV and a Taiwanese player, TV Plus, abandoned their licenses without 
ever going on air. The remaining player, City Telecom, charges US$ll per month. 758 
Galaxy might not be the most unfortunate company in comparison to the other 
three, but its influence in the market became almost negligible. Even though it was 
backed by the production strength of TVB, ex-TV's offerings failed to generate the 
desired level of consumer interest. One of the key criteria in determining the success 
of operators is the content offered; in particular, the quality of programmes in local 
language. Research has shown that news, local drama and sports are the critical 
pay-TV services at the moment. 759 However, TVB's popular dramas on the pay-TV 
platform did not seem to be as attractive as sports programmes and movies. City 
Telecom had a number of religious channels and Now Broadband TV placed an 
emphasis on ｾｩｮｦｯｴ｡ｩｮｭ･ｮｴＧＬ＠ but Galaxy still relied on TVB's quality dramas that 
audience could have just as easily accessed on free-to-air TVB channels. 
TVB's losses in Galaxy increased from US$21.36 million to US$24.07 million in 
2005.760 In 2006, TVB faced even fiercer competition from Wharf Cable's i-Cable 
and Now TV. 76 I In response, TVB's Galaxy relaunched its paid-for service in 2006 
called ｾｔｖｂ＠ Pay Vision', signing an agreement with its rival this time. Galaxy's 
programming will be carried on Now Broadband so that additional distribution for its 
channels will be secured with Now Broadband's 30,000 subscribers. 762 TVB Pay 
Vision offers over 40 channels, including eight TVB channels - TVBN, TVB Classic, 
TVB Drama, and TVB Health, TVBM, TVB Kids, TVBS-News and TVBS-Asia; and 
other channels including CCTV, MTV Southeast Asia, BBC World, National 
H1 Tsang. K. K. 2003, "It's time that media shops shifted focus to contentplanning". Media Asia p. 13. 
m Sudhaman. A. 2004, "Galaxy cuts prices as HK pay-TV flounders", A/edia Asia p. 5. 
m Fl'llez. M. 2003, "11K cable TV boom should hopefully hit the pirates", .\lcelia .Isia p. 21. 
7bO 2005 Tel('\'ision Broadcasts Limited annollncement of ]()(J5 annual reslilts. p. 4. 
761 2006, "Hong Kong", .\letlia Asia p. 7. . 
7b! 2005 Te/('l'I.\ion Broadcasts Limilt'd announcement of ]()05 anntlalll!sulls, p. 4. 
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Geographic, Cartoon Network, three movie channels and four adult channels. 7b3 Thus 
far, TVB Jade and TVB World still maintain dominance in Hong Kong, whereas 
TVB's pay-TV segment had stagnated. 
Table 6.5 Subscriber number of pay-TV operators 
Year Estimated number oj subscribers to TVB s pay-Tr sen'ice 
Feb 2004 
Mid 2005 
Late 2005 
Target end 2007 
Current subscriber numbers of other pay-TV operators 
i-Cable 
Now Broadband TV 
Service launched 
40,000 
63,000 
300,000 
700,000 
500,000 
Source: Bowman, 1. 2006, "Third time lucky for TVB in pay venture'?", Media Asia p. 19. 
6.1.2 When the national turns regional 
Taiwan has long been a profitable market for global players. For TVB, Taiwan plays 
an even more crucial role. TVB's first move towards internationalization took place in 
1993 when it launched its Television Broadcasts Superchannel (TVBS) in Taiwan. 
After a decade, Taiwan has become TVB's second largest market, second only to 
Hong Kong itself. TVBS is a Mandarin-language subscription network on the 
Indonesian satellite Palapa B2P, covering Southeast Asia, Taiwan and the Southern 
provinces of Mainland China. TVBS is a joint venture with a major local media 
entertainment group - Era International (Liann Yee Production) - with TVB owning a 
70 per cent stake of the company. TVBS features infotainment programming which 
includes news, dramas and musical specials. Soon after its launch, TVBS established 
itself as one of the most popular cable channels. Since 2005, TYBS's channels have 
reached 99 per cent of Taiwan's cable television subscribers, accounting for 85.1 per 
cent of the households in Taiwan. The TYBS brand also topped Taiwan' s television 
11>.\ Bowman. J. 2006. "Third lime lucky for TVB in pay venture?". ,\/cdia As/o p. 19. 
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channels, rating 21.2 per cent in brand awareness. 764 
TVBS owes its success in Taiwan to its expertise in channel operations and the 
quality of content from its parent TVB. TVBS includes three dedicated channels in 
Taiwan: TVBS general entertainment channel, TVBS Golden Channel (TVBS-G) 
featuring drama and variety shows, and TVBS News (TVBS_N).765 TVBS-N was one 
of the earliest news channels in Taiwan and it was launched at a time when the 
national stations' news reports were criticized for their inability to engage in the 
round-the-clock news business. In terms of programming, TVB's popular Cantonese 
dramas have long dominated the local video market even before the launch of TVBS. 
The dubbed TVB programming was therefore well-accepted by Taiwan's audiences. 
In addition to exploiting TVB's large library, TVBS also commits itself to localization 
by producing programmes locally. Signature local-produced programmes such as 
2100 Pop Blog, News Nightclub and Lady First have achieved high ratings. TVBS' 
locally-produced Mandarin-language programmes soon prevailed in the Southeast 
Asia TV market and were exported overseas. TVBS was thus slowly transformed into 
the most powerful international arm of TVB in terms of leveraging overseas 
businesses. 
Table 6.6 TV8's revenues by geographical segments between 2001 and 2005 (US$ millions) 
Gcof.{raphical Segmenl 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Hong Kong 272.90 24\. 78 234.20 293.58 329.56 
Taiwan 64.12 73.42 86.38 90.59 95.73 
Malaysia and Singapore 29.89 34.37 42.00 43.38 ·0.47 
USA and Canada 24.31 24.93 28.00 26.86 26.92 
Mainland China 9.29 11.09 13.42 13.50 15.09 
Europe 11.02 10.52 11.60 10.16 12 .... 9 
Australia 3.93 6.22 6.86 7.79 S.72 
Othl'r countries 4.70 4.61 3.70 5.39 5.55 
Total revenues 420.16 406.93 426.15 491.24 537.53 
S()urct!: Company announcements of annual results from 2001 to 2005. 
', ... 2005 Te/(',';sion BmadcClsts Limited announcement oll()(}5 annual results. p. 5. 
7M Saunil'r. V. ｾｏｏｏＮ＠ "Hong Kong' s TVB expands at home and abroad" . . \1ulticllClnnt'1 Yews. \'01. 21. 
no. 7. p. 34. 
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TVB enjoys the prominence gained from the regionalization of its content and thL' 
utilization of its resources in Taiwan. Despite its popularity, it was not able to generate 
significant profit until 2002. Following the 1997 Asian economic crisis, TYBS had to 
get through the earthquake in Taiwan in 1999 and the world economic depression in 
2000. In addition, Taiwan's opposition party, The Democratic Progressiyc Party, came 
into power for the first time in Taiwan's history since 2000. The party's inexperience 
in running the country caused some degree of unrest both economically and politically. 
The economic dissatisfaction and political turmoil subsequently led to a serious slump 
in the market's ad spend, thus further reducing TYBS' profit. 
Apart from a relatively unfavourable environment, TYB made a wrong move in its 
Taiwanese operations. It had invested about US$13 million to set up a DTH platform 
for satellite television services in Taiwan. The venture turned out to be a white 
elephant because Taiwan was already claiming the highest penetration rate of cable 
television in Asia. In view of the business deficits, TYB then committed itself to 
restructuring in Taiwan and withdrew all unnecessary activities in mid-2002. In 2003, 
TVBS further consolidated its television and magazine resources to improve revenue 
and profitability. Although the sale of DTH assets in Taiwan cost TYB an additional 
loss of nearly US$2 million,766 TYB finally began to reap benefits from the 
tumaround of its Taiwan operations, which posted an operating profit of US$8.16 
million in 2002, versus a loss ofUS$4.62 million in 2001.767 
Even though TYBS' economic problems are behind the company, Taiwan's 
political issues are still of great concern to the Hong-Kong-based company. The 
increasingly dichotomous paths taken by the Taiwanese in the controversial issue of 
independence resulted in much tension and this required political fine-tuning in the 
7M IVB tips SI5mloss from raiwan writcdown. Hong KOIl!,! iMail (Chilla). ｾＮＧＭｉｏＭＲＨＩＰＲＮ＠
767 Anthony. T. TVA" s ensf savings raist." concern among analysIs. f1l)ll!,! K{)(1l! iMal1 (China). 
28-J-IOOJ. 
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television business of the region. Taiwan's present ruling party is hostile to Mainland 
China and to some extent, projects these feelings onto Hong Kong. In order not to 
irritate the Taiwanese government, TVBS, with its Hong Kong background, attempted 
to keep a low profile in Taiwan. Since its launch, TVBS labeled itself as Taiwan's first 
local satellite channel. In addition, it operates under the name of its local partner 
Liann Yee Production. Even so, this would not guarantee safety to TVBS. In August 
2005, shortly after granting TVBS a renewed license, the Taiwanese government 
issued a fonnal request claiming that TVBS was a China-based company and that its 
ownership was not in compliance with the government's requirement. TVBS was 
therefore forced to rectify its shareholding structure and was fined about US$30,OOO. 
TVBS was also threatened with a cancellation of its satellite television license if they 
did not immediately address the ownership issue. TVB was then forced to appeal 
against this administrative ruling. In 2006, TVBS won the appeal when the new 
regulatory body, the Taiwanese National Communications Commission ruled these 
accusations invalid. However, TVBS learnt much from this painful lesson about the 
importance of political correctness in the supposedly democratic country. 
As a television company based in Hong Kong, TVB faces no less political 
pressure from the Chinese authorities than from the Taiwanese government. Since the 
1990s, TVB started establishing good relationships with its future "motherland', with 
special consideration to the nearby Guangdong and other Cantonese-speaking areas. 
In 1991, TVB produced 'Operation Relief 1991', raising almost US$16 million to 
help flood victims in eastern China. Three years later, another movement 'Operation 
Relief 1994' was organized by TVB. raising nearly US$5 million for southern 
China. 768 Thereafter, TVB organized similar activities nearly cvery ycar for various 
'1>11 TVB: http://www.t\.b.c\)nl:affairs·faqmilestoneindexe.htm!. consulted l)J1 July ｉｾＮ＠ 2006. ｯｳＺｾｯ＠
a.m. GMT 
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purposes. In 2005, for instance, the 'Support the China AIDS Initiative TV Gala 2005' 
raised US$4.2 million towards the Hong Kong AIDS Foundation. In terms of media 
operations, TVB trod very carefully in order not to antagonize the Chinese 
government. As early as 1994 when BBC was cast off by Star TV. TVB also decided 
not to broadcast BBC's controversial documentary on Mao Zedong in fear of 
upsetting the Chinese authorities.769 The incident then raised concern that the Hong 
Kong media might play a part in turning the territory into merely a 
commercially-driven marketplace. 
In the television industry, TVB is no stranger to Mainland China. Even before it 
was granted landing rights, TVB has had well established video sales in Mainland 
China. Furthermore, TVB has been developing its licensing business on Mainland 
China since the 1980s. In the following decade, TVB supplied programmes to 
Mainland China's stations in five major cities, including Beijing and Shanghai. 770 
The business always maintained a healthy growth in the market, for instance doubling 
its sales in 1999, 
However, in 2000 the Chinese authorities issued changes in the television 
regulations which restricted the broadcasting of imported programming during 
primetime, The ban had a negative effect on TVB's licensing business. In 2002, the 
ban became even stricter, when the Chinese government extended the duration of the 
primetime period, further diminishing the broadcasting window available to imported 
programming. 77 1 It was not until the issue of CEPA that the Hong Kong companies 
were given a life-line from the Chinese authorities with regards to prohibition on 
foreign programming. With the preferential relaxation in government policies, TVB's 
1b'l Rosarill, L. d, 1994, "Self-control", Far Eastern Ecol1omic Rel'/t'\I', \01. 157. no, 9, p, 2R, 
710 Kraar. l.. & Martin. T, J, 1994. "TV is exploding all O\'L'r Asia", Fortwlt', \'tll. 129, no. 2, pp. 
9R-1O I. 
111 2002 TI B manClKemL'nl di.\('u.\s/o1l and ｡ＱｬｃｬｾｬＧｳｩｳＬ＠ p. 3. , 
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dramas have seen a dynamic increase in popularity since 2004. For instance. TVB's 
infotainment programmes received high ratings in Zhejiang province. TVB's recent 
period drama series War and Beauty (broadcast by Hunan TV) achieved record rating 
in Mainland China, signaling TVB's strong licensing business and market share in the 
regIOn. 
TVB's content is delivered not only via television, but also through broadband by 
TV8's advanced Internet portal TVB.COM. In 2001, TVB secured a strategic 
partnership with Shanghai Telecom, taking the provision of broadband content to an 
even higher level. In the strategic partnership, Shanghai Telecom owns 20 per cent of 
a joint venture, Shanghai Jade Pearl Internet Technologies, with TVB. Shanghai 
Telecom then entered into a commercial agreement with Shanghai Jade Pearl Internet 
Technologies to launch VOD services using TVB content on Shanghai Telecom's 
broadband network in 2002.772 A year later, TVB also launched SMS content services 
for mobile phone customers through co-operation with local partners. 
Co-production with local partners was a way for a Hong Kong player to gain 
ground in Mainland China. In 1999, TVB completed a new 30-episode drama series 
shot in Mainland China, which it also co-produced with China International 
Television Corporation. 773 This joint-effort in the territories was a bold step forward 
and the drama series was intended for both the domestic and international markets. In 
2001, more alliances with mainland partners were set up and these involved the 
production of programmes. In this year, a co-produced drama was completed and two 
were in the post-production stage, Since 2003, TVB's joint venture with mainland 
partners has produced a daily one-hour entertainment-infotainment programme. The 
joint venture also launched a drama time block project in major cities across 30 
ＷＱｾ＠ 200 I 7t'lc\'isio1l Broadc(/sts annual report. p. 14. 
m 1999 ]('/c'\';s;on BroadclI,\ts annual ll.'pOri, p. 14. 
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provinces. In order to bolster the projects, TVB established advertising sales teams in 
Shanghai, Beijing and Guangzhou. Taking advantage of the changes brought about hy 
CEPA, TVB's mainland co-production was further strengthened. In 2004. a 
32-episode drama depicting the history of Mainland China from 1940s to 1980s was 
co-produced and aired. The series was received with enthusiasm and it also won the 
Fourth Best Rated TV Drama Award in 2004 from SMG's Dragon Tv.774 
Apart from programme licensing and co-production, channel operations still 
account for the bulk of TVB 's presence in Mainland China. In fact. both Hong Kong's 
TVB and ATV were widely received in Guangdong well before they were granted 
landing rights. This was the result of local cable stations picking up broadcasting 
signals illegally and delivering TVB's programmes as their own. The pirated 
advertising time is estimated to be worth US$181.2 million in a market that generated 
about US$290 million in ad revenue. 775 TVB's real strength in the blossoming 
Chinese market also relied heavily on the nearby Guangdong area, where TVB Jade 
was watched by 5 million Cantonese speakers in Mainland China. 776 Although both 
TVB and ATV are much more popular than the local channels in Guangdong, they 
were unable to profit from this, because of the unlawful distribution. 
It was not until 2002 that ATV was granted formal permission from the 
Guangdong Administration of Radio, Film and Television to broadcast in the province, 
and TVB received the green light in 2004. Although the expansion is limited to 
southern China, acquiring broadcasting rights to the Pearl River Delta province is a 
key priority for the near future as Cantonese programmes on both free and pay-TV are 
in great demand in Guangdong. In terms of market capacity, the 23-million population 
of Guangdong is five times that of Hong Kong's, which will contribute significantly 
Ｎｾ＠ . 
2004 Te/e\';sion Broadcasls llmlOWlcemenl of !O()-I annual rcst/IIS, p. R. 
ns Hargravc-Silk, A. 2002. "Will the underdog'succeed in China'!"", Meciia Asia p. IX. 
776 lanzer. A. 199,\, "Four heavenly kings", Forhn. vol. 152, no. 5, pp. 51-53. 
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to the growth of both companies. More importantly, the Guangdong operations also 
pave the way for further co-operation and would allow TVB to tap into the enonnous 
potential in the market of Mainland China. 
Table 6.7 Top 5 channels in Guangzhou (Guangdong province) 
Ranking Channel 
1 TVB Jade 
2 NFCTJ 
3 GZ34 
4 GDZJ 
5 NFTVS-4 
Note: Date: April 16, 2006 - May 15, 2006. 
Source: Nielsen Media Research, cited in 2006, China media monitor 10. 
Table 6.8 Top 5 Programmes in Guangzhou (Guangdong province) 
Ranking Programme 
1 Ri Ben Bai Tu Pai 
2 Nv Ren M Yi Zuo 
3 Chao Bao Da Zhuang 
4 Huo Wu Huang Sha 
5 Guangzhou TV News 
Note: Date: April 16, 2006 - May 15, 2006. 
Channel 
TVB Jade 
TVB Jade 
TVB Jade 
TVB Jade 
TVB Jade 
Type 
Entertainment 
TV Drama 
TV Series 
TV Series 
TV Series 
Source: Nielsen Media Research, cited in 2006, China media monitor 10. 
Ratings 
12 
9 
9 
7 
Ratings 
10.3 
10.2 
9.8 
9.3 
8.9 
Although the Guangdong landing rights entitled TVB as well as ATV to gain 
revenue from the local viewers, the venture was not as promising as TVB had 
expected. There were numerous profit-sharing conflicts between TVB and local 
operators. TVB was thus forced to seek an alliance with a south China giant -
Guangdong's Southern Broadcasting Media Group.777 During the first half of 2005, 
TVB finally started the collection of license fees. In 2004, TVB Jade and ATV Home 
were the top two channels in the Guangdong province, with an audience rating of 19 
per cent and seven per cent respectively. The remainder was divided between local 
channels such as GZ34, Zhujiang TV and local drama channels. Even their 
English-language TVB Pearl and ATV World secured 1.5 per cent and 0.5 per cent 
m Tse. J. 2004. "TVB looks for ally in push for south China broadcast" . . \Iedia .-1'/1/ p. 5. 
263 
Chapter 6 The Chinese regional players: TVB and Phoeni:< TV 
viewing.778 The advertising revenue, however, remained at insignificant ｬ｣ｮｾｬ＠ due to 
the fact that they only had a limited amount of commercial airtime (the airtime is 
closely protected by the Guangdong authorities) and advertising theft by local 
operators remains a problem for both companies. 779 
TVB Jade and TVB Pearl are TVB's premium channels in Mainland China but 
they were not TVB's first channels to receive official permission to broadcast in the 
country. In 1998, TVB made another regional move by launching two 24-hour 
Mandarin-language satellite channels - TVB 8 and TVB Xing He. Both are positioned 
as pan-Chinese channels targeting an overseas Chinese audience. and both were 
granted landing rights to upscale foreign hotels. 
TVB 8 targets overseas Chinese viewers of all age groups and features 
entertainment news, music and variety programmes.780 Since 1999, the channel was 
broadcast in Mainland China through more than 10 local cable operators. However. 
along with TVB Jade and TVB Pearl, TVB 8 showed only limited success in 
Mainland China. Its success is largely centred in the southern province of Guangdong. 
and to an audience whose cultural background is similar to that of Hong Kong 
consumers. In 2002, TVB 8 was unencrypted and became a free-to-air channel, 
increasing distribution to over I. I million homes. Thus far, TVB 8 and TYB Xing He 
and blocks of TYB 8 's programming have reached 31 provinces or municipalities in 
Mainland China, covering 52 million households (see Table 6.9). 
"K IVB: http:! www.lvb.com/afTairs faq.lvbgrnup.t\"b c.html. consulted on July 1.\. 2006. 10: 10 a.m. 
GMr 
:"1 liu. C. 2004. "11K station tipped to win Guangdong entry in S\.'ptember". ,\fccliel hw r S 
lIO TVA in S616m lund driw. Hong Kong Standard (China). 29-4-1999. 
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Table 6.9 TVB 8 viewership in Mainland China 
District 
Huadong 
Huanan 
Huaxi 
Huabei 
Total 
Provinces/Direct Municipalities 
Shanghai, Shangdong, Anhui, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian 
Jiangxi, Henan, Haikou, Hainan, Hubei, Hunan, Guizhou, Guangdong, 
Guangxi 
Sichuan, Gansu, Qinghai, Chongqing, Yunnan, Xinjiang, Ningxia 
Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, Tianjin, Beijing, Jilin, Hebci. Shannxi. 
Heilongjiang, Liaoning 
Source: TVB company literature. 
. \"u m "t' r.\ (l,. 
Households and 
Units (1IIIIh) 
1-l.OOO 
23.0()() 
11.000 
-l.OOO 
52.0()O 
rVB Xing He is the world's first 24-hour Mandarin language drama satellih: 
channel. It selects and repackages popular dramas from TVB's massive library. It is 
also a paid-for-service channel. However, the television market was facing growing 
competition with a great amount of high-quality dramas produced locally in Mainland 
China. The competition has reached a new height in the recent years, with the 
increasing popularity of Korean dramas. TVB Xing He's expansion in Mainland 
China is therefore still limited. In 2002, TVB 8 and TVB Xing He estimated losses of 
approximately US$3. 90 million to US$7.14 million in total. 781 As of 2005, the 
international TVB Xing He has contributed a gross profit to the operation, whereas 
TYB 8 has substantially diminished its losses. The best performance of TVB Xing He 
was seen in Malaysia, where the channel attracted a high audience rating. 782 
Table 6.10 TVB 8 and TVB Xing He viewership worldwide 
County/District PlatfiJrm Channel/Programmes 
,\'um"as of 
Household ((WOs) 
Mainland China 
Taiwlln 
Malaysia 
Singapore 
Japan 
Auslralia 
USA 
UK and Europe 
TOlal 
Cable Plalfonn 
Cable Plalfonll 
Aslro 
SlarHub 
SkyPt:rfccTV 
Jadeworld 
Jadeworld 
Thl' Chinese Channel 
ｓｯｵｲＨＧｾＺ＠ TVB company literature. 
TVB 8, TVB Xing He, TVB 8 Programml.'S 
TVB 8 
TVB 8. TVB Xing He 
TVB 8 
TVB Dai Fu, TVB 8 Programl11l.'S 
TVB 8. TVB Xing He 
TVB 8 Programmes 
TVB S Programmes 
181 TVB tips $15m loss from Taiwan writedown. Hong Kong iMail (China). 23-10-2002 
ＱＸｾ＠ 2005 Te/('\·i.'iion BlVaticasl'" Limited tlllllOUI1Cemcn/ of ]005 annual n· ... ult .... p. ｾＮ＠
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52.0()O 
300 
700 
2-l 
1 X 
20 
40 
.'0 
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6.1.3 The transnationalization of Chinese culture 
Along with its success in Taiwan and progress in Mainland China, TVB also took a 
further step in the pan-Chinese market by expanding into Asia as well as overseas 
Chinese communities. The launching ofTVBS in Taiwan in the early 1990s could be 
interpreted as TVB's first move towards internationalization, Soon after, TVB began 
fonning cross-border alliances. In order to rival Star TV's dominance in the Asian 
market, TVBI participated in a strategic alliance (called 'gang of five') with CNN, 
ESPN, HBO and AusTV. The consortium planned to invest US$250 million to lease 
channels on Mainland China's Apstar I satellite in the hope of covering the entire 
mainland. 783 TVB' s strategy was to attract the audience of 1.3 billion by leasing five 
of the consortium's 16 transponders on Apstar I, so that TVB could establish various 
Mandarin-language channels. In order to fill up the capacity generated by these 
channels, TVB also invested US$40 million in production in a new venture in 
Taiwan. 784 
In 1996, TVB joined another consortium consisting of the British media group 
Carlton Communications and the 'Hindustan Times' newspaper group, launching a 
Hindi-language channel in India on June 5.785 Unlike most ofTVB's investments, the 
majority of the channel's programming is produced locally and is broadcast in Hindi, 
targeting the India. Similar joint ventures were also seen in Thailand where TVB 
fonned a company, TVB3, with the Bangkok Entertainment Company in order to 
produce Thai-language programming for local stations. By following the same 
strategy, TVBI has, thus far, made its global presence felt through worldwide 
78.1 Lovelock, P. & Schoenfeld, S. 1997. "The broadcast media markds in ASIa:' 111 
Te/('con",,,mications in Asia: Policy, planning and den>lopment. J. Ure. cd., Hong Kong Unl\\:rsity 
Prt'ss, Hong Kl)ng, p. 158. 
ｬｓｾ＠ I'anzcr. A. 1993. "Four hean.·nly kings", Forhn. Vl)1. 152. no. 5, pp. 51,53. 
785 1996. "Hindi channel debuts". Far F,/st('m Economic Re\·iew. vol. 159, Illl. :!5, p. 69. 
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distribution of its TV networks. 
TYB's overseas plan in the earlier stages was to deliver programming to North 
America via satel1ite to target the large and affluent Chinese diaspora. Today, through 
TVBI, TVB operates three major overseas satellite pay-TV subsidiaries: TVB Satellite 
Platform (TVBSP) in the USA, TVB Australia (TVBA) and The Chinese Channel 
(TCC) in Europe. In the USA, TVBI distributes its Jade channel in California through 
its own cable television stations - Jadeworld - in Los Angeles and San Francisco. 
Since December 1994, TVB also started delivering Jade and the TVBS channel 
through DirecTV to Mandarin-speaking viewers nationwide in the USA. Furthermore, 
TYBI launched TVB Vietnam, a Vietnamese-dubbed Hong Kong drama channel on 
DirecTY in 2006, targeting for the first time the Vietnamese-speaking Chinese 
community in the USA. 
In Australia and New Zealand, TVBI ran a Jade channel in 1998. Although TYB 
also established a subsidiary in Australia a year later, the venture was not as 
successful as TVB hoped. As a result, TVB then went on to form a cable platform 
ladeworld. Today TYBA is responsible for delivering its five channels through its 
own cable platform. 786 In the UK and Europe, TVBI has been operating the 
Mandarin-language satel1ite TVBS-E (which broadcasts to the Chinese community) 
through its own subsidiary TCC since 1997. Back then, TCC was the first Chinese 
DTH channel with 17 hours of daily programming. Since 2002, TYBS-E started 
24-hour services in both Cantonese- and Mandarin-language. Although TVBS-E's 
growth is relatively slow, it now covers 48 countries in Europe and presents the 
potential of exploiting the market. 787 In order to do so, TCe is also planning to 
786 Saunier. V. 2000. "Hong Kong' s TVB expands at home and abroad". Mu/ricl1£lnnel XCln. \'01. 21. 
no. 7. p. 34. 
7117 IVBS-E: http:' www.chincsc-channcl.co.uk.cn/contact_ 2.php. consulted on July 15. 2006. ｏｾＺ＠ 20 
a.l11. GMT 
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launch a Mandarin-language general entertainment channel. 
In Canada, TVBI owns a joint venture which operates Fairchild TV, the only 
Mandarin-language television service covering the whole country. In Asia, apart from 
the Greater China marketplace, TVBI also operates two cable channels in Singapore: 
the Cantonese-language Jade Satellite Channel and the Mandarin-language 
TVBS-Asia Channel. In Malaysia, TVBI"s two channels - the Astro Chinese Channel 
(Wah Lai Toi) and the Asian Entertainment Channel (AEC) - are delivered through 
Astro, Malaysia's first DTH satellite service on the MEASAT platform. In Indonesia. 
two Mandarin channels, TVB-Asia and TVB Xing He, are provided to the subscribers 
of Indovision. 
TVB relied very much - and still do to a certain extent - on the strong growth in 
its overseas businesses, especially during the Asia economic crisis in the late 1 990s, 
when Hong Kong was affected by the economic recession. In the fiscal year 2002, 
overseas operations aided TVB's domestic free-to-air stations in overcoming market 
downturn and TVB posted a net profit of US$76.6 million in that year. 788 Two main 
factors contributed to this net profit: 1) Taiwan's TVBS' strong recovery from the 
economic crisis and 2) TVB's formation of new partnerships with DirecTV in the 
USA, which significantly enlarged its audience base. 789 In addition, Singapore and 
Malaysia also played crucial roles in gaining overseas licensing revenue. 79O Thus far, 
Singapore and Malaysia are still the two most important markets for telecast licensing 
business. 
TVB's cross-border operations owe their success to the group's strong content 
resources, which are based not only on TVB's library but also on TVBS' popular 
content. On the whole, TVB's Cantonese-language dramas and TVBS' 
71111 Anthony. T. TYB springs S589m net surprise. Hong Kong iMail (China). 27-3-2003. 
71l'1 Anlhony, T. Dwindling ads sel to hil TYB's operations. Hong Kong iMail (China). 29-1-200:;. 
7<)() Anthony, T. l.ocal eamings drag TVB down. Hong Kong iMail (China). 5-9-2002. 
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Mandarin-language news, talk shows and entertaining programmes make TVB the 
strongest content provider in the pan-Chinese community. Hong Kong"s TVB 
programming, especially from TVB Jade, is either partly or fully repackaged and 
delivered in the USA's Jade channel, Movie Channel and TVB Vietnam: Singapore 
and Australia's Jade channel; Malaysia's Astro Chinese Channel; TVBS-E in Europe 
and TVB Vietnam. Likewise, Taiwan's TVBS channels and its main overseas 
spin-off - TVBS-Asia - supply content to North America, Singapore, Indonesia. 
Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines and part of TVBS-E in Europe. 791 On the 
programming front, TVB dubs its Cantonese programmes into Mandarin in order to 
win the share ratings of the Chinese who do not speak Cantonese, especially for those 
in Mainland China and Taiwan. It also dubs its programmes into other six languages 
including Malay, Thai, Korean, Vietnamese and English, in accordance with 
localization strategies. However, in response to the growing Chinese communities, 
there is an emerging trend to increase the quantity of programmes produced in 
Mandarin language. 
6.2 Phoenix Satellite Television 
Phoenix aims to be the 'Chinese connection', linking Chinese communities to each 
other and the rest of the world through its Mandarin-language entertainment, news 
and information programmes.792 The establishment of Phoenix TV represents a new 
approach of expansion into Mainland China, which involves working closely with 
partners from the Mainland selected for the quality and extent of their political 
network. Phoenix Satellite Television was set up as a Hong Kong-based joint venture 
7'11 TVB: http://www.t\,b.com/afTairsifaq tvbgroup/tvbi.html. ｣ｯｮｳｵｬｴｾ､＠ on July 13. 2006. 10:40 a.l11. 
GMT 
71)' I 3 
. 2002/2003 Plweni\' mlllua report, p. .. 
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in March 1996.793 It brought together three forces: News Corporation's Star TV and 
two Hong Kong-registered finns: Today's Asia and China Wise. Phoenix TV made its 
initial public offering (lPO) in 2000 and gained a listing on the Hong Kong Growth 
Enterprise Market. Today, Phoenix has grown into an international company. It owns 
and operates its main asset - the free-to-air Phoenix Chinese Channel (PCC), and two 
encrypted channels - Phoenix Movies Channels (PMC) and Phoenix InfoNews. It also 
has a presence in Europe via the Phoenix Chinese News and Entertainment Channel 
and a subscription-based service in North America through the Phoenix North 
America Chinese Channel. 
Apart from television, Phoenix also operates an Internet asset and a magazme 
publishing division. Phoenix.com is the dedicated website of Phoenix, which was 
established as a vertical portal carrying content which converges with that featured on 
its television channels. Its publishing ann - Phoenix Weekly - is a pan-Chinese 
magazine, like its parent company. The magazine has been granted pennission for 
nationwide distribution in Mainland China, with rights to report on the current affairs 
of Chinese communities. However, Phoenix remains focused on the television 
broadcasting sector and has not shown any intention to increase its publishing 
operations, because of the strong competition in the Mainland. 
Table 6.11 Phoenix TV's revenues (US$ millions) 
SeKmenl 2000 2001 2002 }O()3 :()(I-I 2005 
Phoenix Chinese Channel 79.60 79.34 90.99 96.48 
Phoenix InfoNcws Channel 1.95 2.30 20.81 21.25 
Phoenix Movies Channel. Phoenix North 
Aml'rica Chinesl' Channel & Phoenix 4.32 6 .. 87 6.60 9.1)7 
ChirH."Sl' News and Entertainment Channel 
Other ｢ｵｳｩｮｾＺｳｳ･ｳ＠ 0.11 5.39 2.30 2.86 5.10 7.46 
Total rnenues 65.80 91.85 XX.16 91.\1 12351 133.17 
ＮｾＭＭＭＭｾＭＭＮＭＮ＠
Source: Phoenix TV annual reports from 2002 to 2005. 
-'1\ Holman. R. L. 1996. "News Corp. st.'ls China n.'nturc", Wall Street )0"""(11- Ellstem Edition. \01. 
ｾＲＷＮ＠ no. 60, p. A 14. 
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6.2.1 The power of Guanxi and an exception to the rule 
Although Phoenix TV has no official backing, it has, among all the foreign television 
players, the best connections with the Chinese government. The foundation of this 
good relationship lies in Phoenix's ownership. Star TV and Today's Asia were the 
main shareholders each with a 45 per cent stake in Phoenix, while the remaining 10 
per cent went to China Wise. Today's Asia is owned by Liu Changle and Chan Wing 
Kee, with Liu controlling 93.3 per cent and serving as Chainnan and CEO. After 
Phoenix TV was listed on the Hong Kong Growth Enterprise Market, it implemented 
a process of restructuration in which both Star TV and Liu Changle' s ownership was 
reduced to 37.6 per cent. Most notably, Murdoch sold 19.9 per cent stake in Phoenix 
in 2006, leaving Liu Changle as the largest shareholder of the company (see Chapter 
4). 
Liu was a fonner officer in the People's Liberation Anny of the Communist Party 
and has strong links with the Chinese authorities. He worked at the Central People's 
Radio Station and resigned in 1988 to pursue private business interests. In 2003, Liu 
Changle was ranked 37 in the China Rich List essentially because of his holdings in 
Phoenix Satellite Television.794 However, Phoenix is not Liu's sole investment in the 
television industry. Liu Changle and Chan Wing Kee also held an 18 per cent and 14 
per cent stake respectively in Hong Kong's second largest terrestrial television ATV. 
After Phoenix was established, Liu increased his holding in ATV to bring it to 43 per 
cent. 795 The acquisition was rubber stamped by the Hong Kong Broadcasting 
Authority in 2002 and this made Liu ATV's majority shareholder. As ATV's new and 
politically well-connected controlling shareholder, Liu was able to extract from the 
ｾ＠ 2003, "China rich lise, Forhes Global. vol. 6, no. 21. p. 90. 
ｘｬｾ＠ Anthony. T. Phoenix boss 'qualities as top A TV shareholder', Hong Knng iMail (China). 
14-6-2002. 
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Chinese authorities landing rights for ATV in the Guangdong province. 796 This was a 
surprising decision since TVB had the highest distribution and ratings in the region at 
that time and was expected to obtain the landing rights first. The Chinese regulator'S 
endorsement - thus placing ATV in an enviable position - was granted within weeks 
after Liu's acquisition of stakes in the station, demonstrating his excellent Guanxi in 
the Mainland. 
This joint-venture turned out to be beneficial to both parties. From Murdoch's 
perspective, a local partner with a strong cultural and political background would help 
to remove the strong 'western' image associated with News Corporation. Liu, on the 
other hand, was interested in the media business and fitted all the requirements News 
Corporation sought in the 'local partner'. When the Chinese government promised 
that Hong Kong would be able to maintain its business model and lifestyle after the 
1997 handover to the PRC, Liu decided to establish his own media company. His 
main problem was his lack of experience in the television industry. Star TV, with its 
global media expertise, was an ideal partner for Liu, and thus they formed a joint 
venture. 
The minority shareholder China Wise also helped Phoenix TV to maintain good 
Guanx; with the Chinese government. China Wise was supposedly owned by the Bank 
of China but its real owner was actually Shanghai Alliance Investment - the 
investment company of the Shanghai Municipal Government, chaired by Jiang 
Mianheng, son of the previous president Jiang Zemin. China Wise already had a good 
working relationship with the Ministry of Radio, Film and Television. Although it is a 
minority shareholder, China Wise has, in practice. the strongest connections within 
Mainland China. 
Apart from Liu Changle and China Wise's excellent connections within the 
7% Hargrave-Silk, A. 2002. "Wdlthe underdog succeed in China')". ,\Ictlia As/(/ p, I R. 
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Mainland, Murdoch's careful and tactful treatment of the Chinese leaders helped to 
facilitate the operations of Phoenix TV in the country (see Chapter 4). Howe\'er, 
Phoenix's advantageous position in the market is not merely based on the Gualtti built 
by these owners. The support of the Chinese leaders also proved to be crucial in the 
strengthening of Phoenix status. The strongest backing came from an endorsement by 
China's Premier Zhu Rongji who announced in a press conference in 1998 that his 
favourite show was Phoenix Chinese Channel's nightly news programme and that he 
was a big fan of the station's news anchor Sally WU. 797 Since the announcement, 
there has been unprecedented access granted by provincial authorities who are 
anxious to please the Premi er. 798 
As a result of the Guanxi, Phoenix's Chinese operations encountered the least 
problems among the foreign channels. Thus Phoenix TV is able to offer a broad mix 
of programming ranging from political and economic news and current affairs to talk 
shows and film and music reviews, as well as movies and mini-series. PCC broadcasts 
mostly informative programmes including news, travel shows and documentaries. It 
also includes some foreign content such as a Taiwanese news bulletin. This turned out 
to be popular in Mainland China as it offers an alternative voice to the news 
programmes of CCTY. Broadcasting news, especially Taiwanese news programmes, 
remains prohibited to all other foreign channels and the granting of these rights is an 
exception and a privilege to Phoenix. In 2003, Phoenix's business was developed 
further when its dedicated news channel - Phoenix InfoNews - was granted landing 
rights, which made it the first foreign-owned Mandarin-language station to broadcast 
24- hour current affairs and news in the Mainland. Phoenix InfoNews was also able to 
enjoy an exemption from censorship. According to the reason pro\'ided by the 
m Gilley. B. 199X. "TV plug". Far Eastern Economic Redel\', \'01. 161, no. 14. p, 55 
Nil 2000. "Risl' {lfthe phoenix", Business China. \'01. 26. no. 21. p. I. 
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government, since the content was deemed suitable enough for the landing rights to be 
granted in the first place, it was not necessary for the news channel to be subjected to 
further scrutiny. 799 
Apart from Phoenix's excellent relationships with the Mainland, Phoenix owes its 
privilege to a programming strategy that is designed to please the Chinese government. 
Phoenix knows better than any other foreign player that to hold on to broadcasting 
rights in Mainland China can be a strenuous exercise. Thus the company is very 
cautious not to broadcast any material that may be sensitive and offensive to the 
Chinese authorities, especially in the field of politics. Its news channel - Phoenix 
InfoNews - skillfully circumvents the political minefield by focusing on financial 
news rather than political developments. The channel is clearly positioned to target 
the 4highly-educated, highly-ranking executives and officials with high income' who 
can bring in advertising revenue rather than to those who like to meddle in political 
issues.8oo Phoenix was reaping the benefits of its Mainland Guanxi as the Chinese 
government turned a blind eye to the fact that Phoenix TV was aired and received 
illegally on unauthorized satellite dishes. Furthermore, even though sometimes 
Phoenix reports politically sensitive news, it is conveniently ignored by the authorities 
because its slick coverage of state affairs always glorifies China's leaders.801 
6.2.2 The Chinese connection: A global pan-Chinese television empire 
Phoenix was not originally conceived as a pan-Chinese operator but as a pan-Asia 
player. Today, Phoenix TV is distributed across the Asia-Pacific region through the 
AsiaSat 3 satellite and covers Mainland China via the SinoSat satellite. However, 
despite its recent success on the Mainland, Phoenix was not initially planned for 
7QCj Anthony, T. InfoNews will beam to 40m homes: Phoenix. Hong Kong iMail (China). 7-1-200J 
800 2003, "Murdoch-owned Phoenix channel wins China entry", .\lcdia Asia p. 4. 
IIUI 2005, "The end of the athir", Economist. vol. 376, no, 8445, p. 80. 
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Mainland China. Phoenix TV evolved as one of the five channels carried bv 
Murdoch's Star TV which targeted pan-Asia audiences. After the BBe was thrown 
off the bouquet, Star launched a new channel to fill in the void. The channel was 
prepared to broadcast in Cantonese but the plan was thwarted by the Hong Kong 
government, which was concerned that the new satellite channel would erode the 
market share of the existing stations. Thus the channel was forced to broadcast in 
Mandarin.so2 It appears that Phoenix did not initially make a deliberate effort to build 
its business in Mainland China and the success of its subsequent television 
development on the Mainland was a fortunate tum of events. 
In 1997, Phoenix obtained official permission to broadcast PCC via local cable 
operators in the Guangdong province, which made Phoenix TV the first non-Mainland 
channel to obtain this privilege. Before obtaining the Guangdong landing rights, pee 
was already granted nationwide landing rights to broadcast in foreign compounds and 
upscale hotels. With approval from the local cable authority and tacit consent from 
SARFT, the Guangdong landing rights added an additional 16 million viewers in the 
Guangdong province onto Phoenix's base. Given that more than 80 per cent of 
Phoenix's revenue relied on advertisers from Mainland China, Phoenix was 
vulnerable in the Chinese market as the authorities could easily find ways to reduce its 
income drastically and wreck the company if they wanted to. However, they decided 
to stay away and not bother Phoenix. 
Although a few other channels gained the Guangdong landing rights after Phoenix, 
pee was able to use its head-start to build up its position in the market. Like most 
other foreign channels, the vast majority of audience tuning to pee picked up the 
signal illegally. The issue of piracy was especially serious for pee as it was broadcast 
as an unencrypted free-to-air channel. Anyone with a C -band satellite dish could 
ｍｏｾ＠ 2000, "Rise of the phoenix", Business Clrina, \'01. 26. no. 21, p. I. 
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easily receive the programmes. PCC was among the foreign channels that were 
routinely and illegally carried by both authorized and illegal foreign channel 
distributors. Like TVB and ATV, Mainland China's rampant and crafty copyright 
violators affected Phoenix's revenue in Guangdong. Many local cable operators 
pirated Phoenix's channels without paying fees. They even removed Phoenix's 
advertisements and replaced them with local commercials. However, thanks to 
Phoenix's excellent relationships with local authorities and operators, the company 
has had no problems in communicating their concerns with the local cable players. 
Negotiation was set up to work out in which way the advertising revenue could be 
shared after the station was officially granted Guangdong entry rights. Unlike its 
heavyweight rival TVB, Phoenix stands out in southern China as a real profit-making 
channel. 
With its excellent connections in the Mainland, Phoenix was able to overcome the 
stringent regulatory rules of the Mainland and was successful in attracting advertisers 
who were keen to tap into its relatively aftluent audience. At the genesis of Phoenix, it 
operated only one general entertainment channel but had already attracted advertisers 
like Procter & Gamble, Daewoo and De-Beers.803 Its business continued to thrive 
thereafter and most of its turnover today is still driven by advertising revenue. It grew 
by 62 per cent between 1997 and 1999 and generated US$39 million in the fiscal year 
1999.804 The advertising revenue for PCC increased at an average of 53 per cent per 
year, over the period from 1997 to 2002, and its distribution expanded to 40 million 
households on the Mainland. 805 Besides advertising revenue, Phoenix also benefited 
from public investment. It was listed on the Hong Kong Growth Enterprise Market in 
KIl.' Yee-lin,1. 1997, "Star TV finds its brilliance: in localization", Adn'rti.'l1Ig Agt'/IIlernaflollal p. IR. 
BIN Osbomc:. M. :WOO, "Different Chinese strokes for dilTerent folks", ,\/ullic/wnm'l Sew., /nlcrnalim",/. 
\'01. 6. no. R. p. R. 
11m 200.1. "Murdoch-oWlle:d Phoenix channel wins China entry", ,\let/ill .hio p. 4. 
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June 2000, which added US$l 00 million to the company's finances. 806 
PCC's advertising revenue growth and the investment from the exchange market 
helped to boost the international ambition of Phoenix and prompted the launch of two 
new channels in 2001: Phoenix InfoNews and Phoenix North American Chinese 
Channel. The Phoenix InfoNews Channel is a 24-hour News and business channel 
modeled on CNN targeting viewers in the Greater China region. Phoenix InfoNews 
began to seek approval for broadcasting rights in the Mainland since its launch in 
2001. Two years later, permission was granted for the channel to broadcast in upscale 
hotels and foreign compounds. Although 28 foreign channels were already granted the 
landing rights before the Phoenix InfoNews, the significance of the license is that the 
channel is clearly intended for Chinese viewership, unlike most of other foreign 
channels that target foreign expatriates in the country. Even today, only Phoenix 
InfoNews and CETV broadcast content produced entirely in Mandarin. 
Table 6.12 The daily reach among business executives on the mainland (2005) 
Channel Name 
('CTV I 
C(TV News 
CCTV 5 
CCTV 2 
CCTV 3 
Phoenix Chinese Channel 
CCTV 4 
CCTV 6 
Hunan Satellite 
Shanghai Dragon TV 
Source: CTR Market Research. cited in 2005 Phoenix annual report. p. 22. 
Daily Reach (%) 
46 .. , 
18.6 
14.1 
12.8 
10.9 
lOA 
9.6 
7.1 
6.9 
59 
In the long term, Phoenix hopes to pioneer a subscription-based sen·ice in the 
Mainland although the pay-TV market still seems immature. Phoenix continucs to 
invcst in domestic Chinese programming by opening a production studio in 
IiOII 2000, "HK l'quity Ill'WS in brief', Ellroweek no. 659, p. 10. 
277 
Chapter 6 The Chinese regional players: TVB and Phoenix TV 
Shenzhen - The Phoenix Film & TV (Shenzhen) Co., Ltd.807 This studio is now 
responsible for Phoenix's production of television dramas, programme distribution 
and promotion, and production of television commercials. Many of Phoenix's 
primetime programmes such as China Town, Secret Documentary, Behind the 
Headlines With Wen Tao, and Sally Wu Eye On World are now produced from its 
Mainland production centre.808 Although it is based in Hong Kong, the majority of 
Phoenix's audience originates from Mainland China. In 2005, PCC was delivered to 
52.27 million households, equating to 180 million people and approximately 14.23 
per cent of the Mainland Chinese population. Phoenix InfoNews also reached 31 
million households, representing an audience of 100 million viewers.809 This makes 
Phoenix the most popular foreign channel in Mainland China. 
In comparison, Phoenix's achievement in Hong Kong IS considerably less 
significant. Apart from the existing PCC, Phoenix InfoNews was launched in Hong 
Kong in January 2002 and carried on the network of i-Cable Communications.810 
Because Hong Kong is essentially an area that is predominantly Cantonese-speaking, 
Phoenix was only relevant to a very limited audience. Thus Hong Kong seemed to 
serve more as a regional base for the operations of Phoenix than a profit-making 
centre. Unfortunately for the company, it did not seem to thrive even in a 
Mandarin-based area such as Taiwan. In fear that Phoenix's programmes might tum 
out to be pro-China and critical of the Taiwanese government, the Taiwanese 
authorities maintained a ruling which banned Phoenix TV. It was not until 2002 that 
the ban on Phoenix TV was lifted. This followed the removal of a decade-old ban on 
advertisements for Mainland China products, property and services in order to help to 
807 2000, "Rise of the phoenix", Business China. vol. 26. no. 21. p. I. 
RUII Phoenix.com: http::phtv.phoenixtv.com'phoenixtv 77406752466796544/20040R30/4536R.shtml. 
consulted on May 15. 2006. 09:20 a.m. GMT 
R09 2005 Pho('nix annual report. p. 22. 
810 Anthony, T. LOSSl'S cause Phoenix to I.:onsider axing InfoNews. 1I0ng Kong ii\tail (Chllla). 
5-9-2002. 
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bolster Taiwan's decreasing ad spend levels.811 When the ban was lifted. Taiwan 
contributed to less than one per cent of Phoenix's turnover.81:! Phoenix has barely 
made any progress in tenns of profit as the market is still highly competitive and 
fragmented. In 2002 and 2003, Phoenix submitted two applications for InfoNews to 
access Taiwan, but the outcome of these applications remain unknown five years after 
the initial request. Nonetheless, the result of the application would have minimal 
impact upon its profit813 because the primary market of Phoenix is still the Mainland. 
In Asia, Singapore is Phoenix's first overseas market outside of Greater China. 
Through StarHub (fonnerly Singapore Cable Vision), Phoenix reached Singapore in 
December 1996. Three years later, PCC entered Malaysia through the Astro DTH 
service. At the same time, the channel was also delivered by Sky Cable and Home 
Cable to the Philippines. Phoenix is also available in Indonesia where it is carried by 
Kabelvision and DirectVision, in Japan via Rakuraku Communication, and New 
Zealand via WorldTV. Among these countries, Malaysia's six million Malaysian 
Chinese have made the country extremely attractive for Phoenix. Today Malaysia 
constitutes Phoenix's largest number of viewers outside Mainland China. Since its 
launch in 2002, the number of households that have subscribed to Phoenix increased 
dramatically from 250,000 to 495,048. In 2005, Phoenix further set up a joint venture 
in the market in order to tap into its advertising market and monetize Phoenix's brand 
value.814 
811 2002, "Headlines", Media Asia p. 3. 
812 Anthony, T. Taiwan pemlit may not lift Phoenix earnings. Hong Kong iMail (China). 3-9-2002. 
81 \ Anthony, T. InfoNews will beam to 40m homes: Phoenix. Hong Kong iMail (China). 7-1-2003. 
ＸＱｾ＠ 2005 Phoenix annual report. p. 11. 
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Table 6.13 Global distribution of Phoenix viewership (2004-2006) 
District 
Asia 
Mainland China 
Hong Kong 
Macau 
Brunei 
Indonesia 
Philippines 
Singapore 
Malaysia 
Thailand 
New Zealand 
Japan 
Others 
Europe 
UK (NTL) 
UK (Sky Eurobird) 
France (UPC) 
France (Sky Eurobird) 
Gcnnany (Sky Eurobird) 
Holland (U UPC, CASEMA, ultiKabel) 
Holland (Sky Eurobird) 
Source: Phoenix company literature. 
Numbers of Households and Units (ODDs) 
52.no 
1.200 
10 
24 
100 
730 
20 
800 
30 
20 
12 
400 
28.373 
3.300 
1\,100 
383 
2.200 
11,900 
2.200 
no 
Phoenix's international expanSIOn encompasses North America and Europe. 
Phoenix's North American arm, the Phoenix North America Chinese Channel, made 
its debut on January 1 st 2001, with the goal of reaching an estimated 2.6 million 
overseas Chinese in the USA. The 24-hour channel is a subscription-based service 
eanied by DirectTV. DirectTV already had nine million subscribers and this helped to 
give Phoenix North America Chinese Channel a competitive advantage over the other 
Chinese channels in the USA market. 815 A year later, the distribution was 
strengthened through an arrangement with Echostar, making Phoenix available to the 
two platfonns with a total of over 17 million subscribers.816 In 2005, Phoenix's North 
American distribution was bolstered when it was given permission to broadcast by the 
Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission. The approval for 
entry allowed Phoenix North America Chinese Channel to be distributed through 
81S Madden. N. 2000. "Star TV seeks Asian viewers in the West". Ad A1!"t' Glohal. \'01. I. no. ｾＮ＠ p. 15. 
KIf) Phoenix .com: http://pht\,.phoenixtv.comlphoenixt\,. 77406739581'894656 20040830 ｾ＠ 5,) 79 .shtml, 
consulted on May 15.2006. 10:05 a.m. GMT 
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Rogers Cable Communications, which made Phoenix the first foreign 
Mandarin-language channel in Canada. Today, Phoenix TV is one of the most popular 
channels among the overseas Chinese community, alongside television giants such as 
Hunan TV and Shanghai TV. 
Phoenix's foray into Europe preceded its North American venture. In 1999. 
Phoenix bought over a majority stake in a London-based broadcaster and renamed it 
the Phoenix Chinese News and Entertainment Channel, thus marking the beginning of 
its European conquest.8)7 When Phoenix launched the Phoenix InfoNews (towards 
Greater China), its European arm also enlarged its programming from six to eight 
hours a day, delivering programmes to no less than 25 European countries.818 The 
channel then turned a 24-hour service and the number of countries it covered 
increased to 45 when it added Eurobird to the list of its channel distributors.819 
Europe has fewer overseas Chinese than North America and unsurprisingly this 
market was not high on Phoenix's list of priorities. Advertising revenue was its main 
source of income in Europe but it was not quite sufficient to cover the operating costs. 
However, considering the need to integrate the global Chinese community, the losses 
made in Europe were accepted as a necessary ·sacrifice'. By way of contrast, the 
Phoenix North American Channel is a profitable subscription-based service. A large 
number of overseas Chinese live in America and hence Phoenix is keen to promote its 
American-Chinese business. In the distribution deal with Echostar, Phoenix pursues a 
bundle strategy and promotes a three-channel package: Phoenix, ATV and CCTV 4. 
The pay-TV operation and marketing strategy turned out to be successful and were 
instrumental in the elimination of Phoenix's deficit in overseas expansion and 
817 Flagg. M. 1999. "News Corp.'s China channel to air in Europe", Wall Street Journal - Eas(ern 
Edition. vol. 234. no. 19. p. A20. 
RIK Vivian. T. Phoenix posts $9.7m deficit on launch of two channels. Hong Kong iMail (China). 
16-5-2001. 
SIC) Phoenix.com: http://phtv.phoenixtv.com!phoenixtv/77406735286927 ＳＶＰＲＰＰＴＰＸＮｾＰＺＴＵ＠ 376.shtml. 
consulted on May 15. 2006. II :35 a.m. GMT 
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operation costs. 
Despite a seemingly promising future, Phoenix's radical expansIOn resulted in 
severe financial losses which brought Phoenix InfoNews to the brink of closure. As a 
Mandarin-language channel, it merely served as one of the many alternatives for the 
audience in Cantonese-speaking Hong Kong and the Guangdong province. At the 
same time, it was not competitive enough to capture a large and regular portion of the 
audience. In the earlier years, Phoenix InfoNews lost about US$20 million 
annually.820 The opportunity to break even hinged on nationwide landing rights but 
these were not granted as early as Phoenix had hoped. This delay, coupled with the 
earlier financial losses, almost resulted in the cancellation of the Phoenix InfoNews 
channel. 821 
There was also the high cost of the European an North American operations 
adding to the woes of Phoenix InfoNews. Although these new channels maintained a 
steady increase in the building up of their brand names and pool of viewership, the 
contribution of their revenue to Phoenix was marginal. In the fiscal year 2001, 
operating losses for the three channels nearly doubled to US$27.25 million from 
US$13.57 million in 2000.822 At the same time, the growth of its core channels PCC 
and PMC was slower than expected, and the profit for the PCC and PMC plummeted 
to US$21.33 million from US$31.92 million. Consequently, Phoenix faced its first net 
loss since 1999 which amounted to about US$25 million.823 This trend continued , 
until Phoenix InfoNews gained landing rights in 2003 and Phoenix's overseas 
business increased the number of viewers. Today, although Phoenix's revenue from 
overseas channels remains insignificant, InfoNews no longer bleeds money and makes 
820 2003 "K I'" B' CI . 1")9 ., I" 
. l'l'p wate ling, uSlness una, \"0 . _ ,no. -. p. -. 
821 Anthony, T. Phoenix may pull plug on InfoNcws Channel. Iiong Kong iMail (China). 18-1 ｏＭｾｏｏｾＮ＠
ＸｾＺ＠ Anthony, T. losses cause Phoenix to consider axing InfoNl'ws. Hong Kong iMad (China). 
5-9-2002. 
81\ Anthony. T. Phoenix posts S 199m net loss. Hong Kong iMail (China). ＴＭＹＭｾｏｏｾＮ＠
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a little contribution to the company's income. 
6.2.3 Building the Phoenix brand: The Chinese CNN 
Phoenix's advantage lies in the credibility of its brand name. With the focus of 
Phoenix on news broadcasting, the channel gained the title of 'The Chinese CNN·. 
During the 1997 handover of Hong Kong's sovereignty to Mainland China, Phoenix 
provided 60 hours of in-depth news coverage on the ceremony and the issues 
surrounding the handover. On 11 September 2001, it cancelled all the scheduled 
programmes in order to make way for the 36-hour live broadcast of the terrorist 
attacks on New York and Washington. In 2003, during the outbreak of Iraq war, 
Phoenix produced a total of 506 consecutive hours of news reports on the event. 
Phoenix's emphasis on quality news reporting served to enhance its reputation in 
Greater China. According to the Gallup Research report in Mainland China, 36 per 
cent of the respondents knew about Phoenix TV, placing Phoenix at the same level of 
brand awareness as McDonald's and General Motors.824ln addition, Phoenix is the 
most-watched Mandarin-language broadcaster. It attracted a great deal of international 
coverage form reputed global media who were keen to introduce Phoenix to the world. 
In 2005, renowned press companies such as the Washington Post, Newsweek, and the 
Sydney Morning Herald all highlighted Phoenix's unique status as a Chinese media 
vehicle delivering information and entertainment into Mainland China and connecting 
th Ch' . 825 e pan- mese commumty overseas. 
124 Jian-Qiang. Y. 2004. Media slraleg\' managementlluaxia Publishing. Beijing. p. 65. 
12S 2005 Phoenix annual report. p. 10. 
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Table 6.14 Audience appreciation survey (2005, Viewing in the office) 
Channel Name 
Phoenix Chinese Channel 
Phoenix InfoNews Channel 
Xing Kong Wei Shi 
CETV 
Phoenix Movies Channel 
Sun Satellite 
National Geographic 
ESPN 
Discovery 
Channel [V] 
CNN 
Source: CTR Market Research, cited in 2005 Phoenix annual report. p. 23. 
Audience Apprcciation (tl tl) 
748 
ＮｾＳＮ＠ ｾ＠
21.2 
13.5 
10.6 
S.7 
3.9 
'-9 
1.9 
1.0 
1.0 
Its high level of brand awareness, however, is not entirely based on strong 
programming but on slick marketing and brand positioning. First, Phoenix's success 
relies on a group of star anchors, journalists and commentators. In order to promote 
the company's identity as 'pan-Chinese' and attain a good professional standard, 
Phoenix recruits presenters and reporters from Taiwan, Hong Kong, Mainland China, 
and the global Chinese community. These stars enhance Phoenix credibility and the 
channel's audience appeal. For instance, Taiwanese Sally Wu, who was publicly 
praised by the Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji, has become one of the most popular news 
presenters in Greater China. She was voted one of the Top-10 Vogue Personalities by 
China Youth Daily, a Chinese leading newspaper. She was also named one of the 
Top-10 News Figures by Huasheng Monthly and was selected to be one of the 50 
Most Influential Figures in the Development of China in the New Millennium by 
ASiaweek.826 Another famous news anchor Tanya Liu, a former Taiwanese TVBS 
presenter, is also popular enough to receive words of sympathy from Premier Zhu 
Rongji after she had suffered from a train crash in London in May 2002. IC7 
In order to ensure stability and allegiance within the core team. Phoenix adopted 
Klb Jian-Qiang, Y. 2004, Media strategy munagement Huaxia Publishing. Beijing. p. 66. 
m TV anchor ｧｩｮｾｳ＠ thanks for recovery. The Standard (Hong Kllllg. China). 18-3-2004. 
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the rare step - at least in Greater China - of offering stock options to its star 
presenters and journalists. At the same time, Phoenix developed specific programmes 
for certain presenters in order to develop audience loyalty and strengthen the 
presenters' local influence. For instance, soon after the Chinese Premier's praise of 
Sally Wu, a programme Sally Wu Eye On The World was aired and soon became a hit. 
Lu Yu Chen, a Beijing-born anchor who grew up in USA, starred in a programme 
called A Date with Lu Yu. This programme was launched after her obvious popularity 
in Good Morning China. A great number of these programmes dominate Phoenix's 
schedule today, such as Li Ao s Standpoint, Xiang Guo Advertising Magazine, and 
Kang Hong Summary of PressPhoenix. Superstar presenters therefore successfully 
bring awareness and popularity to their programmes and it was through these channels 
that the brand name of Phoenix was established. 
Table 6.15 Phoenix's star team of anchors and reports 
Nationality 
Mainland China 
Taiwan 
Name 
Lu Yu Chen, Dou Wen Tao, Cao Jingxing, Dong Jiayao, Li Hui, Chen Xiaonan, 
Zeng Zimo, Yuchi Linjia, Olivia Xu, Shen Xing, Kiang Xinrong, Cheng Helin, 
LiWai, Zheng Hao 
Sally Wu, Shi Chiping, Vie Tseng, Alice Wang, Avon Hsieh, Tiger Hu, Chiang 
Shengyang, Chen Yuchia, Shannon Liu 
Hong Kong & Ada Lau, Yang Jinlin, Anthony yuen, Jonathan Sa, Lawrence Ho, Oliver Lu, Aaron 
International Vim, Leung Mantao, Angela Chow, Ma Dingsheng, Peter Qiu 
Source: Phoenix company literature. 
Holding ground events is also important as a means for Phoenix to promote its 
brand name. The first large-scale event was staged as early as 1997, soon after its 
launch, and it sponsored an acrobatics show called Leaping the Yellow Rin'r. Under 
the guise of celebrating the handover of Hong Kong to the PRe. Phoenix supported a 
Taiwanese stunt man, Ke Shouliang, to drive his motor car in a spectacular leap across 
the 60-meter-wide Yellow River. Having orchestrated a series of promotions, the stunt 
was delivered to more than 30 countries, reaching an audience of about 2 billion 
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through co-relay between Phoenix TV and CCTV. For the fledgling TV company. the 
cost of this stunt was considerable but it significantly improved the awareness and 
audience ratings of Phoenix. Thereafter, Phoenix consistently organized similar events 
including The Millennium Journey, The European Journev, and Looking for A 
Faraway Home. In 2005, Phoenix sponsored a Taiwanese writer, scholar and 
parliamentarian - Li Ao, who was a nominee of the Nobel Prize - for a visit to Beijing 
and Shanghai. Li Ao delivered two speeches in these two cities, which stirred 
considerable controversy. At the same time, he tested the boundaries of freedom of 
expression in the Mainland. All these events appealed to the pan-Chinese community 
and were co-promoted with strong publicity, related exhibitions and performances, 
and news reports. Phoenix's effort was meant to increase the coverage level of the 
events on a pan-Chinese scale, so that Phoenix brand awareness improved 
accordingl y. 
Apart from star anchors and special events, Phoenix integrates its television, 
Internet and publishing resources to co-promote its brand. The vertically-integrated 
Phoenix.com concentrates on creating a new space for TV-Internet interaction, 
featuring special columns introducing all the company's TV channels. Together with 
Phoenix's publishing arm, the Phoenix Weekly, which reports Phoenix-related 
entertainment and tidbits, Phoenix's multi-platform centers itself on the promotion of 
Phoenix TV. Moreover, Phoenix's five television channels all aim to promote the 
brand among the Chinese community, despite the fact that some stations do not 
actually break even in terms of operating costs. Though Phoenix lacked a substantial 
progranul1ing library, it was widely recognized by the global Chinese community and 
perceived as more representative of Chinese media than CCTV 4. 
Apart from the effort to establish its brand. Phoenix also devotes considerable 
energy to cost cutting and adopts a different approach from the other channels in 
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matters of programming. In terms of cost control, Phoenix reduces its production 
costs as much as possible to become a low-cost producer. Its Hong Kong headquarters 
is merely a 3000 square meter building located in a suburban area, and its Beijing 
branch is located in an even more rural area. Compared to TVB's state-of-the-art TVB 
CITY, it is hard to associate the glorious brand name of Phoenix with its low-key 
facilities. 
Phoenix's obsession with cost reduction is reflected in its programming strategy. 
The leading programme Good Morning China, for instance, is a four-person 
production. The creation of core programme blocks of news and talk shows was 
centred round the company's star presenters. The general approach adopted by the 
competition was to produce spectacular dramas and documentaries but Phoenix 
decided to tread a different path. It shifted its focus to low-budget programmes, made 
attractive with a contemporary feel to its approach and the topics for discussion were 
refreshingly new. An increasing number of programmes such as Phoenix Aerostation, 
Phoenix Tonight, Panoramic Eyeshot of Phoenix, Behind the Headlines with Wen Tao, 
and Red Eagle China Forum have already gained a good reputation. As a result of 
programmes which are cost-effective and high quality, Phoenix is able to provide an 
alternative for the Chinese audience and has established a creditable and professional 
impression of the brand name in Mainland China as well as the overseas Chinese 
community. 
In terms of programming production, Phoenix also benefited from its ownership 
of ATY. Phoenix TV was able to obtain most of ATV's dramas and soap opera 
programmes to complement its content base during its early years. Moreover, through 
its connection with Star TV and its ability to recruit experienced professional staff, 
Phoenix's programming is enhanced and considered better than other ｴＨＮｬｲｾｩｧｮ＠
Mandarin-language channels. In May 2001, for instance, Phoenix InfoNcws cntered a 
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commercial agreement with Fox News Network (News Corporation's American 
24-hour news cable channel) in order to bolster Phoenix's abilities in the production 
of international news. 828 From the deal, Phoenix InfoNews was entitled to take 
advantage of Fox's news library, re-broadcast the Fox News Channel and utilize Fox's 
local offices and facilities in the major USA cities. Phoenix's advanced programming 
therefore opened up to a new era of better content, more revenue and increase in 
advertising. 
In terms of programming competition, Phoenix stands in the best position among 
all the foreign channels in Greater China. When Phoenix InfoNews officially entered 
Mainland China, another business channel, Bloomberg TV, was also granted the same 
landing rights. However, as Bloomberg TV is an English-language channel targeting 
English-speaking professionals, its main competitor is CNBC rather than Phoenix. 
Phoenix InfoNews focuses on the Mandarin-language audience by exploiting a very 
strong local viewership. In the Mainland, Phoenix's major foreign competitors are 
therefore the select Mandarin-language channels - Xing Kong Wei Shi and CETY. 
However, the impact from the rival channels is minimal as these two channels are not 
allowed to run a news channel and broadcast news programmes. Phoenix's core 
channel PCC features culture and history programming, which differs from Xing 
Kong's and CETV's entertainment-oriented programmes. Moreover, Phoenix's brand 
awareness is much higher than that of CETV and Xing Kong Wei Shi, thanks to the 
local operators in China, whose earlier illegal reception and distribution of Phoenix 
programming significantly promoted the Phoenix brand. In 2002, for instance, when 
Phoenix's advertising income reached US$94.20 million. CETV only recei\'ed 
US$0.45 million. ｾｑＴ＠
ｾｾｳ＠ Vivian, T. Phoenix posts $9.7m deficit on launch of two channels. Hong Kong iMail (China). 
16-5-]001, 
ｓｾｉｉ＠ Anthony. T. A TV set Il)f joint venture to collect It)st ad n.'\cnues. Hong Kong iMail (China), 
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Given its successful strategy and operations in Greater China, Phoenix committed 
itself to very limited localization strategies in both North America and Europe It 
restricted itself to a few locally-produced programmes such as North America .vC\\'S 
and Europe Today. Instead, Phoenix takes advantage of its popular content in PCC in 
Greater China, repackaging and mixing them (e.g. Good Morning China. The Asian 
Journal, Taipei Tonight Live, and A Date with Lu Yu) with drama series, music, sports. 
factual entertainment from Taiwan, Hong Kong, Mainland China, as well as some 
programmes from Japan, Korea and Singapore. 
Although it offers a diversity of programme genres, these programmes are not 
customized according to the different countries. Its aim is to establish itself as a 
pan-Chinese station hence it was careful not to dominate any particular country. 
Phoenix's core global team is drawn from Taiwan, Hong Kong. and Mainland China 
and it also features programmes originating from these areas. Phoenix represents a 
general Chinese culture identity and avoids being labeled with any country bias. This 
however, results in a remarkable phenomenon: in Hong Kong, Phoenix TV is 
commonly perceived as a Mainland Chinese station because of its Mandarin 
broadcasts and the background of its CEO Liu Changle. However, in Mainland China, 
Phoenix was seen as a Hong Kong station because of the location of its headquarters, 
as well as the fact that most of its famous staff is from Taiwan and Hong Kong. 
Conversely, in Taiwan, the channel is considered a channel with Chinese ideology of 
ambiguous origin - either from Hong Kong or Mainland China. To the Chinese 
diaspora, they were able to relate to the Chinese identity captured within the content 
of this channel. At the same time, there were enough 'cultural' differences between 
the programmes to provide a refreshing perspective. Such pan-Chinese orientation 
therefore helps to facilitate its expansion overseas and increases its acceptam;e by the 
2]·7-2003. 
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Chinese diaspora. Thus these factors have further boosted Phoenix's detennination to 
become the ｾｾｃｨｩｮ･ｳ･＠ CNN". 
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Chapter 7 Conclusions and suggestions: 
Towards a transnationalization of the Greater China television space 
7.1 Conclusions 
This research explored the development of media globalization in the Greater China 
region. It outlined the shape of the multi-layered television market in Greater China 
and examined the business strategies deployed by major global and regional 
corporations. This research began with the notion of the global village. This was the 
vision brought by McLuhan in the early 1960s. He pointed out that .. the 
electro-magnetic discoveries have recreated the simultaneity field in all human affairs 
so that the human family now exists under condition of a global village ... R3o From 
McLuhan's perspective, international television would inevitably lead to shared 
experiences among audiences across the world, and therefore result in a smaller and 
more intimate world so that people would live in a global community. In addition, thc 
simultaneity of electric communication would grant us accessibility to every other 
person in the world. 831 
From the 1960s onwards, the concepts of globalization and media globalization, 
due to their controversial nature, have been closely scrutinized from the viewpoint of 
various and conflicting theoretical frameworks. Accordingly, the meaning of 
globalization evolved, not merely involving social, political, economic and cultural 
aspects but a set of complicated processes that is implemented in a multi-layered 
worldwide market. Ulrich Beck, for example, highlighted clearly the key issues in this 
process of globalization. According to the German sociologist, the trend of 
globalization is not new. What is new is the distribution of global cultural goods. the 
degree of economic concentration, and the number and power of transnational actors, 
8.\0 Md.uhan. M. 1962. The Gutenherg galtny: The making ＨＩｲｾｰＨｽｧｲ｡ｰｨｩ｣＠ man Routledge & K Paul. p. 
31. 
XII McLuhan. M. 1964. C"derstanding media Methuen. London. p. 24R. 
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institutions and agreements. 832 
Beck's perspective is useful for the comprehension of the development in the 
Greater China television market. This thesis has shown that the evolution of the 
market fits well in the wider context of globalization. Its rate of development is so 
rapid that the market is mature enough to embark on the process of 
transnationalization. Nevertheless, the development in this region differs from the 
other established regional markets, such as the Europe and South America. The 
conclusion of this research supports Arjun Appadurai's (2003) argument, who claimed 
that complexity, disjuncture and differences are the outcome of globalization, rather 
than homogenization. On the whole, the region has been undergoing a transformation, 
beginning from separated national markets and converging into a regional market 
which transcends boundaries. This represents a unique television space in the 
multi-layered global media market. 
Thanks to Mainland China and Taiwan's accession to the WTO, Greater China 
fonnally participated in globalization which, in Held and McGrew's eyes, refers to the 
speeding up and deepening impact of transnational flows and patterns of social 
interaction. 833 The WTO works as an expansion of international governance at global 
level but also imposes a compulsory obligation on the Chinese authorities towards 
their media policies. The participation of Mainland China and Taiwan in the WTO 
very much strengthened, if not triggered, the transformation of the television 
landscape of Greater China. 
One feature of the newly established infrastructure is the sanctioned arrival of 
transnational corporations, which already have a great deal of experience in global 
expansion. My tindings find echoes in the work of many sociologists. For instance, 
s.\! Beck, U. 2002, "What is globalization?:' in Tire ｧｬｯｨ｡ｬｬｲ｡ｮＮｾｲｯｲｭ｡ｬｩｯｮｳ＠ readers: All ;IIlrodll('(;Oll 10 
11/" glohali=atioll dehal£', D. Held & A. McGrew, eds., Oxford. p. 103. 
m Held. D. & McGrew. A. 2002, Glohali=atiOlk4nt;-Glohali=alioll Polity Press. Cambridge. p I. 
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according to Beck, geographical expansion, ever-intensive international trade and the 
growing power of transnational corporations have made globality irreversible. ｳＩｾ＠ In 
Chapters 4 and 5, my research has found that all of the six first-tier global media 
conglomerates have set foot in the Greater China television market, in spite of their 
various foci on different business operations. News Corporation with its 
multi-national strategy, especially with the acquisition of Star TV, has proved to be 
successful in reaching out to the audience in Greater China. Viacom. on the other hand, 
was able to make a substantial improvement in its working relationship with the 
Chinese authorities, because of its transnational inclination and corporate culture. 
Apart from global conglomerates, another significant factor in the Greater China 
television market is the emergence of the fledgling regional television players. 
Chapter 6 examined two major regional companies - TVB and Phoenix TV. My 
dissertation shows that commercial companies and privately-owned businesses 
provide the main impetus towards regionalization and cross-border television industry. 
Both global companies and regional firms rely on cross-border growth in order to 
increase power and reduce competition. Such cross-border utilization of resources is a 
way to maximize profits and expand market share. In addition, both global and 
regional players established cross-border channels, contributed to the flow of 
programmes, fonnats, scheduling practices and production values, and facilitated the 
exchange of know-how and ideas. 
The distinction between global and regional players is that while the former strive 
to localize their TV channels to meet the needs of viewers in Greater China, the latter 
are able to take advantage of their geographic, linguistic and cultural proximity to the 
market. With a strong orientation towards local markets. regional players expanded 
8}4 Beck. U. 2002. "What is globalization?," in The ｧＯｯｨ｡Ｏｬｲ｡ｮＮｾｲｯｲＢＬ｡ＯｩｯＢＢＬ＠ reader.\ "'" intrm/lIc/loII If) 
Ih(' g/o"',lbllion dehalt'. D. Held & A. McGrew. eds .. Oxford. p. 102. 
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their operations and became a key force in shaping the Mandarin-language television 
market. Focusing on the emergence of regional market, this research claims that a 
Greater China regional media realm is under way. In order to encapsulate these major 
transformations, this dissertation suggests the notion of "Greater China Television 
Space'. For instance, the regional success of TVB and Phoenix TV provides strong 
evidence in support of Joseph Straubhaar's and John Sinclair"s concept of geo-cultural 
market. These cases also serve as evidence to support the ever-increasing number of 
research studies being conducted in different world regions, all with an interest in 
multi-layered media landscape (e.g. Chalaby, ＲＰＰＵｾ＠ Sakr, 2001 ｾ＠ Sinclair, 2000). 
In Greater China, economy is the driving force behind media globalization and 
culture provides the foundation for the formation of a regional market. Nevertheless, 
this research has shown that the most powerful factor shaping the industry is politics. 
It is the power of states, particularly the Chinese government, which make Greater 
China's media landscape distinctive from other regions. This finding poses a 
challenge to two deeply-entrenched schools of thoughts. Firstly, many governments 
are concerned that media globalization would lead to unfavourable consequences. 
Some claimed that deterritorialization, an outcome of globalization, could lead to 
'de-nationalization" and undermine the status of national states. Secondly, many 
scholars believe that the process of globalization and transnational corporations can 
d · . I . 8,<; un ermme natlona sovereIgnty. --
The Greater China television space shows that cultural difference is not the only 
barrier to be overcome by transnational companies. The Chinese communist' political 
power is the main obstacle for these businesses. After all, it was politics that 
detenllined the various shapes of media systems in Mainland China, Hong Kong and 
m Beck. U. 2002, "What is globalization?:' in rhe g/oha/lrans/tJrmalions rcadas . ..In introduclton 10 
lire K/obali=alio1l dehale. D. Held & A. McGrew. eds .. Oxford. p. 101. 
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Taiwan. It was politics that granted foreign players' landing rights to enter the 
Mainland Chinese market. The Chinese authorities' deregulation of foreign 
investment in television production in 2004 and their re-regulation of the businesses 
the following year inevitably reshaped the television space. It is thus beneficiaL in 
order to sustain the development of media globalization, for the foreign players to 
ensure that the Chinese authorities were handled with care and discretion. This 
research suggests that the determining factors cannot be reduced to economic 
determinism but that culture and politics must also enter into the picture. 
7.1.1 Key players in the Greater China television market 
1990 was a milestone for cross-border television players In Greater China. The 
establishment of Star TV network marked the beginning of the process of media 
globalization in the region, and this vital step was aided by the presence of foreign 
players. In the 1990s, the evolution of information and communications technology, 
especiaJIy the availability of satellite and cable television to mass audience, 
contributed to a major restructuring within the television industry. Since the takeover 
of Star TV by News Corporation in 1993, such global companies took up centre stage 
in the transnational television scene and grew steadily in numbers and strength. 
Three main categories of players in the Greater China television market were 
identified in this research: the global, the regional, and the national/local. As Hong 
Kong and Taiwan are open markets - from an economic perspective - the success of 
the global players in the region is dependent on the scale of their business in Mainland 
China. Thus, although all six first-tier global media conglomerates are present in 
Greater China, the main ones remain News Corporation, Viacom, Time Wanlcr and 
Walt Disney. To be precise, News Corporation and Viacom arc the two most dominant 
companies competing for the Mainland China television market sharc. Time Warncr 
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and Sony, on the other hand, are less competitive In television but rather more 
advanced in the film industry, whereas Disney's strength lies with its theme park and 
consumer products. 
Apart from the top six global players, numerous second-tier global corporations 
were present in Greater China by the early 2000s. Many of them are among the world 
top 20 audiovisual companies such as Cox Enterprises, BBC and NHK. Also included 
in this group are Bloomberg and Hallmark. Together with the first-tier conglomerates, 
these international companies operate a total of 16 pan-Greater China channels that 
make up the global layer of television market. Channels operated by second-tier 
companies are not necessarily less competitive than those from the first tier. 
Discovery and BBC World, for instance, have consistently attracted a substantial 
percentage of the audience in Greater China and Asia. 
Regional players constitute the second stratum of the Greater China television 
industry and are made up of both Greater China and non-Greater China players. TVB 
and Phoenix TV are the major players in the latter group. 1993 was a milestone for the 
internationalization and regionalization of the Greater China television market. It was 
the year when the Hong Kong television giant TVB launched TVBS in Taiwan, which 
was its response to the launch of pan-Asia Star TV. As the largest national television 
company in Hong Kong, TVB represents a typical developing model, as national and 
local television firms are encouraged to seek regional expansion wherever possible. 
By contrast, the young and ambitious Phoenix TV represents an alternative model. It 
is a newly created regional-orientated television without any strong national 
background and seems to fit naturally into the Greater China regional scene. 
The third layer of tdevision market in Greater China is made of national/local 
players, notably Mainland China's CCTV, SMG and Hunan ｔｖｾ＠ llong Kong's ATV, 
Torn.com. PCCW and ｩＭｃ｡｢ｬ･ｾ＠ and Taiwan's ET TV. Witnessing the sucn:ss of T\'8 
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and Phoenix TV, these compames acknowledged the need for a cross-border 
orientation. All of them were striving to expand throughout Greater China and reach 
the overseas Chinese market. Although the process of expansion is still on-going, 
these companies are already quasi-regional players. In contrast, numerous local 
television players are confined by the lack of resources or capabilities, and are not 
able to make any headway in regional development. Examples of such players include 
Taiwan's SET TV, FTV and most Mainland China's provincial and local stations. As a 
result, they turned their attention inwards to secure national or local market, in order 
to make the most of existing fragmented market shares, Since they are not able to 
compete in pan-Greater China level, they are facing increasingly tougher competition 
for diminishing profits. Their dominance in the Greater China market is getting 
marginal ized. 
While the globalization trend in Greater China was unabated as far as most 
television companies were concerned, the rushed expansion of some global and 
regional players, with regard to setting up and investing in channels in the region, 
experienced some drawbacks. Several companies withdrew from some industry 
segments, where they had made heavy losses. Time Warner sold its majority stake in 
CETV to the Hong Kong Tom.com Group in 2003. Murdoch reluctantly sold a 19.9 
per cent stake in the popular Phoenix TV to the Hong Kong China Mobile Group, 
which tunled the media tycoon into a minority owner of the regional television 
platfonn. The CTN channel, one of the first Hong Kong-based regional channels, was 
sold to Taiwan's KG Group after five years of continuous losses. Also sutfering 
similar losses was another regional channel. Sun TV. which was created in Hong 
Kong and sold to Mainland China's Tide Time Group in 2003. While the first two 
cases highlighted the difliculties of global media to make substantial progress in the 
Greater China market, the latter two demonstrated that a pre(ipitated entry into the 
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regional market does not always bear fruit. As Chapter 4, 5 & 6 have illustrated. in 
order to conquer the Greater China market, an increasing number of competitors have 
begun to implement effective cross-border, regionalized and localized strategies. The 
other competitors in the field had no option but to follow this path. 
7.1.2 Transnational strategies and operations 
In this research, the categorization of the cross-border strategies of the television 
players is based on Bartlett's and Ghoshal's (1998) four expansion approaches: 
multinational, international, global and transnational strategies. In surveying the 
operations run by non-Greater China players, this research found that most global 
media companies tended to adopt transnational strategies in their approach to the 
region. Viacom was one such example, so were Time Warner, Sony and NBC 
Universal. Viacom, with its MTV channel, can be said to epitomize this trend. When 
MTV Asia returned to the Asian market in 1995 after it was being removed from Star 
TV's lineup of channels, MTV altered its previous one-size-fits-all approach in Asia. 
Its transformation was very much led by Channel [Vrs success in highly localized 
channel offerings. Recognizing that standardized programming was far from ideal to 
increase its share in the market, Viacom re-organized most of its channels abroad as 
joint ventures with local partners. Admitting that local tastes differ, Viacom split its 
services into regional and even into local services. As a result. the music-production 
centre was moved from Singapore to Taipei and the MTV Mandarin was further split 
into MTV Mandarin and MTV China, in order to get closer to the Greater China 
market. 
While deternlined to cater to local tastes, Viacom understood the value of the 
MTV brand and was careful not to lose the network's global identity. Although largely 
customized for local needs, MTV channels retained their general fonnat and 
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philosophy which prevail worldwide. The increasing locally-produced programming 
and the unique Chinese ABC VJs worked very well as complement to the globally 
successful name of MTV. Viacom's emphasis on its global identity in cross-border 
expansion can be broadly defined as a 'geocentric' approach. When local tastes and 
local competitors made it impossible to adopt a global strategy, Viacom pursued a 
transnational strategy by localizing the content while remaining faithful to its global 
identity. 
Sony and NBC Universal also adopted transnational strategies in spite of their less 
significant presence in Greater China. While Sony was keen to build up AXN as a 
global brand in the action market, its strategy is to increase locally-produced content. 
Its Greater China operation relies on the creation of Mandarin-language programmes 
from its Hong Kong production unit and its acquisition of programmes from other 
Asian companies. NBC Universal, on the other hand, expanded into Asia and Greater 
China with CNBC. In order to cope with local demands, CNBC was split into seven 
feeds, including CNBC Asia in Taiwan and Mainland China, and CNBC Hong Kong. 
An increasing amount of live reports from Hong Kong and Shanghai business centres 
were provided by both channels. 
It soon became clear that Time Warner adopted two different strategies in its 
operation in Greater China, and the paths were markedly different to those of MTV, 
AXN and CNBC. Its branded channels, HBO and CNN, continually topped Asian's 
transnational film and news channels. HBO, as well as Cinemax, provided a global 
perspective by bringing universal programmes to the market. Their programmes were 
disseminated globally and at the same time underwent very limited local adaptation. 
With CNN International, on the other hand, the global strategy adopted hitherto would 
restrict its entry into overseas market. CNN International soon turned to 
rcgionalizationllocalization strategies by splitting into regional services. but 
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maintaining its leading status in global news broadcasting concurrently. Today CNN's 
Hong Kong regional center efficiently manages the production, distribution and sales 
business in Greater China as well as in Asia. CNN's success rested on its regional 
management from Hong Kong and its local affiliates - such as the Beijing bureau. 
This bureau produced local content and took steps at the time to distance itself from 
being deemed as a global- or western-centric channel. To attain its objective, Time 
Warner pursued a transnational strategy in order to allow CNN to achieve localization 
yet maintain its global identity. The Greater China operations were coordinated 
globally but at the same time the programmes were tailored to the local need. 
For a company whose reputation was mainly built on a global awareness of its 
brand and characters, it was difficult to be committed to the principle of local 
adaptation. Walt Disney's Disney Channel was one such example, as demonstrated by 
its struggle in Greater China. Disney's motivation for overseas expansion was 
content-driven and the recycling of its programmes helps spread production costs and 
gain economies of scale.836 Its creative functions were tightly centralized in Disney's 
America headquarters and local adaptation was strictly limited. Unlike most of other 
global moguls, Disney therefore had to adhere to a global strategy. Instead of an 
increase in production of local content, Disney's programming was basically the same 
all over the world. Its locally-produced programming in Taiwan was limited. Its 
newly-launched Playhouse Disney Channel in Hong Kong and Mainland China 
consists largely of promotions and activities. These were aimed at educating the 
Chinese to understand Mickey Mouse, instead of customizing the classic Disney 
characters to meet the locals. 
News Corporation took an approach opposite to Walt Disney's glohal strategy. In 
KII, Wasko. J. 2001. "Is it a small world. after all?" in Sa::::lcd b\' Disllcy:' The global Disney (llldiella\ 
project. 1. Wasko. M. Philips. & r. R. Meehan. eds .. l.eicl:ster Uniwrsity Press. New York. p. 18. 
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fact, News Corporation's regional strategy was distinct from all the other global 
conglomerates. Among the global players, News Corporation alone was committed to 
the large-scale local adaptation for its local markets, especially in Greater China and 
India. A multinational strategy with a "polycentric' approach was deployed. News 
Corporation perceived itself as competing in separate national markets and launched 
channels locally wherever possible. Apart from global channels such as ESPN Star 
and National Geographic, Murdoch took over Star TV to cover the Asian television 
market. Dropping a pan-Asian strategy, the big umbrella of Star TV gradually evolved 
into a service with ever-increasing country-specific programming. Channels such as 
Star Chinese Channel, Star Chinese Movie, and Xing Kong Wei Shi, were 
distinguished by their locally produced programming rather than by a global brand. 
News Corporation established worldwide production facilities which organized as 
autonomous subsidiaries. Its Mandarin-language programmes were produced or 
co-produced locally in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Mainland China. Not only did they 
provide content to these Chinese channels in Greater China, these Mandarin-language 
programmes also enabled News Corporation to deliver content to Chinese 
communities in Europe and North America. Murdoch's adaptive strategies provided 
the company with a competitive advantage in the Chinese diasporic market. In this 
respect, it is evident that a transnational strategy was adopted early by Murdoch's 
Mandarin-television business. Though the Chinese subsidiaries in Taiwan. Hong 
Kong and Mainland China are 'autonomous' in nature, they also provide support to 
the other units which are dispersed overseas, and this helped build up an 
intcrdepcndent network. 
Unlikc forcign players. regional compal11es enjoyed local ad\'antage and thus 
adopted intcnlational strategies in cross-border expansion with a strong 'cthnocentric' 
approach. Thus regional players ｰｲｯ､ｵ｣ｌｾＱ＠ programming from the headquarters and 
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transferred the content to overseas markets. TVB and Phoenix TV both primarily 
produced content in Hong Kong and delivered it to Greater China as well as Europe 
and North America. The demands of the markets are largely similar, hence 
localization was very limited and almost unnecessary. TVB's large library was mostly 
made of Cantonese programmes that were accepted by the Mandarin speakers of 
Mainland China. Phoenix's programmes were even more readily accessed by 
Mainland China viewers since they were made for them rather than the Hong Kong 
and Taiwan markets. For TVB and Phoenix TV's overseas markets, programmes for 
North America, Europe, Australia and Southeast Asia merely relied on the 
repackaging of existing content Hong Kong and Taiwan. 
While most regional players exclusively adopt an international model. the dual 
approach - international and transnational - of TVBS provides a viable alternative. 
This was best demonstrated in the development of its Taiwan's subsidiary, TVBS. 
Although it inherited the brand name of TVB, TVBS worked as an overseas 
independent unit which mostly produced local content for the Taiwanese market. 
TVBS family channels were cautiously labeled and promoted as local Taiwanese 
satellite network rather than a foreign or transnational player. But at the same time, 
TVB managed to transfer TVBS' popular news, talk shows and entertainment 
programmes back to Hong Kong. TVB's popular dramas were also brought to TVBS. 
This exchange of content has formed a common library from which programmes were 
drawn and repackaged in TVB 8, TVB Xing He and other overseas TVB channels. 
Mainland China viewers and overseas Chinese residents were not even able to 
distinguish these programmes' country of origin. In the new transnational framework, 
TVB and TVB's increasingly specialized unit TVBS were integrated into a network of 
operations that enabled them to achieve multidimensional objectives of etliciency, 
responsiveness and programming innovation. TVB and TVBS also gained strength 
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from the nature of their operations - from the way they were autonomous. specializl.'<i 
and yet interdependent. 
7.1.3 The Glocalization approach 
The intense competition in this region led to the internationalization of the television 
market, and the local diversification and adaptation within the market devdoped 
concurrently. Since the 1990s, the latter served as mechanisms to ensure that 
cross-border channel offerings and programming could continue to grow. The 
inclination towards localization of cross-border operations gave rise to a 'glocal' 
approach and the • glocalization' of transnational media. Since it was also a dimension 
of globalization, the approach was not perceived as a 'regression' in media 
globalization. In fact, not only did it not weaken cross-border operations, it allowed 
them to expand further. Striking examples of glocalization in terms of networks 
expansion and their channels offerings were News Corporation, Viacom, and CNBC. 
Viacom's MTV was lauded for its foresight when it adopted its philosophy 'Think 
Global. Act Local' much earlier than most other broadcasters. However, this was after 
News Corporation's Channel [V] had secured most of Asia's music television market 
by splitting into dedicated regional/local feeds. Until 2006. Channel [V] operated six 
dedicated feeds in Asia whereas MTV Asia provided the market with 10 services. 
While there were Channel [V] Mainland China and Channel [V] Taiwan. there were 
also MTV China and MTV Mandarin. Highly localized networks also included News 
Corporation's popular ESPN Star Sports and NBC Universal's ('NBC. In 2006, 
('NBC split into seven feeds while ESPN Star Sports evolved into a total of 13 feeds 
across Asia. Channels like ESPN Taiwan. ESPN Hong Kong. Star Sports Taiwan. Star 
Sports Hong Kong and Xing Kong Sports. give News Corporation greater tlexibility 
to meet the local tastes between Mainland China. Hong Kong and I"aiwan. 
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By observing the path to regional expansion taken by Channel [V], MTV and 
ESPN Star Sports, most broadcasters concluded that investing into local markets was 
a recipe for success. Many viewers were still inclined to associate the westem 
companies with 'foreign invaders'. Localized channels are consistently more popular 
than foreign stations and this is why the philosophy of thinking globally and acting 
locally gained ground. The prominence of these networks in Greater China, especially 
MTV's superiority over other foreign channels, indicated that the complementary 
relationship between globalization and localization became essential for transnational 
expansion. While globalization ensured synergies and power, localization ensured 
popularity with audiences and the appeasement of govenlments. 
The local approach was pursued with increasing fervour by broadcasters trying to 
foster a local identity. The glocalization approach was also reflected in programming 
development, with the provision of more local news, anchor people, locally produced 
dramas and local talk shows. In addition to MTV, ESPN Star Sports, Channel [V] and 
CNBC which offered highly local diversified channels, almost all foreign channels in 
Greater China adopted this approach to a large extent. Sony's AXN exemplified the 
principle "Think Global, Script Locar. While AXN concentrated on global 
distribution, its content relied on local-language and locally-produced programming. 
Sony's Hong Kong production units were responsible for Mandarin-language 
television production for Greater China as well as the overseas Mandarin-language 
market. 
Localization is realized in a variety of ways within the news networks in Greater 
China. For instance, the latecomer Bloomberg was not as committed to localization as 
('NBC. Bloomberg devoted itself to expansion of distribution. Its Greater China 
programming was no ditlerent to its Asia feed, which was based in Tokyo. Bloomberg 
specifically pursued a niche market on a pan-Asian scale. Greater China served as a 
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sub-region in Bloomberg's Asian operations. Since Greater China contributed to 
Bloomberg's revenue to a limited extent only, its localization effort was restricted to 
newsrooms in Taipei, Beijing and Shanghai, with the hope that enough local news 
could be produced in these centres. Bloomberg"s case illustrated that localization can 
be very demanding for an independent television player and regionalization was 
commonly accepted as a solution to cater to local demands. In addition, while large 
investment in local production seemed to pose some difficulties, local distribution was 
the first step towards the entry into a new market and its subsequent expansion. 
CNN and BBC World are also examples of transnational news channels which 
faced the challenges of the localization process. As their reputations were built on the 
delivery of international news, they encountered difficulties in their localization 
strategies. While BBC World dubbed parts of programmes in Mandarin and 
Cantonese, CNN went further with language customization, with Mandarin subtitling 
and local on-air talent. While BBC World produced Asia Today and Asia Business 
Report, CNN brought out even more programmes such as Asia Business Morning, 
Asia Tonight and Asian Edition. The popularity of the two networks proved that the 
'glocalization' remained the key to develop a closer relationship to local markets and 
regional practices served as a sound strategy to glocalization. 
The localizing tactics were widely carried out by networks or channels that 
pursued transnational and multinational strategies. Nevertheless, those which follow 
global strategies were also keen to put the 'localizing mechanism' into practice in 
order to customize their 'foreign' programmes to the taste of the local viewers. Since 
their advantages are mainly dependent upon the universal appeal of specific genres, 
their localized programmes began only recently. In addition, most of the localization 
tended to focus on language customization rather than local production. Documentary 
programmers and children's broadcasters were typical examples. Discovery Channel 
305 
Chapter 7 Conclusions and suggestions 
(and its spin-off Animal Planet) and National Geographic Channel are both aired in 
several languages. NGC, for instance, introduced the use of subtitles in Taiwan and 
dubbed in Mainland China. Although NGC began introducing local interstitials in the 
channel's Taiwan feed, there is little evidence thus far to suggest that channels of this 
genre would produce local programmes in the near future. However. my research has 
uncovered another strategy commonly adopted by these branded networks. They have 
the tendency of differentiating themselves into further specific niche markets and this 
has served to secure existing viewers and attracting new and diversified local 
audience. Discovery overhauled its "factual' suite by launching the 'Lifestyle 
Networks' that offered channel packages to Hong Kong and Taiwan audience. 
Similarly, NGC differentiated itself, based on its 'Think Again' plan, and offered a 
new National Geographic Wild Channel in Hong Kong. The highly fragmented 
pay-TV market and multi-channel environment in both Hong Kong and Taiwan were 
the likely reasons for these companies to adopt differentiation strategies to secure 
local audiences. 
Children's channels such as Disney Channel and Cartoon network also embarked 
up the path of language-customization. Like Discovery and NGC, Disney Channel 
was split into three channels in Hong Kong. However, contrary to Disney's 
widely-recognized global strategy, Taiwan was offered a separate feed, rather than 
having to share a single Asian feed with all the other Asia countries (except Australia). 
One can thus conclude that Taiwan was a relatively profitable market in the Greater 
China television space for foreign networks. It does not mean that Disney altered its 
pattern of global expansion but it illustrates the internal differences among markets of 
Hong Kong, Taiwan and Mainland China. While Disney already reaped the market 
profit of Taiwan. Hong Kong's differentiated channels were estahlished in the hope of 
educating more Hong Kong children and paving the way to enter Mainland China. 
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Networks that least localized were global film channels HBO, Cinemax and 
Hallmark. Renowned channels like HBO and Cinemax were based on the provision of 
Hollywood blockbusters. As a result of the global reputation and promotion of 
Hollywood films, educating the Chinese audience was not necessary and the task of 
attracting them was relatively easy. Even with a relatively less popular station like 
Hallmark, a global strategy was adopted, with the management, content and 
operations being centralized at the Denver headquarters. The use of subtitles was their 
only localization and they remained attached to their Western style. 
Although transnational broadcasters in Greater China adapted localization in 
varying degrees, it remained their priority to offer more local programming. This 
reflects the intention of global players to target important language blocks or specific 
countries in the region. This research found that these transnational companies have to 
consider Greater China's language peculiarity and at the same time adapt to local 
conditions in order to make their content relevant to the region's audience. Thus this 
development counters the claim which regards globalization as undermining local 
specificities. Instead, it shows that the growth of global expansion increasingly relies 
on programming localization. In the trend of glocalization, it is evident that success at 
global level is dependent on local practices. 
7.1.4 The Architecture of competition in the Greater China television space 
With the ongoing commercialization and deregulation in Greater China, the television 
markets in Hong Kong and Taiwan have gradually developed into a commercial 
system. At the same time, the importance of their very own public broadcasting 
services has dwindled over the same period to become almost negligible. In Mainland 
China, although the domestic television industry remains under the control of central 
govcnlmcnt. the Chinese authorities' broadcasting refonn in the television 
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industrialization and consolidation has gIven nse to a competition-driven market 
structure. While the trend of privatization and commercialization prevailed oyer 
Greater China, the emergence of a large number of transnational television companies 
played as catalyst for the intensification of competition. The competitive situation 
then led to the integration in the forms of horizontal, vertical and diagonal expansion. 
Horizontal expansion was most commonly manifested in the establishment of new 
stations. All over the new Greater China television market, broadcasters were keen to 
establish broadcasting family by launching secondary or more family channels. 
Commercial players TVB and Phoenix TV were such examples, but other additional 
cases include ET TV, ATV and Sun TV, and even Mainland China's public services 
CCTV, SMG and Hunan TV. Drastic vertical and diagonal integrations were also put 
in practice. Most of the broadcasters mentioned above have already put together their 
production section and distributing channels. In addition, more ambitious integrations 
were implemented: TVB has joined in the fierce competition of Hong Kong IPTV 
market; ET TV is already one of the largest Cable TV operators in Taiwan's cable 
industry; and Tom.com, through sweeping acquisitions, has enlarged its brand 
umbrella covering media sectors throughout Internet, TV, publishing, sports and 
outdoor equipment. However, while the commercial players constantly redefine the 
boundaries of television integration, the all-out integrations were implemented 
through the Chinese government's broadcasting consolidation. Groups such as the 
China Radio, Film and TV Group (CRFT) which incorporated CCTV and had 20,000 
employees, signaled the coming of age of the Chinese media conglomerate. 
The integration of the television industry took place both at national and 
transnational level. Domestic telcvision players such as TVB. ATV, CCTV and ET TV. 
have increasingly otlcred channels in areas outside their horne territory. Foreign TV 
companies have expressed intcrest in these hroadcasters and invcsted in them. Fllrelgn 
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broadcasters expanded in Greater China mainly with thematic channels distributed 
through local distribution platforms. These channels might be operated in national or 
regional areas, which reflect the transnational companies' localization approaches. In 
this regard, the traditional concept of 'national frontier' is no longer the only 
parameter to define the market landscape. The physical size of the market is often 
irrelevant as it can be smaller than a nation, the size of a nation, pan-regional or made 
up of a linguistic area such as Mandarin, Cantonese or Minna. For a global network 
such as HBO, despite the fact that Taiwan is a country, it perceives Taiwan as a 
window for pan-Asia distribution. Conversely, Star Chinese Channel is dedicated to 
Taiwan and from its perspective this nation is seen as a national market. 
The transnationalization of the Greater China television space was strengthened 
by the overseas operations of both regional and global companies. An increasing 
amount of cross-border activities have resulted in a multi-layered television space in 
the region. As mentioned above, in order to meet the needs local markets, various 
localizing strategies were employed, including language versioning (subtitling or 
dubbing), locally-produced programmes or even stand-alone local or regional 
channels. However, behind the localization practices a series of globalization 
processes took place in the form of transnational activities. These cross-border players 
acted as agents that contributed to the proliferation of international activities in TV 
fOn1lats and programming. Thus News Corporation's 24, Disney's Desperate 
Housewives and HBO's Hollywood blockbusters were also hits in Greater China. 
Trendy formats such as American Idol, the talent contest, were transfonned into Super 
Girl, which tunled tum out to be a great success. Game shows such as Who Wants to 
Be a Millionaire were also copied in Taiwan and Hong Kong. Regional players helped 
promote the flow of intenlational programmes. This was illustrated by TVR. 
Programmes from its large drama library were exported to Taiwan and Mainland 
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China but at the same time TVBS in Taiwan produced general entertainment and news 
programmes which were then made accessible to overseas Chinese. 
More important mechanisms brought to Greater China by the cross-border 
operations were transnational know-how, production values and scheduling practices. 
In the case of News Corporation, Star TV not only brought reality TV and dramas into 
Xing Kong Wei Shi, Murdoch also brought with him the companies' global expertise 
in financial investment and local production that proved to be successful in other 
regions like India and Europe. News Corporation, which managed the news library 
and facility resources of Fox News Network, brought these resources to Phoenix 
InfoNews Channel, adding to Phoenix's own expertise. Although Murdoch's 
investment in Phoenix and Xing Kong Wei Shi suffered some setback, the 
management know-how was transferred to the region. For instance, Phoenix 
InfoNews proved to be one of the most successful regional news channels and enjoys 
the reputation of being 'the Chinese CNN'. 
A similar approach to Star's Xing Kong Wei Shi was reflected in Time Warner"s 
CETV, which also brought a whole package of cash and programming alongside 
knowledge in distribution, marketing and channel operations. However, instead of 
setting up a new channel, Time Warner purchased a local station. This kind of 
cross-border investment through horizontal integration helped transnational 
companies set a foothold in Greater China (as well as in Asia), in addition to reducing 
the competition from local and regional players. In the case of Sony, it acquired 
Taiwan's Super TV in order to take over some four million households in Taiwan. 
This acquisition also enabled Sony to work towards the realization of its aim of 
producing Mandarin-language programming for Mainland China. 
Apart from acquisition, the very process of horizontal integration in transnational 
alliances or merger significantly contributed to the transnationalization of the ('reater 
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China television space. The origin of this practice can be traced as far back as the 
launch of Star TV, when News Corporation fonned an alliance with MTV and BBC 
World in order to offer a five-channel package. This triggered otT retaliation from the 
CNN camp, which set up the so-called "gang of five' sate11ite stations. Besides getting 
a foothold in a new andlor protected market like Greater China, a transnational 
a11iance also helped spread the enonnous start-up costs of television channels and to 
diversify the financial risk of producing costly programmes. Again, a consequence of 
such integration was transnationalization and concentration of channels or networks. 
In the case of CNBC, it merged with Asia Business News in order not to set up a 
confrontation with Dow Jones and TCI. By taking over ABN's 30 million households, 
the merger enabled CNBC to compete with a similar niche player - Bloomberg. 
CNBC finally had the whole ownership of CNBC Asian through further acquisition in 
2005. Another case in point was the 50/50 merger between ESPN and Star Sports. 
ESPN Star Sports (ESS) today dominates the sports programming in Asia and tops 
Mainland China's foreign channels in tenns of ratings. Of equal importance is the 
example of ESS, as Murdoch has now gained whole ownership of Channel [V], 
having previously fonned an alliance with Sony, BMG, EMl and Warner Music 
Group. 
A major reason behind many transnational alliances is the obtaining of a 
competitive advantage. Another motive is the acquisition of local knowledge. For 
transnational television companies to compete effectively in Greater China, a 
successful alliance with local partners has become a detennining factor. TVB's 
cross-border operations very much rely on TVBS. a joint \"cnture with Taiwan's Era 
Intenlational. The local player not only helped to TVBS to look Iikc a local channcl. 
its local production ahility in entertaining prohJfammcs also bolstcrcd TVB's central 
programming lincup. With foreign telc\"ision playcrs' incrl'asing hope of cxploiting 
311 
Chapter 7 Conclusions and suggestions 
the market, such alliances with local firms can be expected to become increasingly 
transnational. Of all foreign companies it is News Corporation that forged the greatest 
number of partnerships. Phoenix TV was the result of an alliance with two formidable 
local forces; its Channel [V] and Vi acorn 's MTV are the best music channels that 
relies on collaboration with CCTV and SMG; and it formed the first strategic alliances 
in television production with Hunan TV, which astonished the whole industry. Other 
cases include Disney's partnership with Beijing TV to create the Chinese version of 
the Mickey Mouse Club and CNBC's co-operation with SMG's China Business 
Network. Time Warner's joint-venture (the China Film Warner Hengdian Company) 
was significant because it marked the first Sino-foreign alliance and Sony established 
the first Sino-foreign television digital production (Huaso Film/Television Digital 
Production). However, Viacom can be said to be the company which benefited most 
and substantially from all the alliances formed in the television industry. Its 
Nickelodeon's co-production joint venture with SMG, and MTV's strategic 
partnership with Beijing TV have both made Viacom the most promising global 
player in the Greater China television space. 
Apart from the operations led by transnational players, the increasing influx of 
money will further increase transnationalization of television ownership. Following 
the footsteps of their foreign competitors, an increasing number of the Chinese media 
players have joined the stock market, as seen with CTV, ET TV, TVB and Phoenix TV 
in Hong Kong and Taiwan. This trend is also reflected in Mainland China, with Hunan 
TV as the pioneer, when it entered the Shenzhen stock market in 1999. Given the 
on-going tendency of television commercialization, the trend of increasing capital 
flow is expected to continue. 
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7.1.5 Regional formation and theoretical implications 
The development of the Greater China television market is increasingly transnational 
in character and this can be attributed to two major factors: intensification in 
competition and the trend towards globalization/localization. Not only was there an 
influx of capital into this regional market but more importantly there is also a shift of 
global culture, involving the process of deterritorialization and remapping of media 
spaces. According to Arjun Appadurai, the new cultural flows are characterized by a 
disjuncture between national borders and cultural communities.837 The complexity of 
the current Greater China television space is the result of a fundamental disjuncture 
between economy, culture and politics. Cultural proximity proved to be an irrevocable 
ground for the formation of the geo-cultural market. Linguistically, the Mandarin 
language, together with Cantonese, Minna and other dialects, is notoriously difficult 
for foreigners to learn. At the same time, the linguistic ability of the local population 
is also rather limited, and it is evident that language is a major hurdle for all. However, 
within the Greater China region, all Chinese are able to relate to each other to a 
certain degree, regardless of their nationality. This is due to the similarities in 
grammar and character within the languages of the Chinese. In addition, there was 
much common ground in the lifestyle and perspectives of the Chinese race because 
they share deeply entrenched religious beliefs, such as Buddhism and Taoism, and 
philosophical systems, notably Confucianism. The cultural familiarity explains the 
audiences' preference for domestic content or 'near domestic' programmes from 
neighbouring Hong Kong, Taiwan or Mainland China over imported material. Thus it 
is not surprising that Taiwan's entertainment programmes. Hong Kong's period 
dramas and Mainland China's historical dramas are well accepted by all Chinese 
m Appadurai. A. lOO:!. "Disjuncture and difference in the global cultural economy:' in ｾＢｴＢ＠ gluhal 
ｉｲｃｬｉＯＮｾｬｩｭＢｃｬｬｩｯｮｳ＠ readers: .. / n introduction to tlr(' glohali::Cltion dehCltt'. J). Held & A. ｾ＠ k( ,rew. cds .. 
Blackwell. Oxford. p. 234. 
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communities. 
The Chinese's reliance on Feng Shui (geomantic omen) and Guanxi is another 
cultural uniqueness in Greater China. Feng Shui dominates the daily life and business 
operations of many Chinese. But Guanxi - the network of personal connections -
plays a crucial role in Chinese business culture. For the western media players. whose 
focus is on transactions rather than relationships, these unfathomable intricacies were 
often the cause of irreparable damage in their economic transactions. Gllanxi serves as 
a key to unlock the door to the Mainland China market. With it, television companies 
can even overcome political deadlock and override broadcasting regulations. A case in 
point is Phoenix TV, whose success in Mainland China demonstrated the supreme 
power of excellent relations. The pursuit of a good Guanxi is also the strategy of the 
other global conglomerates such News Corporations, Viacom, Time Warner and 
Disney. Their achievements in Greater China often reflected their respective efforts in 
establishing a relationship with the Chinese authorities. Unfortunately, despite the 
attempts of these global players to build up Guanxi, such relationship is largely the 
privilege of Chinese business players. It serves to distinguish players from Greater 
China from those outside the region and establish a demarcation between 'us' and 
'them'. Thus it is not surprising that TVB, ATB and Tom.com enjoyed a smoother 
path of expansion in the Mainland than the non-Greater China companies. For these 
global players who were eager to set foot on the Mainland, they rapidl y concluded 
that local partnership was a necessary step to achieve their objective. 
At the political level, the national states do play an important role in shaping the 
Greater China television space. On the one hand, the growing popularity of 
transnational or regional channels in Mainland China, Hong Kong and Taiwan seemed 
to challenge the very foundation of an exclusive national identity. That is to say, 
increased cross-horder activities seemed to hlur the boundaries hetween nations whidl 
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were traditionally defined by politics and ideology, resulting in the weakening of 
national identity. On the other hand, the level of state involvement in the media 
industries continues to be high. The Chinese government is always cautious not to 
grant too much freedom to the inflow of global television influence. Together with the 
problems of corruption and lack of transparency, Mainland China has generated much 
uncertainty within the transnational players. The unprecedented relaxation of 
broadcasting production regulation in 2004, and the swift U-turn in the following year 
spoke volumes about the ease with which the Chinese government could exacerbate 
the disadvantages already suffered by most global companies. 
Every country restricts foreign television ownership. including the United States, 
but the regulations put in place by the Chinese government on this matter were 
unusually stringent. In many other fast-growing economies in Asia, foreign players 
are normally permitted to purchase airtime to air their programmes on domestic 
networks. However, this practice is not applicable in Mainland China. In addition to 
the strict landing rights which control entry into Mainland China's television market, 
the authorities also placed limitations in the sale, distribution and marketing of the 
'foreign' products. Even the use of brand names in the programmes they produced 
was restricted, and cartoons were not spared from this tight control. Thus, for instance, 
Mickey Mouse Club can only be aired as Dragon Club. In addition, the government's 
acute sensitivity in political and ethical matters compelled foreign television 
companies to enforce strict self-censorship. Time Warner"s CETV declared a "no-sex, 
no-violence and no-news' style of programming. Similarly, News Corporation's 
strategy in Xing Kong Wei Shi was to make a local library of programmes that steer 
dear of news and news-related programmes. Phoenix TV is the only foreign company 
permitted to operate Mandarin news programmes and it still treads carefully through 
this political minetield. 
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Not only do political barriers hamper the operations of non-Greater China players, 
they are also often a hindrance in the development of regional television within 
Greater China. This was a problem caused not exclusively by the Communist Party on 
the Mainland but also by the dominant political party in Taiwan. This complicated 
situation arose largely due to the central issue of national identities, evident in the 
tension and antagonism between the Chinese and Taiwanese governments. As a result 
of the political distrust between the two sides, CCTV was banned from the Taiwan 
territory and ET TV was refused permission to land in Mainland. All the political and 
ideological obstacles have suggested that national states do matter and play crucial 
roles in the development of the Greater China television space. 
In the regional television space, Hong Kong effectively acts as a regional hub to 
the television industry. This was largely due to the well-crafted policy set up by the 
Hong Kong authorities, which resulted in an advanced telecommunication 
infrastructure, laissez-faire economy and friendly climate for transnational investment. 
In terms of regional politics, Hong Kong also skillfully steered clear of the contlict 
between the two nations on either side of the Taiwan Strait. Since the 1990s, foreign 
players including Star TV, National Geographic Channel, Walt Disney, CNN I Asia, 
SSC World, TNT & Cartoon Network and Sony, have set up their regional 
headquarters in Hong Kong. Like Singapore, the other popular Asian regional base 
that is also often chosen by some other global players, Hong Kong can play the role of 
pan-Asian television centre. However, unlike its Asian competitor, it can serve as a 
base for Greater China. 
Hong Kong's regional hub status was strengthened further by the support ofCEPA. 
With the backing of the Chinese government. CEPA served as a preliminary model for 
the institutionalization of regional govenlance. Given the regional Preferential Trade 
Agreement between Mainland China and Hong Kong. transnational media companies 
JI6 
Chapter 7 Conclusions and suggestions 
were forced to consider investing in Hong Kong in order to be entitled preferential 
trade to exploit the Mainland market. Star TV provides an illustration, as the company 
successfully established the first wholly foreign-owned advertising company. Star 
(China). CEPA not only helped consolidate Hong Kong's central position but it also 
strengthened the co-operative nature of regional media business. At the same time, it 
sends out a strong political signal to the nearby Taiwan, reminding the Taiwanese 
government of its increasingly disadvantageous status. The message is that Taiwan 
should either join in the co-operation or risk getting marginalized in the regional 
competition. 
In Hong Kong, the emergence of regional corporate players inevitably points 
towards increasing television regionalization. In the process of media globalization, 
Star TV, TVB, Phoenix TV and Tom.com are the regional giants and are all 
competitors in the multi-layered regional television space. Many pan-Greater China 
television channels were gradually making their appearance and no less than 16 
channels have been launched in the regional space. They represent a form of 
television that exemplifies a process of transnationalization that is increasingly 
deterritorialized in character. The coverage of these channels now straddles across 
borders, their audience is multinational and the operations are transnational in nature. 
All of these challenge the conventional understanding of relationship between place 
and television and raise questions about the dynamics between national states and 
television. Pan-regional TV channels are not only a key component of the Greater 
China television space but also serve an intermediary link between the national and 
global strata of television space. Through localization, advertising and international 
cultural exchanges, these pan-regional channels are increasingly involved 111 
globalization and their very appearance constitutes a milestone in the process of 
media globalization in Greater China. 
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This dissertation has revealed that cross-border players have chosen to local ize 
within the ever-expanding globalization process. This move was made in order to 
cater to the demands of the local audience. Within this strategy of glocalization. the 
offering of channels and programmes are important to ensure success. Though 
localization is deemed necessary by most corporate players and is often key to a 
successful regional strategy, the importance of 'cultural difference' should not be 
exaggerated. With a certain level of local customization, many transnational channels 
and their programming have proved to be accessible and popular. 
The ongoing process of globalization has been triggering off further concern from 
cultural protectionists. The fact that homogenization of cultural identity is a possible 
consequence of globalization has caused unrest for many years. This research shows 
that the development of the Greater China television space does not quite conform to 
the arguments presented by the media imperialism school, whose major issue is the 
dynamics between cultural 'dependency' and the 'free-flow' of communication. 
According to this school of thought, transnational television companies and the 
advocates of the "free-flow' of communication should be held accountable for the 
unhealthy phenomenon of media imperialism - because these companies have 
conspired to produce or even reinforce the imbalances and dependency within the 
world system. However, my analysis reveals that the development in the Chinese 
market proves otherwise. Firstly, the free-flow of media or cultural concepts has yet to 
take place and the tight central control already exerted by the Chinese government has 
made it difficult for foreign players to achieve any form of dominance in this market. 
In addition, evidence shows that a "counter-flow' is already in place as television 
products and channels from Greater China arc reaching the core countries. Whilc 
TV8, Phoenix TV and ET TV continue to export programming to o\'crseas Chinese 
communities in North America and Europe, C(,TV 9 is already targeting the citi/ens 
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of these regions, especially to the English-, French- and Spain-language countries. 
It also appears that the transnationalization paradigm of the television industry in 
Taiwan and Hong Kong is inconsistent with the linearity assumption of media 
imperialism. With the increasing exchange of programming, scheduling practices and 
production value between this region and the rest of the world, it is inevitable that the 
local cultural identity would evolve accordingly. However. despite this process of 
evolution, the authenticity of the cultural identity is still preserved. Research from the 
school of reception analysis has argued that "local identity' itself is often produced by 
the "indigenization' of global resources and inputs.838 That is to say. the imagc might 
be recognized globally; but the meaning given to it may not be shared or favoured at 
the global level. The fonnat of MTV prov,ed to be successful worldwide but it was not 
well-accepted in Greater China until local elements were added in. In order to become 
involved with symbolic texts, an audience prefer a familiar and recognizable narrative. 
In fact, cultural sensitivity was so strong that MTV had to distinguish and split into 
MTV China and MTV Mandarin. 
The nature of the process of glocalization served as clear evidence to support the 
theories of scholars such as Roland Robertson, John Tomlinson and Ulrich Beck. On 
the whole, they disagree with the notion that cultural homogenization is the necessary 
outcome of globalization. Globalization is the product of a complex interplay between 
various factors and it cannot be detached from the local political, cultural and 
economical context. The process of globalization carved out a new transnational space 
and established new social-cultural relationships. This could also mark the genesis of 
new cultures. Traditional over-simplified suppositions are hence replaced by the 
recognition of the dynamics between globalization and rcgionalization1localization, 
11.\8 ｍｯｲｬｾｹＮ＠ D. 1991. "Where the global meets the Illcal: noll'S from the silting room". Sen't'n. \'01. 32, 
no. I. p. 9. 
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centralization and decentralization, and consolidation and fragmentation. The dialectic 
continues in the Greater China television space as well as in other regions \\·orld\vide. 
Hitherto, there is no solid evidence to support the hypothesis that the process of 
television globalization and transnationalization is eroding local culture. Equally, 
there is no strong indication that the region's identity will shift under the influence of 
transnational television. 
This dissertation concludes that the globalization of television is driven by the 
growing number of multi-layered transnational television companies, their 
cross-border networks, transnational operations and their globalization/localization 
approach. The Greater China television space is being constructed by the intricate 
interweaving of these threads and will continue to evolve into a unique regional 
television space moulded by increasingly shared globality and locality. 
7.2 Limitations, contribution and suggestions for future research 
There is a lack of research relevant to the development of globalization in Greater 
China, so this study used interdisciplinary theories ranging from sociology to media 
management in order to gain further insight into the transnationalization of the 
Greater China television industry. This research has established the concept of the 
Greater China television space and focused on cross-border activities and regional 
market formation in relation to television companies' expansion strategies, channel 
operations and localization tactics. The conclusion drawn here are relevant to both 
professionals and academics who are interested in the television business and 
transnational development in the region. Thus. this study makes significant 
contributions to the following fields of research: 
I. Met/ia giobalizatioll stu die ... : This study presented an overvIew on the 
development of the multi-layered telc\'ision landscape in Greah:r China. \\'ith the 
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examination of global and regional/local actors, the research characterized the 
emerging regional market as an increasingly transnationlizing, deterritorializing 
and regionalizing television space. The analysis of the regional market formation 
confirmed and also added to the existing literature on media globalization. 
2. The cultural industries/media industries studies: This research analyzed and 
surveyed the market and its competition architecture, the different types of 
integration and expansion, entry strategies and operational practice and their pros 
and cons, and the impact of globalization and localization. This makes it 
particularly valuable for comprehending the television industry in Greater China, 
which also contributes to the understanding of the media economy and the 
cultural industries studies. 
3. Media policy and broadcasting regulation studies: This study examined the 
regulatory environment in Greater China across its constituents. It explored the 
impact of WTO, regional agreement CEPA, and national broadcasting 
regulations. This policy analysis contributes to the field of media policy studies. 
In particular, our analysis of the role of the state is relevant to the debate on the 
sovereign's status in the era of globalization. 
4. Media management studies: Our categorization of television companies' 
cross-border strategies and business operations are helpful for both professionals 
and academics. For professionals, the different overseas models are useful to 
predict competitors' tactics, or can be used to improve or formulate their strategy. 
For academics, these operational types contribute to corporate and management 
studies. 
The study is limited by research resources due to its reliance on in-dcpth 
interviews and secondary sources. In terms of intcnicw. thc findings were restrictcd 
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by the inaccessibility of high-level executives in transnational compames. This 
undoubtedly reduced the insights into the corporation strategies and their motivations. 
In addition, since many business operations and strategic schemes are confidential. 
this compounded the difficulties in comprehending their overseas arrangement and 
competing plan. In terms of secondary sources, although attempts were made to 
collect as much material as possible, it is undeniable that the survey could not include 
all activities and motivations of cross-border television players. The evidence 
collected may thus seem incomplete in some areas. 
Despite the limitations, this thesis serves as an exploratory step to ground 
academic discourse of media globalization with solid examples of the evolution of 
transnational television in Greater China. As mentioned above, the results suggest that 
several issues are worthy of further research: 
First, there is a lack of academic research on media globalization in Greater China. 
As this market becomes increasingly significant, there is a need to establish a firmer 
foundation in the studies of Chinese television industries, so that professionals and 
academics alike can get knowledge about the principles of media business in the 
region. This research has proposed a key concept - the Greater China television 
space - as a framework to comprehend the formation of a regional media space. 
Future studies can make further examinations about specific aspects of this regional 
structure, such as the regional hub - Hong Kong - and its future development, the 
interplay between the constituent markets, the pan-regional television players' 
strategies, and any particular aspect of the communication flows that affect the 
contours of this regional market. 
In addition, in order to enhance our understanding of the way in which 
transnational TV players have adopted localizing programming strategies. future 
studies can l'mploy content analysis to compare and contrast programmes and formats. 
p" 
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In the context of Chinese culture, the impact of such content can be examined in two 
approaches. Research based on cultural studies may focus on the shift in the Chinese 
cultural climate. Investigations can also be conducted to explore the impact of this 
content on the audience. Reception analysis is the likely approach for this type of 
research interest. 
Comparison of regional television industries worldwide is another valuable 
approach to gain insight into media globalization. Although research on ditl'crent 
geo-cultural or geo-lingual areas is on-going, comparative studies at the regional level 
in the multi-layered media landscape remain rare. This type of study can generate 
appropriate knowledge to assess the regional similarities and differences across the 
world. And the result will serve to establish alternative cultural and strategic 
developing models appropriate to the individual context of the regions. 
Future examinations should investigate the evolution of media policies and 
broadcasting regulations. This thesis has shown that regulatory environment within 
Mainland China can be unstable and also acknowledged the possible impact of 
transnational governing forces on regional media industries. As an increasing number 
of negotiations are taking place both among corporate players within Greater China 
and among Mainland and foreign players - more regulation or deregulation may take 
place in the coming years. Their consequences should be carefully analyzed. 
Finally, future research should also compare corporate strategies in different 
media segments. Apart from traditional media such as newspaper, magazme 
publishing and film. an increasing number of transnational players have turned to seek 
opportunities in alternative platforms such as Internet or 3G mobile. Development of 
these new media platforms and their impact on the traditional trajectory of 
globalization may he the next major subjects in Greater China's media industries. 
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